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MAHAYANASAMGRAHA 


(La Somme du Grand Vehicule d'Asanga) 
by Etienne Lamotte 

Associate member of the Insitute of Fiance 
Professor University of Louvain 


Volume II 


Translation and Commentary 


Translated from the French 
by Gelongma Karma Migme Chodron 


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TABLE OF CONTENTS 


PRASTAVANA [pg. 1] 

Ten superiorities of the Mahayana (§ 1-2) 

Ten chapters of the Mahayana (§ 3) 

Authenticity of the Mahayana (§ 4) 

Order of the chapters (§ 5) 

CHAPTER ONE: Jneyasraya [pg. 91] 32 

I. The names of the alaya 

1 . In the Mahayana 

i. Jneyasraya (§1) 

ii. Alayavijnana (§ 2-3) 

iii. Adanavijnana (§ 4-5) 

iv. Citta as apposed to manas and the vijnanas (§ 6-9) 

2. In the Hmayana 

i. Silence of the sravakas on the alaya (§ 10) 

ii. Alaya in the Hmayana schools (v§ 1 1) 

3. Conclusion 

4. Discussion of texts (§ 13) 

II. Characteristics of the alaya 

1. Three characteristics of the alaya (§14) 

2. Vasana (§ 15) 

3. Blja and alaya (§16) 


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4. Mutual causality between dharma and alaya (§ 17-18) 

5. Two pratltysamutpadas (§ 19-29) 

6. Sarvabljaka vipakavijnana (§21) 

7. Six characteristics of the brja (§ 22) 

8. Four characteristics of the ’perfumed’ (§ 23) 

9. Twofold causality of the brja (§ 24) 

10. Outer and inner brja (§ 25) 

11. Alaya and pravrttivijnana (§ 26-27) 

12 Three pratTtyasamutpadas and four pratyayas (§ 28) 
III. Demonstration of the alaya (§ 29) 

1. Klesasamklesa (v. 30-32) 

2. Karmasamklesa (§ 33) 

3. Janmasamklesa 

i. Coagulated vijnana (§ 34) 

ii. Theory of the upadana (§ 35) 

iii. Vijnana and namarupa (§ 36) 

iv. The aliments (§ 37) 

v. Gati in the higher spheres (§ 38-41) 

vi. Cooling at death (§ 42) 

4. Laukika vyavadana (§ 43) 

5. Lokottara vyavadana (§ 44) 

6. Srutavasana (§ 45-49) 

7. Nirodhasamapatti 

i. The vijnana in nirodha (§ 50) 

ii. Refutation of the Sarvastivadin theory (§ 51) 


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iii. Refutation of the branch opinion of the Sautrantika (§ 52) 

iv. Refutation of the turned branch (?) opinion of the Sautrantika (§ 53-54) 

v. Refutation of the root theory of the Darstantika (§ 55) 

vi. Conclusion (§ 56) 

8. Asrayaparavrtti (§ 57) 

IV. The types of alaya 

1. Threefold vasana (§58) 

2. Fourfold type (§ 59) 

3. Shared and unshared alaya (§ 60) 

4. Other types of alaya (§61) 

V. Moral nature of the alaya (§ 62) 

CHAPTER TWO: Jneyalaksana [pg. 91] 128 

I. The three laksanas (§ 1) 

1 . Paratantra and the eleven vijhaptis (§2) 

2. Parikalpita (§3) 

3. Parinispanna (§ 4) 

II. Vijnapti 

1 . Definition of the eleven vijhaptis (§ 5) 

2. Vijhaptimatrata and dream (§6) 

3. Proof of vijhaptimatrata (§ 7-8) 

4. Vijhapti from material appearance (§9) 

5. Simultaneity in the vijhaptis (§10) 

6. Oneness, duality and variety in the vijhaptis (§ 1 1) 

7. A theory on the singleness of the manovijhana (§12) 


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8. Development of the alayavijnapti (§ 13) 

9. Nonexistence of the object (§ 14) 

ITT. The three svabhavas 

1. Definition of the three svabhavas (§ 15) 

2. Parikalpa, parikalpya and parikalpita (§16) 

3. Relationships of the three svabhavas (§ 17) 

4. Subdivisions of the svabhavas (§ 18) 

5. Four parikalpas, ten vikalpas, ten viksepas and their remedy (§ 19-22) 

6. Paratantrasvabhava 

i. It is identified with two others without being mixed with them (§ 23) 

ii. It is not mixed with parikalpita (§ 24) 

iii. It is not totally nonexistent (§25) 

7. Teaching of the sutras on the three svabhavas 

i. "How does one think of the three svabhavas?" (§ 26) 

ii. "Paratantrasvabhava like a magic show", etc. (§ 27) 

iii. "The tathagata does not see samsara, does not see nirvana" (§ 28) 

iv. "There are three dharmas" (§ 29) 

v. "Eternal, transitory, neither eternal nor transitory dharmas" (§ 30) 

vi. Four abhiprayas and four abhisamdhis (§31) 

8. Method of explaining the three svabhavas 

i. The three points of explanation (§ 32) 

ii. The treatise on the qualities of the Buddha (§ 33) 

iii. The treatise on the aims of the bodhisattva (§ 34) 

CHAPTER THREE: Jneyalaksanapravesa [pg. 155] 212 


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I. Pravesa in general (§ 1) 

II. Sambharavastha 

1. Adhimukti (§2) 

2. Four stages of pravesa (§ 3) 

3. Practices of sambhara (§ 4) 

4. Three cittottapana (§5) 

5. Catuhsthanaprahana (§6) 

ITT. Prayoga- and prativedhavastha 

1. Four paryesanas and four yathabhutaparijnanas (§ 7) 

2. Entry into the Vijnaptimatra, process and comparisons (§8) 

3. Entry into the three svabhavas (§9) 

4. Domains of naman (§ 10) 

5. Darsanamarga (§11) 

6. Samatha and vipasyana (§ 12) 

7. Four nirvedhabhaglyas and four samadhis (§ 13) 

IV. Bhavanamarga (§ 14) 

V. Abhisamaya of the sravakas and the bodhisattvas, differences (§ 15) 

VI. Stanzas related to pravesa 

1. Sutralamkara, XIX, 47 (§ 16) 

2. Yogavibhangasastra (§17) 

3. Sutralamkara, VI, 6-10 (§ 18) 


CHAPTER FOUR: Pravesahetuphala [pg. 

185] 249 


I. Mundane and supramundane paramitas § 1) 


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II. Suddhadhyasaya (§ 2) 

III. Summarizing stanza (§ 3) 

IV. Number of the paramitas (§ 4) 

V. Nature of the paramitas (§ 5) 

VI. Order of the paramitas (§ 6) 

VII. Etymology of the paramitas (§ 7) 

VIII. Development of the paramitas (§ 8) 

IX. Subdivision of the paramitas (§ 9) 

X. Content of the paramitas (v. 10) 

XI. Vices opposed to the paramitas (§ 11) 

XII. Benefits of the paramitas (§ 12) 

XIII. Mutual inclusion of the paramitas (§ 13) 

CHAPTER FIVE: Hetuphalabhavanaprabhedha [pg. 202] 272 

I. The ten bhumis and the tenfold dharmadhatu (§ 1) 

II. Definition of the bhumis (§ 2) 

III. Acquisition of the bhumis (§ 3) 

IV. Development and fruits of the bhumis (§ 4) 

V. Bhumi and paramita (§ 5) 

VI. Durations and career of the bodhisattva (§ 6) 

CHAPTER SIX: AdhisTlam Siksa [pg. 218] 293 

I. Superiority of adhisila (§ 1) 

II. Three kinds of slla (§ 2) 


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ITT. Vinaya of the sravakas and bodhisattvas, differences (§ 3) 

IV. Extent of adhisila (§ 4) 

V. Profundity of adhisila (§ 5) 

VI. Conclusions (§ 6) 

CHAPTER SEVEN: Adhicittam Siksa [pg. 225] 302 

I. Superiority of adhicitta (§ 1) 

II. Its object (§ 2) 

ITT. Its varieties : the samadhis (v. 3) 

IV. Its role as counteragent (§ 4) 

V. Its capability (§ 5) 

VI. Its products: the abhijnas (§ 6) 

VII. Its actions 

1. Sixteen maharddhis (§ 7) 

2. Ten duskaracaryas (§8) 

3. Avabodhyaduskaracarya; examples from Samdhabhasya (§ 9-11) 

i. On dana (§ 9) 

ii. On the ten akusalakarmapathas (§ 10) 

iii. On the ’profound’ buddhadharmas (§ 1 1) 

4. Other activities (§ 12) 

CHAPTER EIGHT: Adhiprajna Siksa [pg. 240] 321 

I. Nirvikalpakajiiana (§ 1) 

II. Its nature (§ 2) 


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III. Its support (§ 3) 

IV. Its cause (§ 4) 

V. Its object (§ 5) 

VI. Its aspect (§ 6) 

VII. Refutation of the objections raised as to its place (§ 7) 

VIII. The practices which it maintains (§ 8) 

IX. Its auxiliaries (§ 9) 

X. Its retribution (§ 10) 

XI. Its 'outflow' (§ 11) 

XII. Its outcome (§ 12) 

XIII. Its duration (§ 13) 

XIV. Its benefits (§ 14) 

XV. Its types (§ 15) 

XVI. Examples and comparisons (§ 16) 

XVII. Its mechanism (§ 17) 

XVIII. Its profundity (§ 18) 

XIX. Its subtypes (§ 19) 

XX. Nonexistence of the object (§ 20) 

XXI. Nirvikalpakajnana or prajnaparamita (§ 21) 

XXII. Jnana of the sravaka and of the bodhisattva, differences (§ 22) 

XXIII. Limits to the generosity of the bodhisattva (§ 23) 

CHAPTER NINE: Phalaprahana [ pg. 266] 354 

I. Apratisthitanirvana and asrayaparavrtti (§ 1) 

II. Six Types of asrayaparavrtti (§ 2) 


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ITT. Stanzas on asrayaparavrtti and the identity of samsara and nirvana (v. 3) 

CHAPTER TEN: Phalajnana [pg. 273] 363 

I. The threefold buddhakaya (§ I) 

II. The dharmakaya; summarizing stanzas (§ 2) 

1. Five characteristics (§ 3) 

2. Acquisition (§ 4) 

3. Vibhutvas resulting from the revolution of the five skandhas (§ 5) 

4. Its role as support (§ 6) 

5. The buddha-attributes that consitute it (§ 7) 

6. Identity and differences between the dharmakaya of the Buddhas (§ 8) 

7. Qualities associated with the dharmakaya (§ 9) 

i. The four apramanas (§ 10) 

ii. The eight vimoksas, the eight abhibhvayatanas and the ten 
kritsnayatanas (§11) 

iii. Arana (§ 12) 

iv. Pranidhijnana (§13) 

v. The four pratisamvids (§14) 

vi. The six abhijnas (§ 15) 

vii. The thirty-seven laksanas and the forty-eight anuvyanjanas (§ 16) 

viii. The four sarvakaraparisuddhis (§ 17) 

ix. The ten balas (§ 18) 

x. The four vaisaradyas (§ 19) 

xi. The three araksyas and the three smrtyupasthanas (§ 20) 

xii. Vasanasamudghata (§21) 


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xiii. Asammosata (§ 22) 

xiv. Mahakaruna (§ 23) 

xv. The eighteen avenika buddhadharmas (§ 24) 

xvi. Sarvakarajnata (§ 25) 

xvii. Paramitaparipuri (§ 26) 

8. Five other qualities associated with the dharmakaya (§ 27) 

9. The twelve profundities of the dharmakaya (§ 28) 

10. The seven asnusmrtis of the dharmakaya (§ 29) 

III. The sambhogakaya and the eighteen sampads of the buddhaksetra (§ 30) 

IV. The five activities of the dharmadhatu (§ 31) 

V. The single vehicle (§ 32) 

VI. Oneness and plurality of the Buddhas (§ 33) 

VII. Dharmakaya and nirvana (§ 34) 

VIII. Differences between the svabhavikakaya and sambhogakaya (§ 35) 

IX. Differences between the svabhavikakaya and the nirmanakaya (§ 36) 

X. The three bodies and eternity (§ 37) 

XI. The transitory nature of the nirmanakaya (§ 38) 

XII. Necessity of effort in order to acquire Buddhahood (§ 39) 


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List of Abbreviations 


B Chinese translation of the Samgraha by Buddhasanta (Taisho 1592) 

P Chin, transl. of the Samgraha by Paramartha (Taisho 1593) 

Dh Chin, transl. of the Samgraha by Dharmagupta (Taisho 1596) 

H Chin, transl. of the Samgraha by Hiuan-tsang (Taisho 1594) 

Bh Chin, transl. of the Bhasya bu Hiuan-tsang (Taisho 1597) 

U Chin, transl. of the Upanibandhana by Hiuan-tsang (Taisho 1598) 

T Tibetan transl. of the Samgraha (Mdo hgrel LVI, fol. l-51a2) 

bh Tib. transl. of the Bhasya (Mdo hgrel LVI, fol. 141b2-232b5) 

u Tib. transl. of the Upanibandhana (Mdo hgrel, LVI fol. 232b5- 
396b7) 


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Foreword 


Published in the north-west of India in the 4th century C.E., the Mahayanasamgraha 
which constitutes the charter of Idealist Buddhism (yijndnvada) professed by the 
Mahayana school of the Yogacara, is the work of Asanga, the son of a brahmin of 
Purusapura (Peshawar), who was a monk in the Sarvastivadin order before going over to 
the Mahayana. 

This work, of which Vasubandhu, Asanga' s brother, obtained a copy, has not come down 
to us in the original Indian, but has been transmitted in a number of Chinese and Tibetan 
versions. ^ I (Lamotte) was inspired to attempt a French translation of the 
Mahayanasamgraha which appeared towards the end of 1939. Most of it perished 
because of the war beginning in 1939. The Publications de I'Institut Orientaliste de 
Louvain decided to reproduce my translation together with the commentary and 
accompanying notes by means of an anastatic process. I tha nk them for this mark of 
confidence which honors me greatly, not without confessing my anxiety at seeing a 
thirty-three year-old work reproduced unchanged. 

Today we have working tools far superior to those of the past. Publications in the process 
of being completed, such as the Index to the Taishfi Tripitika 2 and the Pali Tipitikam 
Concordance 1 * 3 open up almost infinite perspectives of infonnation. The updating of 
original documents, duly edited and translated by Eastern and Western scholars, has 
allowed a mass of Chinese and Tibetan versions to be substituted by first-hand texts. 

Idealist Buddhism has benefited greatly from the progress achieved lately by heurism and 
critique. An important lot of Indian manuscripts discovered in 1934 in Tibet by Rahula 


1 See foreword to Vol. I of the present work. 

-Published in Tokyo under the direction of Taizo Ishizaka and Shoson Miyamoto by the Foundation for 
the Advancement of Buddhist Academic Studies and the Japanese Association of Indian and Buddhist 
Studies 

3 In the course of publication by the Pali Text Society. 


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Samkrityayana and deposited in the Jayaswal Research Institute in Patna 4 has given us 
access to many Vijnanavada treatises, and some day we will read in their original 
wording Maitreya's five sastras claimed by the Yogacara: 

1. Yogdcarabhumi "Levels of the Practice of Yoga", just now in the course of 
publication 5 

2. Ratnagotravibhaga Mahayanottaratantra "Highest Doctrine of the Great 
Vehicle analyzing the precious spiritual lineages" 6 . 

3. Mahayanasutralamkara "Ornament of the Sutras of the Great Vehicle", edited 
and translated by Sylvain Levi in the years 1907 to 1911. 

4. Madhyantavibhaga "Analysis of the Middle and the Extremes" which has just 
been enriched by a new manuscript of the karikas and the bhasya, the latter attributed to 
Vasubandhu 7 . 

5. Dharmadharmatavibhaga "Analysis of the Nature of Phenomena", of which 
the original Sanskrit has been found in Tibet and awaits publication 8 . 

Asanga himself is held to be the author of the Abhidharmasamuccaya "Summary of 
Scholasticism" and of the Mahayanasamgraha "General Survey of the Great Vehicle". 


4 The list of these manuscripts will be found in R. Samkrtyayana, Palm-leaf Manuscripts in Tibet, JBORS, 
XXI, 1935, p. 21-43; Second Search of Sanskrit Palm-leaf Manuscripts in Tibet, ibid., XXIV, 1938, p. 137 
et seq. 

- For these later publications relative to this voluminous work, see Le Traite de la Grande Vertu de 
Sagesse, vol. Ill, Louvain, 1970, p. LXVIII, and L. May, La Philosophie bouddhique idealiste, Etudes 
Asiatiques, XXV, 1971, p. 280 n. 

6 E.H. Johnston's edition of the Sanskrit text, Patna, 1950; English translation, introduction and 
commentary by Takasaki Jikido, Rome, 1966; a brilliant explanation of La Theorie du Tathagata et du 
gotra, by D. S. Ruegg, in Publications of BEFEO, LXX, Paris 1969. 

7 Edited and indexed by Gadjin M. Nagao, Madhydnta-vibhdga-bhasya, Tokyo, 1964. 

8 A work widely studied in Japan but still not well known in the West. The Tibetan translation, followed 
by a short fragment of the original text, has been published by Nozawa JflshB in Recueil d' articles dedie au 
professeur Yamaguchi, Kyoto, 1955, p. 11-49. 


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Lengthy fragments of the former work have been published 9 and the complete work has 
had an excellent translation into French by Rev. Rahula 10 The Mahayanasamgraha has 
not been benefited in quite as favorable a way. 

Finally for the record we will mention the Vimsatika and the Trimsika 
Vijndptimdtratasiddhi where Vasubandhu "shows, in twenty and in thirty strophes 
respectively, the nature of things is an activity — (p. VII)....", according to the translation 
proposed by J. May. These two main works, remarkable for their conciseness and clarity, 
were discovered in 1932 in Nepal by Sylvain Levi who then edited and translated them in 
the appropriate style * 11 . 

The study of these various documents raises the problem of authenticity and chronology 
which Professor E. Frauwallner has brought up and discussed on the basis of an 
abundance of documentation. His initiative has set in motion a whole series of research 12 . 

Are the first Idealist sastras, which tradition and legend assign to Asanga or 
Maitreyanatha, the work of an historical individual or are they the work of the 
philosopher Asanga writing under the inspiration of the great Bodhisattva Maitreya 
dwelling in the Tusita heaven? Or again, are they the work of several different authors 
each claiming to have been inspired by the same bodhisattva? Actually it seems difficult 
to attribute them as a group to one and the same author because these sastras, Idealist 
though they are, present important doctrinal divergences and different philosophical 
concerns. Thus the Ratnagotravibhagha proposes as its main heading a doctrine of 'the 


l) These fragments were published for the first time by V.V. Gokhale, Fragments from the 
Abhidharmasamuccaya of Asanga, Journal of the Bombay Branch R.A.S., n.s. XXIII, 1947, p. 13-38. They 
have been continued by P. Pradhan in his Sanskrit restoration of the complete text of the work: 
Abhidhamasamuccaya of Asanga, Visva-Bharati Studies 12, Santiniketan, 1950. 

W. Rahula, Le Compendium de la Super-doctrine d Asanga, Publications of EFEO, LXXVIII, Paris, 
1971. 

1 1 S. Levi, Vijndptimdtratasiddhi, Deux traites de Vasubandhu, Paris, 1925; Materiaux pour Vetude du 
systeme Vijndptimdtra , Paris, 1932. 

See E. Frauwallner, Die Philosophic des Buddhismus, Berlin, 1956, p. 264-350; P. Demieville, La 
Yogacdrabhumi de Samgharaksa, BEFEO, XLIV, 1954, p. 381, n. 4, p. 434, n. 4: L Schmithausen, Zur 
Literaturgeschichte der Alteren Yogdcdra-Schule, Sonderdruck, ZDMG, Wiesbaden, 1969, p. 811-823. 


15 


Embryo of the Tathagata' in terms of which the Buddhanature is virtually inherent in all 
living beings. Furthermore, the intervention of many hands has been detected in one of 
these sastras, the voluminous Yogacarabumi, so much so that, at least in certain sections, 
it appears to be a conglomerate of heterogeneous material rather than a unitary work. 

Whether supplied by the Indian, Chinese or Tibetan traditions, information concerning 
the great scholars of the School is full of obscurities and incoherences, so much so that 
one may wonder if the famous name of Vasubandhu does not apply to two distinct 
individuals 13 : a Vasubandhu of the 4th century, the brother of Asanga and author of 
numerous commentaries on the Idealist sutras and sastras, and a Vasubandhu of the 5th 
century who, after having published the Abhidharmakosa where he explained the system 
of the Sarvastivada-Vaibhasika, was converted to the Idealist Mahayana to which he 
dedicated his well-known Vimsatika and Trimsikd. These, as we know, were successful: 
in India itself; the latter was commented upon no less than ten times and, in various 
forms, was taught during the 6th century by eminent masters including Sthiramati at the 
University of Valabhi at Katiavar, Dharmapala and his pupil Silabhadra who made 
famous the seat of Nalanda in the state of Bihar. It was at Nalanda when he arrived in the 
year 633 that the Chinese master Hiuan-tsang found the information on the Vijnanavada 
that he was seeking, and on the basis of this, when he returned to China, he composed his 
Ch'eng wei che louen 14 which became, in the Far East and for centuries, the map par 
excellence of Idealism. The detailed history of this movement of ideas has yet to be 
written. Paul Demieville 15 comments that the adherents of the school entitled "Idealist" 
Vijnanavada also bear the name Yogacara "Practitioners of (mental) effort". They are 
regarded as successors to the refined Yoga taught in the meditation manuals compiled in 
Kashmir in the second century of our era for the use of those specializing in dhyana. 
These manuals, published under the name Yogacarabhumi 16 , had been developed in 


1 J On the problem of the two Vasubandhus, cf. E. Frauwallner, On the date of the Buddhist Master of the 
Law Vasubandhu, Rome, 1951; Philosophie des Buddhismus, p. 76, 350; Landmarks in the history of 
Indian Logic , WZKSO, V, p. 129-132. - P. S. Jaini, On the theory of the two Vasubandhus, BSOAS, XXI, 
1958, p. 48-53. 

14 Cf. L. de La Vallee Poussin, La Siddhi de Hiuan-Tsang traduite et annotee, 3 vol., Paris, 1928-48. 

In l 'hide Classique, II, Paris, 1953, p. 449. 

16 One of these manuals is the Yogacarabumi of Samgharaksa mentioned above, n. 12. 


16 


Sarvastivadin milieus, but some Mahayana practitioners did not delay in picking them up, 
not without some retouching, and it is not unreasonable that the most monumental 
production of the Idealist School bears, as well, the name Yogdcarabhumisdstra. 

Furthermore, there is no doubt that the Vijnanavadin literature is very deeply rooted in 
the old canonical sutras of the Tripitika. The doctrine of a single mind and the 
psychology of the fundamental or store-consciousness (alayavijiiana) which explains it, 
should be studied in the light of the canonical texts dealing with citta, manas and 
vijndna. Like the other four skandhas, vijndna is produced and disappears in perpetual 
alternation in both day and night 17 , but nevertheless, according to the dependent 
production of phenomena {pratityasamutpada ), it is the condition for name and fonn 
(i namarupa ), i.e. the psycho-physical phenomena of existence. In other respects, so the 
old texts tell us, the world (of beings) is led by the mind, is manouevered by the mind: 
everything obeys this single dharma, the mind 18 ; the mind is luminous, but sometimes it 
is defiled by the adventitious passions and sometimes it is free of the adventitious 
passions 19 ; by the defilement of the mind, beings are defiled; by the purification of the 
mind they are purified 20 ; just as the dyer or the painter paints human shapes by mixing 
colors, so the mind makes future births 21 . Therefore, if there is "a great deal of 
Madhyamika philosophy in the Canon" (L. de La Vallee Poussin), it is also true that in 
the same Canon there is a large portion of Vijnanavada. 

The mind also plays a large role in the Mahayanasutras, but for the earliest and notably 
for the Prajnaparamita, it is a matter of "mind no-mind" ( cittam acittam), and the true 
nature of everything ( dharmanam dharmata ) is precisely the absence of mind (acittatd) 11 . 
Idealist Buddhism obviously cannot claim it. But there exists a second wave of 
Mahayanasutras for which "the threefold world is nothing but mind" (cittdmatram idam. 
vad yad idam traidhatkam ) 23 and which the Vijnanavada will not fail to take into 


1 7 Samyutta, II, p..95. 

Samyutta, I, p. 39; Anguttara, II, p. 177; passage cited in the Mahayanasutralamkara, p. 151. 

I 9 Anguttara, I, p. 10. 

-0 Samyutta, III, p. 151, 152. 

21 Samyutta, II, p. 101-102; III, p. 152. 

-- For this subject, see my Introduction to I'Enseignement de Vimalakirti, Louvain, 1962, p. 56-60. 
- J Dasabhumika, ed. Rahder, p.49. 


17 


account. These are, for example, the DasabhumTka, the Samdhinirmocana, the 
Lankavatara, the Ghanavyuha, the Buddhabhumi, the Aksayamatinirdesa and the 
Snmaladevisimhanada. 

In conclusion, I (E. L.) make the wish that the study of the Mahay dnasam.gr aha will be 
taken up and pursued in the light of the considerable progress marked by the 
documentation and criticism in the course of these last thirty years. The assessment of 
present knowledge on the Vijnanavada has just been presented by Jacques May in his 
article La philosophie bouddhique idealiste (Revue de la Societe Suisse d'Etudes 
Asiatiques, XXV, 1971, p. 265-323). I refer the reader to this clear, precise and complete 
study. 


E. Lamotte 

Louvain, June 10, 1973. 

In Sanskrit: mahayanasamgraha; in Tibetan: theg pa chen po bsdus pa. 
- Homage to the Royal Prince Manjusri. 


18 



PRASTAVANA 


(introduction; 


1. In the Abhidharmamahayanasutra, in the presence of the 
Bhagavat, in order to show the greatness ( mahattva ) of the Great 
Vehicle, the bodhisattva, Greatly Practiced in the Great Vehicle 
( Mahayanasuprapratipanna ), said: In relation to ( arabhya ) to the 
Great Vehicle, the speech (vac) of the Buddha Bhagavats is 
distinguished (visista) by ten superiorities ( dasavidha visesa). 
[132c22], 

1. Comm. Bh 322b9-19, bh 144b4-145al, U 380a29-380cl0, u232b5-233b5. 

This paragraph has been translated according to H; the versions differ slightly. According 
to P: "The Mahayanasamgraha is the doctrine of the Abhidharma and the 
Mahay anasutras. In the presence of the Bhagavat, in order to show that the Great Vehicle 
possesses excellent qualities ( guna ) and concerning the Great Vehicle, the Bodhisattva- 
mahasattva [called] Practiced in the Texts (pada ) and Meaning ( artha ) of the Great 
Vehicle, said: ’The Buddha Bhagavats possess ten superiorities ( visesha ): their speech 
(vac) is unequalled ( asama ) and surpasses the other doctrines.’ Bh is close to H. 

In the presence of the Bhagavat : this epithet designates the venerability [of the Buddha]; 
for that reason there is no other name. 'Having specialized in the Great Vehicle'. Because 
he has attained excellent qualities (guna), dharanl, etc., this Bodhisattva is able to 
comprehend and teach the doctrine (artha) and the texts (pada ) of the Great Vehicle 
perfectly. Such is the name of this Bodhisattva. For what purpose does he teach? In order 
to show the greatness of the Great Vehicle : to show, means to bring to light (prakas -) ... 
In relation to the Great Vehicle : arabhya (brtsams nas) means uddisya (ched du bya ba), 
or adhikrtya (dbah du byas nas). (Bh) 


19 



Bh prefaces its commentary by a general consideration of the canonical literature (Bh 
321cl4-322b8, bhl43a2-144b4), taken from the commentary on the Sutralamkara XI, 1- 
3. A new translation of this would be useful. 

The three baskets (pitakatraya ) are Sutra, Vinaya and Abhidhanna. These three baskets, 
divided into the Lesser Vehicle ( hinaydna ) and the Greater Vehicle ( agraydna ), which 
make up the basket of the Sravaka ( Sravapitaka ) and the basket of the Bodhisattva 
( Bodhisattvapitaka ). Regardless of whether they are three or two, why are they called 
baskets? Because they contain ( samgrahatah ): it should be understood that they contain 
everything to be understood ( sarvajneyartha ). 

Why are there three baskets? For nine reasons: 

i. The Sutra is remedy (pratipaksa ) for perplexity or doubt {vicikitsa). Wherever there is a 

doubt about something, the Sutra supplies a precise solution ( niscayartha ). The Vinaya is 
antidote to habitual tendencies that constitute the two extremes ( cmtadvayanuyoga ). By 
prohibiting culpable pleasures ( savadyaparibhoga ), it remedies loose habitual patterns 
(, kdmasukhaUikdnuyoga ); by authorizing (anujndna) innocent pleasures 

(anavadyaparibhoga); it remedies austerity ( atmaklamathanuyoga ) 24 . The Abhidharma is 
remedy for heretical views ( svayamdrstiparamarsa ), because it clarifies ( dyotana ) the 
true nature of dharmas ( aviparTtadharmalaksana ). 

ii. Furthermore, the Sutra teaches the three trainings ( siksatraya ) 25 ; the Vinaya executes 
(sampadana) the first two, i.e. higher morality {adhisTla) and higher mind ( adhicitta ), 
because the ethical person ( silavat ), going beyond regret ( vipra tisurdtikram ena) 26 , attains 
meditative stabilization ( samadhi ). The Abhidharma executes the third, i.e., higher 
wisdom ( adhiprajha ), because it analyzes (pravicaya ) true things ( aviparftartha ). 


For the two extremes condemned by the Buddha, kdmasukhaUikdnuyoga and atmaklamathanuyoga 
(Pali: attakilamatha), cf. Vinaya, I, p.10: DIgha, III, p. 1 13; Majjhima, III, p. 230: Samyutta, IV, p. 330; V, 
p. 421: Nettipakarana, p. 110; Visuddhimagga, p. 5, 32; Bodh. bhumi, p. 185(5), 187(11). 

25 Cf. Atthasalinl, p. 21 (= Sumangalavilasim): Tisu pi ca etesu tisso sikkhci tini pahdndni catubbhido 
gam bh irabhdivo veditabbo. Tathd hi Vinayapitaka visisena adhisilasikkhd vuttd, Suttantapitake 
adhicittasikkhd, Abhidhammapitake adhipahhdsikkhd. 

() The manuscripts, of the Sutralamkara have ' vipratisdradinemana : S. Levi, in his edition, p. 54, corrects 
this as 'vipratisdrdd avipratis arena, and in his translation, as 'vipratisarddikramena. But here, according to 
hgyod pa la rab tu hdas pas, it should be read as vipratisdrdtikramena. 


20 


iii. Finally, the Sutra teaches the texts ( dharma ) and theses ( artha ) 27 . The Vinaya 
accomplishes ( nispatti ) the texts and theses, because the person who has disciplined their 
afflictions ( klesavinayasamyukta ) penetrates (prativedha) the former and the latter. The 
Abhidharma excels in cutting through arguments ( samkathyaviniscayakausalya ) about 
the texts and theses. For these nine reasons, they are enumerated as three baskets. 
Furthermore, they have, as their purpose, liberation ( vimocana ) from samsara. 

How then do they liberate? They liberate by predisposition ( vasana ), intellection 
(bodhana), pacification ( samana ) and penetration (prativeda ). By hearing ( sruta ), the 
mind is predisposed; by reflection ( cinta ), one understands; by cultivating tranquility 
(, samathabhavana ), one becomes peaceful; by discernment ( vipasyana ), one penetrates. 

Furthermore, in brief ( samasatah ), Sutra, Vinaya and Abhidhanna each has a fourfold 
etymology ( caturvidartha ) by the understanding of which the bodhisattva acquires 
omniscience (, sarvajhata ); as for the sravaka, by understanding the meaning of a simple 
stanza, he acquires the destruction of his defilements (dsravaksaya). In what way does 
each have a fourfold etymology? 

1 . The Sutra is thus called because it tells us ( sucana ) about the scene ( asraya ), nature 
(laksand), thing ( dharma ) and purpose {artha). (i) The scene here means the place where 
the Sutra has been preached, by whom and to whom, (ii) The nature is the nature of 
conventional reality (samvrtisatyalaksana) and the nature of absolute truth 
( paramarthasatyalaksana ). (iii) The entities are the aggregates {skandha), the bases 
{ayatana) of consciousness, the elements ( dhatu ), dependent origination 

( pratityasamutpada ), sustenance {ahara), the trances ( dhyana ), the immeasurables 
(apramana), the eight liberations ( vimoksa ), the spheres of mastery {abhibhvayatana), 
the spheres of totality ( krtsnayatana ), the factors favorable to enlightenment 
( bodhipaksa ), the emancipated special knowledges {pratisamvid), etc. 28 )iv) The purpose 
is application ( anusamdhi ). 


- The expression dharmartha does not mean 'the meaning of the Ideal' (S. Levi); it is a copulative 
compound. By dharma is meant the sutras; by artha, the theses taught in the sutras. Cf. below, chap. Ill, 
paragraph 1. 

According to bh more complete than the Sutralamkara: chos ni phuh po dan/ sky e niche dan/ khams 
dan/ rten chin hbrel par hbyuh ba dan/ zas sah/ bsam gtan dan/ tshad med pa dan/ mam par tlmr pa 
brgyad dan/ zil pahi skye niched dan/ zad par gy’i skye niched dan/ byah chub kyi phyogs dan/ so so yah 
dag rig pa la sogs paho. The detailed list of these various categories will be found in the Mahavyutpatti. 


21 


2. The Abhidharma is thus called because it comprises direction ( abhimukhatva ), 
repetition ( abhiksnatva ), mastery ( abhibhavana ) and access (abhigamana). (i) The 
Dharma that leads ( abhimukha dharma ) 29 to nirvana is the Abhidharma, because it 
teaches the truths ( satya ), the factors favorable to enlightenment ( bodhipaksa ), the doors 
of liberation ( vimoksasamukha ), etc. (ii) The Dharma of repetition ( abhiksnam dharmah ) 
is the Abhidhanna because it supplies much detailed infonnation for each dharma 
( bahulanirdesa ), e.g., etymology ( nirukti ), specific nature ( svalaksana ), shared nature 
(, samanyalaksana ), etc. 30 , (iii) It has supremacy, hence its name Abhidharma, because it 
triumphs over opposing theses (parapravada ) by treating controversial points, (iv) By 
means of it there is access to the meanings of the Sutras ( abhiganyate sutrartha etena ), 
hence its name Abhidhanna. 

3. The Vinaya may be understood from the point of view of wrong-doing ( vipatti ), the 
cause of wrong-doing ( samutthana ), the elimination of wrong-doing ( vyutthana ) and 
liberation ( nihsarana ). (i) Wrong-doing consists of five categories (apattinikaya) 3 1 . (ii) 
The cause of wrong-doing comes from ignorance ( ajnana ) of the wrong-doings, lack of 
attention (pramada ), abundance of afflictive emotions ( klesapracurya ) and lack of 
respect ( anadara ). (iii) Elimination of wrong-doing comes from intention (as ay a), e.g., 
acceptance of a discipline ( samvarasamadana ) and not of punishment ( dandakarman ). 
(iv) There are seven ways of repairing wrong-doing: (i) confession (pratidesana ); (ii) 
acceptance ( abhyupagama ) of punishment: punishment of the postulant (siksadattaka), 
etc.; (iii) repeal ( samavaghata ): when a rule has been promulgated (prajfiapte siksdpade) 
by the Buddha and then repealed ( anujnana ) by him at another place in the scriptures 
( pitnah paryayena ); (iv) remission (prasrabdhi ): when the community allows the rule to 
be dropped unanimously (pratiprasrambhana ) 32 ; (v) transformation of the indivudual 


29 Cf. Atthasalim, p. 19 (= Sumangalavilasim, p. 18): Yam ettha vuddhimato salakkhana pujita 
paricchind/ vuttd adhikd ca dhammd Abhidhammo tena akkhdto. 

According to bh: chos re re €in yah hes pahi tshig dan / rah gi mtshan hid dan/ spyihi mtshab hid la 
sogs pa rab tu dbye ba man pos ston pahi phyir ro. The Sutralalamkara differs: ekaikasya dharmasya 
rupyarupisanidarsanddiprabedhedena bahulanirdesdt. 

2 1 There are five classes of wrong-doing recognized by all schools: pdrdjika, samghddisesa, pdcittiya, 
pdtidesamya, sekhiya (cf. Davids-Stede, Pali Dictionary, s.v.) For the Sanskrit form pdrajayika, U. 
Wogihara, Lexicalisches aus d. Bodh. bhumi, p. 34. 

22 According to Bh which corresponds exactly to the Sutralamkara; bh differs notably: hes par hbyuh ba 
ni mam pa bdun te/ so sor hchags pa dan/ huh bar mthoh ba dan/ bslab pa sbyin pa la sogs pahi chad 
pahi las dan/ nan khrims kyis te/ bslab pahi gnas bcas pa la rim gy’is rjes su gnah ba la brten nas dge 


22 


( asrayapardvrtti) 3 3 resulting from change in the male or female sex organs of a monk or 
nun ( vyanjanaparivartana ); if there has been a wrong-doing not shared ( asadharana ) 
[by both sexes], it does not count 34 ; (vi) reflection on reality ( bhutapratya veksa) : this is a 
special reflection having the aspect of summaries of the doctrine ( dharmoddana ) 35 ; (vii) 
penetration of the nature of phenomena ( dharmatapratilambha ): when, by seeing the 
truths ( satyadarsana ), one escapes ( nihsarana ) from the lesser and the least wrong- 
doings ( ksudranuksudrapattif 6 . The Vinaya has four other meanings: (i) the individual 
( pudgala ): the person for whom the rule has been promulgated [by the Buddha]; (ii) 
promulgation ( prajnapti ): when, having learned of an individual fault ( aparadha ), the 
Buddha, having called the community together, promulgated the rule; (iii) analysis 
( pravibhaga ), i.e., the analysis of the wording of the rule ( uddesa ) after its promulgation; 
(iv) discussion ( viniscaya ): this is establishing ( nirdharana ) in each case whether or not 
there is wrong-doing. 


2. Indeed, the speech {vac) of the Buddha Bhagavats is distinguished by the 
following superiorities (visesa): 

i. the support of the knowable (jheyasraya ), 

ii. the natures of the knowable (jneyalaksana ), 

iii. entry into the natures of the knowable (jneyalaksana-pravesa) 

iv. the cause and result of this entry ( tatpravesahetuphala ), 

v. the various cultivations of the cause and result of this entry 
{tadhetuphalabhavanaprabheda). 


hdun bio mthun pas rab tu bcas pahi bslab pahi g€i rjes su gbah ba hid dan. For the Siksadattaka, cf. S. 
Levi, Sutralamkara, transl. p. 199, n.4. 

I® For paravrtti in general and asrayaparavrtti in particular, see below 'Notes and References'. 

34 Case examined by the Pali Vinaya in Suttavibhanga, I, 10, 6. 

33 In the expression dharmoddnakaraih, the word akara , which does not appear in the Tibetan and 
Chinese versions of the Sutralamkara, does appear in the Bh and bh: chos kyi skye mos tshal gyi rnam pas. 
According to the Bodhisattvabhumi, p. 277 (5), there are four dharmoddana which the Buddhas and 
bodhisattvas teach for the purification of beings: anityah sarvasamskdrah, duhkahsarvasamskdrah, 
andtmdnah sarvadhardh, sdntam nirvdnam. Cf. the Pali scriptures which deal with the sankhdra as aniccd, 
vayadhamma, anattd, dukkhd, etc. (cf. Davids-Stede, s.v. sankhdra). 

36 According to bh: chos nid rab tu rtogs pas bden pa mthohba nid ky’is Ituh ba phra €ih phra ba dag las 
hes par hbyuh ho. 


23 


vi. the superior discipline ( adhisTla ) contained in these various cultivations, 

vii. the superior mind ( adhicitta ) contained in these various cultivations, 

vii. the superior wisdom ( adhiprajna ) contained in these various cultivations, 

ix. the cessation which is the result ( phalaprahana ) of these three trainings, 

x. the knowledge of the result ( phalajhana ) of these three trainings. 

This passage of the sutra shows that the Great Vehicle is the speech of the 
Buddha ( buddhavacana ). [133a4] 


2. Comm Bh 322b29-322c24, bh 145al-145b5, U 380c20-381a6, u 233b5-234b3. 

“i. The support of the knowable : that which can be known is called the knowable, 
namely, the defiled ( samklesika ) dharmas and the pure dharmas ( vaiyavadanika ); also, 
the three natures ( svabhavatraya ). Support has the meaning of cause (lie tit) .... This 
support is the store-consciousness ( dlayavijndna ). 

ii. The natures of the knowable: namely, the three natures, imaginary ( parikalpita ), 
dependent ( paratantra ) and absolute ( parinispanna ). 

iii. Entry into the natures of the knowable: this is the way (ji Itar) or the means (gah gis) 
of entering, namely, Concept-Only ( vijhaptirndtrata ) 

iv. The cause and fruition of this entry: entry into Concept-Only has as cause, at the time 
of preparation (prayoga ), the mundane virtues of generosity, etc. ( laukika 
danadiparamita)', as fruition, it has, at the time of realization ( abhisamaya ), the 
supramundane virtues of generosity, etc. ( lokottara danadiparamita). 

v. The various cultivations of the cause and fruition of this entry: cause and fruition 
consist of different cultivations ( bhavanaprabheda ). Cultivation is repeated practice. 
This ongoing repeated practice being perfected in the stages ( bhumi ), one speaks of 
various cultivations: these are the ten stages. 

vi. Superior discipline contained in these various cultivations: in the ten stages, training 
(siksa) in the matter of discipline ( sTla ) is called higher discipline; this is the discipline 
( samvara ) of the bodhisattvas who have not even a thought of wrong-doing. 


24 



vii. Superior mind : the concentration of the mind or observance in the matter of mind is 
called superior mind: these are the concentrations ( samcidhi ). 

viii. Superior wisdom : the practice of full understanding ( abhisamaya ) or observance in 
the matter of wisdom is called superior wisdom: this is nonconceptual knowledge 
(, nirvikalpajnana ) . 

ix-x. bh comments as follows: spans pahi khyad par €es bya ba la/ khyad par du hpags 
paham/ rab tu dbye bas sam/ so so ran go rig pas non morn pa dan/ ses byahi sgrib pa 
spans pa ste/ de van mi gnas pahi my a nan las hdas pa ho// ye ses kyi khad par...ni sgrib 
pa dan bral bald ye ses te/ deyan mam par mi rtog pahi ye ses rjes su mthunpaho// sans 
rgyas kyi ye ses ni sgrib pa thams cad kyi bag chags spans pa ste/ hdi ni mam par mi 
rtog pahi ye ses dan/ ye ses kyi khyad par ro/ : " Superiority of cessation : superiority 
(visesa), classification (prabheda ) or intuition ( pratyatmagati ) cut off the obstacle of the 
afflictions ( klesavarana ) and the obstacle to knowledge (jneyavarana ): this is the 
nonabiding nirvana ( apratisthitanirvana , cf. chap. IX). Superiority of knowledge : 
knowledge without obstacle ( vimvaranajnana ); this is consonant ( anulomika ) with 
nonconceptual knowledge. The Buddha’s knowledge is free of any trace ( vasana ) of 
obstacle. It is a nonconceptual knowledge par excellence.” 


3. How is that shown? According to this passage, ten topics ( sthdna ) of which 
there is no mention in the Vehicle of the Sravakas are treated in the Great 
Vehicle. These are: 

i) The store-consciousness ( dlayavijndna ) is called support of the knowable 
( jneydsraya ). 

ii) The three natures ( svabhdva ): dependent nature (paratantrasvabhdva ), 
imaginary nature (parikalpitasvabhdva ) and absolute nature 

( parinispannasvabhdva ), are the natures of the knowable (jneyalaksana ). 

iii) Concept-Only ( vijndptimdtratd ) is the entry into the natures of the 
knowable ( jneyalaksanapravesa ) 

iv) The six virtues ( sat pdramitd ) are the cause and the result of this entry 
( pravesahetuphala ). 


25 



v) The ten stages of the bodhisattva (ddsa bodhisattvabhumi) are the various 
cultivations of the cause and result of this entry ( hetuphala 
bhavanaprabheda). 

vi) The discipline ( samvara ) of the bodhisattvas is the superior discipline 
(i adbisTla ) contained in these various cultivations. 

vii) The concentrations ( samadhi ) called 'Hero's walk' ( suramgama ), 'Matrix 
of space' ( gaganagarbha ), etc., are the superior mind ( adhicitta ) contained in 
these various cultivations. 

viii) Nonceptual knowledge ( n irvikalpakajn an a) is the superior wisdom 
( adhiprajhd ) contained in these various disciplines. 

ix) The nonabiding nirvana (apratistitan irvdn a) is the cessation which is the 
result ( phalaprahana ) of these three observances. 

x) The three bodies of the Buddha ( buddhakaya ), namely, essence body 
( svabhavikakaya ), enjoyment body ( sambhogakaya ) and apparitional body 
(nirmdnakadya), are the knowledge of the result (phalajhdna) of these three 
trainings. 

The ten topics ( sthana ) mentioned here show that the Great Vehicle is distinct 
from the Vehicle of the Sravakas. Furthermore, they show the superiority 
( agratd ) of the Great Vehicle. The Bhagavat reserves the preaching of it for 
bodhisattvas. Therefore, relative to the Great Vehicle alone, the speech (vac) of 
the Buddha Bhagavats is distinguished ( visista ) by ten superiorities (visesa). 
[ 1 33a 1 8] . 

3. Comm. Bh 323al0-323b4, bh 145b5-146a8, U 381z20-382a3, u 234b4-237a2. 

“iv) The six virtues are the cause and the result of this entry, when one has entered into 
the three natures by means of Concept-Only, the mundane virtues of generosity, etc., are 
called the cause of purity ( visuddhihetu ) because they envisage (aksip-) the 
supramundane virtues. After having entered into the stages, these same virtues of 
generosity, etc., become supramundane and are called result of purity (visuddhiphala). 


26 



v) The ten stages of the Bodhisattva are the various cultivations of the cause and result of 
this entry : the ten stages of the bodhisattva are the various cultivations of the two, i.e., of 
the cause and of the result, which are the aforementioned virtues. 

viii) Nonconceptual knowledge (literally , free of concept) is the higher wisdom : for the 
sravaka, the absence of concept ( nirvikalpa ) consists of not conceiving of any of the four 
errors ( viparyasa ); for the bodhisattva, the absence of concept consists of not conceiving 
of any dhanna whatsoever; this is the difference between the two absences of concepts. 

[For the four errors: taking what is impermanent to be pennanent, (anitye nityam iti), etc., 
cf. Anguttara II, p. 52; Visuddhimagga, II, p. 683: Kosa V, p. 21: Samdhinir., p. 101; 
Siksasam.,p. 198]. 

ix) The nonabiding nirvana is the fruit of cessation: this concerns the cessation which is 
the fruition of the three trainings ( siksa ), namely, the cessation (prahana ) of the obstacle 
of the afflictions ( klesavarana ) and the obstacle to knowledge (jheyavarana ). 

x) The three bodies is the knowledge of the result this concerns the knowledge of the 
result of the three trainings. If there were no essence-body ( svabhavikakaya ), the Dhanna 
body (dhanna kayo) would not exist, as in the case of the eye (caksurindriya). If there 
were no Dhanna body, the body of enjoyment (sambhogakaya) would not exist, as in the 
case of the visual consciousness (caksurvijhana). Here the ’supporter’ (nisraya) and the 
'support' (nisrita) should be thought of as equal. If the enjoyment body did not exist, after 
having entered into the higher stages, the bodhisattvas would have no pleasure in 
enjoying ( sambhuj -) the Dhanna. Without this pleasure, the accumulations ( sambhara ) of 
enlightenment would not be complete ( paripiirna ), as in the case of color (rupa). If there 
were no body of appearance (nirmanakaya), the bodhisattvas on the stage of application 
of faith (adhimukticaryabhumi) and the sravakas of lesser faith ( hmddhimuktika ) would 
fail in their undertaking (arambha). That is why it is necessary (avasyam) that there be 
three bodies. (Bh) 

The ten subjects, etc.: This last line been translated according to H; the Tibetan is 
obscure. The ten topics mentioned here show that the Great Vehicle is distinct from the 
Vehicle of the Sravakas, since they are not treated in the Vehicle of the Sravakas.” (Bh) 


27 



4. Because the speech {vac) of the Tathagata is characterized ( visista ) by ten 
superiorities {visesa), why is it asserted that the Great Vehicle is truly the speech 
of the Buddha ( buddhavacaita ) and why is it denied that the Vehicle of the 
Sravakas is mingled with the Great Vehicle? Actually, the ten topics ( sthdna ) in 
question are not treated in the Vehicle of the Sravakas but are dealt with in the 
Great Vehicle. These ten topics confirm great enlightenment {mahabodhi) and 
are fully justified by ( upapanna ), consonant with {anukula) and non- 
contradictory to {aviruddhd) the attainment of omniscience {sarvajhdjhand). 

Here are the verses {gatha ): 

a) The support of the knowable {jheyasraya), its characteristics ( laksana ), 
entry (pravesa ) into its characteristics, the cause ( hetu ) and the result (phala ) 
of this entry, their different cultivations {prabheda ), the three trainings 
{siksa), the cessation which is the result {phalaprahana ), and the knowledge 

( jndna ) of the result: these are the superiorities ( visesa ) of the Great Vehicle 
{agrayana). 

b) Such topics are not seen elsewhere. Because it is the cause of higher 
enlightenment {agrabodhi), the conclusion {is-) is that the Great Vehicle is the 
word of the Buddha {budddhavacana). Because it explains the ten subjects, it 
is superior. (This last verse is translated according to H). [133a27] 


4. Comm. Bh 323bl5-323c4, bh 146a8-146b4, U 382al4-382bl, u 237a2-237b3. 

"These ten topics assure great enlightenment : they are the cause capable of producing 
great enlightenment. They are fully justified for the attainment of omniscience', viewed 
according to correct proofs ( pramana ), reasonings (yukti ), etc., they show the marks 
{nimitta) of the path taught by the Buddha {nayakopadistamarga); they are in conformity'. 
in the course of the preparatory practice {prayoga ), in view of full understanding 
{abhisamaya), they appear in a harmonious way ( anulomika ): they conform to the direct 
path taught by the Buddha {nayaka); they are without contradiction: in the levels 

{bhumi), they do not constitute a cause of disturbance { apakarahetu ); in the path taught 
by the Buddha, they do not bring the disturbances {apakara) of thievery {caura), etc.; or 
again, they are not in variance with either samsara or nirvana." (Bh) 


28 



5. Why are the ten tpics ( sthana ) treated in this sequence ( krama )? 

i) From the very start ( prathamata eva), by their skill ( kausalyam nisritya) in 
the cause of dharmas ( dharmahetu ), bodhisattvas must acquire skill in 
dependent origination (pratltyasam u tpdda) . 

ii) Next, in order to succeed in suppressing ( parihdni ) the extremes, which are 
the faults ( antadosa ) of superimposition (samaropa) and negation ( apavdda ), 
they must acquire skill in the natures ( laksana ) of dependently produced 
dharmas ( pratltyasamutpanna ). 

iii) Bodhisattvas trained in this way ( evamprayukta ) must penetrate 

( pratividh -) the natures that they have understood {parigrhlta ); in that way, 
they will liberate ( vimuc -) their minds (citta) from obstacles ( dvarana ). 

iv) Next, after having understood the natures of the knowable (jneyalaksana ), 
and by depending on the six virtues (sat paramita) previously practiced 

( purvaprayoga ), they must acquire purity of the highest intention 
(adhydsayavisuddhi). 

v) Next, having spread {pratibhid -) the six virtues contained {parigrhlta ) in 
the purity of highest intention over the ten levels (bhumi), they must practice 
them for three incalculabl periods ( kalpdsamkhyeya ). 

vi-viii) Next, they must fulfill the three trainings ( siksa ) of the bodhisattva to 
perfection (paripur -). 

ix-x) Having fulfilled them, they must reach the nirvana which is their result, 
and attain ( abhisambudh -) complete and perfect enlightenment (anuttara 
samyaksatn bodhih). That is why these ten topics are treated in this order. In 
this explanation, the entire Greater Vehicle is completed (paripurna). 

[ 133b 10] 

5. Comm. Bh 323cl6-324al4, bh 146b4-147b4, U 382bl4-382c28, u 237b3-238b8. 


29 



“ii) They must acquire skill in the natures of dependency produced dharmas : to wrongly 
(ahhinivis-) attribute existence ( bhava ) to the imaginary truly nonexistent 
( abhutaparikalpita ) is called ’superimposition '. Then, because one has superimposed onto 
the nonexistent, to deny the absolute true nature ( bhutaparinispannasvabhdva ) is called 
'negation'. Suppression of these two extreme defects ( antadvayadosa ) consitutes 
skillfulness in the natures of the dharmas. 

iii) Next, bodhisattvas must penetrate into the natures thus understood by means of 
Concept-Only ( vijnaptimdtrata ) and thus escape from obstacles. 

iv) Then, having entered into Concept-Only, they must bring to perfection ( paripur -) by 
way of the absolute ( paramartha ) the six mundane conventional virtues and integrate 
them into the highest pure intention ( parisuddhadhydsaya ). 

v) Then, in the ten levels ( bhumi ) ... , they must practice these virtues for three 
incalculable great periods ( kalpasamkhyeya ). This is different from the sravakas who 
practice the remedy (pratipaksa ) for three lifetimes (janma ) and then arrive at 
deliverance [cf. Sutralamkara, I, 10]. 

vi-viii) Then, in the course of this cultivation ( bhavana ), they must completely fulfill 
(paripur-) the three trainings ( siksa ) of higher morality (adhisila), etc. 

ix-x) Finally, they must realize nirvana which is the fruit of the three trainings, the 
cessation of the afflictions, supreme perfect enlightenment and the three bodies of the 
Buddha." (Bh) 


NOTES 

§ 1 - 3 . Superiority of the Mahayana over the Hmayana: Bodh. bhumi, p. 297 6 ; 
Sutralamkara, I, 10; XIX, 59-60; Madhyantavibhanga, chap. V, Yananuttarya, p. 199- 
262; N. Dutt, Aspects..., p. 46-90. 

Mahayana scripture, bodhisattvapitaka, dvadasahgadharmapravacana, dhdram: Siddhi, 
p. 614, which refers to Bodh. bhumi, p. 96 (6), 160 (16), 272 (12). Add Samdhinir., 
index, see under bodhisattvapitaka, dhdram, dharaprajhaptivyavasthapana ; 
Uttaratantra, p. 227. Bu-ston, I, p. 34-38, drawn from the explanation in Sutralamkara- 


30 


Samgraha; later, II, p. 101, he quotes some late sutras and tantras on the compilation of 
Mahayana scripture by Manjusn-Maitreya-Vajrapani. Another section of scriptures in 4, 

9, and 29 categories of sutra, 7 aspects of the Vinaya and 1 1 aspects of Matrka: 
Samdhinir., X, v. 5-7. 

§ 4. Authenticity of the Mahayana: Sutralamkara, I 7; Hien yang cheng kiao louen song, 
Taisho 1603, p. 58 lb5- 13; Bodhicaryavatara, IX, 42; Siddhanta in Wassiliew, p. 289- 
290; Siddhi, p. 176-178. 

§ 5. Compare the seven topics of the Madhyantavibhanga, p. 6-9 with the ten topics of 
the Samgraha (Stcherbatsky, p. 10-15). 


31 




Chapter I 


THE SUPPORT OF THE KNOWABLE 

( jheyasraya ) 


1. First of all, ( atra tavat), at the very beginning (prathamata eva: cf. Prastavana, § 
3), it was said that the store-consciousness ( dlayavijhdna ) is the support of the 
knowable (j heydsraya). The Bhagavat has spoken of the store-consciousness. 
Where did he speak of the store-consciousness? - In the Abhidharmasutra (cf. 

Trimsika, p. 37; Siddhi, p. 169) Bhagavat spoke this verse: 

anadikaliko dhaluh sarvadharmasamdsrayah/ 

tasmin sati gatihsarva nirvanadhigamo 'pi ca// 

It is the beginningless element; it is the common support of all dharmas. Given 
this consciousness, there exists every destiny and entry into nirvana. [133b 16] 


1. Comm. Bh 324a21-324b5, bh 147b5-8, U 383a4-15, u 238b8-239a6. 

P: “At the beginning, it has been said that the support of the knowable is called store- 
consciousness. Where did the Bhagavat speak about this consciousness, and why did he 
call it ’store’ consciousness? 

“It is the beginningless element because there is no initial term ( purvakoti ). Element. 
cause ( hetu ) or seed (by a). Of what is it the cause? Of dharmas, but only of afflicted 
(samklesika) dharmas and not of pure (vaiyavadanika) dharmas ... (For srutavasana, the 
cause of pure dharmas, cf. below, § 45-49). This store-consciousness is also the common 
basis of all dharmas, in the capacity of support (nisraya) and not as cause. Nisraya is 
synonymous with asraya, but cause (hetu) is not synonymous with support. Indeed, the 
support ( asraya ) and the entity supported (asrita) are two distinct things. Otherwise, if 
the words cause and support were synonymous, the author would not have mentioned 
support after having spoken about cause.” (U) 


32 



“Given this consciousness : Since there is a basis common to all dhannas, there exists 
every destiny: every destiny of samsara; destiny, i.e., fruit of retribution ( vipakaphala ) ... 
There are no destinies that do not exist as its result; thanks to it, there is access to 
nirvana: it is necessary that there be defilements ( samklesa ) in order that there be access 
to nirvana." (Bh) - In fact, "the definitive destruction (nivrttf) of the defilements of 
existence and of birth ( bhavadijatyadisamk/esa ) is called nirvana).” (U) 


2. In the same sutra (cf. Siddhi, p. 172), it is said: "The consciousness which, 
supplied with all the seeds ( sarvabTjaka ), underlies (ally ate) every dharma, is 
called root, fundamental, receptacle stor e-(alaya). I have revealed it to the 
virtuous ones," Such is the agama. [ 133b 19] 


2, Comm. Bh 324b9-12, bh 147b8-148al, U 383a20-28, u 239b6-240al. 

This verse has been translated according to H which brings out the meaning of alaya 
better. Alaya comes from the root a-ll, che ts'ang in Chinese. 

“The author quotes the words of the Buddha again in order to prove that the store- 
consciousness has the name ’root' or 'receptacle'. It underlies every dharma, whether in 
the nature of perfumed ( bhavya , vasya) or as perfumer (bhavaka, vasaka) ... It is 
consciousness provided with all the seeds, because it arises and perishes 
(sahotpadanirodha) with all the seeds. The store-consciousness and the active 
consciousness ( pravrttivijhana ) being mutual conditions ( anyonyapratyaya ), are lodged 
one within the other ( parasparam allyante ); cf. below, § 27. This is why we speak of the 
store-consciousness. Wishing to exclude nonvirtuous ones, the author adds: I have 
revealed it to the virtuous ones, i.e., to the great bodhisattvas. Capable of receiving this 
teaching, they are called virtuous ones; it is to them that this revelation is addressed and 
not to the nonvirtuous ones.” (U) 


3. Why is this consciousness called store-consciousness (all-basis consciousness)? 
- It is a store- consciousness because all defiled (samklesika) dharmas of those 
who are born (jatimat ) are lodged within it ( asminn allyante) as fruit 


33 



( phalabhavana ), and it itself is lodged in the dharmas as cause ( hetubhdvena ). 
Or again ( athava ), it is a store-consciousness because beings ( sattva ) are lodged 
in it as if in their self ( svatman ). [133b24] 


3. Comm. Bh 324b 121, bh 148al-3, U 383b4-l 1, u 239a7-239b5. 

Now the author explains the name ’store-’ applied to this consciousness. Those who are 
born : (according to U, the samskrtas). Defded dharmas, in order to exclude pure dharmas 
( yaiyavadanika ). They are lodged in if. they are present there (pravartante ). Beings are 
lodged in this consciousness as if in their self: they wrongly consider ( parigrhnanti ) it as 
their self. (Bh) 


4. This consciousness is also called appropriating consciousness ( adadavijhana ). 
On this subject, an agama, the Samdhinirmocanasutra, V, 7, says 

dddnavijndna gabhlrasuksmo ogho tathd vartati sarvabljo / 

bdlana eso mayi na prakdsi ma haiva dtmd parikalpayeyuh // 

Like a violent current, the profound and subtle store-consciousness proceeds 
with all its seeds. Fearing lest they would imagine it to be a self, I have not 
revealed it to fools. [133b28] 


4. Comm. Bh 324b26-325al5, bh 148a3-150al, U 383bl6-24, u 240al-5. 

Bh reproduces Chapter V of the Samdhinirmocana in its entirety. There are a few 
variants. “ Profound , because it is difficult to be probed ( duravagaha ) by the intellect 
(mati) of clear-sighted worldly people; subtle, because it is difficult to understand 
( durvigahya ) by the sravakas, etc. For this reason, the Budha does not reveal this 
consciousness to the sravakas, etc., becaue the latter do not aim at {na paryes-) subtle 
omniscience {suksma sarvajhajhana) (cf. below, § 10). Like a violent current, it proceeds 
along with all the seeds : the series of its moments (ksanaprabandha) is never interrupted 
(samucchinna); it is like the current of a river ( udakaugha ). / have not revealed it to 
fools: I have not revealed it to those who embrace the view of a self (atmadrsti), fearing 


34 



lest they imagine that it is a self. Why would they imagine that? Because this 
consciousness remains unchanged in its unifonnity ( ekakara ) until the end of samsara 
(dsamsdrakoteh ) . " (U) 


5. Why is it called the appropriating consciousness? - Because it appropriates 
( upadadati ) all the material organs ( ruplndriya ) and because it is the support of 
the grasping (upagrahasraya) of all the existences ( atmabhava ). Why is that? The 
material organs, appropriated ( upatta ) by this consciousness, do not perish 
(vinas-) as long as life (dyus) lasts. Furthermore, at the moment of reincarnation 
( pratisamdhibandha ), because it grasps ( upagrhndti ) their production 
(i tadabhinirvrtti ), this consciousness appropriates ( upadadati ) the states of 
existence (atmabhava). That also is why it is called appropriating consciousness. 
[133c4] 

5. Comm. Bh 324b26-325al5, bh 148a3-150al, U 383M6-24, u 240al-5. 

The version of H is the most satisfactory and that is the one I [Lamotte] translate. The 
Chinese versions differ from the Tibetan version more or less. 

"Because it appropriates all the material organs. Why? The phrase the material organs 
appropriated by it do not perish ... gives the explanation. The material organs, the eye, 
etc., appropriated by the appropriating consciousness do not undergo the state of 
decomposition (vimlakadyavastha) of a corpse (mrtasanra). But the moment of death 
(maranakala) having come, this consciousness abandons (tyajati) them and thus these 
organs fall into decomposition. Therefore it is known with certainty that this 
consciousness appropriates the organs and, for this reason, until the end of life, they do 
not perish. (Bh) - It appropriates all the material organs, the eye, etc., in common safety 
and common risk (ekayogaksematvena) which lasts for the entire lifespan; that is why it 
is called appropriating consciousness." (U) 

"It is the support of grasping of all the states of existences. The phrase furthermore, at 
the moment of reincarnation ... ’ gives the explanation. This consciousness is the series- 
consciousness (samtanavijhana); this is why, at the moment of reincarnation, it grasps 


35 



( grhnati ) the ‘Cheng’ ( abhinirvrtti ). The states of existence of a given life-span 
(< ekavadhyatmabhava ), likewise, are grasped ( grhita ) by this consciousness because the 
seeds ( vasana ) of these ekavadhyatmabhava reside in this appropriating consciousness ... 
That is why it appropriates ( upadadati ) the states of existence.” (Bh) - “All the states of 
existence are grasped by the store-consciousness which coagulates ( sammurcchita ) in the 
middle of the sperm and blood ( sukrasonita ).” (u) 


6. This consciousness is also called mind ( citta ). Thus the Bhagavat said: "Mind 
(citta), manas and consciousness ( vijnana )." Among these three, manas is twofold 
( dvividha ): 

i) Acting as immediately preceding condition ( samanantarapratyaya ) and 
forming support ( asraylbhuta ), the consciousness that has just disappeared 
{anantaraniruddha vijnana) is the support for the birth ( utpattyasraya ) of the 
mental consciousness ( manovijhdna ). 

ii) The second is the afflicted manas ( klistamanas ), always associated 
(samprayukta) with the four afflictions ( klesa ), i.e., wrong view of the self 
( satkayadrsti ), pride of the self ( asmimana ), attachment to the self 

( atmasneha ) and ignorance ( avidya ). It is the support of the defilements 
(samklesa) of the consciousnesses {vijnana). 

The consciousnesses arise because of the first manas as support; the second one 
is defilement. 

Because it cognizes the object ( visayavijhapteh ), the manas is a consciousness; as 
antecedent ( samanantara ), as thinking ( manana ), the manas is of two kinds. 
[133cl 1] 

6. Comm. Bh 325M2-27, bh 150a8-150b8. U 383cl6-29, u 240bl-241a2. 

When the Buddha speaks of citta, manas and vijnana (cf. DTgha, I, p. 21; Samyutta, II, p. 
95), it is not a question of three synonyms as the Visuddhimagga has it, p. 452 {vihhdnam 
cittam mano ti atthato ekam) and the Kosa, II, p. 176 (cittam mano 'tha vijhanam 
ekartham), but rather of three distinct things (cf. H: citta, manas and vijnana are three). 


36 



Citta is the store-consciousness; manas is the twofold manas; vijiiana is the six active 
consciousnesses ( pravrttivijndna ). 

i) The first manas corresponds to the manas or, more precisely, to the manodhatu, mana- 
ayatana , manaindriya of the Vaibhasika; cf. Kosa, I, p. 31-33: ‘There is no manas 
distinct from the consciousnesses. That one of the six consciousnesses which has just 
disappeared is the manas ( sanndtn anantaratftam vijhdnam yad dhi tan manas) ... The 
first five consciousnesses have the five material organs, eye, etc., as support; the sixth 
consciousness, the mental consciousness, does not have a similar support. Consequently, 
with the view of attributing a support to this consciousness, manas or manodhatu, or 
again mana-ayatana and manaindriya, is called that which serves as support, i.e., one or 
another of the six consciousnesses.’ In relation to the mental consciousness which 
immediately follows it, the consciousness that has just passed is the immediately 
preceding condition and support of arising', it is called the first manas. 

“ii) The second is the afflicted manas, because it is afflicted ( klista ) by four passions ... 
First, wrong view of the self is erroneous clinging to ’me and mine’ ( atmatnuyabhinivesa ). 
Under its influence there comes pride of self, when one depends on ’me and mine', one 
becomes proud (garvayate). When these two afflictions exist, self-love ( atmarati ) arises., 
i.e., attachemnt to the self. These three afflictions all have ignorance as cause. Ignorance 
is not-knowing ( ajhana ), the opposite of knowingness (vidyavipaksa).” (U) - “It is the 
support of the defilement of the consciousnesses, because in the wholesome states, etc., of 
concentration or non-concentration ( samahitasamahitakusaladyvastha ), it is not 
suppressed ( viruddha ) and is always present" (U); “indeed, even in wholesome states of 
mind ( kusalacitta ), there is belief in a self ( atmagraha ).” (Bh) 

“The consciousnesses arise because of the first manas as support ... , because the 
consciousness that has just disappeared ( anantaraniruddha vijhana) and which is called 
manas, gives up its place ( avakasam dadati ) to the consciousness that is about to arise 
( utpitsu vijhana) and thus acts as support for its birth ( utpattyasraya )" (Bh) - “The 
second one is defilement', because it is a manas associated with the four afflictions; since 
it believes in a self, etc., it defiles ( samklesajT (U) 

“Because it cognizes the object : in the sense that it grasps ( grhnati ) the object and 
appears like the object. This justifies its name of consciousness. As antecedent, as 


37 



thinking, the manas is of two types : this justifies its name of Manas.” - “As it gives up its 
place to the mental consciousness, it is called the first manas; as it brings defilement 
through belief in a self ( atmagraha ), it is called the second manas.” (Bh) 


7. How do we know ( katham gamyate ) the existence of the defiled manas 
( klistamanas )? - If it did not exist, 

i) unmixed ignorance ( avidya avenikT) would not exist, and this would be a 
fault ( dosa ). 

ii) There would be no similarity between the mental consciousness] and the 
five [other consciousnesses (pah casddh army a) , and this would be a fault. 
Indeed, the five groups of consciousnesses ( pahca vijhanakaya ) have the eye, 
etc., for their simultaneous support ( sahabhu-asraya ); and the mental 
consciousness, likewise, must have a simultaneous support, which is the 
manas. 

iii) The etymology (nirukti) of the word ‘manas’ would not be explainable, 
and that would be a fault. 

iv) There would be no difference ( visesa ) between the absorption of non- 
identification (asam jh isam apatti) and the absorption of cessation 
(nirodhasamapatti), and this would be a fault. Indeed, whereas the absorption 
of non-identification is characterized (prabhavita) by a defiled manas, the 
absorption of cessation is not. Otherwise (anyatra), these two absorptions 
would not be different. 

v) Among those beings without conceptuality (asamjhika), there would be 
neither belief in a self (atmagraha) nor pride in a self (asmimdna); for the 
entire duration of their nonconceptualizing existence, they would not be 
afflicted (klista). 

vi) Because in states of mind that are wholesome ( kusala ), unwholesome 
(akusala) or indeterminate (avydkrta), we notice ( upalabhyate ) that belief in a 
self (atmagraha) is always (sarvakdle ) present (samuddcara). Otherwise, if 
the defiled manas did not exist, the affliction called pride of self 


38 



{asm im an aklesa) would be present by association ( samprayogatah ) with 
unwholesome states of mind alone, whilst it would not exist in wholesome or 
indeterminate states. But since it is by co-existence {sahabhavd) with the 
manas that this affliction is present and not by association with unwholesome 
minds, these errors are avoided. Here are some stanzas: 

(a) Unmixed ignorance, similarity with the five, difference between the 
concentrations and the etymology would be lacking, and this would be a 
fault. 

(b) During nonconceptualizing existence, belief in a self would be absent, and 
this would be a fault. The presence of belief in a self in all types of states of 
mind ( sarvakara ) would not be explained (yuj-) . 

(c) If the defiled manas did not exist, two things, unmixed ignorance and 
similarity with the five, would be lacking; and three things, etymology, 
difference between the concentrations and the presence of belief in a self 
among the nonconceptualizing beings would be icompatible ( viruddha ). If it 
did not exist, belief in a self would not be universal. 

{d) The mind would attain the truth ( bhutartha ). But the unmixed ignorance, 
ever present, always creates an obstacle to the mind. 

Being afflicted ( klista ), the manas is defiled and indeterminate {nivrta- 
avyakrta ); it is always associated (samprayukta) with four afflictions ( klesa ). 
Like the afflictions of the material and nonmaterial domains 
{mpampyavacara), it is included in the defiled-indeterminate. On the one 
hand, the afflictions of the material and nonmaterial worlds are controlled 
(alingita) by tranquility ( samatha ); on the other hand, this manas is always 
present. [134a6] 


7. Comm. Bh 325c24-326al7, bh 151a5-152a2, U 384a25-385a7, u 241a2-243a6. 

i) "If the existence of the defiled manas is denied, there would not be any unmixed 
ignorance. Let us define the nature ( laksana ) of unmixed ignorance: it is a mistake 
(i moha ) which poses an obstacle ( avrnoti ) to the birth of true knowledge 


39 



(tattvajnana)."( U) - Unmixed ignorance cannot reside elsewhere than in the defiled 
Manas. 

“It cannot be said that it resides in the five consciousnesses, because these places 
( sthana ) do not contain any remedy (pratipaksa) for ignorance. Wherever there is a 
remedy, there is also that which is to be remedied ( vipaksa ). But in the five 
consciousnesses there is no remedy for ignorance, because the path of seeing 
(< darsanamarga ) does not arise in them. 

Ignorance is not found in the nonafflicted mental consciousness (akl istamano vijhana ) , 
because the mental consciousness would be afflicted in its nature on account of this 
ignorance, [which would be absurd]. 

Neither does it reside in the afflicted mental consciousness ( klistamanovijnana ), because 
ignorance there would be associated with the other afflictions and consequently would 
not merit its name of unmixed. If it is claimed that the mental consciousness is afflicted 
as a consequence of this affliction, which is ignorance, it must be accepted that it is 
absolutely afflicted in its nature, which is false. Generous states of mind, etc., 
(i danadicitta ) would not be wholesome ( kusala ) since they would be associated 
(sarnprayukta) with the nature of passion-ignorance. 

If it is claimed that passion-ignorance exists with ( saha pravartate) wholesome states of 
mind, it would necessarily ( ekantena ) be associated with wholesome states of mind and 
the other states of mind would not exist. It is not possible that the afflicted mental 
consciousness would produce ( saksatkr -) the remedy for the ignorance which renders it 
afflicted. 

But if it is claimed that various wholesome states of mind, capable of bringing ( avail -) 
the remedy for ignorance, exist with the manas, if it is claimed that when the remedy 
arises, that which is remedied, i.e., the Manas and its ignorance, disappears, then the 
reasoning is correct. 

Objection : If that is so, unmixed ignorance is not possible. Being always associated in the 
Manas with three other afflictions, wrong view of the self, etc., it is not unmixed]. 

Answer. Your objection is not pertinent. I do not say that ignorance is unmixed because it 
is not associated with the other passions. But I do say that it is called unmixed because it 


40 



exists nowhere else than in the Manas. It is like the eighteen special attributes of the 
Buddha ( avenikabuddhadharma ), so called because they exist only among the Buddhas. 
It is true that above I said that if it is associated with the other afflictions, the name 
'unmixed' would not be justified, but there I had in view the thesis of my opponent the 
faults of which I was pointing out. 

ii) “ There would be no similarity with the five and this would be a fault : this comes back 
to saying that the activity ( pravrtti ) of the six consciousnesses ( vijhana ) calls for six pairs 
of conditions ( pratyaya ). The similarity ( sadharmya ) between the five consciousnesses, 
visual consciousness, etc., and the mental consciousness, i.e., that they arise from two 
conditions, would be contradicted ( viruddha ) if the afflicted manas did not exist, for the 
mental consciousness would not have an empowering condition ( adhipatipratyaya ) as 
simultaneous support ( sahabhu-asraya ) from its own side. The two conditions belonging 
to each of the five] consciousnesses, visual consciousness, etc., constitute their nature of 
consciousness. These consciousnesses each have the eye, etc., as coexisting and specific 
support. These organs are their empowering condition ( adhipatipratyaya ) and not their 
causal condition ( hetupratyaya ) ... It is the same for the mental consciousness: it must 
have a support specific to its type. It is true that the store-consciousness is a simultaneous 
support for the mental consciousness; but it cannot be said that it is its specific support. 
Indeed, the store-consciousness is a support common to all the consciousnesses; it is a 
causal condition and not an empowering condition. 

According to a Sautrantika theory [cf. the root-theory], form ( rupa ) is the simultaneous 
and particular support of the mental consciousness. This theory is false and unacceptable. 
If that were so, the mental consciousness would always lack the two activities called 
vikalpa, namely, investigation ( nirupandvilakpa ) and memory (anusmaranavikalpa) . [Cf. 
Kosa, I, p. 60: If the mental consciousness, like the first five consciousnesses, dependd 
on a material organ, like the latter it would be without examination and memory.] 

Thereby it is demonstrated that the theory proposed by other schools (cf. Notes), 
according to which a material substance localized in the heart ( hrdayastharupavastu ) 
would be the special support of the mental consciousness, is also wrong. Indeed, it also 
incurs the fault already pointed out above, and the mental consciousness resembles the 
other five consciousnesses which depend upon the material organs ( rupindriya ). (U)” 


41 



iii) “ Because of the etymology. What is there to be said? It is said: cogitat ergo vocatur 
cogitans (manyata iti manas); if the manas did not exist, to what would this etymology 
apply? Certainly not to the six consciousnesses. These six consciousnesses cannot be the 
support for the consciousness that follows them immediately, because they have already 
been destroyed ( viruddha ) when the fonner succeeds them.” (Bh) 

iv) “ There would be no differrence between the absorption of nonidentification and the 
absorption of cessation, and this would be a fault : assuming acceptance of the existence 
of the defiled Manas, this Manas resides in the mental continuum of fools ( balasamtana ) 
and does not reside in the mental continuum of saints ( aryasamtana ), and the two 
corresponding absorptions are different. In the opposing hypothesis, these two 
absorptions, which both involve the destruction of awareness and sensation 
(samjhaveditanirodha) and the cessation of the activity of the consciousnesses 
( vijhdnasamuddcara ), would not be different. 

It is not possible to say that these two concentrations are different, because the levels 
(bhumi) on which they are practiced - the fourth Dhyana on the one hand, the Bhavagra 
on the other hand - are different, or because the aims pursued ( ishta ) - deliverance 
(nihsarana) on the one hand, tranquility ( santavihara ) on the other hand - are different 
(cf. Kosa, II, p. 210). Indeed, their self-natures ( svalaksana ) are identical since mind 
(citta) and mental factors ( caitta ) have been destroyed ( niruddha ) in both.” (U) 

The Upanibandhana is attacked here, not by the Vaibhasikas for whom the concentrations 
are entities in themselves ( dravyadharma ), but by the Sautrantikas for whom, according 
to Kosa, II, p. 214, the absorptions are simply an entity by designation 
( prajhaptidharma ), the simple nonexistence of the mind for a time. The present reasoning 
( nirnaya ) is addressed to the Sautrantikas, for both of us are quite close. This school, like 
us, denies that the non-associated factors ( viprayuktasamskara ), of which the two 
absorptions are a part, (cf. Kosa, II, p. 178) are things in themselves ( dravyasat ). In this 
case, how could the two absorptions be substantially different, at least that they differ 
only by the presence or absence of the manas?” (U) 

v) “Moreover among the gods having no conceptualizing ( asamjhideva ), for the entire 
duration of an existence there would be no belief in a self ... When one is bom among the 
gods having no concept, the mind (citta) and mental factors (caitta) are destroyed. At the 


42 



very first moment of their reincarnation ( pratisamdhi ), there is the production of mind 
and mental factors. At the end of the duration of their existence, the mental series 
(. sanitaria ) resumes (cf. Kosa, II, p. 199-200). If these gods did not have afflicted manas, 
they would be free of belief in a self during the course of their existence. But we have 
never seen that beings, burdened as they are with all the afflictions ( sakalaklesayukta , cf. 
Kosa, II, p. 180), would be freed from belief in a self for the duration of a lifetime. This 
is why the Aryas are mistaken. 

It is inadmissible to claim, with the Sarvastivadins, that the mental consciousness present 
at the moment of the arising and support of belief in a self projects ( aksip -) the latter, and 
that beings lacking awareneness thus possess this belief in a self because it has not been 
cut off, is unacceptable ... Indeed, belief in a self perishes at the same time as its support, 
and its projection has no other support than the mental consciousness that appears at the 
moment of its arising. It is also impossible that - as the root-Sautrantikas have it - the 
predispositions ( vasana ) of belief in a self reside in a bodily continuum ( kayasamtana ). 
Actually, material dharmas ( rupadharma ) cannot undergo perfuming ( bhavana); they are 
completely incapable of it. Moreover, the Sautrantikas deny that matter {nip a) is a mental 
factor (caitta) because it has no immediately preceding condition 
(samanantarapratyaya). Now mind and mental factors require four conditions. 

Those who say that there is, separately, a mind simultaneous ( sahabhu ) with belief in a 
self and support of this belief, avoid these faults. (U) This mind is the manas. 

vi) “Without the manas, the persistence in all situations of the belief in a self could not be 
explained; if the existence of the manas is denied, the truth of the on-going peristence is 
no longer confirmed. Generosity and the other wholesome states {kusaldvastha) of mind 
are always accompanied by belief in a self, for one says: "It is I who am giving this gift", 
etc. 

Belief in a self does not persist without ignorance. Without support, ignorance does not 
arise, for it is a mental factor {caitta). This support can be none other than the manas; 
wholesome thoughts cannot support ignorance. (U) 

The last stanza is cited in Siddhi, p. 277. Unmixed ignorance poses an obstacle to seeing 
the truth {tattvarthadarsana). When the one exists, the other does not arise. It is present 
at all times : ever inherent {anudaddha) in all states of mind, wholesome, unwholesome, 


43 



indeterminate." (U) H translates: “present no matter what the nature of the state of mind 
is.” 

The commentaries do not explain the last line. For explanation, we refer to Siddhi, p. 
265. The four afflictions associated with the manas constitute an obstacle on the the path; 
they are therefore defiled. On the other hand, they are indetenninate from the moral point 
of view, neither wholesome nor unwholesome, because the manas which supports them is 
subtle and their coming is spontaneous. They are comparable to the afflictions of the two 
higher realms which, enveloped by tranquility, are indetenninate (cf. Kosa, V, p. 40, 74, 
93,218). 


8. There would be no ( nopalabhyate ) third category ( kaya ) called mind (citta) 
outside of the store-consciousness. Thus it is proved (siddha) that the store- 
consciousness is of the category 'mind'. The manas and the consciousnesses 
( vijnana ) arise from the mind provided with all the seeds (sarvabljaka). [134a9] 


8. Comm. Bh 326b21-24, bh 150b8-151al, U 385al0-16, u 243a6-243bl. 

In the saying of the Buddha citta-mano-vijnana, “the word manas designates the afflicted 
manas ( klista ) and the manas that has just disappeared ( anantaraniruddha); the word 
vijnana designates the six active consciousnesses (pravrttivijhana ). If the store- 

consciousness did not exist through lack of a third category, the word citta could 
designate only these two things, namely, the manas and the vijnanas. But on the one 
hand, there is no designation ( abhiddna ) without something designated ( abhidheya ) and, 
on the other hand, the words manas and vijnana are not synonymous (paryaya ) because 
the things that they designate ( abhidheya ) are distinct. By the word 'category' (/us, 
Chinese t'i) we understand the thing designated. Thus it is proved that the store- 
consciousness ... the store-consciousness is, of course, the thing designated by the word 
citta.'’'’ (U) 


9. Why is the store-consciousness also called mind ( citta )? - Because it is built up 
(dcita) by the various predisposition-seeds (vdsanabija) of dharmas. [134a 10] 


44 



9. Comm. Bh 326b27-29, bh 151al-3, U 385al8-21, u 243bl-3. 

“The various dharmas: the dharmas that result ( samgrhita ) from active consciousnesses 
( pravrttivijnana ) of various categories. For our school, the dharmas are mixed up with 
the consciousnesses of which they are the subject (cf. below, II, § 11). The 
predisposition-seeds are the special potentialities ( saktivisesa ) belonging to the perfumed 
(vasya), to the store-consciousness perfumed by the active consciousnesses. The store- 
consciousness is built up by these predisposition-seeds: the mingled ( misra ) and multiple 
( bhinnakara ) predispositions pile up in it. (U) 


10. Why is this mind (citta) not called store-consciousness or appropriating 
consciousness in the Vehicle of the Sravakas ( srdvakaydna )? - Because it pertains 
( samgrhita ) to the subtle object (siiksmajneya): the sravakas are not instructed 
( paryapanna ) to recognize all phenomena ( sarvajheya ). Although someone 
preaches the store-consciousness to them, they succeed (pmsidhyanti ) in 
knowledge ( jiidna ): that is why they are not taught the store-consciousness. But 
the bodhisattvas are instructed to recognize all phenomena: that is why the 
store-consciousness is taught to them. Without this knowledge, it would not be 
easy for them to acquire ( adhigam -) omniscience {sarvajhAana). [134a 16] 


10. Comm. Bh327c7-13,bh 151a3-5, U 385a27-385cl3, u 243b3-245al. 

The versions differ: H: “although they are not taught the store-consciousness, 
nevertheless they reach liberation ( vimukti ) by means of knowledge.” 

“ Because it pertains to the subtle object this shows that the store-consciousness is at the 
same time profound and subtle (gambhira-suksma) and the object to be understood 
( jheyartha ). Being profound and subtle, it is not preached to the sravakas. Since the latter 
are converted (vimta) by grasping coarse objects ( sthulajheya ), they do not seek to 
understand the profound and subtle object The sravakas are not instructed to recognize 
all phenomena : they have neither the capacity ( samarthya ), nor the desire ( prarthana ), 
nor the competence ( adhikara ?) Although someone preaches the store-consciousness to 


45 



them ... although they are not taught the store-consciousness, they analyze 
( pratyaveksana ) matter and other coaarse objects ( rupadisthula ), the nature of suffering 
and its origin ( duhkasamudayddisvabhava ), impermanence and other aspects 
(< anityadyakara ); by doing this, they cut off all the afflictions ( klesa ). With this aim and 
in the presence of the Bhagavat, they practice {dear anti) the religious life (brahmacarya). 
Coarse objects, because material dharmas ( rupadharma ) have a nature and 
characteristics that are coarse; because feeling ( vedana ) and the other dharmas are easily 
distinguished ( paricchinna ) in their object ( alambana ) and in their aspect {akara) and are 
of coarse aspect. The store-consciousness is quite different (tadparita) and is rightly 
called profound and subtle. 

It is true that the Buddha said: ’I deny that it is possible to put an end to suffering if there 
were even a single dhanna not understood or not known completely' (naham 
ehadharmam apy anabhijhdydparijhdya duhkhasydnatkriyam vadami, cf. Kosavyakhya, 
p. 4, § 16). But the Buddha means that if the afflictions are not cut one does not put an 
end to suffering. In different words ( visistasabda ), the Buddha deals with the same 
general subject: the afflictions are not cut each one separately. Or else the Buddha has in 
mind the general characteristics {samanyalaksana), impermanence and other aspects 
{anityatady akara). Therefore he does not mean to speak here about the store- 
consciousness; there is no fault in that. 

But the bodhisattvas are trained to understand all things : they have a capacity belonging 
to their family ( gotraprabhava ). Endowed with this capacity, with the wish and the 
ability, they are instructed to cognize everything. Otherwise they would be unable to 
bring about the welfare of others (parartha ). Why? Not being omniscient, they would not 
adequately understand the aspirations ( asaya ) of others, their acquired inclinations 
{anusaya, dhatu), the degree of their moral faculties {indriyavaravara), their possibilities 
and their weaknesses, the different occasions: therefore they would not be able to bring 
about the welfare of others. But all these things are sought by the bodhisattvas; this is 
why they are taught the store-consciousness. 

Without this knowledge ...: without the knowledge of the store-consciousness, they would 
be unable to cut through mental constructions regarding the object ( arthaparikalpa ). If 
these are not cut through, nonconceptual knowledge ( nirvikalpakajnana ) would not be 
produced since there would still be imaginary objects (parikalpitartha ). For this reason it 


46 



would not be easy for them to acquire omniscience (saravajnajndna). Why? They are 
able to grasp ( saksatkr -) the general characteristics ( samanyalaksana ) of objects; but the 
imaginary objects of conceptual knowledge ( savikalpajhana ), the self-natures 
(. svalaksana ), concepts ( yikalpa ), are mutually different {any any a vyavrtta ) and infinite in 
number ( ananta ); it is absolutely impossible to know them all. But if they know that it is 
only by the power of transformation ( parinamabala ) of the predispositions of speech 
(read: ming yen si k'i, abhilapavdsana) characterizing the store-consciousness that 
objects ( artha ), beings (sattva) and individuals ( atman ) manifest ( avabhasante ), then 
they understand that there is neither the object that is known ( grahya ) nor the subject that 
knows ( grahaka ), and thus they acquire nonconceptual wisdom ( nirvikalpakajndna ). 
Then, by subsequent wisdom ( prsthalabdhajhdna ), they penetrate ( pratividh -) the nature 
of things ( dharmata ) as studied (yathabhyastam ). Since the true nature ( tathata ), which 
consists ( prabhavita ) of the general characteristic ( samanyalakshana ) of all dharmas, is 
of one taste ( ekarasa ), they know all dharmas. In one instant they acquire universal 
knowledge ( sarvavisayajhana ), because the objects of this knowledge are not infinite 
{ananta). 

Nevertheless, in order for the bodhisattvas to succeed in that, they must spend three 
incalculable periods {kalpasamkhyeya, cf. chap. V, § 6): they must accumulate ( sambhr -) 
vast accumulations ( sambhara ) in order to acquire a vast perfection. 

This universal knowledge ( sarvakarajhana ), knowledge with marvellous fruits, is such as 
we have said. The gathering of this marvelous wisdom assumes the clear seeing of the 
nonexistence of dharmas (dharmanairatmya). Hence this stanza: 'If one does not cut 
through the concept of object ( grahyadharmavika/pa ) for all objects, one does not 
acquire omniscience. Therefore it is proper to proclaim the nonexistence of dharmas.’ - 
For those who do not understand this doctrine properly, this verse is added: 'Hence 
continuity {sanitaria) is powerful. They will know that, like fire that devours everything, 
omniscience makes everything and cognizes everything.'. 

Thus, according to whether one cognizes or does not cognize the store-consciousness, it 
is easy or difficult to attain omniscience. In regard to this subject, it is asked whether the 
knowledge relating to the nonexistence of dharmas {dharmanairatmya) constitutes 
omniscience. Although it is omniscience {sarvajhana), it is not universal knowledge 
{sarvakarajhana). ” (U) 


47 



11. In the Vehicle of the Sravakas also, the store-consciousness is mentioned by 
synonyms ( parydya ). 

i) Thus, in the Ekottaragama (cf. Anguttara, II, p. 131), in the sutra of the four 
superiorities ( anusamsa ) of the Tathagata's birth, it is said: “Creatures 
(prajd) love the ultimate basis ( alayarata ), cherish the ultimate basis 

( alayarama ), are fond of the ultimate basis ( a lay as am m u dita) , are pleased 
with the ultimate basis ( alayabhirata ). In order to destroy the ultimate basis, 
when someone preaches the Dharma to them, they wish to hear it ( susrusanti ) 
and lend an ear to it ( srotram avadadhati ); they seek perfect knowledge 
( ajnacittam upasthapayanti) and are in possession of the path of truth 
(dh arm dnudh arm apratipann a) . When the Tathagata appeared in the world 
( prddurbhava ), this marvelous ( dscarya ) extraordinary ( adbhuta ) Dharma 
appeared in the world.” It is by this synonym that the store-consciousness is 
mentioned in the Vehicle of the Sravakas as well. 

ii) In the agama of the Mahasamghikas also, it is called the root- 
consciousness ( mulavijhdna ): it is mentioned by this synonym also. Thus, the 
tree ( vrksa ) depends upon its root ( inula ). 

iii) In the agama of the Mahlsasaka also, it is called 'aggregate which lasts 
through all samsara' ( asamsarikaskandha ): it is mentioned by this synonym 
as well. In certain places (kvacit) and at certain times ( kaddcit ), matter ( riipa ) 
and mind ( citta ) are interrupted ( samucchinna ); but in the store- 
consciousness their seeds ( blja ) are never interrupted. [134a26] 


11. Comm. Bh 327a4-18, bh 152a3-152b2, U 386a2-386b3, u 245al-245b6. 

i) The text of the Ekottara is in Anguttara, II, p. 131: Alayarama bhikkhave paja 
alayarata alaaalyasammudita, sa tathagatena analaye dhamme desiyamane sussuyati 
sotam odahati annacittam upatthapeti, tathagatassa bhikkhave arahato 
sammasambuddhassa patubhava ay am... acchariyo abbhuto dhammo patubhavati. 


48 



“Creatures love the ultimate basis : This first member of the phrase (pada ) designates 
attachment ( abhinivesa ) to the store-consciousness in a general way. They cherish the 
ultimate basis: they cherish the store-consciousness of the present: they are fond of the 
ultimate basis: they are fond of the store-consciousness of the past; they are pleased with 
the ultimate basis: they will be pleased with the store-consciousness of the future. 
Because, in their nature, creatures are deeply attached to the ultimate basis, because they 
cherish it, are fond of it and are pleased with it, generally it is said that they love the 
ultimate basis. 

In order to destroy the ultimate basis ..., when they are taught the doctrine: the holy 
doctrine ( atyadesana ), they want to listen ... and lend an ear: this refers to wisdom 
coming from hearing ( srutamaya jhana). They seek perfect wisdom: they want to reflect 
on the doctrine which they have heard; this refers to wisdom coming from reflection 
(< cintamaya jhana). They are in possession of the path of truth 

(dharmanudharmapratipanna); Dharma means that which should be realized 
(sdksdtkarta vya ) ; anudharma means the path ( marga ), because it is favorable 
( anulomika ) to Dhanna. Or else, Dharma means the supramundane path 
(lokottaramarga) and anudharma means the mundane path ( laukikamarga ). They possess 
it ( pratipanna ): they establish it ( a vas t ha pay an ti ) in their mental continuum 

{cittas amtana), they implant it and develop it to the point of manifesting the masteries 
( vasita ); this refers to the wisdom coming from meditation {bhavanamaya jhana).” (U) 

“ii) Among the Mahasamghikas, it is called root-consciousness. In the same way that the 
tree depends on its root: the store-consciousness is the root cause {mulahetu) of all the 
consciousnesses. In the same way, the tree's root is the cause of the leaves, etc., and 
without the root, the leaves would not exist.” (Bh) 

iii) "In the Agama of the Mahisasakas ... : this school accepts three kinds of aggregates 
(skandha): (!) momentary aggregates ( ksanikaskandha ), i.e., the dharmas that arise and 
cease from moment to moment; (2) aggregates that last for a lifetime (janmiskandha ), 
i.e., the dharmas that last up until death; (3) the aggregate that lasts for all of samsara 
(, asamsdrikaskandha ), i.e., the dhanna that lasts until the attainment of the diamond-like 
concentration ( vajropamasamadhi , cf. Kosa, VI, p. 228). Other than the store- 
consciousness, nothing else could be this aggregate. Therefore it is synonymous with 


49 



store-consciousness; actually, the other aggregates of which we are going to speak do not 
last for all of samsara. 

Why? Because in certain places and at certain times ...: in certain places, i.e., in a certain 
world; at certain times, i.e., at certain moments. In the fonnless world ( arupyadhatu ), all 
matter ( rupa ) is interrupted ( samucchinna); among the gods without identification 
(i asamjnideva ) and in the two meditative attainments ( samapatti ), every mind is 
interrupted. By contrast, the seeds ( bija ) of matter and of mind contained in the store- 
consciousness can never be interrupted as long as the path that counteracts them 
( pratipaksamarga ) does not arise.” (U) 

iv) For bhavanga see the commentaries in the following §. U: hphags pa gnas brtan pa 
mams (arya sthavira) kyi lun las ni srid pahi yan lag (bhavanga) gi sgara gsuhs te / srid 
pahi rgyu yin pahi phyir ro// mam par phye ste smra ba (vibhajyavadin) hi luh las kyah 
de skad du hbyuh ho // Ita ba (darsana) la sogs pa drug ni mig la sogs pahi mam par 
shes pa (caksurddivijhana) nas yid (mana) la sogs pahi bar du ci rigs su (yathayogam) 
sbyar ro// gah €ig su dag kun g€i mam par ses pa (alayavijhana) ; la €e sdah (dvesa) ba 
ni mam par ses pahi cha bdun dan Idan pahi phreh ba (vijhdnasdptabhdgvyamdla) Ita 
bar byedpa nas / dhos po yohs su good pahi bar ro €es smra ba dehi la ni rigs pa thigs pa 
(nyayabindu) hi nan du Ita bar byaho. 

U: “In the school ( nikaya ) of the Arya Sthaviras, this consciousness is also given the 
name of ’bhavanga' (factor of existence): indeed, the store-consciousness is the cause 
(hetu) of existence ( bhava ). According to what they say, the six consciousnesses do not 
cease nor do they arise. It is on account of either the bhavanga or the retrospective mind 
(fan yuan = paryalambana) that they cease. [My (Lamotte) understanding of this is: when 
the six consciousnesses cease, it is on account of the bhavanga where they subside, or on 
account of the retrospective mind which makes them subside there.] It is on account of 
the mental retribution-consciousness ( vipakamanovijhanadhatu ) that they arise. - They 
say this because the projector ( aksepaka ) is the mental consciousness alone 
( manovijhana ). The first five consciousnesses, having nothing to cognize in the Dharma, 
are merely projected ( aksipta ). It is the same for the manas element ( manodhatu ) which is 
merely the registering of the object ( sampraticchana ). Seeing ( darsana ) - which precedes 
registering - is a simple apprehension (tchao-tchou). Examining (samtirana) ensures a 
definite knowledge ( viniscaya ). Defining ( avasthapana ) is the creation of verbal concepts 


50 



(i vag\nkalpa ). The six (??) consciousnesses are capable only of producing conduct 
(deportment) ( Tryapatha ) as their result; they are incapable of accomplishing wholesome 
or unwholesome actions ( karmapatha ); they are incapable of entering into or coming out 
(vyuttha-) of concentration ( samadhi ). Function ( kriya ?) [Monier-Williams Dictionary 
gives performance, activity] alone is capable of causing production. By virtue of the 
projector, one is awakened from sleep; by virtue of function, one reviews what one has 
dreamed, etc. The Vibhajyavadin school also calls this consciousness ’bhavanga’.” 

Here U gives an incomplete list of the nine cittas of the Sthavira school. The list cites, 
among others, bhavanga, -, darsana, sampratfcchana, samtirana, avasthapana, kriya, 
pajyalambana and bhavanga. See below, Notes. 


12. Thus, this support of the knowable called store-consciousness (§ 1-3), 
appropriating consciousness (§ 4-5), mind (§ 6-9), ultimate basis § 11, no. 1), root 
consciousness (§ 11, no. 2), element that lasts throughout all of samsara (§ 11, no. 
3), factor of existence (§ 11, no. 4), is the store-consciousness. The great path 
(mahdmdrga) that is the store-consciousness is praised by all these names. 

[134b 1] 


12. Comm. Bh 327a23-24, bh 152b2, U 386b7-18, u 245b246a2. 
See § 1 1, no. 4. 


13. i) Some think that, [in the words of the Bhagavat cited in § 6], the words 'citta' 
(mind), 'manas' and 'vijnana' (consciousness) are one and the same thing 
(< ekdrtha ), but that the syllables ( vyahjana ) are different ( bhinna ). This opinion 
does not hold ( ayukta ): we have noted ( upalabhyate ) that manas and vijnana are 
two different things; thus citta also is a separate thing. 

ii) Regarding the words of the Bhagavat cited [in § 11],: "Creatures love the 
ultimate basis,” etc., some say: "The ultimate basis ( alaya ) is the five 
elements of grasping (upaddnaskandha)" ; others say: " The ultimate basis is 
the pleasant feeling joined with lust ( sukhvedand ragasamprayukta)" \ others 


51 



again say: "The ultimate basis is wrong view of self ( satkdyadrsti ). " They are 
mistaken ( ntudha ) about the store-consciousness in their texts (again a) and 
their conceptions (pratipatti ); that is why they interpret it in that way. 
According to the interpretations (vyavasthapana) current in the Vehicle of 
the Sravakas, these interpretations of the name of the alaya do not hold. 
Enlightened people (amudha), however, believe ( parigrihnanti ) that the 
ultimate basis is the store-consciousness. Why is this preferable? 

(1) The five elements of grasping are impediments (pratikula ) for those born 
into very painful ( praduhkita ) destinies (gati ). It would be absurd that these 
beings would take these extremely disagreeable (anista) elements as ultimate 
basis (all-); on the contrary, they want to be liberated from them. 

(2) Pleasant feeling joined with desire does not exist in and beyond the fourth 
dhyana. It would be absurd that beings who experience it (tadupeta) would 
take it to be ultimate basis, because it annoys them. 

(5) Wrong view of self also is an impediment for Buddhists (chos hdi pa) who 
believe in the non-existence of self (nairdtmyddhimukta). That is why it would 
be absurd for them to take it as ultimate basis. 

1. Considering the store-consciousness as their own substance (dlayavijn an am 
antardtmabhdvena abhyupagamya), beings born into very painful destinies 
want to eliminate (vindsa) the painful elements. Nevertheless, bound (baddha) 
to the store-consciousness by attachment to the self ( dtmasneha ), they do not 
by any means wish the destruction of the latter. 

2. Beings born in the fourth dyana or beyond are opposed (pratikula) to 
pleasant feeling joined with desire. Nevertheless, they remain bound 
(anubaddha) to the store-consciousness by attachment to their own substance 
(dtmabhdvasneha). 

3. Similarly, Buddhists who believe in the nonexistence of self are opposed to 
wrong view of self. Nevertheless, they remain bound (anubaddha) to the 
store-consciousness by attachment to their own substance. Thus the 


52 



receptacle is the store-consciousness; this is indeed the correct interpretation. 

[134b21] 


13. Comm. Bh 327M9-28, bh 152b3-153a4, U 386cl 1-387M5, u 246a2-248al. 

The Tibetan version is shorter than that of H. - U brings out the principle on which this 
whole discussion rests: no one takes as ultimate basis that which is unpleasant to them 
( anistarthe na kascid ally ate). But the store-consciousness is always dear to beings since 
they confuse it with their atman. The instinct of self-preservation is supported by it. 
Therefore it is really the 'ultimate basis'. 

A variation that we note in the edition, § 13, no. 2, is worthy of discussion. H: “This is 
how they interpret the word ultimate basis but, according to the Vehicle of the Sravakas, 
this interpretation is not logically correct.” U comments: “Even according to their own 
school (tseu tsong), it is not correct. It is like the tattvas, etc., established by the 
Vaisesikas (cheng louen), etc.: according to the Vaisesika system itself, they include 
faults.” The way I (Lamotte) understand it is as follows: Just as the Vaisesikas contradict 
their own system by setting up some tattvas, so the Sravakas contradict themselves by 
interpreting the word 'alaya' in that way. - T: “Although these interpretations are not 
correct according to the interpretations current in the Vehicle of the Sravakas, 
nevertheless enlightened people believe that the ultimate basis is the store- 
consciousness”; u comments: ran gis lo rgyus kyi lugs kyi na thams cad kyi thams cad du 
run bar bstan to. 


14. Here ends the study of the synonyms ( paryaya ) of 'store-consciousness'. We 
will now take up the study of its natures ( laksana ). In brief (samdsatah), its 
natures are three in number, i.e., self-nature ( svalaksana ), nature of being cause 
( hetuvalaksana ) and nature of being fruit ( phalavalaksana ). 

i) First, the self-nature of the store-consciousness: by virtue of the 
predispositions ( vdsand ) of all the afflictive dharmas {samklesikd) that 
perfume it, the store-consciousness is the generating cause (janakahetu ) of 


53 



these dharmas since it has the ability to contain the seeds 
( bljaparigrahanopetatvat ). 

ii) Next, its nature of being cause: this store-consciousness furnished with all 
its seeds ( sarvabljaka ) is always present as the cause of these afflictive 
dharmas. 

iii) Finally, its nature of being fruit: the store-consciousness arises by virtue 
of the eternal predispositions ( anddikdlika vdsana) of these same afflictive 
dharmas. [134cl] 


14. Comm. Bh 327cl0-29, bh 153a4-153b2, U 387b25-387cl7, u 248al-248b5. 

The original Sanskrit may be restored as follows: idarn tavad alayavijhanasya 
paiyayavyavasthapanam / alas tasya laksana vyavasthapanam katham drastavyam / tat 
trividham samasatah svalaksanavayavasthapanam hetutvavyavasthapanam phalatvavya- 
vasthapanam ca / atralayavijhanasya svalaksanam yat sarvasamklesika-dharmavdsanam 
nisritya bljaparigrahanopetatvat tajjanakahetulaksanam / atra hetutvalakshanam yad 
evam tasya sarvabijakasyalayavijhasya tesam eva samklesikadharmanam hetutvena 
sarvakale pratyupasthanam / atra phalatvavyavasthapanam yad alayavijhanam tesam 
eva samklesika-dharmanam anadikalikam vasanam nisritya pravatate // 

“The self-nature of this consciousness is not understood from its names alone: this is why 
it is necessary to explain its self-nature ( svalaksana ) and its inherent natures (read ying 
siang = sambandhilaksana ) ... The self-nature is separated from the inherent natures since 
the inherent natures of cause and fruit are different from the self-nature. 

i) By virtue of the predispositions of all the afflictive dharmas : The afflictive dharmas are 
lust, hatred, etc. ( ragadvesadi ). Arising and ceasing ( sahotpadanirodha ) with these 
dharmas that perfume it, the store-consciousness becomes seed ( bjja ). Hence, in relation 
to the dharmas which are to be born, its power of being generating cause. Since it has the 
power of containing the seeds : Arising and ceasing with the dharmas of beings ( jatimat ), 
it undergoes perfuming by them. As a result of this perfuming, it contains the seeds of the 
dharmas. Joined with these seeds, it can give birth to the dharmas. The ’pradhana', etc., 
does not have this power to contain the seeds; neither do the immediately-preceding 


54 



conditions ( samanantara-pratyaya ). These are auxiliary ( upakara ) but not principal 
causes ( pradhanahetu ), since they do not have the power to contain the seeds. The 
principal cause is the seeds. The store-consciousness contains them; therefore relative to 
the dharmas, it plays the role of generating cause; it is only an auxiliary ... 

ii) The nature of being cause is activity par excellence (adhimatrakriya). Having the 
power of perfuming ( vasanasakti ), the store-consciousness has the nature of cause. Being 
present, it can give rise to the afflictive dharmas. 

iii) The nature of being fruit: The store-consciousness is generated by the perfumings of 
the active afflictive dharmas, lust, etc., which come from (, sdmgrhita ) the active 
consciousnesses ( pravrttivijnana ). That is its nature of fruit.” (U) 


15. What is propensity ( vasana )? What is the entity designated (a b hid hey a) by 
this word ( abhidhdna )? - That which, by simultaneous birth and destruction 
( sahotpddanirodha ) of the dharma, is the generating cause (janakanimitta ) of this 
particular dharma, is what is called propensity. 

Thus, sesame seeds ( tila ) perfumed by a flower (puspabhdvita ): sesame seeds and 
flower arise and perish at the same time, but the sesame seeds arise as the cause 
reproducing the scent ( gandha ) of the flower. In this way also among desirous 
people ( rdgddicarita ), the propensity of desire ( ragadivasand ) arises and perishes 
at the same time as the desire, but their state of mind arises as the cause 
engendering this desire. Finally, among the sages ( bahusruta ), the propensity to 
knowledge ( bahusruta-vdsand ) also is born and perishes at the same time as the 
act of reflecting on what has been heard ( shrutamanasikdra ), but their state of 
mind arises as the cause engendering discourse ( abhildpanimitta ). Filled 
( parigrhlta ) with this propensity, they are called 'dharmagrahin'. The same 
reasoning applies to the store-consciousness. [134c 10] 


15. Comm. Bh 328al 1-14, bh 153b2-4, U 387c26-388al0, u 248b5-249a5. 

“ That which, by simultaneous birth and destruction of the dharma, is the generating 
cause of this particular dharma : that which is perfumed {vasya, bhavya) arises and 


55 



perishes at the same time as that which perfumes ( vasaka , bhavaka). In accordance with 
the perfuming, in harmony with that which perfumes, that which is perfumed has a 
perfume capable of giving rise to a fruit of special type which, in turn, will be capable of 
perfuming. Birth and destruction are simultaneous : this rules out births and destructions 
which would take place at different moments and excludes eternal entities ... Thus, 
sesame seeds perfumed by a flower. The author illustrates his explanation by examples 
generally accepted ( prasiddhadrstanta ) by his adversaries. Actually, sesame seeds and 
the flower are, both of them, modifications of the mind ( cittaparinama ). The sesame 
seeds arise and cease at the same time as the flower which perfumes them. Thereby they 
are a cause capable of reproducing the scent belonging to the flower immediately 
afterwards. It is the same here for successive moments of the sesame seeds.” (U) 


16. Do the seeds ( blja ) of afflictive dharmas ( samklesika ) contained in the store- 
consciousness constitute a category substantially different ( pratibhinna ) or non- 
different ( abhinna ) from this consciousness? - Substantially, these seeds are 
neither different nor non-different from the store-consciousness. However, the 
store-consciousness arises in such a way that it has the power (prabhdvavisista ) of 
giving rise to the afflictive dharmas; it is said to be provided with all the seeds 
( sarvabljaka ). [134c 14] 


16. Comm. Bh 328al9-328b7, bh 153b4-154a4, U 388al4-16, u 249a5-249b6. 

The seeds cannot be either different from the store-consciousness or identical with it: 
these two hypotheses present diffulties; bh comments: de dan tha dad na ni yan lag 
thams cad kyis kyah tha dad pa thob par hgyur €ih kun g€i mam par ses pa skad cig mas 
kyah gnod par hgyur tel de dan tha dad pahi phyir de la dga ba dan mi dge ba dag gi bag 
chags yod pa sa bon hid yin par hgyur na de ni luh du ma bstan par hdod do// tha mi dad 
na yah ji Itar na man po yin des na de Ita na yah ma yin te/ ghi ga I tar yah skyon yod do. 
- This passage is obscure; Bh differs slightly: “If they were different from the store- 
consciousness, the seeds would differ part by part (fen fen): instantaneous destruction 
( ksanikanirodha ) of the store-consciousness would not take place since they are different. 
By the power of the wholesome or unwholesome propensities ( vasana ), the seeds would 


56 



be wholesome or unwholesome. But it is accepted that they are indeterminate ( avyakrta ). 
If they were not different, how could there be a number of them ( sambahula )? Thus these 
two hypotheses present difficulties.” 

“The store-consciousness arises in such a way ...: it is endowed with special 
potentialities ( saktivisesa ) capable of giving rise to afflictive dharmas. Furnished with 
these potentialities, it is called 'consciousness endowed with all the seeds'. There are 
examples ( drstanta ) for this. The wheat seed (yavabija), because it has the power to give 
rise to the shoot ( ahkura ), has the nature of seed. After having undergone the action of 
time or fire, the wheat loses is germinative power: its nature of being wheat subsists just 
as at the beginning, but since its strength is exhausted, it no longer has the nature of seed. 
It is the same for the store-consciousness. It has powers giving rise to afflictive dharmas; 
endowed with these powers, it is called 'consciousness endowed with all the seeds'. (Bh) 


17. The store-consciousness and the defiled dharmas ( sdmklesika ) are 
simultaneously mutual causes ( anyonyahetuka ). How? - It is like the case of a 
lamp ( dTpa ): the arising of the flame (jvalotpada ) and the combustion of the wick 
( vartidahana ) are mutual and simultaneous. Or like two bundles of reeds 
( nadakaldpa ) which, simultaneously leaning on each other, do not fall down. In 
the same way, here too it is a matter of mutual causes: the store-consciousness is 
the cause ( hetu ) of the defiled dharmas; in the same way, the defiled dharmas 
are the cause of the store-consciousness. That is the true definition 
( vyavasthdpana ) of the causal condition ( hetupratyaya ) because another causal 
condition does not exist ( nopalabhyate ). [134c20] 


17. Comm. 328M4-23, bh 154a4-8, U 388a22-388b8, u 249b6-250a8. 

“Let us take a lamp, for example: at a given moment, the lamp’s wick gives rise to the 
flame and the lamp's flame consumes the wick; they are mutually cause and result. 
Similarly, the store-consciousness and the active consciousnesses [ pravrttivijhana which 
are identified with defiled dharmas] are simultaneously and mutually cause and fruit. 
Thus, two bundles of reeds leaning against each other remain upright and do not fall 
down. At the time when the first one supports the second one so that it remains upright 


57 



and does not fall, at the same time the second one supports the first one so that it remains 
upright and does not fall over. 

This is the true definition of the causal condition : as we have said above (§ 14), the cause 
that contains the seeds is the causal condition to the exclusion of any other. 

For another causal condition does not exist : for the other dharmas cannot contain the 
seeds (, hija ). [The Vaibhasikas, Kosa, II, p. 244 seq.] who claim that five causes are 
causal condition ( hetupratyaya ), equally (paryayena ) name the store-consciousness. - 
Actually, in regard to the three causes, co-arisen cause ( sabhagahetu ), omnipresent cause 
(. sarvatragahetu ) and completely-ripening cause ( vipakahetu ), their nature of cause 
( hetutva ) is not justified ( ayukta ) if they do not carry the seeds ( vasana ). But the seeds 
exist nowhere else than in the store-consciousness. - As for the associated causes 
( samprayuktahetu ), i.e., the interdependent mind-and-mental events ( cittacaitta ), like 
wandering merchants, they exert themselves on objects ( visaya ) and possess a 
potentiality of their own ( svasakti ); but, without the seeds that depend upon the store- 
consciousness [according to bh: kun g€i mam par ses pa la brten pahi sa bon tried par], 
this potentiality is not explained. - By simultaneously-arising cause ( sahabuhetu ) is 
understood the store-consciousness and the active consciousnesses. Apart from the store- 
consciousness, the mutual cause that contains the internal ( adhyatmika ) and external 
( bahya ) seeds, no other causal condition exists " (U) 


18. How can the non-different ( abhinna ) and non-variable ( acitra ) propensities 
(vasana) be the cause of different and variable dharmas? Like cloth (vastra) 
coated ( parinata ) by different ingredients: when it is coated, it does not show any 
variation, but when it is dipped into the dye-bath ( rangabhdjana ), then many 
(aneka) different (bhinna) rainbow-hued (ndndvidha) colors (rahgaprabheda) 
appear. Similarly, for the store-consciousness perfumed (bhavita) by diverse 
propensities (ndndvdsand): at the moment of impregnation it is not varied; but 
when it is dipped into the dye-bath, which is the arising of the fruit 
( phalabhinirvrtti ), a crowd of various dharmas (up ram dnandnddh arm a) 
manifests. [134c27] 


58 



18. Comm. Bh 328c3-10, bh 154a8-154b3, U 388M6-20, u 250a8-250b2. 

It is to be assumed that, in order to dye a cloth, the raw material is coated with various 
ingredients (tshig guhi rtsi: nut juice), then the whole thing is dipped into a developing 
bath. Only after coming out of the bath are the colors seen on the cloth. In our 
civilization, the example of photography would be even more appropriate. 

“The store-consciousness is like a dyed cloth. The arising of the fruit being its dye-bath, 
the author speaks of the dye-bath of the arising of the fruit. It penetrates it when it is 
seized (parigrhfta ) by the conditions (pratyaya ). At the time of impregnation, it shows no 
difference or variety, but when it has reached the stage of retribution ( vipakavastha ), it 
appears as the very cause ( hetusvabhava ) of multiple dharmas.” (Bh) 


19. Here in the Greater Vehicle, there is dependent origination 
( pratityasamutpada ) which is subtle (suksmd) and very profound ( atigambhlra ). 
In brief ( samdsatah ), this pratityasamutpada is twofold: the pratityasamutpada 
that apportions the self-natures ( svabhdvavibhdgin ), and the pratityasamutpada 
that apportions pleasantness and unpleasantness ( istdnistavibhdgin ). 

i) The production of dharmas by virtue of the store-consciousness is the 
pratityasamutpada that which apportions the self-natures, since it is the 
same condition (pratyayasvabhdva ) of the distribution ( vibhaga ) the various 
self-natures ( ndndsvabhdva ). 

ii) The twelve-membered pratityasvabhava ( dvddasdngapratityasvabhdva ) is 
that which apportions pleasantness and unpleasantness, since it is the same 
condition that differentiates pleasant and unpleasant existences ( atmabhava ) 
in the wholesome and unwholesome destinies ( sugatidurgati ). [135a5] 


19. Comm. Bh 328cl8-26, bh 154b3-8, U 388b27-388c8, u 250b3-8. 

“In the Greater Vehicle there is a dependent origination that is subtle : because it is 
difficult to cognize ( durvigahya ) by worldly (/oka) people and very profound : because it 
is difficult to probe (durvigaha) by sravakas, etc. 


59 



Dependent origination signifies production as a result of a cause of that which has cause 
(rgyu las rgyu dan ldan pa hbhun: hetoh sahetukotpadah, cf. Kosa, III, p. 78. When we 
want to indicate the reason, we use the gerundive suffix (k-tva). 

That apportions the self-natures : as it has the power ( samarthya ) of apportioning them, 
or, as its activity ( prayojana ) is to apportion them, it is said that they apportion. The 
store-consciousness apportions the self-natures, for it apportions the defiled nature 
(sdmklesikadharmasvabhdva) of everything that arises ( jatimat ) by differentiating it. 

That apportions the pleasant and the unpleasant, the twelve members [of the causal 
chain] beginning with ignorance ( avidya ), by apportioning the different kinds of 
existences ( atmabhavavisesa ), pleasant and unpleassant ( ramyaramya ), into wholesome 
and unwholesome destinies, operates as principal condition (pradhanapratyaya ) in 
rebirth ( abhinirvrtti ). Indeed, at the moment when the mental factors ( sarnskara ), etc., 
arise from the store-consciousness, merit ( punya ), demerit (a puny a) and non-agitation 
( aninjya ), etc. are differentiated (visista) by the power of ignorance, etc.” (U) 


20. Here, those who are mistaken ( miiilha ) about the first dependent origination, 
i.e., store-consciousness, think that the origin of things ( anvayatva ) is to be 
sought in self-nature ( svabhdva ), or in previous actions (piirvakrta ), or in a 
transformation of the creator (isvaran irmdn a) , or in the Self (at man); or else they 
think that there is neither cause ( hetu ) nor condition (pratyaya ). 

Those who are mistaken about the second dependent origination imagine a self 
that is actor (kdraka) and enjoyer (bhoktr). 

Let us suppose there is a group of people who are blind from birth 
( jatyandhapurusa ), who have never seen an elephant ( hastin ) and who one day 
are presented with an elephant. The first blind person touches (sprsati) the trunk 
(tunda) of the elephant, the second its tusks ( danta ), the third its ears ( karna ), the 
fourth its feet (pada ), the fifth its tail (langula), the sixth its side ( prsthavamsa ). 
Someone asks them what is the elephant like, and the first answers that it is like 
a plow (haladanda), the second, like a wooden leg ( musala ), the third, like a 
winnowing basket ( surpaka ), the fourth, like a pillar (nisadasila), the fifth, like a 
broom (sammarjanT) and the sixth, like a rock (upald). In the same way here, 


60 



those who are ignorant about these two dependent originations, blinded by 
ignorance, are ignorant about the store-consciousness which here is comparable 
to the elephant, are ignorant about its self-nature ( svabhava ), its nature as cause 
and its nature as result. They think that the cause of things is the self-nature, or 
previous actions, or a creator, or a Self, or else that there is production without 
any cause. Finally, others believe in a Self which is active and enjoyer. [135al9] 


20. Comm. Bh 329al4-24, bh 154b8-155a5, U 388c23-25, u 250b3-251al. 

“Being mistaken about the two dependent originations, they are like people who are blind 
from birth. They think that previous actions are the origin of things : because they reject 
human activity ( purusakara ), they conceive this false belief ( mithyagraha ).” (U) 


21. In short ( samdsatah ), the self-nature of the store-consciousness is that of 
being a retribution-consciousness furnished with all the seeds ( sarvabTjaka 
vipakavijhAana). All the existences (kdya = dtmabhdva) of the three-fold world 
( traidhdtuka ) and all the destinies (gati) are the result of this consciousness. 

[ 1 35a2 1 ] 

21. Comm. Bh329a28-329b2, bh 155a5-7, U 388c28-389a7, u 251al-6. 

“In short, etc.: from birth to birth, because of the propensities of good or bad actions 
( karmavasana ) and because of erroneous adherence ( abhinivesa ) to dualistic concepts 
(vikalpa) about an object and a subject of consciousness (grahya - grdhaka), the original 
substance of the being ( sattvamuladravya ), the result of seed, has retribution ( vipaka ) as 
nature ( svabhava ) and the store-consciousness and the seeds ( brja ) of afflictive 
(samklesika) dharmas as its self-nature ( svalaksana ).” (U) 

u continues: des khams gsum pahi lus thams cad dan / hgro ba thams cad bsdus so €es 
bya ba la hdod pa dan gzugs dan / gzugs tried pa na spyod pahi lus thams cad dan / sem 
can gyi rgyud hgro ba thams cad de / lha la sogs pa bsdus pa ni hbrel pa can gyi mtshan 
hid do // ji ltar gzugs dan hjug pahi mam par ses pa yul kha cig dan / res hgahi dus su 
rgyun chad pa de ltar kun g€i mam par ses pa ni ghen po ma byuh gi bar du ma yin te / 


61 



khyab pahi phyir thams cad hdzin par byed paho : “All the existences of the three-fold 
world and all the destinies are the result of this consciousness: all the existences 
belonging to the realm of desire, the realm of form and the formless realm 
(, kamaruparupyavacara ), and all the destinies in the continuum of the being 
( sattvasamtana ), divine rebirth, etc., are the result of this consciousness: are inherent in it 
( sambandhilaksana ). Whereas matter ( rupa ) and the active consciousnesses 
( pravrttivijhana ) are interrupted (samucchinna) at certain places and at certain times, the 
store-consciousness is never interrupted as long as its obstruction (pratipaksa ) has not 
arisen. Because it extends everywhere ( vyapya ), it is 'all-inclusive' ( sarvagrahaka ).” 


22. Here are some verses: 

i) The outer ( bdhya ) seed and the inner ( ddhydtmika ) seed are 
undifferentiated ( avyakta ). Of these two seeds, the first is purely conventional 
( samvrta ), the second is absolute (pdramdrthika). It is accepted that there are 
seeds with six characteristics {sadkdrablja). 

ii) They are momentary ( ksanika ), simultaneous {sahabhu), proceeding in a 
continuum ( samtdnapravrtta ), determinate ( viniyata ), dependent on 
conditions (pratyaydpeksa) and originator of a self-fruit {svaphaloparjita). 

[135a26] 

22. Comm. Bh 329bl9-329cl2, bh 155a7-155b8, U 389al9-389bl4, u 251a6-252a3. 

The versions vary considerably. Bh: “The outer seed and the inner seed are 
undifferentiated as to two points: as to goodness and maliciousness, as to defilement and 
purification. The first is purely conventional, the second is absolute.” - U: “The outer 
seed and the inner seed are undifferentiated. These two seeds are merely concept 
( vijhaptimdtra ). The first is conventional, the second is absolute.” u commnets: phyi rol 
sa bon ni nas sogs paho // nan gi sa bon ni kun g€i mam par ses paho // mi gsal ba ni luh 
du ma bstan paho // ghis ni phyi dan nan giho // yah na hbras bu dan rgyu ste / de ghis 
kyi rgyu mtsahn kung €i mam par ses pa yah ghis so // de las rgyu dan g€ihi dhos pos 
kun nas lion mohs pa dan mam par byah bahi chos hbyuh bahi phyir ro // gah dag ghis 


62 



dag ces hdon pa de dag gi Itar na rgyu dan libras bu dag bsad do // him rdzob ces bya ni 
phyi rol gyi nas la sogs pa ste/ kun g€i mam par ses pa gyur pa yin pahi phyir ro // dam 
pahi don ces bya ba la don dam pahi sa bon ni kun g€i mam par ses pa ste / sa bon 
thams cad kyi rkyenyin pa dan / dehi bdag hid van lag yin pahi phyir ro: “The outer seed 
is the wheat ( yava ), etc.; the inner seed is the store-consciousness. They are 
undifferentiated, indetenninate from the moral point of view ( avyakrta ). These two seeds: 
this is a matter of the outer seed and the inner seed or of the fruit (phala) and the cause 
(, hetu ). With this two-fold object ( nimitta ), the store-consciousness is two-fold as well 
because afflicted ( samklesika ) dhannas and pure ( vaiyavadanika ) dharmas arise from the 
store-consciousness, cause and primary subastance ( muladravya ). Those who read giiis 
dag [in place of giiis ni] see this as an allusion to cause and fruit. The conventional seed 
is the external seed, wheat, etc., because it is just a development (parinama ) of the store- 
consciousness. The absolute seed is the store-consciousness, because it is the condition 
( pratyaya ) for all the seeds and the quintessence of the seed.” 

“All the seeds have six characteristics: 1) They are momentary: the two kinds of seeds 
perish as soon as they are born (janmanantaram nirudhyante). Why? It is impossible that 
an eternal ( nitya ) dharma could be seed because its nature remains unchanged from what 
it was at the beginning. - 2) They are simultaneous with their fruit. A past ( atita ) dharma, 
a future ( andgata ) dharma or a dharma dissociated from its fruit ( visamyukta ) cannot be 
seed. Why? Because the fruit is bom at the precise moment when the seed exists. - 3) 
They proceed in continuity: The store-consciousness lasts up until its obstruction 
ipratipaksa) arises; the seeds of outer dharmas last until the formation of the root (mill a) 
or until maturity. - 4) They are determinate: they are individually determined 
( pratiniyata ). Everything is not born from everything; each substance is born from the 
seed appropriate to it. Everything is not born at any time whatsoever; but a given 
substance arises from the seed belonging to it. - 5) They depend on conditions: these 
seeds require their own conditions in order to produce their fruit. Anything does not give 
rise to anything whatsoever but, at given times and given places, when the seeds 
encounter their proper conditions, at these places and times, their fruit takes birth. - 6) 
They are the authors of an appropriate fruit: a given seed produces only the fruit 
appropriate to it. Thus, the store-consciousness produces only the store-consciousness, 


63 



and wheat seed produces only the wheat fruit.” (Bh) - “This refutes the causality 
( bijatva ) of the Pradhana, etc., which does not have the qualities of seed, (u)” 


23. i) Stable ( dhruva ), indeterminate ( avyakrta ), perfumable ( bhavya ) and in 
strict relationship with the perfumer ( bhdvakasamsrta ), the perfumed and none 
other shows the nature of propensity ( vasanalaksana ). 

ii) [Theses refuting the nature of the perfumed are untenable] because i) there is 
no contact ( sambandha ) amongst the six active consciousnesses, and their 
respective three natures ( akara ) are in opposition ( viruddha ); ii) two moments 
( ksana ) are never simultaneous {sahabhu); iii) there would be application 
( prasanga ) to other categories (jati). [135bl] 


23. Comm Bh 329cl3-330al8, bh 155b8-156b5, U 389bl4-389c20, u 252a3-253a4. 

“The union of the perfumed and the perfuming is necessary so that the nature belonging 
to the seed ( bija ) and to the possesser of the seed (bijin) be established. Describing the 
perfumed, the author says that it is 1) stable : the Dharma, like the sesame seed {til a) 
which forms a continuous and stable series, can be perfumed. It is not the same for 
unstable things like sound ( sabda ), etc. - 2) In order to be perfumed, it is not enough to 
be stable; it must also be indeterminate. Thus substances of neutral odor can be 
perfumed, but not odoriferous substances like agallochum ( agaru ) or malodorous 
substances like garlic ( lasuna ), etc. - 3) Perfumable: any substance that is perfumable or 
that is capable of concentrating perfumes and the parts of which are are in mutual 
cohesion ( anyonyasamsrta ) is called ’perfumable'. Gold, stone, etc., are not perfumable 
because their parts are not in mutual cohesion. - 4) In order to be perfumed, it is 
necessary not only to be perfumable, but also to be in strict relationship with the 
perfumer : not to occupy a separate space. The relationship is the fact of never being 
separated. 

The store-consciousness alone, which has these four qualities merits the name ’perfumed’ 
and none other. These words deny that the active consciousnesses (pravrttijhana ) are the 
’perfumed’: indeed, they are in opposition to the four points enumerated above. On the 


64 



contary, the store-consciousness is stable in its nature; until the arising of its obstacle 
( pratipaksa ), it forms a continous series that is never interrupted. It is essentially 
indeterminate, being neither wholesome ( kusala ) nor unwholesome ( akusala ). Not being 
an eternal entity, it is naturally perfumable or capable of concentrating perfumes. Finally, 
it is in strict relationship with the perfumer, since it arises and ceases at the same time as 
the latter. It shows the characteristics of propensity, because of these qualities, the 
perfumed is the laksana, whereas the propensity is the laksya .” (U) 

The opposing theses concerning the nature of the perfumed are untenable: 

“1st thesis: The active consciousnesses mutually perfume one another. - No, because 
there is no contact between these active consciousnesses : these consciousnesses have a 
mobile activity ( calapravrtti ). 

Their respective three natures are in opposition: each of them functions with a special 
support ( asraya ), a special object ( alambana ) and a special act of attention ( manasikara ). 
Or again, each of them appears in particular aspects ( akara ). 

2nd thesis: The Darstantikas claim that the earlier moment (purvaksana) perfumes the 
later moment ( uttar aksana ). - To refute this thesis, the author says that two moments are 
never simultaneous: there are no two moments that exist at the same time. It is the 
simultaneous arising and cessation ( sahotpadanirodha ) that constitutes propensity. [U 
adds: It is clear that these two moments which are not simultaneous are not in contact 
( sambaddha ). Not being in contact, they do not have the nature of perfumed-perfumer]. 

3rd thesis: But, it is said, these consciousnesses belong to the same type ( samajatTya ). 
Even though they are not in contact, they share the same type, the type consciousness 
( yijndnajati ). Therefore they can perfume one another. - No, because it would be 
applicable to other categories: it would be the same for other types. The organs ( indriya ), 
eye, etc., being of the same type of riipaprasada (subtle material element), should also be 
mutually perfumed, in the sense that the two organs, eye and ear, together having a subtle 
characteristic ( prasadadharma ), should be mutually perfumed. Now you cannot accept 
that because, despite the subtle element common to them, these organs have distinct 
series and consequently cannot perfume one another. It is the same for the 


65 



consciousnesses: despite the characteristic of consciousness common to them, how could 
they perfume one another?” (Bh) 

“These are the various theses arguing aginst perfuming. They claim that the six 
consciousnesses are mutually perfumed, or that the previous moment perfumes the 
subsequent moment, or that there is perfuming of the 'consciousness' type or of the 
'moment' type. All of these theses are erroneous. Thus it is correct to say that only the 
store-consciousness, to the exclusion of the other consciousnesses, is susceptible of being 
perfumed.” (U) 


24. The outer seed and the inner seed are, at the same time, generator ( janaka ) 
and projector ( dksepaka , avahaka) because they project the offspring ( anupta ) 
and the corpse respectively. It is like an arrow (isu) which does not fall in mid- 
flight. [Variant]: because they cease ( vinas -) spontaneously ( svarasena ) in 
succession. [135b3] 


24. Comm. Bh 330al8-27, bh 156b5-157al, U 389c20-390a8, u 253a4-253b4. 

“The two seeds in question, i.e., the outer seed and the inner seed, are both generating 
cause (janakahetu ) and projecting cause ( aksepakahetu ). First, the outer seed is 
generating cause until the ripening of the fruit; the inner seed is generating cause until the 
end of life ( ayuhparyanta ). The outer seed projects the shoots ( anupta ) after the tree has 
rotted away. When the tree is dead, it shoots up off-shoots without them having to be 
planted ( vap -). The inner seed projects the corpse after death. It is thanks to the 
projecting cause that the shoots and the corpse last long enough. If the two seeds were 
generating cause only, as soon as the cause disappears, the fruit would perish and would 
not last for even an instant. If the moments ( ksana ) followed one another, if the 
subsequent moment arose because of the previous moment, there would never be a final 
tenn. That is why the projecting cause necessarily exists. These two seeds are cause in 
the same way that the string that is released and the bow that is bent cause the arrow not 
to fall but to travel a long distance.” (Bh) 


66 



“These two kinds of seeds, outer and inner, are generating cause (janakahetu ) and 
projecting cause ( aksepakahetu ) at the same time. The outer seed, on the one hand, is 
generating cause relative to the shoot (afikura) and, on the other hand, projecting cause 
relative to the leaves ( parna ), etc. The store-consciousness or inner seed is, on the one 
hand, generating cause relative to name-and-form ( namarupa ) and, on the other hand, 
projecting cause relative to the six sense organs ( sadayatana ) up to and including old age 
and death (jaramarana ). 

So be it; the seed is generating cause, but how is it projecting cause? In reply to this 
question, the writer responds: they project the rotten wood and the corpse respectively. If 
these two seeds were merely generating cause and not projecting cause, the seeds of grain 
contained in warehouses and storehouses could not be kept as such for a long time. After 
death, the corpse ( mrtasanra ) could not exist ( anupravrt -) in the state of putrefaction, 
etc. (yimlakadyavasthd), but it would disappear ( vinas -) immediately after death. 

What is the example for that? Because they spontaneouly perish subsequently, like the 
arrow (isu). The momentum ( samskaravega ) supplied by the stretched ( ksepakaguna ) 
bowstring is the generating cause that makes the arrow released from the string not to 
fall. The force ( samskarabala ) exerted by the bent bow is the projecting cause that makes 
the arrow fly far to its target. It is not just the momentum furnished by the stretched cord, 
for then the arrow would fall at once. Neither is it just the continuing thrust belonging to 
the movement ( Trana ), for then the arrow would not fall. But when these two forces are 
joined together, the arrow, having left the string, travels far to its target. Thus it must be 
agreed that here there is a twofold force operating {samskarabala), that which gives birth 
and that which projects. 

Those who read the variant: “because they subsequently perish spontaneously" establish 
the existence of the projecting cause by means of reasoning without resorting to the 
example of the arrow. How? When the oil wick ( tailavarti ) is used up, the flame of the 
lamp subsequently is extinguished spontaneously ( svarasena ) independent of any 
external cause {bahyapratyayanapeksa)', but that occurs little by little (kramena) and not 
right from the start. For these reasons, there must necessarily be a projecting force. In all 
compositional factors ( samskara ) that are undestroyed and actually present, there must 
also be a germinating force which, by its development, projects them and causes them not 
to be cut.” (U) 


67 



25. Here are two stanzas that show the difference between the external and 
internal seed: 

i) The outer seed sometimes (ham) is not planted (H: perfumed). It is not the 
same for the inner seed. If the propensity for hearing, etc., (srutadivasana) 
did not exist, the arising of its fruit would be impossible. 

ii) Because this absurd consequence would follow ( dosaprasanga ), that the 
thing accomplished would perish ( krtavipranasa ) and that the thing not 
accomplished would occur (akrtabhyagama). Therefore that is the support of 
propensity. [135b8] 


25. Comm. U 390al4-390b7, u253b5-254a6. 

“Up to now the author has talked about the outer and inner seed as vaguely similar. Now 
he notes their difference, saying: the outer seed sometimes is not perfumed, etc. 

i) The word sometimes shows that it is not a fixed rule (aniyatartha): the outer seed is 
sometimes perfumed, sometimes not. From coal, cow dung and sheep's wool respectively 
(anukramena) there arise sesame (tila), lotus ( utpalamula ) and panic grass (durva). The 
sesame does not arise, does not cease at the same time as the coal, etc.; they do not 
mutually perfume each other, and yet the first arises from the second. Thus, sometimes 
the outer seed is not perfumed. On the other hand, the sesame, etc., arises and perishes at 
the same time as the lotus, etc.; thanks to the perfuming by the lotus, the sesame takes on 
the smell [of the lotus]. There is no fixed ru;e conserning this. This is why the author says 
sometimes. - The inner seeds are the predispositions of all the dharmas contained in the 
store-consciousness. These seeds of necessity exist due to the perfuming. How? If the 
predisposition of hearing (srutadivasana) did not exist, its fruit, i.e., the great hearing 
(bahusruta), etc., would not exist. 

ii) Some outer seeds, such as rice, etc., (salyadi) sometimes die even after having been 
planted (upta); others, such as rye grass, etc., sometimes develop even without having 
been planted. - It is not the same for the inner seed. Why is there this difference between 
the outer and the inner seed? Because if the inner seed died after having been planted, 


68 



like rice, or grew without having been planted, like rye grass, there would be the absurd 
consequence that the thing accomplished would perish and the thing not accomplished 
would occur. Therefore the outer seed and the inner seed are in opposition ( viruddha ). 

Objection. Saying that the outer seed is different in nature from the inner seed, is that not 
contradictory to the thesis explained above (§ 15, 17), that the store-consciousness is the 
true seed of all dharmas? - In reply to this objection, the author says: the inner seed is the 
condition for the outer seed, etc. Actually, the seeds of outer dharmas, rice, etc. appear in 
the store-consciousness, considering the propensity-seeds ( vasanabija ) laid down in this 
consciousness by the actions ( karman ) of living beings (pranin) who are experiencing 
these dharmas (cf. Tibetan verses). That is why the outer seed does not exist aside from 
the inner seed. Cf. the stanza: The sky ( vyoman ), the earth ( prithivi ), the wind ( vayu ), 
space ( akasa ), the rivers ( sarit ), the directions ( dis ) and the ocean ( sagara ) are simply 
internal creations, mental constructions ( vikalpa ), and do not exist externally. There are 
innumerable verses of this type.” (U) 


26. As for the other consciousnesses, the active consciousnesses (pravrttivijnana), 
they are ‘enjoyers’ ( aupabhogika ) throughout all the existences (kdya = 
dtmabhdva) and destinies (gati ). Cf. this stanza from the Madhyantavibhanga 
(pg. 32-33): 

ekarn pratyayavijnanam dvitlyam aupabhogikam / 

upabhogaparicchedaprerakds tatra caitasah // 

“The first consciousness is the condition-consciousness; the second is the 
‘enjoyer’. It is there that the mental events act as] enjoyer, discriminating and 
stimulating." [135bl2] 


26. Comm. Bh 330b4-6, bh 157a2-3, U 390b 12- 18, u 254a6-254bl. 

“In the course of the destinies : god realm, etc. They are enjoyers : the six active 
consciousnesses enjoy. They arise from conditions, for their objects ( alambanavisaya ) 
are distinct ( paricchinna ). To explain this idea, the author cites a verse from the 
Madhantavibhangasutra as proof of his theory. The sutra says: It is there, i.e., amongst 


69 



these consciousnesses, that the aggregate of sensation ( vedandskandha) acts as enjoyer; 
the aggregate of identification ( samjndskandha ) acts as discriminater and the aggregate 
of concepts (samskaraskandha) acts as stimulant, because volition (cetand) stimulates 
mind ( citta ). These three aggregates, the principal causes ( pradhanahetu ) of the activity 
( pravrtti ) of every mind, are called auxiliaries (upakdra) to mind. Because they enjoy 
objects, they are called mentals (caitasa). ,, (U) 


27. These two consciousnesses, store-consciousness and active consciousness, are 
mutual conditions ( anyonyapratyaya ). A verse of the Abhidharmasutra (cf. 
Madhyantavibhanga, p. 34) says: 

sarvadharmd hi alma tesu tat tathd / 

anyoyam phalabhavena hetubhdvena sarvadd // 

All dharmas are lodged in consciousness and the latter is lodged in them: 
eternally they are result and cause of one another. [135b 16] 


27. Comm. Bh 330bl 1-14, bh 157a3-6, U 390b23-390el5, u 254bl-3. 

“The store-consciousness and all dharmas are always mutually cause and result; they 
arise from one another. At the moment when the store-consciousness is the cause of 
dharmas, at that very moment the latter are its result; at the moment when the store- 
consciousness is the result of dharmas, at that very moment the latter dharmas are its 
cause.” (Bh) 

U cites a passage from the Yogacaryabhumisastra, chap, of the Nirnayasamgraha (cf. 
Taisho 1579, 580b9-29) at length. “The store-consciousness plays the role of two-fold 
condition relative to the active consciousnesses: it is both their seed (bija) and their 
support ( asraya ). It is their seed, for at the moment when the wholesome ( kusala ), 
unwholesome ( akusala ) or indetenninate ( avyakrita ) active consciousnesses are 
actualized, the store-consciousness is seed for all of them. It is their support, for the store- 
consciousness takes over (upddaddti) the material organs ( rupindriya ). The five groups 
of consciousnesses are actualized ( pravartante ) by relying on these organs thus 
appropriated and not on the non-appropriated organs ( anupatta ). Moreoved, it is because 


70 



there is a store-consciousness that there can be a manas: with the manas as support, the 
mental consciousness is actualized ( manovijnana ). Just as the five groups of 
consciousnesses are actualized by depending on the five organs, eye, etc., - and not 
without these five organs - so the mental consciousness is not actualized without the 
manas organ ( manaindriya ). 

Conversely, relative to the store-consciousness, the active consciousnesses play the role 
of twofold condition. Actually ( drstadharme ), they nourish (pariposayanti ) the seeds of 
the store-cosnciousness; later ( samparaye ), they envelop-plant (che-tche) their seeds so 
that it may grow. In the moment, they nourish the seeds of the store-consciousness: by 
relying on the store-consciousness, the active consciousnesses, wholesome, 
unwholesome, indetenninate, are actualized. At that moment, their arising ( utpada ) and 
cessation ( nirodha ) coincide with that of their single and common support. Thus they 
perfume the store-consciousness. As a result of this perfuming, causal condition 
( hetupratyaya ), the subsequent active consciousnesses, wholesome, unwholesome or 
indeterminate, are actualized by developing, multiplying and becoming more and more 
differentiated. Later, they envelop-plant their seeds so that it may be born: there is a 
certain kind of perfuming capable of drawing-enveloping (yin-che) the store- 
consciousness which is retributive ( vipaka ) and indeterminate ( avyakrta ). 

Thus, since on the one hand the store-consciousness is the seed and the support of the 
active consciousnesses, and since on the other hand the active consciousnesses nourish 
the seeds of the store-consciousness, envelop them and plant them, one is forced to admit 
that store-consciousness and active consciousness are reciprocal conditions.” (u) 


28. If in the first dependent production (pratTtyasamutpada ), these two 
consciousnesses are mutually conditional cause ( hetupratyaya ), of which 
condition is it a question in the second conditioned production? - Of the 
dominant condition. 

Of how many conditions ( adliipatipratyaya ) are the six active consciousnesses the 
outcome? - They are the outcome of the dominant condition, the object condition 
( dlambanapratyaya ) and the condition as equal and immediate antecedent 
( samanantarapratyaya ).. 


71 



The three dependent productions, samsara, pleasant or unpleasant ( istanistagati ) 
destinies and complete enjoyment ( aupabliogika ), include these four conditions. 

[135b20] 


28. Comm. Bh 330b20-26, bh 157a6-157b2, U 390c20-391a2, u254b3-255al. 

“ In the first dependent production, i.e., in that which apportions the self-natures (cf. § 
19), if these two consciousnesses are mutually causal condition - this is about to be 
explained - of which condition is it a question in the second dependent production, i.e., in 
the one which apportions approval or disapproval? Of the dominant condition, because it 
is due to the predominance ( adhipatibala ) exerted by ignorance ( avidya ), etc., that 
actions ( samskara ) produce the result of retribution ( vipakaphala ) in the good and bad 
destinies. 

The six consciousnesses come from three conditions. Thus, concerning the visual 
consciousness, the eye ( caksus ) is the dominant condition, color (rupa) is the object 
condition, the consciousness that has just disappeared ( anantaraniruddha vijhana) is the 
antecedent condition. Just as the visual consciousness is the outcome of three conditions, 
so each of the other active consciousnesses, the auditory consciousness, etc., is the 
outcome of three particular conditions, just like the visual consciousness. 

The different self-natures ( svabhava ) are the outcome of only the causal condition, 
because the other three do not play a part here (na sambhavanti ). Thus the three 
dependent productions, that of samsara, etc., include four conditions. It does not follow 
that each of them possesses all four; only mind-and-mental factors ( cittacaitta ) possess 
all four.” (U) 


29. Here the store-consciousness is studied under its names {parydya ) and 
characteristics ( lakshana ). How does one know that these names and 
characteristics apply exclusively to the store-consciousness and not to the active 
consciousnesses {pravrttivijhdna )? - Without a store-consciousness defined in this 
way, defilement ( samklesa ) and purification ( yyavaddna ) are impossible (ayukta): 
passion-affliction ( klesasamklesa ), action-affliction ( karmasamklesa ) and birth- 


72 



affliction (jan m asamklesa) are impossible; mundane purification ( laukika 
vyavadana ) and supramundane purification ( lokottara vyavadana) are 
impossible. [135b26] 


29. Comm. Bh 330c4-6, bh 157b2-3, U 391a9-20, u 255al-6. 

“If the names and natures in question are applied to something other than the store- 
consciousness, affliction and purification are impossible. That is why there is definitely a 
store-consciousness.” (U) - “ Affliction is a synonym for impurity ( avisuddhi ); 
purification is a synonym for purity ( visuddhi ).” (u) 

“There are three kinds of afflictions: afflictions resulting from passion, action or birth. 
There are two kinds of purification: mundane or temporary weakening ( yiskambhana ) of 
the passions by the impure path ( sasravamarga ), and supramundane purification or 
definitive cutting off ( prahana ) of the passions by the pure path ( andsra vamdrga ) . ” (U) 


30. Why would the passion-defilement ( klesasamklesa ) be impossible? - Because 
the nature (t'i) consisting of being the seed (bya) [of the passions and sub- 
passions] - the nature realized by the perfuming ( vasana ) of the afflictions ( klesa ) 
and sub-afflictions ( upaklesa ) - does not belong to the six groups of active 
consciousnesses ( pravrttivijnana ). 

i) Indeed, let us suppose a visual consciousness ( caksurvijnana ) arising and 
perishing with the afflictions and sub-afflictions, lust, etc. 
(rdgddhiklesopaklesaih sahotpannaniruddham ). It is this visual consciousness 
perfumed ( vdsita ) by the propensity of lust, etc., that must be the seed of lust 
and not another consciousness, auditory consciousness, etc. But when the 
visual consciousness perfumed by lust is destroyed ( niruddha ) and replaced 
(< antardyita ) by another consciousness, auditory consciousness, etc., there is 
no longer the propensity of lust and the support of this propensity, namely, 
the visual consciousness, does not exist. It is impossible that from this visual 
consciousness previouely destroyed there could arise a second visual 
consciousness provided with the aforesaid lust ( raga ), etc. In the same way, 


73 



from a past action ( atitakarma ) presently without self-nature, there cannot 
arise a retributive result ( vipakaphala ). 

ii) Furthermore, the propensity {yds and) does not reside in the first visual 
consciousness arising with the lust. Also, it does not exist a fortiori in the 
second visual consciousness subsequent to the first. Moreover ( tdvat ), the 
propensity seed of the second visual consciousness does not reside in the lust, 
because the lust depends ( asrita ) on the visual consciousness and is not stable 
{dhruva). 

iii) Neither does the propensity reside in the other consciousnesses, auditory 
consciousness, etc., because the organs that support ( asraya ) these 
consciousnesses are distinct, for these consciousnesses do not arise, do not 
perish, together. 

iv) Finally, the propensity [of the visual consciousness] does not reside in the 
visual consciousness itself, because two consciousnesses of the same nature do 
not arise, do not perish, together. 

This is why the visual consciousness cannot be perfumed by impregnation by 
afflictions and sub-afflictions, lust, etc. One consciousness cannot be perfumed 
by another. The same reasoning that is valid here for the visual consciousness 
will be applicable mutatis mutandis ( yathayogam ) to the other active 
consciousnesses. [135cl2] 


30. Comm. Bh 330c23-331a20, bh 157b3-158b3, U 391b7-391c5, u255a6-256a8. 

[Lamotte:] In order to make my translation understandable, I have been forced here and 
there to introduce, in brackets, extracts from the commentary. I have translated the first 
two indented lines of the paragraph according to H, which is more explicit than the 
Tibetan version. 

“i) In the same way, a retributive result cannot arise from a past action presently without 
sef-nature: like the Sautrantika masters, [we say] that the past {atlta) is without self- 
nature ( nihsvabhava ), and that the retributive result is projected {aksipta) by an 
propensity ( vasana ) presently existing ( pratyutpanna ). But the Vaibhasika masters 


74 



believe that the retributive result arises from a past action; that is impossible. Why? 
Because the past does not exist. From this example, the author shows that a citta of raga, 
etc., cannot arise. Therefore he accepts that that the visual consciousness arising with the 
lust, etc., may be perfumed by the lust. But he denies that another consciousness, a later 
visual consciousness, arises with the passion.” (U) This last phrase is clearer in u: hdi ni 
re €ig hdod chags la sogs pa dan than cig bhun bald mig gi mam par ses pa la hdod 
chags la sogs paid bag chags khas blahs te/ de las g€an hbyuh ba gah yin pa de hdod 
chags la sogs pa dan I dan par hbyuh du mi run bar bastan pa yin no / 

ii) "bh: re €ig mig gi mam par ses pa hdod chags la sogs pa dan Ilian cig hbyuh ba de la 
yah bag chags mi run ste / mig gi mam par ses pa las lar skyes pa de la bag chags ji Itar 
rigs”: If there cannot be impregnation in the visual consciousness that arises with lust, 
etc., how could there be impregnation in what arises later than this visual 
consciousness"? This is an a fortiori argument ( kaimutikanyaya ), clarified still further in 
the Chinese by the expresssion chang .... ho houang. 

“Furthermore, the propensity does not reside in the lust: the propensity of the visual 
consciousness cannot reside in the lust” (Bh) - u continues: “ hdod chags ni sems las 
byuh ba yin pas mam par ses pa la brten paho // gnas pas gnas la bsgo ba ni rigs paid 
tshul tin gyi gnas pa hid kyis gnas pa la bsgo bar ni mi run ste Being a mental event 
(< caitta ), lust depends ( asrita ) on the consciousness. But, whilst the perfuming of the 
asraya by the asrita is possible, the perfuming of the asrita by the asraya is impossible.” 
In other words, the lust can perfume the consciousness on which it depends, but the 
consciousness cannot perfume the lust which it supports. Thus the propensity does not 
reside in the lust. 

iii) “Neither does the propensity reside in the other consciousnesses', the impregnation 
cannot reside in the auditory consciousness, etc. ( srotadivijhana ). Why? Because the 
supports of these consciousnesses are distinct ( bhinna ). Since their supports are distinct, 
none of them can arise and perish together. Indeed, the visual consciousness depends on 
the eye, the auditory consciousness depends on the ear, and so on up to the mental 
consciousness which depends on the manas. Since the supports are separate ( viprakrista ), 
it is impossible that the impregnation of one of them be found in the other.” (Bh) 


75 



iv) “ Finally , the impregnation does not reside in the visual consciousness itself. ” the 
visual consciousness likewise cannot perfume the visual consciousness because two 
consciousnesses cannot arise at the same time. Since there are not two, simultaneous 
birth and destruction (sahotpadanirodha) definitely does not occur. - The visual 
consciousness does not return to perfume the visual consciousness because the perfumer 
(v as aka) and the perfumed (vasya), the agent ( karaka ) and the action ( kriya ), would be 
confused.” (U) 


31. Furthermore, amongst those who fall ( cyu -) from a higher level, the ones 
without identification ( asamjhin ), etc., and are reborn here in the realm of 
desire, the first consciousness ( vijhana ), which is afflicted ( klista ) by the 
afflictions and sub-afflictions of the realm of desire and which appears at the 
very beginning of the reincarnation: pratisamdhi, will be reborn without seed. 
Indeed, the propensity ( vdsand ) of afflictions and sub-afflictions along with the 
consciousness that supports it is past (atlta) and no longer exists. [135cl5] 


31. Comm. Bh 331a25-27, bh 158b3-4, U 391c9-17, u 256a8-256b3. 

I (Lamotte) have incorporated the commentaries into my translation. The reasoning is 
clear: the mind at birth is defiled by all the passions of the level into which it is born (cf. 
Kosa, III, p. 118: upapattibhavah klistah sarvaklesaih svabhumikaih). But this mind at 
birth is separated from the earlier empassioned mind by an entire existence. Lacking a 
store-consciousness, it would then be born without seed. 


32. When the consciousness that counteracts the afflictions 
(klesapratipaksa vijh an a) is born, all the other mundane consciousnesses ( laukika 
vijhana ) are destroyed ( niruddha ). Thus, lacking a store-consciousness, it is 
impossible ( ayukta ) that this counteracting consciousness would contain the 
seeds (blja) of the afflictions and sub-afflictions ( klesopaklesa ) because it is free 
in nature ( svabhdvavimukta ), for it does not arise and does not perish with the 
afflictions and sub-afflictions. 


76 



If the store-consciousness did not exist, when a mundane consciousness arises 
( tadanantaram ) later, it arises without seed, for the propensity of passion and its 
support-consciousness (s as ray am) are past ( atita ) and have long ago ceased to 
exist. 

Consequently, if the store-consciousness did not exist, the passion-defilement 
would be impossible. [135c23] 


32. Comm. Bh 331b7-16, bh 158b4-159al, U 391c25-392a9, u 256be-257a2. 

“When the consciousness that counteracts the passions is born : when, in the Arya who 
possesses the fruit of stream-entry, the path counteracting (pratipaksamarga ) the 
afflictions that are to be cut by seeing ( darsanaheyaklesa ) arises for the first time, all the 
other consciousnesses, the mundane consciousnesses, are immediately destroyed. Then, if 
there were no store-consciousness, where would the seeds ( anusaya ) of the afflictions 
that are to be cut by meditation ( bhavanaheyak/esa ) reside? The counteracting 
consciousness cannot contain their seeds, since this counteracting consciousness is 
liberated in its nature : it is, in its nature, very pure ( ativisuddha ). Moreover, it does not 
arise and does not perish with the afflictions', for the antidote (pratipaksa ) and what is 
counteracted ( vipaksa ) are opposed to each other ( anonyaviruddha ) like light ( aloka ) and 
shadow ( tamas ). This shows that the counteracting consciousness cannot be the seed of 
the afflictions. 

When later, when the path of meditation ( bhavamarga ) follows the path of seeing 
(< darsanamarga ), were a mundane consciousness to arise, it arises without seed] because 
the propensities of the afflictions and its support-consciousness are past and have not 
existed for a long time : this comes back to saying that what is past no longer exists. The 
prapti of the afflictions of which the Vaibhasikas speak [cf Kosa, II, p. 179-195] has 
already been refuted ( nirakrta ); therefore we will not refute them anew. However, for the 
Sautrantikas, the support ( asraya ) of the propensity ( vasana) is stained by the fault of 
nonexistence ( abhavadosaprasahgat ) and is thus inadmissible ( ayukta ).” (U) - u 
translates this last phrase as follows: de la yah (for the Sautrantikas still) bag chags kyi 
gnas med pahi skyon chags pa hid do. 


77 



33. If the store-consciousness does not exist, why is action-affliction 
( karmasamklesa ) impossible ( ayukta )? Because then, in the twelve-membered 
causal chain, 

i) the consciousness conditioned by the mental factors {samskarapratyayam 
vijhanam) is impossible. 

ii) Because, lacking a store-consciousness, existence conditioned by grasping 
(updddnapratyayo bhavah) is impossible. [135c25] 


33. Comm. Bh 331M9-29, bh 159al-6, U 392al2-27, u 257a2-257b2. 

i) “The consciousness conditioned by the mental factors is impossible: if, by 
samskarapratyayam vijhanam, the active consciousnesses ( pravrttivijhana ) are 
understood, action-affliction is impossible. Indeed, it is impossible to consider a visual 
consciousness, etc., conditioned by the mental factors and existing with lust, etc., 
(, ragadi ) as a vijnana-factor ( vijhanahga ). According to the Buddha’s words 
(i aryavacana ), this vijnana is the condition for name-and-fomi ( vijhanapratyayam 
namarupam ). But the visual consciousness, etc., perishing instantaneously 

(, ksananiruddha ) and destroyed a long time ago, cannot be the condition for name-and- 
form. 

If, in order to avoid this fault, a consciousness of rebirth (pratisamdhivijhana ) is seen in 
the vijnana-factor, one is still mistaken. Indeed, (a) at the moment of rebirth 
( pratisamdhikale ), the mental factors, meritorious ( punya ), unmeritorious (apunya) and 
invariable ( anihijya ), have long ago been destroyed, and the consciousness of rebirth 
cannot arise from mental factors long since destroyed; ( b ) the rebirth consciousness 
( pratisamdhicitta ) is not morally indetenninate ( avyakrita ), as it is eqipped with 
attraction ( anunaya ) and repulsion ( pratigha ) [for sex; cf. Kosa III, p. 50]. Since it is 
indeterminate, it does not have the mental factors as condition. 

If the vijnana-factor is understood to be the store-consciousness conditioned by the active 
consciousnesses associated with the mental factors and capable of containing the seeds, 
the reasoning is correct.” (U) 


78 



ii) “ Lacking a store-consciousness, existence conditioned by grasping is impossible : there 
would be no upadanapratyaya bhavah. Why? Given the consciousness perfumed 
( bhavita ) by the aforesaid mental factors, it is by the power of grasping ( upadanabala ) 
that the propensities ( vasana ) develop ( vrdh -) and give existence.” (Bh) 


34. If the store-consciousness does not exist, why is affliction-birth 
( janmasamklesha ) impossible? - Because then the connection of rebirth 
( pratisamdhibandha ) is impossible. 

After death ( cyuti ) in a non-absorbed level ( asamdhitd bhumih ), an afflicted 
mental consciousness ( klistamanovijhana ) which is the rebirth connection 
( pratisamdhibandha ) is produced dependent on the manas of the intermediary 
existence ( antarabhava ). This afflicted mental consciousness perishes in the 
intermediary existence, and a vijnana becomes coagulated as embryo 
( kalalatvena sammurcchati) in the mother's womb. 

i) If it was the mental consciousness of the intermediary existence that 
became coagulated, there would be, in the mother's womb, a second mental 
consciousness depending on the coagulated mental consciousness. Thus, two 
mental consciousnesses would exist simultaneously in the mother's womb. 

ii) Furthemore, the coagulated vijnana ( sammurcchita vijhdnd) cannot be a 
mental consciousness because [the mental consciousness always has a defiled 
support ( klistasraya ) since, if it were the coagulated vijnana, it would never 
be interrupted ( samucchinna ) and would have an imperceptible ( asamvidita ) 
object ( dlambana ). 

iii) Supposing that the coagulated vijnana is a mental consciousness, then 
either it is the coagulated mental consciousness that is equipped with all the 
seeds (sarvabTjaka), or it is another mental consciousness - arisen in 
dependence on this coagulated vijnana - that is equipped with all the seeds. If 
it is the coagulated mental consciousness that is equipped with all the seeds, 
then what we call 'mental consciousness' is, in reality, synonymous with 
'store-consciousness'. If, on the other hand, it is the mental consciousness 


79 



dependent on the coagulated vijnana that is equipped with all the seeds, then 
the 'support causal' consciousness ( asrayabhavena hetubhiitam ) would not be 
equipped with all the seeds, whereas the 'supported ( dsrita ) fruitional 
( phala )' consciousness would be equipped with all the seeds, which is 
completely impossible. 

Consequemtly, it is proved ( siddha ) that the coagulated vijnana is not a mental 
consciousness but a retributive consciousness equipped with all the seeds 
(sarvabljaka vipakavijnana). [136al2] 


34. Comm. Bh 331c26-332al4, bh 159a6-159b7, U 292b22-393al0, u 257b2-259a2. 

The second paragraph is obscure and, by correcting the Tibetan version according to H, I 
[Lamotte} think it can be restored thus: Asamdhitdydm bhumau cyutva jatikale, 
antarabhavamanonisritam klistam manovijndnam pratisamdhibandha utpadyate. Etat 
klistam manovijndnam antarabhave nirudhyate, vijndnam ca matuh kuksau kalalatvena 
sammurcchati. 

“Non-absorbed level', the realm of desire ( kamadhatu ). Cyuti, i.e., death ( marana ), 
appears, dependent on the manas of the intermediate existence', dependent on the active 
mind ( citta ) in the intermediate existence between death ( maranabhava ) and birth 
{upapattibhava), an afflicted mental consciousness. It is afflicted: because, equipped with 
attraction ( anunaya ) and aversion (pratigha ) for sex, it is disturbed ( viparyasta ); it is a 
mental consciousness because, at this moment, the other consciousnesses have long since 
been destroyed. Because it connects existence (janmapratisamdhdndt ), it is called 
'pratisamdhi, rebirth'; because it captures existence (janmaparigrahandt ), it is called 
'bond'. This afflicted mental consciousness, because it has birth as object ( upapattibhava ), 
perishes in the intermediary existence: if it did not perish, there would be no birth 
{upapattibhava). And a vijnana becomes coagulated as embryo in the mother's womb : at 
the moment when this mental consciousness perishes in the intermediary existence, in the 
mother’s womb there is a retributive consciousness ( vipakavijhdna ) that unites with the 
semen and the blood {sukrasonita) in a shared sense of safety and risk {ekayogaksemena), 
which gives an embryo {kalala). As the Buddha said (Digha, II, p. 63): 'Ananda, if the 
vijnana did not descend into the mother's womb, the embryo would not fonn into an 


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embryo’ ( sa ced Ananda vijhdnam matuh kuksim navakrameta, na tat kalalam 
kalalatvaya samvarteta). [For the vijnanasammurcchana, see comments by P. Demieville, 
in Notes, § 34). 

i) If it was the mental consciousness of the intermediary existence and not the store- 
consciousness, that coagulates, that is born, there would be, dependent on the coagulated 
mental consciousness : dependent on the retributive consciousness ( vipakavijhana ), a 
second mental consciousness : another active consciousness ( pravrttivijhana ). That is to 
say, in subsequent states ( uttarottard vasthd) there would be a mental consciousness 
associated ( samprayukta ) with faith ( sraddhadi ) and with lust ( ragadi ) and equipped with 
pleasant, unpleasant and conceptual feeling ( sukhaduhkhavedana ) and conceptual 
(savikalpaka). Thus, two mental consciousnesses would exist simultaneously in the 
mother's womb, namely: (a) a mental consciousness retributive ( vipakatmaka ) in essence, 
the primary substance of the being ( sattvamuladravya ), existing independently of the 
effort of the moment ( tatkalaprayoganapeksa ) and morally indeterminate ( avyakrta ); and 
(b) a mental consciousness having an object (alambana) and an aspect (akara) quite 
distinct ( paricchinna ), associated with pleasant, unpleasant, etc., feelings. These two 
mental consciousnesses would exist simultaneously in the same body. But that is 
impossible, being contradictory to the sutra ( sutavirodhat ). A verse says: 'It is impossible 
in the present, in the future, that two vijnanas of the same kind arise together in the same 
body without the one preceding and the other following’ ( asthanam anavakaso yad 
apurvacarame dve vijhane samabhage samakaya utpaddeyatam). And it cannot be 
maintained that these two are only one, because their nature is different. Furthermore, the 
retributive consciousness ( vipakavijhana ) cannot be interrupted; for, in this hypthesis, the 
rebirth ( pratisamdhi ) having taken place, there would be a new taking of rebirth in 
another place. Finally, the nature of the retributive consciousness is just a perpetual 
series, and it does not have a new destiny ( gati ).” (U) 

ii) “ Furthermore , the coagulated vijhana cannot be a mental consciousness. Why? 
Because the mental consciousness always has a defiled support; because, if it were the 
coagulated mental consciousness, it would never be interrupted. The mental 
consciousness has the manas defiled by the afflictions ( klesa ), lust {ruga), etc., as support 
(asraya) (cf. § 6), for it has birth ( utpattibhava ) as object. Since it has something that is 
afflicted as support, we say that it has an afflicted support ( klista asrayo yasya sa 


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klistasrayah). But here the retributive (or coagulated) vijnana does not have an afflicted 
support because this vijnana is indeterminate ( avyakrta ). Furthermore, the coagulated 
vijnana is never interrupted because it undergoes the mechanism of activity 
(, karmapravrtti ). Because then, if the mental consciousness were the coagulated vijnana, 
it would have an imperceptible object. The object of the mental consciousness is 
perceptible ( parihchinna ), i.e., the dharmas. But the coagulated vijnana does not have a 
perceptible object of this kind. That is why the coagulated vijnana cannot be a mental 
consciousness.” (Bh) - In other words, the coagulated vijnana is morally indetenninate; it 
is never interrupted; it has an imperceptible object. On the other hand, every mental 
consciousness is afflicted, even if it is good; it is often interrupted and it has an easily 
distinguishable object. Thus, the coagulated vijnana cannot be a mental consciousness. 
The clearest translation of this passge is from Paramartha: “Furthermore, the coagulated 
vijnana cannot be a mental consciousness because it depends on the afflicted, because it 
takes its object for a long time , and because its object is imperceptible.” 

iii) Compare the Tibetan version with that of H, which is more explicit. 


35. In those who are reborn, the grasping ( graha ; Chinese, updddna) of the 
material organs ( ruplndriya ) is impossible without a retributive conscousness 
( vipdkavijhdna ), for the consciousnesses other than this last one have their 
specific support {dsraya = organ) and are not stable ( dhruvaj . On the other hand, 
there is no material organ without a consciousness. [136a 15] 


35. Comm. Bh 332al8-25, bh 159b7-160a2, U 393al3-27, u 259a2-259b2. 

“In those who are reborn : who have taken up existence ( atmabhava ); without a 
retributive consciousness : without a store-consciousness; the appropriation or the 
grasping (parigrahana) of the material organs, of organs other than the manas, would not 
take place. Indeed, the other consciousnesses, the active consciousnesses 
(pravrttivijhana), are unable to appropriate the material organs. Why? Because these 
consciousnesses have their particular support : this shows that, lacking a store- 
consciousness, the six organs, eye, etc., would not have a single dharma to appropriate all 
at once. Indeed, the visual consciousness depends only on the eye; the auditory 


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consciousness depends only on the ear, and so on. Each of them can appropriate only its 
own organ; it cannot appropriate a foreign organ. Thus a store-consciousness is necessary 
to appropriate all the organs at once.” (U) - “ Moreover , these consciousnesses are not 
stable : they are extremely mobile ( cala ) and disappear momentarily. Then, lacking a 
store-consciousness, the eye and the other organs, deprived of an appropriator, would 
perish.” (Bh) 

“Some say (cf. Kosa, II, p. 215): ‘The organ of touch ( kayendriya ) appropriates the 
organs because it naturally accompanies (y yap-) them.’ This is wrong because the organ 
of touch also is appropriated. If it is assumed that the organ of touch is the appropriator, 
there would be nothing else to appropriate it, which is inadmissible. Besides, the 
Bhagavat would have said: ‘When one abandons the organ of touch, there is death’, and 
would not have said what he did say (Majjhima, I, p. 296): ‘When life, heat and 
consciousness leave the body, the body lies abandoned like a piece of wood, without 
feeling’ (ayur usmatha vijhanam yada kayam jahaty arm, apaviddhah tada sete yatha 
kastham acetanah ). That is why the organ of touch cannot be the appropriator.” (U) 


36. Consciousness and name-and-form, which function supported by each other 
(anyonyanisrayayogena) like two sheaves of reeds ( nada kalapa ), cannot be 
explained without a store-consciousness. [136a 17] 


36. Comm. Bh 332a28-332b4; bh 160a2-7; U 393a29-393b9; u 259b2-7. 

“The Bhagavat said: 'Name-and-form has vijnana as condition ( vijhdnapratyayam 
ndmarupam)' . By 'name' here is meant the four non-material aggregates ( arupaskandha , 
i.e., vijnana and the three mental factors, namely, vedana, samjna, cetana); by 'form' here 
is meant the embryo ( kalala ). ... The vijnana, which is condition for name-and-form, can 
be nothing other than the store-consciousness. Why? If by 'name', the active 
consciousnesses ( pravrttivijnana ) was already understood, then what is meant by 
'vijnana' if not the store-consciousness? Moreover, when the sutra says: 'Similarly, the 
vijnana returns', vijnana here is the store-consciousness: the support of existence 
(< atmabhavasraya ), it functions uninterruptedly. That is why it is said that it is condition 
for name-and-form. Finally, the Bhagavat said (Dlgha, II, p. 63): 'Ananda, if the vijnana 


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were to be cut in a boy or a girl, would name-and-fonn grow, would it develop?’ - ’No, 
Lord.’ ( vijnanam ced Ananda daharasya kumarasya kumarikaya vd ucchidyeta vinasyen 
na bhaved api tu tan namarupam vrddhim virudhim vipulatam apadyeta. no bhadanta). 
Similar texts would not be explained if there were not a store-consciousness.” (U) 


37. With the exception of the retributive consciousness ( vipdkavijhdna ), no other 
consciousness can be the nutriment-consciousness ( vijhdndhdra ) of which the 
Bhagavat speaks for beings ( sattva ) already born. Indeed, we do not see any one 
of the six active consciousnesses forming a nutriment for beings born in the 
three worlds ( traidhdtuka ). [136a20] 


37. Comm. Bh 332b8-20, bh 160a7-160b4, U 393M2-17, u 259b8-260a2. 

See the corrections supplied as a note to the Tibetan text. 

“According to the Bhagavat, there are four nutriments: the nutriment which consists of (/) 
food-by-the-mouthfuls, (/'/) contact, (Hi) mental activity and (z'v) consciousness, (z) The 
nutriment of food-by-the-mouthfuls (kavadhlkdrahara) is digestion ( parinama ) because 
digestion comforts ( upakaroti ) the body ( asraya ); (z'z) nutriment of contact (sparsdhdra) 
is the grasping of the object ( visayagrahana ) because merely seeing (darsana) the object, 
the color, etc., is a source of strength for the body; (Hi) nutriment of mental activity 
(manahsamcetanahara) is aspiration (asamsa , abhilasa) because aspiration comforts the 
body: thus, when one sees water in the distance, even though one may be thirsty, one 
does not die; (z'v) nutriment of consciousness (vijnanahara) is appropriation ( upadana ) 
because by this appropriation the body subsists for a long time. Otherwise, like a corpse 
(mrtasanra), the body would soon decompose ( acirat ). Thus it must be accepted that 
consciousness is a nutriment since it comforts the body. 

In this list, nutriment of contact refers to the six active consciousnesses; nutriment of 
mental activity refers to the greedy manas. Then what special consciousness except the 
store-consciousness could be called nutriment? Moreover, in the states deprived of mind 
(acittaka) - sleep ( nidra ), swoon, blackout (murccha), the absorption of cessation 
(nirodhasamapatti) - the six groups of consciousnesses are destroyed. What then is this 


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other consciousness, except the store-consciousness, that appropriates the body so that it 
does not decompose? Abandoned by the store-consciousness, the body would perish.” 
(Bh) - “The mind and the mental factors ( cittacaitta ) present at the entry into absorption 
do not merit the name of nutriment, for the sutra does not speak of them, for, being 
destroyed, they no longer exist. Neither is the destruction ( nirodha ) of this mind and 
mental factors nutriment because the number of nutriments has been fixed as four.” (U) 


38. When, after having died here ( ihatra cyutva ), one is reborn in an absorbed 
level ( samahita bhumih), a non-absorbed ( asamahita ) and afflicted ( klista ) mental 
consciousness ( manovijhana ) forms the bond of rebirth (pratisamdhibandha ). But 
in regard to the non-absorbed and afflicted mind ( citta ) of the higher levels, 
nothing other than the retributive consciousness can constitute a seed ( bija ). 
[136a23] 

38. Comm. Bh 332b25-332c5, bh 160b5-161a3, U 393b21-393c2, u 260a2-7. 

“The author has already shown (§ 34) how, lacking a store-consciousness, the bond of 
rebirth in the realm of desire ( kamadhatu ) is impossible. It is equally impossible in the 
form and the fomless realm (ruparupyadhatu): this is what the author is going to show. 

When, after having died here, one is reborn in an absorbed level : when, having died in 
the realm of desire, one is reborn in one of the two higher realms, a non-absorbed and 
afflicted mental consciousness, for it is associated ( samprayukta ) with the passions of the 
higher realms: delight in concentration ( samadhirasavadana ), etc., form the bond of 
rebirth. 

In regard to the non-absorbed and afflicted mind of the higher realms, nothing other than 
the store-consciousness can constitute a seed: 

(/) The mind at death ( maranacitta ) belonging to the realm of desire ( kamavacara ) is not 
a seed because the birth and destruction ( utpddanirodha ) of two minds are not 
simultaneous. 


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(//) The mind at conception ( upapatticitta ) in the absorbed realm is not its seed because it 
is impossible that one and the same mind can be seed ( bija ) and the possesser of seed 
(by in) at the same time. 

(Hi) The mind belonging to the material world, etc. (rupavacaradicitta) which in the past 
had been realized (prapta) in the course of earlier existences (jataka) is not a seed 
because there was no other consciousness to undergo the perfuming (bhavana). 

(i iv ) The material series ( rupasamtdna ) is not a seed because it does not constitute a 
causal condition ( hetupratyaya ). 

A store-consciousness, therefore, must necessarily be accepted in which resides the 
eternal propensity ( anadikdlikd vasana) of the mind returning from of the higher realms 
( tadbhumisamgrhTta ) . ” (U) 


39. Among beings born in the formless realm ( arupyadhatu ), when there is an 
afflicted-wholesome mind (klistakusalacitta), without a retributive consciousness 
furnished with all the seeds (sarvabTjaka vipdkavijhana), it too would be born 
without seed (bija) and without base (adhara). [136a25] 


39. Comm. Bh 332c9-14, bh 161a3-6, U 393c5-9, 260a7-260bl. 

“In beings born in the formless realm, having gone beyond fonn (rupavimukta), the 
afflicted-wholesome mind : of enjoyment ( rasavadana ) and of concentration (samadhi) 
would be born without seed : would arise without cause ( hetu ); and without base (asraya) 
[according to U, without vipdka]. Another meaning: if this twofold mind were without 
seed, from what would it arise? If it were without base, upon what would it depend in 
order to function? This mind has come from its own seed contained ( parigrhita ) in the 
store-consciousness ” (Bh) 


40. In this same realm, when the supramundane mind ( lokottaracitta ) appears 
(sdksdtkdrakdle), the other minds, the mundane minds (laukikacitta), disappear. 
Thus the destiny in this realm (tadgati) would be annihilated (nivrta). [136a27] 


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40. Comm. Bh 332c 17-20, bh 161a6-8, U 393c 1 1-16, u 260b 1-4 

“In this same realm : in the formless realm, when the supramundane mind, the pure mind 
(andsravacitta) appears, is bom; the other minds, the mundane minds, i.e., the impure 
minds (sasravacitta), disappear, are completely destroyed ( nirudhyante ). Thus the birth 
in this realm would be annihilated, because the retribution ( vipaka ) contained 
(samgrhita) in this destiny in the fonnless realm would not take place, and the nirvana 
without residue ( n irupadh is esan ir vdna ) would be acquired ( adhigata ) without 
preparatory effort (aprayogdt) by itself ( svatah ). Indeed, when the antidote (pratipaksa ) 
is present, all the opponents ( vipaksa ) disappear.” (U) - But in reality, the destiny in the 
formless realm is not annihilated; “since this annihilation has not occurred, one cannot 
deny the existence of the store-consciousness.” (Bh) 


41. Some beings born in the sphere of neither-identification-nor- 
nonidentification ( naivasamjhdndsamjhayatana ) produce a supramundane mind 
( lokottaracitta ) of the sphere of nothingness ( akimcanyayatana ). But then, lacking 
a store-consciousness, the two destinies (gati ) that these two spheres constitute 
would be annihilated ( nivrta ). Indeed, this supramundane consciousness cannot 
have as support ( asraya ) either destiny in the naivasamjnanayatana or destiny in 
the akimcanyayatana or destiny in nirvana. [136b2] 


41. Comm. Bh 332c25-333a5, bh 161a8-161b4, U 393c21-29, u 260b4-261al. 

“ Some beings born in naivasamjhdndsamjhayatana'. some beings born in the summit of 
existence ( bhavagra ) wish to destroy ( praha -) the afflictions of their sphere ( tadbhumi ). 
But, as their awarewness ( samjha ) is very weak ( atimanda ), their sphere does not include 
the path of destruction of the afflictions. Since the akimcanyayatana is a sphere of lucid 
( patu ) awareness they produce a pure mind ( andsravacitta ) belonging to this sphere. But 
then the two destinies would be annihilated', the two destinies, in bhavagra and 
akimcanyayatana, would be annihilated, and the beings residing there would die since the 
destinies which support them would no longer exist.. Indeed, the pure dharma 


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( anasravadharma ) - i.e., the supramundane mind - is not within the scope (samgrhita) of 
these destinies because it has no connection with them and counteracts (pratipaksa) these 
destinies. Finally, there is no nirvana as destiny support : because the pure dharma 
resides in the nirvana- without-residue Element ( sopadhisesanirvanadhatu ): because 
nirvana, being the destruction aof all destinies, is called 'a destiny which is not a destiny’ 

(< agatikd gatih ) ” (U) - “The supramundane mind cannot have either the first sphere or 

the second sphere as destiny-support because these two spheres are mundane. 
Furthermore, produced as the mind of akimcanyayatana by beings belonging to another 
sphere [the sphere of naivasamjnanasamjnayatana], it cannot have two destiny-supports 
simultaneously. Finally, this supramundane mind cannot have nirvana as destiny-support 
because it has another support, namely, sopadhisesanirvanadhatu. None of these three 
things can be its destiny-support. If one does not believe in the existence of the store- 
consciousness, what then is the destiny-support of this supramundane mind?” (Bh) 


42. At the moment of death ( chuti ), beings who have accomplished good actions 
( sukrtakarin ) and beings who have committed bad actions ( duskrtakdrin ) 
experience a gradual cold feeling ( usmanirgama ) in the lower or the upper part 
respectively of the body which, without a store-consciousness, would be 
impossible. Consequently, the birth affliction (janmasamklesa ) also, lacking a 
retributive consciousness furnished with all the seeds {sarvabljaka vipdkavijhdna ) 
would be impossible. [136b5] 


42. Comm. Bh 333al0-14,bh 161b4-7, U 394a4-8, u 261al-3. 

“At the moment of death (cyuti = marana), those who have carried out good actions 
experience a gradual cooling in the lower part of their body; those who have committed 
bad actions experience it in the opposite part” (U), “because those who have carried out 
good actions must rise, whereas those who have committed bad actions must descend. 
Without a store-consciousness capable of appropriating the body, how could the body 
(asraya) gradually become cold? But, as long as life lasts, the store-consciousness 
appropriates the body. That is why, when it abandons it, the body becomes cold in the 
lower part or the upper part, according to the case (yathakramamam ).” (Bh) 


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43. Why is the mundane purification ( laukika vyavadana) impossible in the 
absence of a store-consciousness? 


i) Those who have not rejected ( tyai -) the lust of the desire realm 
(kdmdvacardga) and who have not yet acquired the mind of the form realm 
(rupavacaracitta) endeavor ( prayuhjate ) to liberate themselves from the lust 
of the desire realm by a good mind ( kusalacitta ) of the desire realm. But this 
mind of effort ( prayogikacitta ) belonging to the desire realm is not born, does 
not perish with the mind of the desire realm; thus it is not perfumed ( bhdvita ) 
by the latter and cannot be the seed (bya). 

ii) The preceding mind of the form realm is a past ( atlta ) mind; in the course 
of numerous earlier existences (jataka ), it has been separated by other minds: 
it no longer exists. As a result, it cannot be the seed of the absorbed mind 
{sum ah itacitta), i.e., of the mind of the form realm that occupies us. 

(iii) Consequently, the retributive consciousness furnished with all the seeds 
(sarvabljaka vipakavijndna) which proceeds in a continuous series is the 
causal condition ( hetupratyaya ) of the absorbed mind in the form realm, 
whereas the good mind of effort is its dominant condition ( adhipatipratyaya ). 
Thia is what has been proved ( siddha ). 

The same reasoning may be applied mutatis mutandis ( yathdyogam ) to all realms 

exempt from lust. [136b 15] 


43. Comm. Bh 333a25-333b6, bh 161b7-162a4, U 394al8-394b2, u 261a3-261b2. 

“The author has just shown that by confining oneself to the active consciousnesses 
( pravrttijnana ) alone, the threefold defilement is impossible. He will now show that 
mundane purification is impossible as well. To this effect, he says: Those who have not 
given up the lust of the desire realm, etc. 

i) The mind of effort and the good mind, the one belonging to the desire realm and the 
other to the form realm, do not arise and do not perish together. Therefore they cannot be 
respectively perfumed (vasya, bhavya) and perfumer ( vasaka , bhavaka). Moreover, the 


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mind of the desire realm, not being indetenninate ( avyakrta ), is not perfumable. As its 
level of attachment is separate, it is not causal condition for the good mind. 

ii) The good mind of the form realm, already obtained (prapta) in the course of other 

existences in eternal samsara, is not the seed of the present good mind of the fonn realm 
because it is past ( atTta ) and, for many existences, has been replaced {antardyita) by 
many minds belonging to the desire realm. For the Sautrantika masters, the past does not 
exist. Since it does not actually exist, this past good mind cannot be the seed of of the 
actual good mind of the form realm ” (U) 

iii) “The store-consciousness contains the seed of this mind and the actual mind of the 

form realm is bom from its own seed contained in the store-consciousness. But the good 
mind of effort {prayogikakusalacitta ) is not without efficacy ( samarthya ): it is only a 
dominant condition and not a causal condition. It is from the power of its dominance that 
the mind of the fonn realm is bom ” (Bh) 


44. Similarly, lacking a retributive consciousness furnished with all the seeds 
{sarvabljaka vipdkavijhdna ), the supramundane purification 
( lokottaravyavadana ), is impossible ( ayukta ). Why would the supramundane 
purification be impossible? 

The Bhagavat said (Anguttara, I, p. 87): "The words of others {paratasca 
ghosah) and correct inner reflection ( adhyatmam ca yonisomanasikarah) are the 
causes of correct seeing (samyagdrstf)" . Words of others and correct reflection 
perfume either the auditory consciousness ( srotavijnana ) or the mental 
consciousness ( manovijndna ) or both together. However, at the time of correct 
mental reflection on the texts ( dharma ), the auditory consciousness does not arise 
and similarly, the mental consciousness is replaced {antardyita) by other 
consciousnesses, distracted consciousnesses ( viksipta vijnana). At the moment 
when the supramundane mind associated with correct reflection 
( yonisomanasikdrasamprayuktaka citta), i.e., correct seeing ( samyagdrsti ), arises, 
the mental consciousness perfumed {bhdvita) by the propensity of hearing 
(snitavdsana) together with the propensity of hearing, is destroyed ( niruddha ), 
past {atTta), finished long ago. Not existing any longer, how could it be the seed 


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(blja) able to give birth subsequently to the supramundane mind associated with 
correct reflection? 


The mundane mind ( laukika citta) associated with correct reflection does not 
arise, does not perish with the supramundane mind ( lokottara citta) associated 
with correct seeing; thus it is not perfumed by the latter; not being perfumed by 
it, it cannot be the seed. Consequently, the supramundane purification also 
would be impossible in he absence of a retributive consciousness furnished with 
all the seeds. Indeed, the impregnation of hearing, which occurs in the mundane 
mental consciousness, cannot contain ( parigrah -) the seed of the supramundane 
mind. [136b28] 

44. Comm. Bh 333b21-333c5, bh 162a4-162b3, U 394M5-18, u 261b2-4. 

“This text is very easy to understand; there is no need to explain it.” (U) 


45. How can the retributive consciousness furnished with all the seeds 
(sarvabljaka vipdkavijnana), the cause of affliction ( samklesahetu ), be the seed 
(bTja) of the supramundane mind ( lokottara citta) that counteracts this affliction 
(tatpratipaksa) ? The supramundane mind is foreign ( anucita ); thus its propensity 
(vdsaiia) does not yet exist. Not having a propensity, from what seed (blja) could 
it be said to arise? 

Answer: It comes from the seed that is the propensity of hearing (srutavasana), 
issuing from (nisyananda) the very pure (ativisuddha) dharmadhatu. [136c4] 


45. Comm. Bh 333cl 1-23, bh 162b3-163a2, U 394b23-394c6, u261b4-8. 

“The retributive consciousness, the cause of that which is counteracted (vipaksa), i.e., the 
affliction, cannot be the cause of the antidote (pratipaksa ), i.e., purity.” (Bh) - “Poison 
has never been known to produce ambrosia (amrta). How could the store-consciousness, 
which is like the poison, produce this supramundane ambrosia which is the pure mind? 


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The supramundane mind is foreign ...: the pure mind has not yet been realized (prapta ); 
how could it arise without an appropriated cause?” (U) 

“It comes from ... This phrase shows that the pure mind has a separate seed. It is certainly 
not bom from the store-consciousness as its seed. What then is its particular seed? It is 
the propensity of hearing, issuing from the very pure dharmadhatu". (U) - " To show that 
the dharmadhatu is unknown to the sravakas, etc., it is qualified as very pure : indeed, this 
dharmadhatu, attested to by the Buddha Bhagavats, cuts through the attachment obstacle 
( klesavarana ) and the obstacle to knowledge ( jheyavarana ). The teachings 
(< desanadharma ), i.e., the sutras, etc., which result from this very pure dharmadhatu, are 
called the result of the very pure dharmadhatu. Since we ’understand’ these sutras without 
error ( avipatyasa ), we speak of hearing. The propensity coming from this hearing is 
called propensity of hearing ; or again the hearing itself constitutes propensity; hence the 
expression propensity-hearing. [In Sanskrit: srutasya vasaneti srutavasana, or also 
srutam eva vasaneti srutavasana. This propensity-series ( vasanasamtana ) residing as an 
foreign principle in the store-consciousness is the cause capable of producing the 
supramundane mind. That is why it is said that this mind comes from this seed which is 
the hearing propensity resulting from the very pure dharmadhatu”. (Bh) - For 
dharmadhatu, see chap. V, § 1. 


46. Is the hearing propensity ( srutavasana ) the same as the store-consciousness 
or is it not the same as the store-consciousness? If it is identical with the store- 
consciousness, how is it the seed ( by a ) producing the antidote (pratipaksa) to this 
consciousness? If it is not identical with the store-consciousness, where could a 
support (as hr ay a) to this hearing- propensity seed ( srutavdsandbTja ) be found? 

Answer: Until the enlightenment of the buddhas is attained (adhigama), this 
hearing propensity, according to whether it resides in any place of functioning 
whatsoever that serves it as support (dsrayapravrttisthana), resides temporarily 
(ki tsai) in the retributive consciousness ( vipdkavijhdna ), becomes united with it, 
functions with it, like water ( arnbu ) and milk ( kslra). However, it is not the 
store-consciousness because it is its seed. [136cl 1] 


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46. Comm. Bh 334a2-13, bh 163a2-6, U 394cl3-26, u 261b8-262a6. 

Lamotte has translated this entire paragraph according to H. 

“If the hearing propensity is identical with the store-consciousness, how could it be the 
seed of the antidote to the store-consciousness? If it is not identical with the store- 
consciousness, it must have a support distinct from the store-consciousness.” (Bh) 

“Until the enlightenment of the Buddha is attained : until one acquires the supreme 
enlightenment ( anuttara bodhih ) acquired by the Buddhas” (Bh), - “until one acquires the 
destiny (gad) that serves as support ( asraya ) for stainless emancipated wisdom ( vimalam 
asaktam ca jhanam)" (U), this hearing propensity, “the propensity coming from the 
teachings ( desanadharma ), i.e., the sutras umistakenly (aviparyasa) 'heard', according as 
it resides in any place of functioning whatsoever that serves it as support depending on 
whether it has any series ( sanitaria ) whatsoever as place of functioning, resides 
temporarily in the retributive consciousness, is joined to it, functions with it, like water 
and milk : although the hearing impregnation is not the store-consciousness, it resides in 
this consciousness and functions with it. Nevertheless, it is not the store-consicousness : 
the hearing propensity is the seed of the supramundane mind ( lokottara citta), is not 
identical with the store-consciousness, is not the seed of this consciousness .... For it is 
the seed of the counteragent of the latter, it is the cause (hetu) of the nonconceptual 
knowledge ( nirvikalpakajhana ) that counteracts the store-consciousness. It is like an attic 
into which all sorts of things are all jumbled up, like a doctor's medicine ( risibhaisajya ) 
mixed up with all kinds of poisons (visa), like a drug (agada) for all the illnesses. 
Although it functions for a long time with the bad poison, the good medicine is not 
identical with the poison, is not the seed of the poison. It is the same here for the hearing 
propensity.” (U) 


47. From the small propensity (mrduvdsana) is derived the medium propensity 
(madhyavdsana), from the medium propensity is derived the great propensity 
(adhimatravdsana); indeed, hearing (sruta), contemplating (cinta) and meditating 
(bhavana) comprise a progression (bahullkarana). [136c 13] 


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47. Comm. Bh 334al7, bh 163a6-163bl, U 394c29-395al, u 262a6-7. 


Here, by the propensity of the small, medium and great categories respectively, the 
wisdom {prajna) bom from hearing ( srutamayi ), contemplating ( cintamayi ) and 
meditating ( bhavanamayt) should be understood. (Bh) 


48. This hearing propensity-seed ( srutavasanabija ), small, medium and great, is 
also the seed (bTja) of the dharmakaya. 

Since it counteracts {pratipaksa ) the store-consciousness, it is not identical with 
the store-consciousness. 

Issuing from ( nisyanda ) the supramundane ( lokottara ) and very pure 
(ativisuddha) dharmadhatu, even though it is worldly ( laukika ), it is the seed of 
the supramundane mind ( lokottara citta). 

Even before the supramundane mind arises, it counteracts {pratipaksa ) the 
explosion of the afflictions ( klesaparyavasthdna ); it counteracts the hell destinies 
( apayagati ); it is the antidote that supresses {parydddnapratipaksa) all bad actions 
(duskrta). 

It favors ( anulomika ) meeting ( samyoga ) with the Buddhas and bodhisattvas. 

Although worldly, it pertains {samgrhlta) to the dharmakaya of the beginning 
bodhisattvas {adhikdrmika bodhisattva ); it also comes out of the vimuktikaya 
(body of deliverance) of the sravakas and pratyekabuddhas. Although it is not 
the store-consciousness, it comes from the dharmakaya and the vimuktikaya. 

To the extent that the hearing propensity, small, medium or great, develops 
(vardhate) successively, to that extent the retributive consciousness {vipdkajndna) 
diminishes ( nyunXkriyate ) and transforms its support {dsrayapardvrtti). Having 
completely ( sarvatha ) transformed its support, the retributive consciousness, 
although supplied with all the seeds {sarvabTjaka), becomes deprived of seeds 
and completely cut off (prahma). [136c35] 


48. Comm. Bh 334b7-19, bh 163bl-6, U 395al4-195bl2, u 262a7-263a4. 


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“ Although mundane, because it is impure ( sasrava ), it is the seed of the supramundane 
mind : for it constitutes the apparatus ( sambhdra ) of the pure ( anasrava ) mind .... Arising 
in the world ( lokam nisritya), it is called mundane because it is mixed with the store- 
consciousness and functions with it.” (U) 

“It coun teracts the explosion of the passions : it is a cause capable of cutting through the 
excessive activity ( adhimdtrapra vrtti) of sensual desire ( raga ), etc.” (Bh) 

“It counteracts the hell destinies : “having cut through the explosion of the passions, it is 
able to counteract the bad destinies ( durgati ) of hell.” (Bh) - “Thus, a verse says ’Those 
who have correct worldly vision ( samyagdrsti ) but of the higher class, while passing 
through thousands of successive existences, do not fall into the bad destinies.” (U) 

It is the antidote that suppresses all bad actions. According to bh: mam grans la myoh 
bar hdyur bahi las gah gis nan sohdu skye bar hgyur ba de yah / dens par hgyur bahi 
rgyu yin te / mdor bsdu na hdas pa dan / ma hohs pa dan / da Itar byuh bahi hes par 
spy ad pa thams cad kyi ghen polio : “It is the cause that suppresses these actions-to-be- 
experienced-later ( aparaparyayavedamyakarman ) as a result of which one is reborn in 
the bad destinies. In summary ( samasatah ), it is the counteragent of all bad conduct 
(< duscarita ), past ( atfta ), future ( anagata ) and present ( pratyutpanna ). 

It favors the meeting with the Buddhas and bodhisattvas. According to bh: ma lions pa na 
dge bahi bses ghen dan bdag phrad pa thob pahi rgyu hid kyah yin no: “It is also the 
cause which will permit one later to become connected to spiritual friends 
( kalyanamitra ).” 

“It pertains to the dharmakaya: because it is its cause. Similarly, says the author, it is the 
concern of the vimuktikaya. There are differences between the dharmakaya and the 
vimuktikaya. The vimuktikaya is just the radical cutting off of the bond ( grantha ) that is 
the passion-obstacle ( klesavarana ). It is like the citizen ( paurajana ) who breaks the 
painful straps of the cangue (the heavy wooden yoke worn on the neck by criminals): he 
escapes from the pain without, however, gaining any glory, any pre-eminence 
(adhipatya), sovereignty ( aisvaiya ), or fortune ( samrddhi ). The dharmakaya, on the other 
hand, is free of both obstacle-bonds, the obstacle of the passions ( klesavarana ) and the 
obstacle to knowledge (jheyavarana ), which disappear along with their traces ( vasana ). 
The dharmakaya is ornamented ( alamkrta ) with innumerable qualities ( aprameyaguna ), 


95 



wonderful and extraordinary (ascaiya-adbhuta): the powers ( bala ), the fearlessnesses 
(■ vaisaradya ), etc. It is the basis of all fortune ( samrddhi ) and all sovereignty ( aisvaiya ). 
It has excellent masteries ( yaravasita ) at its disposal. It does as it pleases (yathdkamam ). 
It is like the prince ( rdjaputra ) who is anointed ( abhiseka ), but who, guilty of a mistake, 
has been thrown into prison: once freed, he comes once more into possession of his 
prerogatives, sovereignty and fortune. 

The retributive consciousness transforms its basis', it is like a sick person's body which is 
transfonned by drinking the medicine of the doctor (< rsibhaisajya ) ....; he escapes from 
sickness and gets health. (U) 

The last phrase of the paragraph should be understood properly; u comments on it in 
these words: sa bon thams cad pa yah sa bon med par hgyur €es bya ba la sogs pa ni sa 
bon gyi mam pa thams cad spans pahi phyir te / kun nas non mohs pahi sa bon thams 
cad med pa hid hdi ni spans par rig par bya ho : “It is said that although it is furnished 
with all the seeds, it becomes deprived of seeds because these seeds are completely cut. 
And this absence of all seed of defilement ( samklesabija ) should be considererd to be the 
cutting through (pr a liana ) of this consciousness. Indeed, the transformed store- 
consciousness amounts to the tathata, to what it is in essence by the destruction of its 
seeds.” 


49. As in the example of water ( ambu ) and milk ( ksTra ), the hearing propensity, 
which is not the store-consciousness, and the store-consciousness itself exist 
together in the same place. But how is it that the store-consciousness becomes 
completely exhausted ( sarvakarena ), whereas the hearing propensity, which is 
not the store-consciousness, develops completely? 

It is like the milk drunk from water by a goose ( hamsa ). In the same way, when 
the mundane attachment ( laukika rdga ) is eliminated, the propensity (yds ana) of 
the non-absorbed levels ( asamdhlta bhumih) decresases little by little, whereas 
the propensity of the absorbed levels ( samdhlta bhumih) develops little by little, 
and thus one arrives at the transformation of the basis ( dsrayapardvrtti ). [137al] 


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49. Comm. Bh 334b25-334cl, bh missing, U 395b 17- 19; u 263a4-5. 

There is a gap in the Tibetan text; Lamotte has translated this paragraph according to H. 

“Let us return to the example given above (§ 46) of water and milk mixed: when geese 
drink this mixture, the milk disappears and the water reamins.” (Bh) - “This text is easy 
to understand; there is no need to explain it.” (U) 


50. “In those who dwell in the absorption of cessation ( nirodhasamapatti ), the 
vijiiana does not leave the body (My«)": according to these words of the 
Buddha, we know that the retributive consciousness ( vipdkavijhdna ) does not 
leave the body. The production ( utpada ) of the nirodhasamapatti does not 
counteract (pratipaksa ) this retributive consciousness but it does counteract all 
the other consciousnesses. [137a3] 


50. Comm. Bh 334c4-7, bh 163b6-164al, U 395b22-395c4, u 263a5-263b3. 

u comments: de Itar kun nas non mons pa dan mam par byan ba hthad pas kun g€i mam 
par ses pa bsgrubs nas hgog pa la siioms par €ugs pa mams kyati €es bya ba la sogs pas 
hgog pahi snoms par hjug pa mi srid par sgrub po // sans rgyas dan / ran satis rgyas dan 
/ dgra bcom pa dan / phyir mi Idog pahi byan chub sems dpah mams ma gtogs pa hgog 
pa la snoms par €ugs pa g€an mams si ba las bye brag ston pa na bcom Idan hdas kyis 
dehi mam par ses pa lus dan bral ba ma yin no €es bkah stsai te/ de ni g€i mam par ses 
pa las g€an ma yin no // de Itar ci mhon €e na / hgog pahi snoms par hjug pa ni dehi 
gtien po ma yin pahi phyir ro // dehi gtien por hgog pahi snoms par hjug pa skye ba ma 
yin te / dmigs pa dan mam pa yotis su ma chad pahi phyir ro // mam par rig pahi mi gsai 
ba ni [ma] €i ba hid du yotis su mi gcod pas ghen po mi byed pahi phyir hgog pahi snoms 
par hjug pa ni kun g€i mam par ses pahi ghen po ma yin no // gati la ghen po tiled pa de 
ni hgog par mi hgyur ro // hjug pahi mam par ses pa gati dmigs pa dan mam pa yotis su 
chad pas ma €i ba dehi ghen por skye ste / de hgag pa hid do: "The writer has proved 
the existence of the store-consciousness by showing that, without it, affliction ( samklesa ) 
and purification (y yavadana) are impossible. By speaking now of 'those who dwell in 
nirodhasamapatti', he proves that without it, nirodhasamapatti could not take place. 


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Except for the Buddhas, the pratyekbuddhas, the arhats and the avaivartika bodhisattvas, 
those who dwell in nirodhasamapatti are not dead ( maranavisista ): to show this, the 
Bhagavat said that, amongst them, the vijnana does not leave the body. This vijnana is 
none other than the store-consciousness. How does he know this (katham gamy ate )? 
Because the nirodhasamapatti does not counteract this consciousness: the production of 
nirodhasamapatti does not counteract this consciousness, because the object ( alambana ) 
and the aspect ( akara ) of the store-consciousness are not different ( aparicchinna ). Since 
a vague ( apatu ) and indistinct consciousness ( vijhapti ) does not hinder the 
nirodhasamapatti in its subsiding, the latter does not counteract the store-consciousness 
because it does not destroy that which it does not hinder. 

But the nirodhasamapatti, having a distinct object and aspect, is produced by 
counteracting the active consciousnesses (pravrttivijhana ), the non-calmed 
consciousnesses. The latter are then destroyed.” 


51. In those who emerge from ( vyutthd -) nirodhasamapatti, the vijnana is not 
produced anew. Indeed, when the retributive consciousness ( vipdkavijhdna ) has 
been interrupted ( samucchinna ), it does not rearise ( abhinirvrt -), except in being 
reborn ( pratisamdhi ). [137a5] 


51. Comm. Bh 334cl0-13, bh 164al-3, U 395c6-9, u 263b3-4. 

“Some believe that the consciousnesses which perish on entering absorption are produced 
anew when emerging from the absorption. For this reason, the Bhagavat said that the 
vijnana does not leave the body.” (U) - “This is not true, because on leaving the 
absorption, the vijnana is not produced anew. This vijnana, which is fruit of retribution 
( vipakaphala ), does not rearise once it is interrupted except to be reborn and take on a 
new existence.” (Bh) 


52. Some think that the absorption of cessation {nirodhasamapatti) is provided 
with mind ( sacittaka ) because it contains a mental consciousness (i manovijhdna ). 


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But even from their point of view, such a mind ( citta ) is impossible [in nirodha- 
samapatti]. Indeed, 

i) Nirodhasamapatti would be impossible. 

ii) The object ( alambana ) and the aspect ( akara ) of the absorption vijnana 
are not perceived ( upalabdha ). 

iii) Since the mental consciousness cannot be described here as an 
unwholesome ( akusala ) or morally indeterminate ( avyakrta ) consciousness, it 
would be associated ( samprayukta ) with the roots of good ( kmalamula ). 

iv) In the nirodhasamapatti, there would be a contact (sparsa) whence the 
presence ( samudaya ) of conceptualization ( samjiia ) and sensation ( vedita ). 

v) Or rather, the nirodhasamapatti would be reduced to a simple 
interruption of conceptualization ( samjhdsamuccheda-mdtra ), which is 
erroneous because another mental stabilization ( samadhi , namely, the 
asamjnisamapatti) has this power (prabhdva ). 

vi) Volition (cetana), faith (sradda), and the other roots of good would be 
present. [137al 1] 


52. Comm. Bh 334c22-335b8, bh 164a3-165b3, U 395cl6-396al0, u 263b4-264a6. 

“The vijnana which, in the course of absorption does not leave the body, is certainly not a 
mental consciousness. 

i) The nirodhasamapatti would be impossible because concept ( samjiia ) and sensation 
( vedita ) would not be destroyed. Actually, if the mental consciousness were inseparable 
from these two general factors ( mahabhumika ), these two factors, i.e., concept and 
sensation, would not be destroyed, and this absorption would not take place since the 
samjnaveditanirodhasamapatti is defined as the absoption where conceptualization and 
sensation are destroyed. 

ii) The vijnana of this absorption is definitely not a mental consciousness because the 
object and the aspect of this vijnana are not perceived. Every mental consciousness 


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presupposes a perceptible object and aspect. But in the nirodhasamapatti there is nothing 
like that. Therefore there is no mental consciousness in it. 

iii) The vijnana of this absorption is definitely not a mental consciousness because this 
mental consciousness would be associated with the roots of good. The mind of entry into 
this absorption ( samapatti ) is definitely neither unwholesome nor morally indetenninate. 
Since concentration is wholesome, it, i.e., the mind of entry, is only wholesome ( kusala ). 
But without the roots of good, non-attachment ( alobha ), etc., this wholsome mind would 
not exist. It is by association ( samprayogatah ) that it is good. But if these roots of good 
exist, how would the two mental factors, concept and senation, not be present? 

iv) Non-covetousness and other roots of good are inseparable from contact. That is why 
there would be contact in the nirodhasamapatti . Now the contact coming from this 
absorption has well-being ( prasrabdhi ) as its nature: it is to-be-sensed pleasantly 
(sukhavedaniya) or to-be-sensed indifferently ( upeksavedaniya ), whence the presence of 
a sensation ( vedana ) simultaneously ( sahaja ) with contact. But according to the 
definition given by the Buddha, if there is concept and sensation, there is no 
nirodhasamapatti. 

v) It is said: ’By suppressing ( vidusana ) concept and sensation in the manner that an 

abscess ( visphota ) or an arrow (isu) is removed, nirodhasamapatti is produced. In this 
absorption it is only concept and sensation that are destroyed, but mind remains'. In order 
to refute this theory, the writer then says: Another absorption (samddhi) has this power: 
this suppression of concept and sensation possible in samadhi is not characteristic of 
nirodha alone. Why? Thus, in the nonconceptual absorption ( asamjhisamapatti ), by 
virtue of a preparatory practice ( purvopaya ), there is this power of suppression 

characteristic of samadhi The nirodhasamapatti would be reduced to a simple destruction 
of concept if the suppression of conceptualization was characteristic of nirodha alone. 
The absorption of nonconcept, primarily and only, in suppressing conceptualization, 
would be merely the destruction of conceptualization ( samjhdnirodha ) in the absorption 
of nonconcept and not a distinct absorption. Now you do not agree to this. 

vi) Finally, as the destruction of the supported thing ( asrita ) does not occur without 
destruction of the support ( asraya ), the mind present in this absorption should also be 
destroyed. If this mind contained in the nirodhasamapatti were not destroyed, volition. 


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faith and the other roots of good would be presen t. On the other hand, if the latter had 
been destroyed, the mind too would definitely be destroyed. This is why 
nirodhasamapatti is not simply the destruction of the factors supported ( asrita ) by the 
mind because, when there is a support ( asraya ), to suppress the things supported {asrita) 
is not possible.” (U) 


53. The absorption of cessation does not contain a mind (citta) without mental 
factors ( caitta ), 

i) because it is impossible to separate the things supported {asrita, i.e., the 
mental factors) from their support {asraya, i.e., the mind); 

ii) because there are examples {drstanta) where destruction of the things 
supported necessarily leads to destructiom of the support; 

iii) because the factors of the mind or mental factors are not like the non- 
omnipresent bodily factors ( asarvaga ). [137al2] 


53. Comm. Bh 335b8-335c2, bh 165b3-166a2, U 396al0-16, u 264a6-264bl. 

“In order to avoid all the kinds of difficulties ( dosa ) enumnerated above and to avoid 
contradicting the agamas, some scholars are content to exclude the mental factors 
{caitta). Thus rejecting these mental factors, they posit a mind without mental factors in 
this absorption of cessation. That also is impossible. Why? 

i) Because it is impossible to separate the things supported from their support : the 
support {asraya) is the mind {citta); the things supported {asrita) are the mental factors 
{caitta). Support and things supported, i.e., mind and mental factors, have been 
inseparable from one another since beginningless samsara because they mutually attract 
one another. This is why, if the absorption of cessation is equipped with a mind, it will 
necessarily bring along non-attraction and the other roots of good {alobhadikusalamula) 
inseparable from the mind. 

Objection - But, you may say, the absorption and the means of absorption 
{samapattyupaya) are in opposition {virodha) to non-attachment and the other roots of 


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good. Therefore, in this absorption, the roots of good do not exist and the wholesome 
mind ( kusalacitta ) alone exists. 

Answer - Such a dissociation has never been seen elsewhere. If, at the time of its cause, 
the absorption is associated with these mental factors, it would remain associated with 
them at the time of the fruition of result ( nisyandaphala ). Therefore the objection does 
not hold. 

ii) Neither does it hold because there are examples. The Bhagavat has said (Majjhima, I, 
p. 296): ‘In those who dwell in the absorption of cessation, the factors ( samskara ) of the 
body {kayo), speech (vac) and mind ( manas ) are destroyed ( niruddha ).' Here the factors 
of the body are the inbreath and the outbreath ( anapana ); the factors of speech are 
examination ( vitarka ) and judgment ( vicara ); the factors of mind are volition ( cetana ), 
conceptualization (samjna), etc. If examination and judgment were destroyed, speech 
could not arise. It is the same for the mind: if the factors are destroyed, it does not arise. 

Objection - But, you may say, if the factors of the body perish when one enters into 
absorption, the body persists and does not perish. It is the same for the mind: the mental 
factors are destroyed but the mind persists and does not perish. 

Answer - This objection does not hold. Why? 

iii) Because [the mental factors are not non-omnipresent like the body factors. The 
Bhagavat has said: ’When the body factors are suppressed, there is still another cause for 
the susbsistence ( sthitihetu ) of the body: food ( ahara ), drink (pana ), the vital organ 
(jivitendriya), consciousness ( vijnana ), etc. Thanks to these, although the inbreath and 
outbreath may have disappeared, the body persists.’ But it is not the same for the mind. If 
the mental factors are suppressed, there is no further particular cause supporting the mind 
so that it can subsist. Thus, since the absorption of cessation would not have a mental 
consciousness, it would be necessary to call it absorption without mind 
( acittakasamapatti ). 

But since the retributive consciousness ( vipdkavijhdna ) remains in this absorption, the 
Bhagavat has stated that the vijnana does not leave the body, and it is from this vijnana 
supplied with all the seeds (sarvabfjaka) that, coming out of absorption (samdpatti- 
vyutthana ), the active consciousnesses (pravrttivijhana ) arise. This is why the store- 
consciousness necessarily exists.” (Bh) 


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54. Since it cannot be wholesome (k usala), unwholesome ( akusala ) or morally 
indeterminate ( avydkrta ), this mental consciousness is not in conformity (no 
yujyate) with the absorption of cessation. [137a 14] 


54. Comm. Bh 335c5-336a8, bh 166a2-167b5, U 396al8-196bl9, u 264bl-265bl. 

“The vijnana which, according to the Buddha, does not leave the body during 
nirodhasamapatti, cannot be a mental consciousness without ideation and sensation (§ 
52), or a mind without mental factors (§ 53). Every mental consciousness must be either 
wholesome, unwholesome or morally indeterminate.” (U) - Now, in nirodhasamapatti, 
the mental consciousness would have none of these qualities. 

i) It could not be wholesome: 

a) Neither by association ( samprayogogatah ) with the roots of good 
( kusalamula ). “How could the roots of good be separated from contact ( sparsa )? How 
could contact be separated from the univeral ( sarvaga ) mental factors, sensation, etc.?” 
(U) 

b) Nor by reason of its original cause ( samutthanatah ): a wholesome mind of 
effort (prayogika kushalacitta). “That contradicts the sutra for which every mind is 
wolesome by virtue of an association with the roots of good. Moreover, who forces us to 
believe that, if the mind of effort, the condition for absorption, is wholesome by 
association with non-covetousness and the other roots of good, it is not the same for the 
mind of absorption which is the result that that resembles the cause ( nisyandaphala )?” 
(U) 

c) Nor by its nature ( svabhavatah ): “it would be included in the series of things 
wholesome by nature, roots of good, etc.” (U) 

d) Nor absolutely ( paramarthatah ): ”it would necessarily be liberated ( yimukta ).” 

(U) 

ii) “It could not be unwholesome, because the nirodhasamapatti is in essence 
wholesome.” (Bh) 


103 



iii) “Neither could it be morally indeterminate ( avyakrita ), for it is not the avyakrta 
relating to conduct ( Tryapcitha ) or to the arts ( silpasthana ) or to magical creations 
(, nirmana ). But, you may say, it is the avyakrta arisen from retribution ( vipakaja ). In this 
case, it comes down to a store-consciousness. Beyond these four avyakrtas there is no 
fifth avyakrta.” (Bh) 

“This is why the vijnana residing in this absorption is the retributive consciousness and 
not the mental consciousness.” (Bh) 


55. The theory according to which the continuous production ( anantarotpada ) of 
matter ( rupa ) and of mind ( citta ) would be the seed ( blja ) of the dharmas is 
inadmissible as we have seen above (§ 23). 

It would be impossible to fall ( cyuti ) from the formless realm ( arupya ) or from 
the heaven of the non-identifying ones ( asamjhin ), and to emerge from the 
absorptionof cessation ( nirodhasamapatti ). 

The last mind ( antyacitta ) of the arhat would not be explicable, unless the earlier 
mind, with respect to the later mind, would be an immediately preceding 
condition and ( samanantara-pratyaya ) and not a causal condition. [137a 17] 


55. Comm. Bh 336al3-21, bh 167a5-168a2, U 396b23-396cl 1, u 265M-8. 

“According to one theory, the authors of which are the Sautrantikas, the continuous 
production of matter and mind (in the sense that forms and minds arise in series in order 
of anteriority and posteriority) would be the seed of the dharmas: would be the generative 
cause (janakahetu ) of conditioned dhrmas ( samskrta ). This theory says: the form (rupa) 
of the later moment ( uttaraksana ) arises immediately ( anantaram ) from the form of the 
preceding moment ( purvaksana ); the mind (citta) of the later moment and the associated 
mental dharmas (samprayukta) arise immediately from the mind of the preceding 
moment. Thus cause (hetii) and result (phala ) are explained correctly. Of what use (him 
prayojanam) would it be to imagine a store-consciousness, cause of the dharmas? 


104 



In order to refute this theory, the writer says: it is inadmissible as we have seen above 
when he said, in § 23, that two moments are never simultaneous. But this theory has yet 
other defects. 

When one falls from the formless realm ( arupyadhatu ) and is reborn into the form realm 
( rupadhatu ), it is impossible that the earlier form is the generating seed of the actual 
form, because the earlier fonn has long since been destroyed. - When the mind falls from 
the heaven of the non-identifying ones to be reborn into an identifying world, when the 
mind reappears to leave the absorption of cessation, etc., it is impossible that the earlier 
mind could be the generating seed of the later mind because the earlier mind has long 
since been destroyed. 

If the earlier mind could contain the seed of the later mind without having a birth and 
cessation simultaneous with the later mind, if only the mind of the earlier moment could 
be the seed that produces ( avahati ) the mind of the later immediately-following moment, 
the last mind of the arhat could not be explained : he would be unable to enter into the 
sphere of nirvana-without-residue (nirupadhisesanirvdnadhdtu). Indeed, this ultimate 
mind would be the seed which, as immediately preceding condition ( samanantara - 
pratyaya), gives rise to another mind; the result would be that the sphere of nirvana- 
without-residue would never occur. 

Consequently, the forms and minds that arise following one another in order of anterioity 
and posteriority could only be immediately preceding conditions ( samanatarapratyaya ) 
or dominant conditions ( adhipratyaya ) with respect to one another; they are not causal 
conditions ( hetuprataya ).” (U) 55. 


56. Consequently, lacking a retributive consciousness ( vipdkavijhdna ) supplied 
with all the seeds ( sarvabljaka ), defilement ( samklesa ) and purification 
( vyavaddna ) would be impossible {ayuktd). Therefore the existence of a store- 
consciousness showing the characteristics that we have described 
( yathoktalaksana ) is proven ( siddha ). [137a20] 

56. Comm. Bh 336a25-26, bh 168a2, U 396cl4-24, u 265b8-266a4. 


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“With the help ( yukti ) of innumerable arguments explained above (§29 to § 55), the 
author has proved that the store-consciousness exists necessarily.” (Bh) 


57. Here are some stanzas: 

i) If there was only one good mind ( bhadracitta ) among the bodhisattvas, i.e., 
a mental consciousness ( manovijitdna ) that is whollesome but impure ( kusala - 
sasrava)], apart from the first five active consciousnesses (pravrttivijnana ) 
and distinct from the other mental consciousness - the unwholesome impure 

(i akmala-sdsrava ) consciousness how would this mind transform its support 
(katham pardvarteta )? 

ii) The counteragent (pratipaksa) is the transformation (pardvrtti ), you would 
say? No, because the antidote to the affliction is not the cutting (prahana) of 
the affliction. Besides, if the counteragent were the cutting, cause ( hetu ) and 
result (phala ) would be indistinguishable. 

iii) Perhaps you would admit that this mind loses its seeds ( blja ), or loses its 
nature of seed ( bljasvabhdva ) and that that is its transformation. But since 
this mind no longer exists, these two losses are nonexistent and your claimed 
transformation is impossible. [137a27] 


57. Comm. Bh 336b5, bh 168a2-168b6, U 387a3-19, u 266a4-266b4. 

“These three stanzas explain how, by confining oneself to the active consciousnesses 
( pravrittivijhana ), the transformation of the support ( asrayaparavitti ) would not take 
place. 

i) If among the bodhisattvas there were only one good mind : a wholesome ( kusala ) 
mental consciousness associated with the counteragent of the afflictions 
( pratipaksasamprayukta ) and supramundane ( lokottara ), separate from the five: the first 
five consciousnesses, visual consciousness, etc., and distinct from the other: from the 
unwholesome ( akusala ) impure ( sasrava ) and afflicted ( samklista ) mental conscousness; 
the author, who has already spoken of a good mind, adds here that it is distinct from the 
other with the aim of distinguishing it from the wholesome but impure ( kusalasasrava ). 


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How would this mind transform its support ?\ if you believe in the existence of the store- 
consciousness, you could call 'transformation of the support' the phenomenon that causes 
all the seeds of affliction ( samklesabija ) that it contains to lose the quality of seed. But if 
you do not believe in it, what would this transformation consist of? 

ii) You say that the arising of the counteragent is the transformation. But that is 
impossible. Why? The counteragent is the transformation, you will say. No, because the 
counteragent is not the cutting : it is the cutting of the afflictions that is called 
transfonnation of the support. But the counteragent is not this cutting, because it is 
merely the cause of the cutting (prahanahetu ). If it were the cutting itself, the cause and 
the result would not be different. The result, i.e., nirvana, is the cutting; the cause, i.e., the 
noble path ( aryamarga ), is the counteragent. If the counteragent were the cutting, the 
result and the cause would be one and the same thing and, on the arising of the 
counteragent, there would be nirvana.” (Bh) 

iii) You would perhaps admit that this mind loses its seeds or loses its nature of seed and 
that that is the transformation : “You would perhaps admit that the loss of the seeds or the 
loss of its nature of seed applied to the active consciousness constitutes the 
transfonnation of the support.” (Bh) - “The mind ( citta ) in which the numerous seeds of 
defilement ( samklesabija ) are accumulated (delta) would be without seeds, and you 
would consider that to be the transformation of the support; or else its nature of seed 
(. btjasvabhava ) would disappear, and you would consider that to be the transformation of 
the support.” (U) 

But since this mind no longer exists, these two gates are nonexistent, and your claimed 
transformation is impossible : “If this mind still existed, one could say that it loses its 
seeds when it loses its nature of seed. But if it no longer exists, it cannot be said that it 
loses its seeds or its nature of seed. But at the moment when the supramundane mind 
(lokottaracitta) manifests, this mind of which you speak no longer exists. How could it 
be said that it loses its seeds when its nature is destroyed?” (U) - “The afflicted active 
consciousnesses ( samklista pravrttijhana ) no longer exist in the state of absorption 
(, samapattyavastha ) with which we are concerned. Thus there are no longer any seeds 
that could be destroyed. The two losses that you call transformation of the support are 
impossible. But let us accept the existence of a store-consciousness: then, although the 
afflicted active consciousnesses no longer exist in the state of absorption, their seeds 


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reside in the store-consciousness which can be deprived of seeds or of its nature of seeds 
by transforming it. Since thus your claimed transfonnation of the support is not 
explicable in the hypothesis of the existence of only the active consciousnesses, it is 
necessary to believe in the existence of a store-consciousness.” (Bh) 


58. What are the types (prabheda) of store-consciousness? - In short, the store- 
conciousness is threefold ( trividha ) or fourfold ( caturvidha ). 

Firstly, it is threefold in regard to the three types ( visesa ) of propensities 
( vdsana ): 

i) the propensity of speech ( abhildpavdsana ), 

ii) the propensity of the view of self ( dtmadrstivdsana ), 

iii) the propensity of the factors of existence ( bhavdngavdsana ). [137b2] 


58. Comm. Bh 336c3-12, bh 168b6-169a3, U 397a24-397b4, u 266b4-267al. 

“Having defined and demonstrated the store-consciousness and its characteristics, the 
author asks about its types and answers that it is threefold or fourfold. 

i) The propensity of speech : The expressions ( abhilapa ) of language concerning the self 
( atman ), entities (dharma) or actions ( kriya ) are numerous. From them are derived these 
special propensities ( vasanavisesa ) concerning the self (human, god, etc.), entities (eye, 
color, etc.) or actions (coming, going, etc.). As a result of these propensities, the 'self, 
things and actions appear and the consciousnesses exercizes their special capacities 
(saktivisesa). 

ii) The impregnation of the view of the self By the power of the wrong view regarding 
the self ( satkayadrsti ) peculiar to the manas gripped by the four afflictions (cf. § 6), there 
exists in the store-consciousness a special propensity of belief in a self ( atmagraha ). [Bh 
adds: it is the cause of the distinction between self (svo) and other (para)]. 

iii) The propensity of the factors of existence. By the power of dominance (adhipatya) 
exerted by the mental factors ( samskara ), meritorious (puny a), non-meritorious (apunya) 
or unchanging (anihjya), the special propensities of the twelve-membered causal chain, 


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cf. § 19, from ignorance ( avidya ) up to old-age-and-death ( jatamarana ), exist in every 
destiny ( gati ), divine, etc.” (U) 


59. The store-consciousness is fourfold: projection ( aksepaprabheda ), retribution 
( vipdkaprabheda ), cause ( hetuprabheda ), nature ( laksanaprabheda ). 

i) 'Projection' store-consciousness is the propensity ( sadyojdtatd vasana) 
newly arisen by the fact of retribution. Without this projecting store- 
consciousness, the consciousness conditioned by the factors 
(samskdrapratyayanam vijnanam) and the existence conditioned by 
attachment ( upadanapratyayo bhavah) would be impossible ( ayukta ). 

ii) ‘Retribution’ store-consciousness is the retribution in the destinies (gati ) 
according to the factors ( samskdra ) and the acts of existence (bhava). Without 
this retribution-consciousness there would be no seed (blja) and, as a result, 
the dharmas destined to arise ( paunarbhdvika ) could not arise. 

iii) ‘Cause’ store-consciousness is the cause (hetu) of the belief in a self 
(dtmagrdha) belonging to the manas. Without it, the belief in a self belonging 
to the manas would have no object (alambana). 

iv) ’Nature’ [store-consciousness] is that which has a shared nature 
(sddhdranalaksana) and a unshared nature (asddhdranalaksana), a nature of 
seed with respect to the insensate world (nirveditotpattibijalaksana) and a 
nature of seed with respect to the sensate world ( saveditotpattibTjalaksana ). 
[137b 11] 

59. Comm. Bh 336cl5-337a9, bh 169a3-169b3, U 397M0-23, u 267al-7. 

This paragraph continues and completes the preceding paragraph: the store- 
consciousness, as projection, retribution and cause, corresponds respectively to the 
propensities of speech, factors of existence and view of the self. 

i) Impregnation newly arisen : “impregnation coming from first speech ( abhilapa ) is 
called species-projection because this projection projects the birth.” (U) 


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ii) The dharmas destined to arise .... : “the material organs ( rupindriya ), eye, etc., and 
other entities of retribution would not be able to arise.” (Bh) - “If the root is suppressed, 
there will be no leaves, etc.” (U) 

3. “The store consciousness is the object ( nimitta ) of the view of self ( dtmadrsti ) and the 
belief in the self ( dtmagrdha ) that resides in the afflicted ( klista ) manas. If this special 
store-consciousness which is object did not exist, belief in the self that has as its cause 
the wrong view of self ( satkayadrsti ) contained in the afflicted manas would no longer 
have an object ( alambanavisaya ). But it should be known that it is the result resembling 
the cause ( n isyan daphala) . ’ ’ (Bh) 

iv) The fourth point is developed in the following paragraph. 


60. When it is shared ( sddhdrana ), the store-consciousness is the seed of the 
world-receptacle ( bltdjanaloka ); when it is unshared ( asadharana ), it is the seed 
of the individual bases of consciousness (prdtydtm ikdyatan a ) . 

Shared, it is the seed of the insensate ( [nirveditotpattibTja ) world; unshared, it is 
the seed of the sensate ( saveditotpattibTja ) world. When [the truth of the Buddhist 
path ( mdrgasatya)\ counteracting (pratipaksa) the store-consciousness arises, the 
unshared store-consciousness which is counteracted ( vipaksa ) disappears 
( nirudhyate ); on the other hand, the shared store-consciousness which continues 
to exist, grasped by the concepts of others ( paravikalpa ), becomes the object of a 
purified ( visuddha ) vision {darsana). 

Thus, by reason of diverse aspirations ( bhinnddhimukti ), the yogins have 
different visions ( bhinnadrsya ) of one and the same thing (dravya). Here are 
some stanzas: 

a) The universe, the shared fetter ( sddhdrnabandhana ), is difficult to cut 

( duspraheya ) and difficult to know ( dusparijheya ). Because the outer world 
( bdhyanimitta ) is vast, the yogins have different views of it. 

b) Although the universe is not destroyed by the niargasatya, the vision 
{darsana) of it by pure people is pure {suddha). Because the buddhafields 
(buddhaksetra) are pure ( visudda ), the vision of the Buddhas is pure. 


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Lacking such a shared and unshared store-consciousness, the distinction (visesa) 
between receptacle-world ( bhajanaloka ) and animate world ( sattvaloka ) would 
be impossible. [137b26] 


60. Comm. Bh 337a26-337b3, bh 169b4-7, U 397cl2-398al8, u 267a8-268a8. 

“When it is shared, the store-consciousness is the seed of the world-receptacle', it is the 
cause ( hetu ) of a concept ( vijhapti ) having the appearance ( cibhasa ) of a world- 
receptacle. It is shared in the sense that by the dominant power ( adhipatibala ) providing 
retribution ( vipaka ) of similar actions ( tulyasvakarma ), this concept ( vijhapti ) world is 
conceived ( utpadyate ) in a form that is the same for all who enjoy it. When it is unshared, 
it is the seed of the individual bases of consciousness', the eye and the other bases of 
consciousness ( ayatana ), being the object ( alamaba ) of the belief in self ( atmagraha ), are 
called individual ( pratyatmika ); residing in the inner person, they are called internal 
( adhyatmika ). Since it is the cause of these bases of individual conciousnesses, the 
unshared store-consciousness is their seed. 

Shared, it is the seed of the insensate world. In fact, because it is beyond any advantage 
(upakara) or disadvantage ( apakara ) resulting from a pleasant or unpleasant sensation 
(sukhaduhkhavedana), the receptacle-world is free of pleasure and pain [cf. u: bde ba 
dan sdug bsnal gyi tshor bas phan hdogs pa dan gnod par byed pa med pahi phyir te / 
snod kyi hjog rten la bde ba dan sdug bsnal med do]. When the counteragent of the store- 
consciousness arises : when the truth of the path arises ( margasatya ), the unshared store- 
consciousness, which is counteracted, disappears: the seed of the bases of the individual 
and internal consciousness disappears because it is counteracted ( viruddha ). On the other 
hand, the shared store-consciousness which continues to be grasped by the concepts of 
others becomes the object of a purified vision, for this shared store-consciousness is the 
receptacle-world. Among the yogins, conceptualizations ( vikalpa ) coming from the 
indivual bases of consciousness are destroyed. Nevertheless, they have only a purified 
view ( darsanavisuddhi ) of the receptacle-world grasped by the conceptualizations of 
others (parasamtanavikalpa ). They see this world as a pure thing, like space ( akasa ) that 
is not stained ( putikrta ) by water (a pas), or in the grip ( grhita ) of earth ( prthivi ) or 
burned ( dagdha ) by fire ( tejas ), or shaken (prakampita ) by wind ( vayu ). - But how does 


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one acquire a purified vision ( darsanavisuddhi ) of something real ( sadartha )? - Fearing 
some such objection from his adversary, the author says: Thus the yogins, by reason of 
diverse aspirations, etc.: Thus they have a different vision of one and the same thing 
according to such and such an aspiration: they see gold, etc. (suvamadivisesa 
bhinnadrsyam upalabhyate). Depending on whether they see gold ( suvarna ) or silver 
(rajata) or grass (trna) or wood ( kastha ) there, the object they perceive ( alambana ) is 
multiple [cf. u: mos pa gari dan gah yin pa ji Itar mos pa b€in du gser la sogs pahi bye 
brag gis blta bar bya ba sna tshogs pa dmigs pa Ita bu ste / gser dan / dhul dan / rtswa 
dan / sin la sogs pahi bye brag gis dmigs pa sna tshogs so].” (U) 

The commentary on the stanzas follows: “ Since the outer world is vast', because the 
world-receptacle has a great extent .... Since the universe is not destroyed : because it is 
grasped by the concepts of other beings, it is not destroyed .... Pure beings : those who 
have transfonned their support (para vrttasraya ) . ” (U) 

It is because the vision of the Buddhas is pure that the buddhafields are pure', u 
comments: gzugs la sogs pahi mam par rtog pa ma spans pahi sohi skye bo mams kyis 
€ih gah dag hdam rdza ba dan / rdo dan / brag tshwa can dan / mi mham pa dan / sdoh 
dum dan / tsher ma dan / mi gtsah ba dan Idan par mthoh ba de dag hid gzugs la sogs 
pahi mam par rtog pa spans pa de b€in gsegs pa mams kyis gser la sogs pahi rah b€in 
du gzigs te: “There where ordinary people (prthagjana) who have not cut through the 
concepts of matter, etc. ( rupadivikalpa ) see only fields ( ksetra ) full of mud (pahka), 
stones (pasana), dry land, unevenesses, tree trunks, thorns ( kantaka ) and dirt ( asuci ), the 
Tathagatas who have cut through the concepts of form, etc., see gold, etc. 


61. i). The store-consciousness also has a nature of weakness ( dausthulyalaksana ) 
as well as a nature of validity (prasradhilaksana ). As weak, it is the seed of the 
defilements ( klesa ) and the minor klesas ( upaklesa ); valid, it is the seed of the 
impure but wholesome {sdsravakusaladharma) dharmas. Without this twofold 
store-consciousness, the distinction ( visesa ) between inaptitude ( akarmanyatd ) 
and aptitude ( karmanyatd ) - a distinction that comes from retribution ( vipdka ) - 
would be impossible. 


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ii) The store-consciousness has a further twofold nature: it is exhausted 

( bhuktalaksana ) or it is non-exhausted ( abhuktalaksana ). As exhausted, it is the 
wholesome or unwholesome seed (kusaldkusalabija) that, once retributed, is 
retributed for the good. As non-exhausted, it is the seed of propensity of speech 
( abhildpavdsand ), because, throughout eternity ( anddikdldt ), it is the seed that 
engenders the multiplicity (prapahca ) of discursiveness (v yavahara). Without this 
[twofold store-consciousness], (1) the good or bad actions ( kusalapapakarman ) 
already accomplished ( krta ) would not be exhausted by giving their result and 
would become retributed indefintely; (2) the production of a new propensity of 
speech would be impossible. 

iii) The store-consciousness has also a nature of similarity (drstdn taluks an a), 
because the store-consciousness is like an illusion (mayo), a mirage ( marlci ), a 
dream ( svapna ) and an optical illusion ( iimira ) (cf. II, § 27). Without this 
nature, the store-consciousmness that is the seed of false conceptualizations 
(abhutaparikalpa) would not, at the same time, be the object of errors 

( ' yipary asanimitta ) . 

iv) The store-consciousness has yet another twofold nature: it is complete 

( sakalatalaksana ) or it is incomplete ( asakalata-laksana ). Among beings bound 
by all the bonds of the world of desire ( sakalabandhana ), it is complete. Among 
those who have rejected the mundane attachments ( vigatalaukikaraga ), it is 
reduced. Among the saiksas - sravakas and bodhisattvas - it is partially 
suppressed. Among the arhats, pratyekabuddhas and Tathagatas, it is free of all 
obstacles of passion ( klesd-varana ). Mutatis mutandis ( yathdyogam ), it is the same 
for freedom from all obstacles of passion and all obstacles to knowledge 
(klesajneydvarana). Without this store-consciousness, the gradual suppression 
(kramanivrtti) of afflictions ( samklesa ) would be impossible. [137c 13] 


61. Comm. Bh 337b21-337c4, bh 169b7-170a6, U 398b5-23, u 268a8-268b8. 

“i) Weakness ( dausthulya ) is inaptitude ( akarmanyata ) .... Validity ( prasrabdhi ) is quite 
the opposite; it is synonymous with aptitude ( karmanyata ), with lightness ( laghava ), with 
good physical constitution (zo mdog bdr ba).” (u) 


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ii) “As exhausted, it is the good or bad seed which, once retributed, etc:, the good or bad 
seed, once retributed, cannot be retributed again because it is exhausted. It is like the seed 
(bija) which, after having produced a stem ( ahkura ), cannot produce another one. As non- 
exhausted, it is the seed of the speech impregnation : this seed which develops according 
to conditions ( anutpratyayam ) is a cause capable of giving rise to the multiplicity of 
discursiveness (y yavaharaprapanca) .... Without a store-consciousness of exhaustion, 
good or bad acts would not perish by exhaustion after having given their result: that is, 
after having given their result, they would produce it again according to u: spyad zin pahi 
mtshan hid med na dge ba dan sdig pa €es bya la sogs pa ni hbras bu phyin pas spyad zin 
pa hjig pa de med pa hgyur te / hbras by byin nas yah hbras bur hgyur re €es bya bald 
tha tshig go]. 

Without a store-consciousness of non-exhaustion, the production of a new speech 
impregnation would be impossible : without earler speech (purvabhilapa), no present 
speech (pratyutpannabhilapa ).” (U) 

iii) “These magical entities, etc. are a cause capable of producing wrong views 
(asamyagdrsti); it is the same for the store-consciousness.” (U) 

iv) This passage is easy to understand; there is no need to explain it. 


62. Why is the store-consciousness, which is the retribution {vipdka) of 
wholesome and unwholesome dharmas ( kusaldkusaladharma ), a nonafflicted 
and morally indeterminate ( anivrta-avyakrta ) retribution? - Because, being 
nonafflicted and indeterminate, it opposes neither good nor bad; it is the good 
and the bad that oppose each other. If the retribution were good or bad instead 
of being nonafflicted and indeterminate, the disappearance of the afflictions 
(, samklesanivrtti ) would be impossible. As a result, the retribution consciousness 
is nonafflicted and indeterminate. [137c 18] 


62. Comm. Bh 337cl0-15, bh 170a6-170bl, U 398b28-398c5, u 268b8-269a5. 

“Nonafflicted and indeterminate : i.e., without affliction ( aklista ) and morally 
indeterminate ( avyakrta ). The word because gives the reason: because, being nonafflicted 


114 



and indeterminate, it opposes neither the good nor the bad with which it is in the 
relationship of cause and result.” (u) - If the retribution were not nonafflicted and 
indeterminate, the disappearance of the afflictions would be impossible : since the good 
arises from good and the bad from bad, the process of samsara would have no end.” (Bh) 


NOTES ON CHAPTER I 

More or less com-lete accounts of the doctrine of the alayavijnana: Samdhir., chap. V; 
Lankavatara, p. 46-54 and Suzuki, Studies, p. 248- 264; Sutralamkara, I, 18; XIX, 51; 
Madyantavibhanga, p. 32-35 (Stcherbatsky, p. 54-57); Yogacaryabhumi, Taisho 1579, p. 
579 sq; Alambanaparlksa, JA, 1929, p. 41-46; Trimsika, p. 18-22; Karmasiddhi in MCB, 
IV, 1935-36, § 33-40;Siddhi, p. 94-220; Fan yi ming in S. Levi, Materiaux. - 
Madhyamika sources: Madhyamavatara, p. 125-160 (Museon, 1910, p. 317-344); 
Bodhicaryavatara, IX, 15-35. - Brahmanical sources: Bathmasutra, II, 28-32 (Belvalkar, 
II, p. 91-95); Sarvadarsanasamgraha in Museon, 1901, p. 191 sq.; Saddarsanasamgraha 

Other references in Hobogirin, art. Araya, p. 35. 

1. Jneyasraya: Siddhi, p. 166; Fan yi ming, p. 127. The stanza anadhikaliko dhcituh is 
cited and commented in Trimsika, p. 37 and Siddhi, p. 169. 

2 - 3 . Etymology of the alaya: Samdhinir., V, § 3; Trimsika, p. 18 (23): tatra 
sarvasamklesikadharmabTjasthdnatvdd alayah. alayah sthdnam itipaeayau. atha 
valvyante upanibdhyante ‘smin sarvadharmah kajyabhavena. tad valvyate upanibadhyate 
karanabhavena sarvadhamesv ity alayah; Karmasiddhi, § 33; Siddhi, p. 96, 167; Fan yi 
ming, p. 127. 

4 - 5 . The stanza of Samdhinir., V, v. 7, dddnavijhana gambhirasuksmo occurs in 
Trimsika, p. 34; Karmasiddhi, § 32, 37; Yogacaryabhumi, Taisho 1579, p. 379al2; 
Madhyamakavatara, p. 196 (3) ; Siddhi, p. 173. Comparison with the river and the mirror: 
Samdhinir., V, § 5; Lankavatara, p. 48 (3), 37 (16), 127 (12), etc.; Trimsika, karika 4; 
Siddhi, p. 156-157; H. Ui, Indo-tetsugaku-kenkyu, VI, 1930, p. 559. 

Upadana: Samdhinir., V, v. 2 (the alaya appropriates sadhisthanarupmdriya and the 
threefold vasana); Trimsika, p. 19 ( upadanam upadih sa punaratmadivikalpavasana 
rupadidharma-vikalpavasana ca ); Siddhi, p. 124; the upadhi is twofold: bija or threefold 
vasana and sendriyakakaya); Fan yi ming, p. 140-141. 

The expression yogaksema: Vinaya, II, p. 205; Dtgha, III. p. 123, 124, 164; Majjhima, I, 
p. 1 17, 349, 357; Samyutta, I, p. 173; II, p. 195, 226; III, p. 1 12; IV, p. 125; V, p. 130; 
Anguttara, I, P- 50; II, P- 40, 53, 87, 247; III, P- 21, 294, 353; Divyavadana, p. 98, 123, 
303, 408; Samdhinir., V, § 3; Madhyantavibhanga, p. 33 (6); Trimsika, p. 19 (17); 

Siddhi, p. 125. Cf. C. H. Jacobi, Trimsikavijhapti des Vasubandhu, p. 54; R. B. A. Ray, 
Yogaksema, BSOS, VII, 1934, p. 133-136. 

The coagulated ( sammurcchita ) vijnana: below, § 34. 

6. Citta-mano-vijnana. These seem to be synonymous for the Lesser Vehicle: Dlgha, I, p. 
21 {Yah ca kho idam vuccati cittan ti vamano ti va vihhanan ti va ay am...); Samyutta, II, 
p. 95 - Visuddhimagga, II, p. 452 ( Vihhanam , cittarn, mano ti atthato ekam ); Kosa, II, p. 


115 



176. There are, however, slight differences: Mano represents intellectual functioning of 
consciousness, while Vinana represents the field of sense and sense-reaction 
(“perception”) and Citta the subjective aspect of consciousness (cf. Mrs. Rh. D., Buddhist 
Psychology, p. 19). For Asanga, these are three different things (see below, § 8). - 
Lankavatara, p. 322 (16): cittam vikalpo vijhaptir mano vijnanam eva ca, alayam 
tribhavascesta ete cittasya paryayah ); but, ibid., p. 46 (17): cittena cvyate karma manasa 
ca vicfyate, vijhanena vijanati drsyam kalpeti pancabhih ). 

Asanga distinguished two manas: the manodhatu of the Lesser Vehicle, also called mana- 
ayatana or mana-indriya (cf. Kosa, I, p. 31-33) and the klistamanas. The latter is studied 
in Trimsika, p. 22-23 and Siddhi, p. 225-274. It is always associated with the four 
defilements. In these two texts, the four defilements are called atmadrsti, atmamana and 
atmasneha (Trimsika, p. 23 (11); Siddhi, p. 255). In the Samgraha the fonner is the 
satkayadrsti : cf. Majjhima, I„ p. 300; Samyutta, III, p. 16 seq.; J. Rahder, La sathayadrsti 
d'apres la Vibhasa, MCB, I, 1931-32, p. 227-239. 

7. Demonstration of the existence of the klistamanas: Siddhi, p. 275-288. 

i) On avidya aveniki, Kosa, III, p. 84; V, p. 31. The word avenika : Samyutta, IV, p. 239; 
Anguttara, V, p. 74 seq.; Visuddhimagga, I, p. 268, Divyadana, p. 2, 182, 268, 302; Kosa, 
VII, p. 66; Madhyantavibhanga, p. 56 (15); Siddhi, p. 277-279. 

ii) There is a discussion on the support of the manovijnana. This would be: a) The 
consciousness which has just passed ( yad anantaratitam vijnanam ) as immediately 
preceding condition and antecedent ( samanantarapratayaya ); Sarvastivadin-Vaibhasika 
theory, cf. Kosa, I, p. 31-32; Siddhi, p. 281. b) A substance (rup a) as co-arisen support 

( sahabhu-asraya ): root-Sautrantika theory mentioned here. More precisely, this material 
would be the fleshly heart ( hrdayavastu ): theory of the later Abhidhamma, cf. Milinda, p. 
281; Atthasalim, p. 140, 257, 264, 342; Tikapatthana,p. 17, 26, 53 seq. 62, 256; 
Visuddhimagga, p. 447, 588; Paramatthajotika, II, p. 228; Abhidhammatthasangaha, p. 

14; Vibhanga, p. 87-88. It is also the Taraparmya theory, cf. Kosavyakhya, p. 39 (26): 
Taraparniya api hrdayavastu , amo vijhanadhdtor asrayam kalpayanti; and that of the 
early Sautrantikas, cf. note of K’ouei ki in Siddhi, p. 221. c) A previous moment of the 
organ as condition as the equal and immediate antecedent: another Sautrantika theory 
mentioned in Siddhi, p. 282. d) The klistamanas as co-arisen support, specific and 
dominant condition ( adhipatipratvaya ): Yogacara theory defended here and in Siddhi, p. 
282. 

iii) Etymology of manas: manuta iti manas (Kosa, II, p. 177); manasa manyate punah 
(Lankavatara, p. 316 (2); mano manyanti vai sada (ibid., p. 323 (4); manvata iti manas 
(Siddhi, p. 280). 

iv) Difference between the two concentrations. There is a discussion on the nature of the 
concentrations, a) They exist by themselves (dravyasat) , both being the two destructions 
of mind, but they differ from each other in the preparatory practice, the level where they 
are practiced, the goal pursued, etc.: Sarvastivadin-Sautrantika theory, cf. Kosa, II, p. 
210-213; Siddhi. b) They have only nominal existence (prajhaptisat ), being the simple 
nonexistence of the mind for a time: Sautrantika theory, cf. Kosa, II, p. 214. c) They have 
only nominal existence but they differ by the presence of the klistamanas in the 
asamjnisamapatti and its absence in the nirodhasamapatti: Yogacara theory defended here 
and in Siddhi, p. 283. 


116 



v) Presence of atmagraha in the asamjnin. This is explained differently, a) Asamjnins, 
aware at birth and at death, are in ’possession’ (prapti) of belief in a self, for the mind of 
atmagraha at birth ’projects' ( aksipati ) the mind of atmagraha at death: Sarvastivadin- 
Vaibhasika theory, cf. Kosa, II, p. 199; Siddhi, p. 284. b) The body of the asamjnin who 
lives in unawareness during existence contains the seeds of future belief in a self: root- 
Sautrantika theory, cf. Siddhi, p. 284. c) The asamjnins are unaware because they lack 
any active consciousness ( pravrttijnana ), but they retain a seventh consciousness, the 
klistamanas, always associated with belief in a self: Yogacara therory. 

vi) Only the presence of the klistamanas explains the possibility of a good-impure 
(sasaravakusala) mind, i.e., defiled by belief in a self, cf. Siddhi, p. 284-287. 


8. Compare the references in § 6. On the contrary, Vimsika, p. 3 (2): cittam mano 
vijnanam vijnaptis ceti pa ry ay ah. 


9. Etymology of citta: Kosa, II, p. 179; Siddhi, p. 166, 182-183; Fanyi ming, p. 126. 


10 . The silence of the Lesser Vehicle in regard to the alaya is explained by many reasons: 

a) The ideal of the sravakas, adepts of the Lesser Vehicle, is personal salvation, 
deliverance ( moksa ) by destruction of the obstacle of the afflictions (kies avar ana). For 
this result, it is enough for them to understand coarse objects, the truth of suffering, etc. 
The ideal of the bodhisattvas, adepts of the Greater Vehicle, is the acquisition of 
omniscience ( sarvajnatva ) which assumes suppression of the obstacle of the afflictions 
and the obstacle to knowledge ( klesajheyavarana ) and which allows them to achieve the 
welfare and happiness of all beings ( sarvasattvahitasukhakriya ). The acquisition of 
omniscience is greatly facilitated by the knowledge penetrating the subtle object or the 
alaya. That is why the Buddha reserves the preaching of the alaya for the bodhisattvas. 
This first response formulated here by the Samgraha is also found in Trimsika, p. 15 (7): 
klesajneydvaranaprahanam api moksasarvajnatvadhigamartha. klesa hi moksaprapter 
dvaranam iti atas tesu prahinesu mokso ‘dhigamyate. Jheyavatranam api sarvasmin 
jheyae jhanapravrttipratibandhabhutam aklistam ajnanam. tasmin prahine dsarvakare 
jheye ‘saktam paratihatam ca jnanam pravartata ity atah sarvajhatvam adhigamyate. 

On the two avaranas, klesavarana (= dvarana consisting of the klesas) and jheydvarana 
(= dvarana that covers over or veils the true nature of jheya and thus forms an obstacle to 
knowledge), cf. Madhyantavibhanga, index; Siddhi, p. 566 seq. 

b) The alaya is not preached to the sravakas who might take it for an atman, above, § 4; 
Samdhinir., V, § 7; Karmasiddhi, § 37b. 

c) The sutras of the Lesser Vehicle where it is treated have disappeared, cf. Karmasiddhi, 
§ 37b. - On the disappearance of sutras, Kosa, index, p. 138; Buston, II, p. 169-171; 
Vyakhyayukti, etc. 

d) The alaya is preached to the sravakas in veiled terms; cf. following §. 


11 . The alaya in the Lesser Vehicle: Siddhi, p. 179 and Karmasiddhi, § 35, note 1 16. 


117 



1) Alayarama. A phrase having three members: drama, rata, sammudita in Pali (Vinaya, 
I. p. 4; Majjhima, I. p. 167; Samyutta, I., p. 136; Anguttara, II, p. 131) and in Sanskrit 
(Mahavastu, III,p. 314; Tibetan Samgraha); the same phrase preceded by a fourth 
member: ngai-alaya in the Chinese versions and in Siddhi, III, fob 23b. Related 
expressions: Loka analaya (Saundarandana song XII, v. 22), dharma analaya 
(Lalitavistara, XXV, p. 302). Same phrase in the Vinaya of the Dhannagupta (Sse fen liu, 
chap. 31, Tok., XV, 5, 7a: "Beings are happy in the tch'ao k’ou", 75 and 11; 116 and 8) 
and of the Mahisasaka (Wou fen liu, chap. 15, Tok, XVI, 1, 90a: "Beings being happy, 
become attached to k'ou tche”, 1 16 and 8, 40 and 3). See S. Levi, Alayarama, JA, 

CCXV, 1929, p. 281-283; Hobogirin, art. Araya, p. 35, col. 2. 

Srutamaya jhana, etc.: DTgha, III, p. 219; Vibhanga, p. 324; Visuddhimagga, II, p. 439: 
Kosha, II, p. 265; VI, p. 143; Samdhinir., VIII, v. 24; Madhyantavibhanga, p. 35 (19), 
210 ( 12 ). 

Dharmanudharmaptatipatti : DTgha, II, p. 224; III, p. 1 19; Samyutta, III, p. 40 seq.; 
Anguttara, III, p. 176. Defined in Bodh. bhumi, p. 107 (22): yathaparyesitanam 
yathodgrhitaanam dharmanam kayena vaca manasa ‘nuvartna samyakcintana bhavana 
ca. Lengthy study in Madhyantavibhanga, p. 213-233. 

2) Mulavijhana of the Mahasamghikas : The Sautrantika thesis 3 in Vasumitra's Yi tsong 
louen louen (J. Masuda, Orogon and Doctrines of early Indian Buddhist schools, Asia 
Major, II, 1925, p. 68) seems to be of Mahasamghika inspiration: "There exist 
mulantikaskandhas and ekarasaskandhas." - “The Mahasamghika preceded the 
Sautrantika whose thoughts have been influenced by the founders of the Yogacaraschool. 
It seems to me that the Sautrantika idea of the ekarasaskandha of the siubtle 
consciousness which becomes the substance of trnasmigration and from which the 
cu=rrent five skandha come into existnce was erived originally from the Mahasamghika 
thought”. (J. Masuda, ibid.). 

3) Asamsarikaskandha of the Mahisasaka. Cf. thesis IXB, 9 of the Mahisasaka: "The 
skandhas, ayatanas and dhatus are always present." - “According to the “Shu-chi, the 
constant existence of the ‘bija or seeds’ nd not of the current ( samudacara ) skandha, 
ayatana and dhatu. This is undoubtedly an ingenuous interpretation because otherwise 
the present proposition contradicts one of the other doctrines of the Mahisaska, namely te 
doctrine of the perpetual destruction and recreation of the samskara (IXA, 23). This 
interpretation is usbject, however, to a serious doubt. As it is well-known the bija theory, 
i.e., the theory of the causation of the phenomena out ot the bija, plays an important role 
in the later Yogacara literature, such as the Vijhaptimatratasiddhi, et.c, I am unable, at 
present, to ascertain if the Mahasasaka Abhidharmika had already the bija theory in 
mind”. (J. Masuda, ibid.). 

4) Bhavahga, in Pali bhavahga, 'subconscious life-continuum’. Many Pali and Sanskrit 
references: Atthasalini, p. 72, 140, 269; Sammoha vino dam, p. 81, 156 seq., 406; 
Abhidhammatthasamgraha, p. 12-13; Nettipakarana, p. 91; Milinda, p. 299 seq., 
Visuddhimagga, p. 21, 164, 457 seq., 549, 617, 676; Jataka, VI, 82; Mrs. Rhys.-D., 
Buddhist Manual of Psych. Ethics, p. 3, 132, n.l, 134, n. 1; The Buddhist Philosophy of 
Change, Quest review, Oct. 1917, p. 16; A. B. Keith, Buddhist Philosophy, 1923, p. 104, 
180, 194; L. de La Vallee Poussin, Nirvana, 1925, p. 65-66. 


118 



The Upanibandhana passage on bhavanga is closely related to the doctrine of the 
Visuddhimagga and the Sthavira doctrine summarized by K'ouei ki in Tch’eng wei che 
tchang tchong tch’ou yao, Taisho 1831, P. 635b 1 8-635c 1 . 

a. Bhavanga (or bhavahgavihhana ) extends between birth ( patisamdhivihhana ) and death 
(< cutivihnnana ). It is a flow from which arise the mental operations. First there is 
avajjana : the bhavanga is disturbed by the presence of an object; ‘the subject merely 
turns to something that arouses its attentions after producing a disturbance in the 
bhavanga, but knows no more about it’: this operation of avajjana belongs to 
kiriyamanodhatu (resultant mental element). - Then follows ‘vision, etc.’ ( dassana , 
savana ...): there is a visual sensation ( cakkhuvinnnana ): one sees, but there is no 
awareness of the nature of what is seen. - Then follows ’reception’ (sampaticchana): 
reception of the object so seen’ with pleasant or unpleasant impression. - Then follows 
‘examination’ ( sa a tirana ): examination of the object which has been ’received'. - Then 
follows ’determining’ the votthapana: the arranging of the examined or investigated 
material in such a manner as to consitute it into a definite object’. - Then comes the stage 
called ’apperception’ (javana ): ‘the object, determined or integrated by the foregoing 
activity, is apperceived, or properly cognized’. - Then there is tadmarammana, 

’registering or identifying of the object thus apperceived.’ - The operation is thus 
complete and the ‘consciousness is lost in the bhavanga’ See S. Z. Aung, Compendium of 
Philosophy, p. 28-30; Visuddhimagga, p. 21, 457 (Pe Maung Tin, Path of Purity, p. 25). . 

Thus there is bhavahga-dvajjana-dassanasavanafhdyanasayana = 
phusanasampaticchana-samtTrana-votthapana-javana-tadarammana- bhavanga in 
all nine vinnanas. 

Pe Maung Tin trans. Visuddhimagga, p. 21, (Path of Purity, p. 25): But indeed, when a 
visible object ( rupdrammana ) enters the avenues of sight (cakkhussa apatham), on the 
cessation of the subconsciousness ( bhavanga ) after arising teo or three times, the 
imoperative mind-element (or the five-door adverting, kiriyamanodhatu, 
pahcadvar avajjana), arises, accomplishing the function of adverting (avajjanakicca), and 
then ceases. The arise and cease in order, the visul consciousness (cakkhuvihhana) 
accomplishing the function of seeing ( dasssanakicca ), the resultant mind-element 
(vipakamanodhatu) accomplishing the function of receiving ( sampaticcahanakicca ), the 
reiltant element of mond-cognition without root-conditions 

(vipakahetukamanovinhanadhatu : ahetuka maenas not depending on raga, desire, etc.) 
accomplishing the function of scrutinizing (sam-tTranakicca), and the inoperative element 
of mindcognition without rootcodition ( kiriyahetukamanovihhanadhatu ) accomplishing 
the function of determining ( votthapanakicca ). Immediately afterwards, apperception 
takes place (javanam javati). 

b) The Sthaviras of K'ouei-ki have a list of nine cittas which may be superimposed on the 
preceding. There are, however, some problems. 

i) bhavahgacitta : “When, for example, at the beginning, one is born and since one is still 
incapable of vikalpa (conceptualization), the citta can only take place concerning (alamb- 
) objects automatically, this is called bhavahgacitta. ” 

ii) citta having the power of pulling-producing: “If there are objects that present 
themselves and the citta produces a 'watchful gaurd-duty' (king-kio, 149 and 13, 147 and 
13 = avajjana ) [attracting, overcoming: Monier-Williams dictionary], this is called citta 
having the power of pulling-producing. 


119 



iii) darsanacitta: “The citta with regard to this object having occurred, it sees ( kien ), it 
looks at it ( tchao-tchan , 86 and 9, 109 and 13).” 

iv) citta of ’equal investigation’ ( sampraticchanachitta ): “Having seen, it examines itch ' a, 
40 and 11, mimamsa, uhana) by means of ‘equal examination’ of the good and the bad.” 

v) citta of 'equal penetration’ (samtiranacitta): “Having examined, it then cognizes 
(vijanati) the good and the bad by means of ’equal penetration’.” 

vi) citta of establishment (y yavasthapanacitta): “Then the mind of establishment 
produces verbal concepts ( vag\nkalpa ) and tells the good and the bad of the object.” 

vii) citta of functioning ( cheyong ): “Then, according to the good and the bad, there is 
’movement-action’ ( tong tso, 19 and 9, 9 and 5; this phrase in Siddhi, X, 28a 1; 
corresponds to cestita injita: may be the javana of the Pali sources, and the citta of 
functioning arises.” 

viii) citta of fan-yuen (162 and 4, 120 and 9). This corresponds to tadarammana in the 
Pali sources: S. Z, Aung reanslates: “The mind by which one says ’that object’, just that 
very one and no other.” - “When the javana has taken place, at the moment when the 
citta is about to enter into rest, it refers back to (fan-yuen ) the thing previously 
accomplished”. 

ix) The citta of fan-yuen having taken place, return to the bhavahga which concerns 
objects automatically. 


13 . This whole paragraph is taken up and developed in Siddhi, p. 1 8 1-182. 


14 . On the laksanas of the alaya, cf. Siddhi, p. 96-99. K’ouei-ki has a learned note on the 
relationships between laksana and the natures of being cause and effect. These two 
natures will be studied in § 17 and 27. 


15 . In this paragraph, vasana has the meaning of perfumed. The perfumed is studied in § 
23. On the theory of the blja-vasana in the Samkhya-Yoga, see L. de La Vallee Poussin, 
Le Bouddhisme et la Yoga de Patahjali, MCB, V, 1936-37, p. 230-232. 

The example of sesame seeds is well known. For the Kosa, the smell of sesame perfumed 
by the flower is different from the smell of the flower; cf. Kosavyakhya, p. 329 (19): 
yatha tilesu pusspagandhad gandhantraram utpadyate ‘nyad eva na sa pauspo gandha 
ity aha. 


16 . The seeds are neither different nor non-different from the alaya, "because they have 
been made its own, appropriated ( upatta ) by the alaya, embraced ( parigrhita ) within its 
being, sharing its good or bad destiny ( ekayogaksema )." Siddhi, p. 124. 


17 . Two well-known examples of reciprocal causes: 


120 



i) The flame and the wick: Seyyathapi... telanca paticca vattim ca patticca telapdTpo 
jhayeyya. tasseva telassa ca vattiya ca pariyadana anaharo nibbayeyya (Samyutta, 
III, 126; V, p. 319). Expression repeated in Madhyamakavrtti, p. 588 (2): 
tailavartiksayaniruddhapradfpavat. Compare also Majjhima, I, p. 295: Seyyatha pi avuso 
telappadTpassa jhayato accim paticca abha pannayati. abham paticca acci pannayati. 

ii) The bundles of reeds: Seyyathapi avuso dve nalajalapinam ahham anham nissaya 
tittheyyum... Tasam ce avuso nalakalapinam ekam akaddheyya eka papateyya aparahce 
akaddheyya apara papaateyya (Samyutta, II, p. 114); tadathayusman Sdriputra dve 
nadakalapyav akase ucchrite syatam. te ‘nyonyanisrite anyonyam nisritya tistheyatam. 
tatra kascid ekam apanayet. dvitfya nipatet. dvitvyam apanayet. eka nipatet 
(Kosavyakhya, p. 668 (2), ad Kosa, VIII, p. 138). Cf. also Madyamakavrtti, p. 561 (11): 
nadakalapayogena. 

The six hetus in the Vaibhasika system: Kosa, II, p. 244 seq.; Kosavyakhya, p. 188-189; 
Vikhyapana, Taisho 1602, p. 170al2. Lengthy discussion on the ten and two hetus in 
Siddhi, p. 453-463. 


18 . On the crafts of tailor and dyer, some information in Jataka no. 38; trans. H. 
Obermiller, Reden des Buddha, 1922, p. 428. 


19 . To be compared with § 28. The Yogacarins distinguish three pratityasamutpadas: 

i) Mutual causality of the alaya and dharmas: cf. above, § 17; Siddhi, p. 468-472. It is 
mingled with the mutual causality of the alaya and the pravrttijnanas, cf. § 27. 

ii) Causality in the twelve-membered causal chain: cf. Visuddhimagga, p. 517-586; 
Sammohavinodam, p. 130-213; Compendium, p. 260 sq.; Salistambasutra; Dasabhunrika, 
p. 47-52; Madhyamavrtti, XXVI, p. 542; Kosa, III, p. 60 seq., Madhyantavibhanga, p. 35- 
45; Siddhi, p. 481-501. - Various works: L. de La Vallee Poussin, Theorie ds douze 
causes, 1913; P. Oltramare, La formule bouddhique des douze causes, 1909; P. Masson- 
Oursel, Essai d’onterpretation de la theorie bouddhique des douze conditions, 1915; 
Oldenberg-Foucher, Le Bouddha (4), 1934, p. 250 sq. Recent works: V. Gokhale, 
Pratityasamutpadasastra des Ullahgha (Nanjio 1227), 1930; Die buddhistishe Theorie 
der Kasalkette, Sinica, V, 1939, p. 37-40; N Dutt, The Place of the Atyasatyas and the 
PratTtyasamutpada in Hinayana and Mahay ana, ABORI, XI, pt. II, p. 101-27; G. Tucci, 

A Fragment from the PratTtyasamutpada of Vasubandhu, JRAS, 1930, p. 611-623. 

iii) Causality of the pravrttivijnanas, cf. below, § 28. 

The division of the samskaras into punya, apunya, aninjya: DTgha, III, p. 217; Vibhanga, 
p. 135; Kosa, III, p. 84; Madhyantavibhanga, p. 36 (11), 238 (8). 


20 . This paragraph appears to be a development of Anguttara, I, p. 173: Santi bhikkhave 
eke samanabrahamana evamvaino evamditthino -yam kihcayam purisapuggalo 
patisamvedeti sulham va dukkham va adukkhamasukham va sabbam tarn pubbe 
kataahetu ti...tam issaranimanahetu ti... tarn ahetu-appaccaya ti. 


121 



The theories of the tlrthikas on the origin of things (guna, padartha, Isvara, Mahabrahma, 
kala, dis, purvakoti, svabhava, akasa, atman, sabda, paramanu) are explained and refuted 
in Siddhi, p. 23-27. 

Parable of the blind and the elephant: Udana, VI, 4, p. 68-69; E. Chavannes, Cinq cents 
contes et apologues, 1934, no. 86; Kimsukopamajataka, no. 238; G. A. Jacobs, A second 
Handful of Popular Maxims, 1902, p. 53; JRAS, 1902, p. 174; T. W. Rhys-Davids, JRAS, 
1911, p. 200 sq.; V. S. Ghate, Ind. Ant., 42, 1913, p. 251; M. Winternitz, Hist. Of Indian 
Lit., II, 1933, p. 88. 

On purusakara, cf. DJgha, I, p. 53; Milinda, P. 96; Kosa, II, p. 289; Madhyantavibhanga, 
p. 193 (20), 197 (17). 


21 . Sarvabijaka vipakavijnana: Siddhi, p. 97-99. 


22. Six characetristics of seed: Siddhi, p. 1 16-118. 


23 . Four characteristics of perfumed: Siddhi, p. 120. 

The Samgraha mentions and refutes three theses on the nature of the perfumed: 

i) that the pravrttijnanas are perfumable : root-thesis of the Sautrantika, cf. Siddhi, p. 183, 
207. 

ii) that the previous moment of a vijnana perfumes the later moment : thesis of the 
Darstantika according to Samgrahabhasya, p. 330a9; Sthavira thesis according to Siddhi, 
p. 187 (here Sthavira probably means the Sautrantika Srllabdha, cf. Siddhi, p. 222). 

iii) that the vijnanajati is perfumable: thesis of the divergent Sautrantika masters ( yi che), 
according to Siddhi, p. 185. 

Other theses mentioned in Siddhi, p. 182-188. 


24 . Twofold causality of seed: Siddhi, p. 118-119. 

Example of the bow and arrow: Vibhasa, Taisho 1545, k. 20, p. 103c; k. 21, p. 105a; 
Kosa, II, p. 200, 217; IV, p. 102. 


25. Example of the flame and the wick: above, § 17. 

Expression akrtabhyagama, krtavipranasa : Mahavyutpatti, 7529-7530; 
Madhyamakavrtti, p. 321 (1) Sarvadarsanasamgraha, ed. Anand- asrama, p. 21; 
Syadvadamanjan, § 18, p. 151; Bodhicartavataratika in L. de La Vallee Poussin, 
Bouddhisme. Etudes et materiaux, 1898. [. 306 (18); Advaitabrahmas., p. 125. 


26 . Alaya and pravrttivijnana: Madhyantavibhanga, p. 32-35(Stcherbatsky, p. 54-57); L 
de Lavallee Poussin, MCB, I, p. 403. 


122 



28. Pratityasamutpada: above, § 19. - Four pratyayas: Kosa, II, p. 299; 
Abhidharmasamuccaya, Taisho 1605, p. 671b seq.; Madhyantavibhanga, p. 43-35; 
Siddhi, p. 436-452. 


29. Introduces the proof of alaya due to samklesa (§ 30-42) and vyavadana (§ 43-44). 

The same proof in Karmasiddhi, § 34; Trimsika, p. 37 seq.; Siddhi, p. 214-220. 

The affliction is passion, action and birth; the compounds k/esasamklesa, etc., are to be 
analyzed: klesa eva samklesa iti klesasamklesah. Definition in Madhyantavibhanga, p. 41 
(10): tredha samklesah hetor dvidhabhedat. klesasamkleso ‘vidyatrsnop adananiti. 
trtyam api klesatmakatvat. karmasamklesah svarupavastham karma vijhanandma- 
rupasaddyatanasparsavedanbjdtijarbmaranani. esam janmasamgrhitvdt. 


30-32. Directed against the thesis that has the pravrttijnnanas as perfumable, cf. above, § 
23. Vaibhasika-Sautrantika argument on the existence and causality of a past action: 
Kosa, V, p. 49-65; Karmasiddhi, § 15-17; L. de Vallee Poussin in Etudes Asiatiques, 
1925, p. 343-376; MCB, V, 1937, p. 1-158. 

Problem of the praptis: Kosa, II, p. 179-195; Karmasiddhi, p. 16 of the off-print 

The consciousness counteracting the afflictions cannot be the seed of the afflictions: 
Trimsika, p. 38 (23): na hi tat klesabij anusaktam eva tatpratipakso bhavitum arhati. 


33. Theories on the nature of vijnana conditioned by the samskaras: Trimsika, p. 37 (16) - 
38 (13); Siddhi, p. 217. This would be either the pravrttivijnana or the pratisamdhivijnana 
(consciousness at conception) or the alaya. 


34. Pratisamdhibandha: Visuddhimagga, II, p. 499, 548 seq.: 649; Nettipakarana, p. 79, 
80; Milinda, p. 140; Sammohavinodam, p. 155-160; Compendium, p. 267 (theory of 
Buddhaghosa); Trimsika, p. 37; Madhyantavibhanga, p. 241 (21); Siddhi, p. 195-199.. - 
The present paragraph seems to be directed against the root opinion of the Sthaviranikaya 
for which two manovijnanas, the coarse and the subtle, coexist at conception-death; cf. 
K'ouei ki ad Siddhi, p. 198. 

The passage on the descent of the vijnana is prserved in Pali and Sanskrit: Vihhanam va 
hi Ananda m atu kucchim na okkamissatha, api nu kho namarupam matu kucchismim 
asucchissath ati. No h ’etam bhante (DTgha, II, p. 63). - Sa ced Ananda vijhanam matuh 
kuksim navakrameta na tat kalalsm kalalatvaya samvarteta (Madhayamakavrtti, p. 552 
(6). - Vijhanam ced ananda matuh kukim navakramed api tu tan samarupam kalalatvaya 
sammurchet (Kosavyakha, p. 669). 

The phrase in § 34: mam par ses pa yah mahl mhal du nur nurpo hid du brgyal lo 
surely covers an original Sanskrit: vijhanam ca matuh kuksau kalalatvena sammurcchati 
’and a vijnana coagulates an embryo in the mother's womb.' Cf. Mahavyut, 295: brgyal ba 
= murcchitah; 7578: brgyal ba = murccha. The present phrase recalls the canonical 
phrase cited above. The Madhyantavibhanga, p. 40, also deals with the 
vijhdnasammurcchana. But the Chinese translators experienced some problems in 
translating this phrase. Demieville makes this remark in this regard: "Hiuan-tsang 


123 



(Taisho 1594, p. 135c29): In the mother's womb, the vijhana and the kalala mutually 
unite again. Physiological conception of the vijnana, cf. S. Schayer, Ueber den 
Somatismus der indischen Psychologie, Bull. Ac. Pol., 1936. - Paramartha (Taisho 1593, 
p. 1 16b6): This vijhana takes its support (t'ouo) upon the kalala and one is born by 
transformation and union in the mother's womb. - Comm, of Vasubandhu translated by 
Paramartha (Taisho 1595, p. 169b29-169c3): To take support upon the kalala means that 
at one moment the vijhana is associated (siang ying) with the kalala; it is 'transformed' 
means that the retribution-vijhana is different from the preceding samklistavijhana; it is 
'united' means that the blood and semen, coagulated by the wind which produces the 
power of earlier actions, is identified with the vijhana (ling yu che f ong). - H. Ui, 
Shodaijoron kenkyu, p. 303, cites, according to the commantary of the Samdhininnocana 
of Yuan-t'so, a passage by Paramartha on the Samgraha, where Paramartha says: The 
union of the mulavijhana (pen che) with the body coming from the father and mother (fou 
mou yi t'i) is called upapattibhava (cheou cheng). Paramartha says that kalala should be 
translated as coagulated fat (hoa, 85 and 10). - The vijhana undoubtedly becomes 
coagulated by becoming identified with the kalala but, properly speaking, it is the kalala 
that is a coagulant." 

The phrase asthanam anavakasah, in Anguttara, I. p. 27; Kosa, III, p. 198; explained in 
Kosavyakhya, p. 228 (17). 


35. Appropriation of the material organs by the mind and mentals: Kosa, I, p. 63; 
Karmasidddhi, § 34a; Madhyamakavrtti, p. 576; Siddhi, p. 193. 

The verse ayur usmatha ... Majjhima, I, p. 296; Samyutta, III, p. 143; Kosa, II, p. 215: 
Kosavyakhya, p. 668 (16). 


36. Theories on the vijnananga. It is made up of: 

i) the six pravrttivijnanas of the intermediate existence: Sarvastivadin theory, cf. Kosa, 
III, p. 85. 

ii) the manovijnana: another Sarvastivadin theory according to K'ouei ki, ad Siddhi, p. 
200 . 

iii. the alaya: Yogacara theory, cf. Siddhi, p. 199. 

Continuation of the Buddha- Ananda conversation: Vihhanam va hi Ananda daharass ’ 
eva sato vocchijjissatha kumarassa va kumarikaya va, api nu kho namarupam vuddhim 
vindhim vepullam apajjissathati (DTgha, II, p. 63). - The Sanskrit phrase reproduced in 
Lamotte's commentary is taken from Kosavyakhya, p. 669 (4). 


37. Theory of ahara : Majjhima, I, p. 261; Dfgha, III, p. 228, 296; Dhammasangam, p. 58, 
121, 358; Visuddhimagga, p. 3421; Kosa, III, p. 119-128: Siddhi, p. 200-204. Here the 
Samgraha refutes the Sarvastivadins. Other theories in Siddhi. 


38-42. The question of the gatis and the yonis and, more specifically, that of the destiny 
in arupyadhatu is studied in Kosa, III, p. 12 seq.; Karmasiddhi, v. 34c; Siddhi, p. 191. 


124 



§ 40 is clearest in Siddhi, p. 102. 

On the necessity of a being bom in bhavagra to realize the absorption of akimcanya in 
order to practice the pure path, cf. Kosa, VIII, p. 175; Karmasiddhi, v. 34c, note 1 14. 

On the gradual cooling of the body in the case of kramamrtyu: Kosa, II, p. 133; III, p. 
134-135; Siddhi, p. 199. 


43-44. The impossibility of a mundane and supramundane purification without an alaya: 
Trimsika, p. 38 (13) - 39 (4); Siddhi, p. 218-220. Difference between the mundane and 
the supramundane path: Kosa, VI, p. 238; L. de La Vallee Poussin, Morale bouddhique, 
p. 23-27; MCB, V, 1936, p. 192. 


45. Srutavasana: Madhyantavibhanga, p. 186 (7); Siddhi, p. 106, 113. 


46. Example of milk and water: cf. the phrase khirodakibhuta, symbol of harmony, 
Anguttara, I, p. 70; Samyutta, IV, p. 225; Majjhima, I, p. 207, 398. 


47. Threefold prajna, cf. references to § 9. 


48. Klesaparyavasthana explained in Kosa, V, p. 3-4, as note. 

Distinction between dharmakaya and vimuktikaya, Samdhinir., X, v. 2; Trimsika, p. 44 
(25) - 45 (1); Siddhi, p. 702 seq. 


50. On nirodhasamapatti, see Majjhima, I, p. 301-400; Kathavatthu, II, p. 327, 516-518; 
Patisambhidamagga, I, p. 97-100; Milinda, p. 300; Visuddhimagga, p. 702-710; Kosa, II, 
p. 203-214; VI, p. 223; VIII, p. 193, 203, 207; Karmasiddhi, v. 22-32; Siddhi, p. 61, 63, 
196, 204-214, 405-409 P. Demieville, Origine des sects bouddhiques, MCB, I, 1931-32, 
p. 48; L. de La Vallee Poussin, La Nirodhasamapatti, MCB, V, 1936-37, p. 210-22. The 
major text is the Vedallasutta in Majjhima, I, p. 296: yo cayain bhikkhu 
sahhavedaitanirodham samapanno, tassa pi kayasahkharaniruddha patippassaddha, 
vacTsahkhara .n p. cittasahkara n. p. ayu aparikkhino, usma avupasanta, indriyani 
vippasannani. The Sanskrit version of the same sutra in Karmasaiddhi, v. 24; Samgraha, 
I, v. 50; Siddhi, p. 204, ends with the phrase: " The vijnana does not leave the body". - 
This vijnana is the alaya according to Vasubandhu who adopts the view of a class of 
Sutrapramanika in Kannasiddhi, § 36, note 100, and according to Siddhi, p. 205. 


51. Presents and refutes the Sarvastivadin-Vaibhasika theory found in Kosa II, p. 211; 
Karmasiddhi, § 22, note 72; Siddhi, p. 205. 


52. Presents and refutes the branch-opinion advocating a subtle citta. Kosa, II, p. 212 and 
Karmasiddhi, § 24, attribute this theory to Vasumitra described as Bhadanta or Sthavira, 


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author of a Pariprcchasastra and a Pancavastuka commented on by Dharmatrata (Taisho 
1555). Vibhasa (Taisho 1545, k. 151, p. 772c, 774a) attributes this theory to the 
Darstantikas and the Vibhajyavadins. According to K'ouei ki, ad Siddhi, p. 207, it 
concerns the Sutra-nikaya-branch-system-shifted(?)-opinion (tsong-tchouan-ki: 40 and 5; 
59 and 11; 140 and 2) and the Sthaviracaryas share this view. 


53. Presents and refutes the branch-opinion advocating a citta without caitta. This is a 
question of the branch-thesis of the Sautrantikas mentioned in Karmasiddhi, § 26, and 
Siddhi, p. 211. 

"In his Bhasya, Vasubandu gives quite a different interpretation for § 52 and 53: the 
arguments there are divided into 19 (Paramartha's translation) or 1 1 (Hiuan-tsang's 
translation) unless I'm (P. D.) very much mistaken; and the interpretation differs 
noticeably from that of Asvabhava. But the commentary of the latter is very clear and 
more plausible." (P. Demieville) 


54 . Repeated and developed in Karmasiddhi, § 27-29; Siddhi, p. 213. 


55. Presents and refutes the root-opinion of the Darstantikas which will be found in Kosa, 
II, p. 212; Karmasiddhi, § 23; Siddhi, p. 207. 


57. For paravrtti and its compounds, H. Jacobi, Ueber das ursprungliche Yogasystem, 
SPAW, 1930, p. 322-332; M. Wintemitz, Notes on the Guhyasamaja Tantra, IHQ, IX, 1, 
p. 1-10; A. K. Coomaraswamy , Paravrtti = Transformation, Regeneration, Anagogy, 
Mel. Wog., p. 232-36; P. C. Bagchi, A note on the word paravrtti, COJ, I, 1933; G. 
Coedes, Les inscriptions malaiases de Snvijaya, BEFEO, XXX, 1930, [. 29-80. - For the 
doctrine of asrayaparavrtti, below, chap. IX, § 2; Samdhinir., VIII, § 13; X, v. 1; 
Sutralamkara, VI, 9; IX, 12-17; Madhyantavibhanga, p. 51 (19), 84 (21), 122 (17); 
Trimsika, p. 27 (21); Bodh. bhumi, p. 367-370; Siddhi, p. 607-612; 661-667. 


58 - 59 . On the three vasanas, karika 19 of Trimsika: 

karmano vasana grahadvayavasanaya saha / 

ksine purvavipake 'nyad vipakam janayanti tat // 

Compare the commentary of Sthiramati, ibid., p. 36-37, and the four explanations of 
Siddhi, p. 473-513. 


60 . For the adhimukti ( adhimoksa , adhihthana ) of the yogin, cf. Kosa, II, p. 155; VIII, p. 
207; Kosavyakhya, p. 125 (7): saktir eva hi nanavidha ‘ sti yaya yogibhir 
adhimoksavisesena suvarnadhatu rupydhdtus tamradh atur ity evamadayo dhatavah 
kriyante; Trimsika, p. 25, Vimsika 10 (7) (adhisthdna); Bodh. bhumi: adhimukty- 
adhisthana, p. 95 (13), 195 (12); adhimoksa, p. 40 (5), 41 (12); S. Levi, L ’inscription de 
Mahanaman a Bodh-gaya, Memorial. P. 352 sq.; below, chap. II, 14. 


126 



61. Dausthulya and prasrabdhi: Samdhinir., p. 96, 116, 118, 120, 126, 127, 129, 146, 161, 
127-129; Lahkavatara, p. 94 (12), 109 (6); Sutralamkara, transl. p, 51; Bodh. bhumi, p. 9 
(1), 14 (26), 20, (16); Trimsika, p. 22 (9), 27 (14), 43 (23), 44 (11); Siddhi, p. 608-612. 

Alaya among the arhats; Siddhi, p. 162-166. 


62 . Moral nature of the alaya; Trimsika, p. 21(11); Siddhi, p. 152. 


127 



Chapter II 


THE NATURES OF THE KNOWABLE 

( jheyayalaksana ) 


1. How must the natures of the knowable (jheyalaksana ) be described ( katham 
drastavyam )? These are, in brief ( samdsatah ), three in number: i) the dependent 
nature (paratantralaksana ), ii) the imaginary nature (parikalpitalaksana ), iii) the 
absolute nature ( parinispannalaksana ). [137c26] 


1. Comm. Bh 337c24, bh 170b 1-2, U 398c 1 3-26, u 269a5-269b4. 

“These, in brief, are three in number, because, in every dharma, that which huls be 
known ( parijheya ), that which must be cut (prahatavya ) and that which must be realized 
(saksatkartavya) is distinguished ( paricchid (U) 

i) Dependent nature : gzuh ba dan hdzin par yohs su rtog pahi rjes su hjug pahi las dan 
non mohs pa g€an dag gis dbah byas pahi phyir te / ses bya ci yah run ste de Itar mtson 
pa ni g€an gyi dbah gi mtshan hid do: "This is to be dependent in regard to another 
thing: action ( karman ) or affliction (kies a) resulting from imagination (parikalpita ) 
bearing upon an object and a subject of consciousness (grdhyagrdhaka ) . Every dhanna, 
no matter what it may be, which shows up in that way is dependent.” (u) 

“ii) Imaginary nature : This is a nature of absolute nonexistence ( atyantabhavalaksana ). 
That which does not exist absolutely is imaginary (parikalpita ), namely, the object and 
subject of consciousness (grdhyagrdhaka), the pudgala and the dharmas .... 

iii) Absolute nature : This is the absence of self-nature (nihsvabhdvata) which is the basis 
of imaginary things: grahya-grahaka, atman and dharma ...” (U) 


128 



2. What is the dependent nature {paratan tralaksan a)! It is the concepts ( vijhapti ) 
that have the store-consciousness as seed ( blja ) and that pertain to ( samgrhlta ) 
erroneous imagination (abhutaparikalpa). What are these concepts? 

i) - iii) dehadehibhoktrvijhapti : the concept of the body (five sense organs), of 
the possessor of the body (klistam manas) and of the enjoyer (manodhatu). 

iv) tadupabhuktavijhapti : the concept which is known by the preceding (the 
six sense objects). 

v) tadupabhoktrvijhapti: the concept which knows the preceding (the six 
consciousnesses). 

vi) kalavijhapti : the concept of time. 

vii) samkhyavijhapti : the concept of number. 

viii) desavijhapti : the concept of place. 

ix) v yavaharavijhapti: the concept which manifests as speech. 

x) svaparavisesavijhapti : the concept which produces the distinction between 
self and other. 

xi) sugatidurgaticyutyupapattivijhapti: the concept which manifests as good 
destiny, bad destiny, death and birth. 

* * * 

i - ix) Concepts i - ix have speech impregnation (abhildpavdsana) as seed. 

x) Concept x has impregnation of the view of self ( dtmadrstivdsand ) as seed. 

xi) Concept xi has impregnation of the members of existence 
( bhavdngavdsand ) as seed. 

All the worlds ( dhdtu ), all destinies (gati ), all wombs (yoni) and all the 
defilements ( samklesa ) pertain to (samgrhlta) these concepts. The dependent 
nature is expressed as wrong imagination ( abhutaparikalpa ). These concepts are 
nothing other than conceptual ( vijnaptimatra ) and pertain to wrong imagination 
(abhutaparikalpa). The support of the appearance (abhasasraya) of a nonexistent 


129 



(asat) and fictitious ( bhranta ) thing (art ha) is called the dependent nature. (Cf. 
the Chinese versions) [138al 1] 


2. Comm. Bh 338al l-338b2, bh 170b2-171a6, U 399al4-399bl 1, u 269b4-270a8. 

“The concepts that pertain to wrong imagination: the concepts that have wrong 
imagination as self-nature ( svabhava ).” (Bh) 

i) - iii) dehadehibohoktrvijnapti: “deha is the five dhatus, eye, etc.; dehin is the 
klistamanas; bhoktr is the manodhatu.” (Bh) - As will be seen below (§ 5), these are the 
six internal elements ( adhyatmikadhatu ), eye, etc. Among them, the manodhatu, the 
support of the five consciousnesses, visual consciousness, etc., is called dehivijhapti. The 
manodhatu, the support of the sixth consciousness or mental consciousness 
(manovijhana) is called bhoktrvijnapti .” (U) 

iv) tadupabhuktavijnapti: “This is the six external elements ( bahyadhatu ), color, etc.” 
(Bh, U) 

v) tadupabhoktrvijnapti : “This is the six consciousness elements (vijhdnadlidtu)” (Bh, 
U) 

vi) kalavijhapti : “This is non-interruption of the stream of samsara 

(samsdrapravdhdsamuccheda)r (Bh) - “This is the concept which manifests with the 
appearance of the three times ( tryadhvan ).” (U) 

vii) samkhydvijhapti : “This is enumeration (, ganana ).” (Bh) - “This is the concept which 
manifests numerically with the appearance of the number 1, etc.” (U) 

viii) desavijnapti : “This is the receptacle world (bhajanaloka).'” (Bh) - “This is the 
concept which manifests with the appearance of a village (grama), a garden (drama), 
etc.” (U) 

ix) v yavaharavijhapti: “This is the concept which manifests with the appearance of 
discourse: what is seen, heard, felt and known (drstasrutamata vij data vya valid ra ).” (U) 

x) svaparavisesavijnapti: “This is the concept of person, etc. As long as the belief in me 
and mine (atmatmiyagraha) has not been cut (samucchinna), one believes in 'me' and 
’mine’, in ’self and ’what belongs to self; one makes distinctions.” (U) 


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xi) sugatidurgaticyutyupapattivijnapti: “This is the concept which manifests as god 
(< deva ), human ( manusya ), the damned ( naraka ), animal ( tiryak ), hungry ghost (preta ); as 
birth and death.” (U) 


* 

“ Concepts i) to ix) have speech propensity (abhildpavdsana) as seed, because they are a 
transfonnation of the consciousness ( vijhanaparinama ) and are not a separate substance. 
Concept x) has the impregnation of the view of self as seed : it develops because of the 
propensity of the view of self. Concept xi) has the propensity of the members of existence 
as seed : it develops because of the propensity of the members of existence.” (U) (Cf. I, 
verses 58, 59). 


3. What is the imaginary nature (parikalpitalaksanafl It is to manifest as the 
appearance of an object ( arthdbhdsa ), whereas there is no object, nothing but 
concept ( vijhaptimdtra ). [138al3] 


3. Comm. Bh 338b5-8, bh 171a6-8, U 399bl 1-13, u 270a8-270bl 

"It is to manifest as the appearance of an object : It manifests as the appearance of a 
known object ( grahyartha ) or manifests as the appearance of an atman-knower, whereas 
there is no object : whereas there is no known object or atman that knows, nothing but 
concept: whereas there is no real object but simply an idea ( vijhapti ) like an object or a 
like a concept similar to an atman.” (freely from Bh) 

“In reality, there is neither a known object ( grahya ) nor a knowing ( grahaka ) subject; 
there is only a multiplicity of concepts pertaining to ( samgrhita ) wrong imagination 
( a bh u taparika l pa) in which the imaginary appears as object.” (U) 


4. Finally, what is the absolute nature (parinispanna-laksanafl - It is the 
complete absence ( dtyantikdbhdva ) of any objective nature ( arthalaksana ) in the 
dependent nature. [138al5] 


131 



4. Comm. Bh 338bl 1-13, bh 171a8-171bl, U 399bl3-399cl3, u 270bl-3. 

bh: vans su grub pahi mtshan hid ni gati yod pa ma yin pa mi bden pa snan bahi rgyu la 
don dehi bdag nid du snan med par gyur ba ste / hdi Itar bdag tu snan ba gtan tried par 
gyurpa nid ni bdag tried pa tsam yod par gyur pa nid yin te // “The absolute nature is the 
fact that, in the paratantra, the cause of the appearance ( dbhdsahetu ) of non-existent and 
false things, that which appears as being an object is non-existent in the absolute sense. 
Similarly, that which appears as an atman is non-existent in the absolute sense: there is 
naira tmyamatra.” - u: de nid kun brtags pa de dan gtan du bral ba niyons su grub pahi 
mtshan hid de: “The absence of parikalpita in the paratantra constitutes the 
parinispannalaksana.” 

The Chinese Upanibandhana adds a well-chosen series of explanations at this point: 
“Another definition: 1) All dharmas that arise from causes and conditions 
(, hetupratyayasamutpanna ) are nothing but concept ( vijhaptimdtra ): this is their 
dependent nature. 2) Out of error ( viparyasa ) and miscalculation, they manifest as the 
appearance of an object (art ha); this is their imaginary nature. 3) Their true nature 
(tathata) which is characterized ( prabhavita ) as the complete absence of parikalpita in 
the paratantra, consitutes their absolute nature.” There follows an example borrowed 
from the mirage (, marici ) which will be translated freely. The water in a mirage, produced 
by the action of the mirage, is real in its nature of appearing: this is its dependent nature. 
This appearance, however, manifests as real water: this is its imaginary nature. The water 
of the mirage is, in the absolute sense, without any nature of true water; this is its 
absolute nature. For other examples see Notes and References. 

U continues: “The imaginary character is the imaginary nature ( parikalpitasvabhava ); the 
dependent character is the dependent nature (paratantrasvanhdva ), also called conceptual 
nature ( vikalpasvabhava ); the absolute character is the absolute nature 

( parinispannasvabhdva ), also called the fundamental nature of things 

(< dharmatdsvabhava ). These three chaeracters appear respectively as the dharma-to-be- 
known (parijheya) , the dharma-to-be-cut (prahatavya ) and the dharma-to-be-realized 
(saksatkartavya). Thus in the Mahaprajnaparamitasutra (Taisho no. 220 = Satasahasrika), 
the Buddha said to Maitreya: One imagines everything that is a conditioned substance 


132 



(, samskaralaksanavastu ) as form ( rupa ), feeling ( vedana ), discrimination ( samjiia ), 
volition ( samskara ), consciousness ( vijhana ), or, finally, as an attribute of the Buddha 
( buddhadharma ). All of this relies on names ( naman ), designations ( samjiia ), signs 
( prajnapti ), speech ( vyavahara ) and conceptualizations ( parikalpa ). Indeed, the self- 
nature of form ( rupasvabhava ) up to and including that of the conceptual attributes of the 
Buddha are imaginary form ( parikalpitarupa ) and imaginary attributes of the Buddha 
( parikalpitabuddhadharma ). In all these conditioned substances, a conceptual reality 
( vikalpadharmata ) alone can be established ( vyavasthapa -). These concepts are the cause 
of all these proliferations ( prapanca ), metaphors ( upacara ), names (nciman), designations 
(samjna), signs (prajnapti ) and speech (vyavahara). Thus, when one speaks of form or 
the attributes of the Buddha, it is a matter of conceptual fonn (vikalparupa) and 
conceptual attributes of the Buddha (vikalpabuddhadharma). Whether the Tathagatas 
appear or not (utpadad va tathagatanam anutpadad va), this nature of things remains, 
this fundamental element (dharmadhatu) remains. Because of of this imaginary nature 
( parikalpitarupa ), conceptual form (vikalparupa) is eternal and constant: this is the true 
nature (tathata), the absence of self-nature (nihsvabhdvata), the nonexistence of dharmas 
(dharmanairatmiya), the limit of existence (bhutakoti); it is called dharmatarupa. 
Because of these imaginary attributes of the Buddha (parikalpitabuddhadharma ), the 
conceptual attributes of the Buddha (vikalpabuddhahdarma) are eternal and constant; 
they are called dhannatabuddhadharma.” 


5. Among the concepts listed in § 2, the concept of body, of the possessor of the 
body and of the enjoyer (dehadehibhoktrvijhapti) is the six inner elements 
(adhyatmikadhatu), eye, etc. The concept cognized by the preceding ones 
(i tadupabhuktavijhapti ) is the six outer elements (bahyadhatu), color, etc. The 
concept that cognizes the preceding one ( tadupabhoktrvijhapti ) is the six 
elements, visual consciousness, etc., (caksurjhdnddi-saddhdtu). The other 
concepts, vi) - xi), are modes (prabheda) of the first five. [138a 19] 


5. Comm. Bh and bh are lacking. U 399cl7-25, u 270b3-4. 


133 



“T he other concepts, vi) - xi), are modes of the first five : concepts i) - v), beginning with 

dehavijhapti and ending with tadupabhoktrvijhapti Indeed, there are temporal 

distinctions in the concept of samskara, namely, past, present or future samskara; hence 
the concept of temporal appearance. There are numerical distinctions in this concept of 
samskara: the number 1, etc.; hence the concept of numerical appearance. There are 
distinctions of place in this same concept, namely, above, below, etc; hence the concept 
of the aspect of space; and so on for the other concepts.” (U) 


6. You say: "These notions ( vijhapti ) are none other than concept only 
(vijhaptimdtra) since there is no object ( arthdbhdvdt )." What is the example 
( drstdnta ) for that? - The dream ( svapna ), etc,, can be used as an example. Thus, 
in a dream where there is no object ( artha ), nothing but a bare consciousness 
(vijhdnamdtra), various objects - colors ( rupa ), sounds ( sabda ), smells (gandha ), 
tastes (rasa) and tangibles (sprastavya), houses ( ghara ), forests ( vana ), lands 
( bhumi ) and mountains ( parvata ) - appear; however, there is no real object there. 
By this comparison, it will be understood (avabudh-) how, not only in the dream 
but everywhere else ( sarvatrapi ), there is nothing but concept ( vijhaptimdtratd ). 

In the phrase 'the dream, etc., can be used as example', the word 'etc.' should be 
understood as including other examples: magic (may a), mirage (mdrici) and 
optical illusion (timira). [Cf. I, § 61, no. 3; II, § 27], 

Let us agree that in the awake state (prabodha) as in the dream state (svapna), 
everything comes down to concept-only (vijhaptimdtra). But on emerging from 
the dream, one has the feeling that the dream was just a concept. Why does the 
same feeling not arise equally in the awake state? - It appears in those who are 
awakened (prabuddha) by means of the knowledge of reality (tattvajhdna). Just 
as the feeling of the non-objectivity of the dream visions is lacking during the 
dream but appears after waking up, in the same way the feeling of the non- 
objectivity of the visions of the waking state is lacking in those who have not 
been awakened by the knowledge of reality, but does appear in those whom this 
knowledge has awakened. [ 138b 1] 


134 



6. Comm. Bh and bh are lacking. U 400a5-7, u 270b4-5. 


7. How can those who have not yet been awakened (prabuddha ) by the 
knowledge of reality ( tattvajhdna ) understand the existence of concept only 
(vijnaptimatra) by deduction ( anumd -)? - By scripture ( agama ) and by reasoning 
( yukti ). 

i) Scripture, first. In the Dasabhumika (p. 49), the Bhagavat said: "This 
three-fold world is nothing but mind" ( cittamdtram idarn yad idarn 
traidhdtukam). And in the Samdhinirmocana (VIII, v. 7), Maitreya asked: 
"Bhagavat, are the images (pratibimba ) perceived during concentration 

( samadhigohara ) different ( bliinna ) or not different ( abhinna ) from the mind 
(citta) that perceives them?" and the Bhagavat replied: “Maitreya, they are 
not different from the mind. Why? Because these images are concept only 
( vijnaptimdtra ). I have said that the object of consciousness 
( vijhdndlamabana ) is formed {prabhavita ) by concept only, thus there is no 
external object." - Maitreya asked: "Bhagavat, if the images perceived 
during concentration are not different from the mind, how can the mind 
grasp (grhnati ) the mind itself?" - "Maitreya, no dharma grasps another 
dharma; nevertheless, the mind that arises thus ( evam utpannani) from 
causes and conditions appears thus ( evam avabhdsate) in the twofold aspect 
of a mind that is seen and a mind that sees. Thus, for example, given a form 
( rupam nisritya) in the polished surface of a mirror ( suparisuddha 
adarsamandala ) in which it is reflected, one imagines that one sees the form 
and the image (pratibimbam api pasyamlti manyate). The form and the image 
that one sees appear as two distinct things ( bhinndrthendvabhdsante ), 
whereas the image is non-existent [cf. Kosa III, p. 34-35.] Similarly, the mind 
that arises thus from causes and conditions and the images [erceived in 
concentration seem to be different things, whereas they are two aspects, the 
one passive, the other active, of one and the same mind. 

ii) The reasoning is given as well by this agama. Thus, when the mind {citta) 
is in concentration ( samdhita ), whatever dharma image (jheyapratibimba ), 


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blue ( vimlaka ), etc., is seen, it is the mind itself that is seen. There is no object 
blue, etc., separate from the mind. By means of this reasoning, the 
Bodhisattva is able to deduce ( anumana ) that, at the basis of all notions [and 
not just at the basis of meditated concepts], there is concept only 
( vijhaptimatrata ) and not objective reality. [138b 18] 


7. Comm. Bh 338c21-28, bh 171bl-4, U 400a28-400cl5, u 270b5-272al. 

"By scripture and reasoning : By proof drawn from scripture ( agamapramana ) and by 
proof of deduction ( anumanapramana ), those who have not attained the cognition of 
reality ( tattvajnana ) concerning concept only nevertheless can indirectly understand that 
there is concept only and there is no object .... 

In the Dasabhunuka, it is said that the threefold world is only mind ( cittamatra ). Mind 
( citta ) and concept ( vijnapti ) are synonymous. The word only ( matra ) denies the 
existence of the known object ( grahya ); since the known object does not exist, neither 
does the knowing subject ( grahaka ) exist. The word matra does not deny the mental 
factors ( caitta ) because the mental factors are inseparable from the mind {citta). Indeed, 

it says: “If the mental factors are absent, the mind also is absent ” The text says that the 

traidhatuka, ‘that which belongs to the three worlds’, is only mind. What should one 
understand by traidhatuka ? That which is associated with trsna, desire, etc., ( kamadi ), is 
part of the three worlds. The word cittamatra thus establishes that only mind and mental 
factors exist, that the falsely imagined objects ( alambana ) of the three worlds do not 
exist. It does not deny that the true nature {tathata) and the dependent nature (paratantra ) 
are objects {alambana) of mind and mental factors, for these two constitute part of the 
truth of the path ( margasatya ), are the object of root-cognition {mulajhana) and 
subsequent cognition ( prstalabdhajhdna ), are not held by trsna, are not to be 
counteracted, are not erroneous, are not included in the three worlds, are not separate 
(y yatirikta) from mind. Consequently, the text does not deny them. 

Objection - You say that the world of desire {kamadhatu) and the form realm {rupadhatu) 
are only mind {cittamatra). But why say that the formless realm {arupyadhatu) is only 
mind? The Lesser Vehicle accepts that the third realm is only mind. Your text proves that 
which is already accepted {siddhasadhana). 


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You are mistaken about the meaning of the word cittamatra. It is not only a question of 
the nonexistence of form ( riipa ), but also of the nonexistence of the mind and mental 
factors ( raga , etc.) inasmuch as they take an object, of the nonexistence of objects taken 
by the mind, including the akasanantya, etc., [objects of the mind in arupyadhatu 
according to the Sarvastivadins.] On the other hand, the Sautrantikas think that akasa, the 
simple absence of form, has no reality: in fact, the akasa is a manifestation of the mind; it 
is cittamatra. Fearing lest the Sautrantikas would say: "The akasa, being separate from 
the citta-caitta, should be called a dharma that is not mind", or lest they say: "The mind 
that bears upon akasa, not having an object, does not exist", the text says the three worlds 
are only mind ...." (U after Siddhi, p. 420) 

Here is the passage of the Samdhinirmocana commented on by u: tin he hdzin ni sems 
rtse gcig tu byed pa sems las byun bahi chos so Idehi spyod ni yul lo // gzugs brnan ni 
gzugs dhos Itar snan baho // dmigs pa mam par rig pa tsam gyis rab tu dbye ba can €es 
bya ba ni phyi rol gyi dmigs pa med paho // mam par ses pa dmigs pa yin par bsad do // 
€es ba ni hdi Itar dmigs pa de mam par rig pa tsam gyis rab tu phye ba ni dehi no bo hid 
ces bya bahi tha tshig go // mam par ses pa ni dmigs par snan ba tsam gyis rab tu phye 
ba yin par bsad €es bya bahi tha tshig go // sems de hid kyis €es bya ba la sogs pa ni 
bdag hid la byed pa hgal bar ston paho // byams pa chos gah yah €es ba la sogs pa ni lan 
hdebs pa ste / chos thams cad ni byed pa med pas byed pa dan byed pa po mi hthad pahi 
phyir ro // de Itar skyes pa €es bya ba ni rten cih hbrel par hbyuh bahi che ba hid kyis ni 
gcig kho na mam pa ghis su snan bahi tshul brjod paho // dper na gzugs kyi g€i bo rah gi 
b€in hid la brten nas me loh la sogs pahi nan du de hid snan yah gzugs brnan mthoh ho 
sham du log par sems te / me loh la sogs pa rgyuhi mthus don g€an du med kyah snan 
bahi phyir ro // de b€in du dran pa dan kun tu rtog pa la sogs pahi rkyen gyi mthus gah 
tha dad pa ma yin yah tha dad par snan ba tin he hdzin gyi spyod yul gyi gzugs brnan de 
de b€in du skyes so // luh de ni tshad ma dan bcas par bcom Idan hdas hid kyis gtan la 
phab po /: “Concentration is the one-pointed fixing of the mind ( cittaikagrata ): it is a 
mental factor ( caittasikadharma ). The domain ( gocara ) perceived by it is its object 
(vis ay a). The image ( pratibimba ) is a representation similar to the original. The object of 
consciousness is formed (prabhavita) by a concept onlyt : there is no external object 
( bahyalambana ). / have said that the object of consciousness is a concep only: that is to 
say that this object formed by a mere concept has this simple concept as self-nature 


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(, svabhava ). This goes back to saying: I have said that consciousness is formed simply by 
an appearing object. How can the mind grasp the mind itself! This shows the duality 
between substance and its activity [between the emptiness that has been thought of and 
the fact of the consciousness]. Maitreya, no dharma, etc.: this refutes the objection: 
indeed, since all dharmas are without activity (cf. Kosa, IX, p. 280), action ( kriya ) and 
agent ( karaka ) are non-existent. Nevertheless, the mind that arises in this way, etc.: by 
the vastness ( mahattva ) of dependent origination (pratftyasamutpada ), the mind, single 
and simple, is caused to appear in a twofold aspect ( akara ) [of a mind that is seen and a 
mind that sees]. Thus, when one places a screen (?) before one's face ( svamukha ), it is the 
face itself which appears in the mirror ( adarsa ), etc.; however, one wrongly thinks that 
one sees an image ( pratibaimba ) distinct from the face. By the causal power ( hetubala ) 
of the mirror, etc., the image which is not something other than the face (cf. Kosa, III, p. 
34)] appears nevertheless as different from it. Similarly, by the conditioning power 
( pratyayabala ) of memory ( smrti ), of imagination (parikalpa ), etc., images seen in 
concentration arise which, without being different from the mind, nevertheless appear as 
differerent from it. This agama with its commentary ( sapramanam ) was given by the 
Bhagavat himself.” 


8. At the basis of the image blue, etc., there can be no consciousness of memory 
because the object perceived in concentration is immediately present (puro 
’vasthita). Arising from hearing ( srutamaya ) and pondering ( cintamaya ), the 
consciousness of memory has the past ( atlta ) as object; therefore what it sees is 
concept only (vijh aptim dtra) . By this deduction ( anumana ), even if he is not yet 
awakened (prabuddha ) by the knowledge of reality ( tattvajhana ), the bodhisattva 
can deduce the existence of concept only. [138b22] 


8. Comm. Bh 338c28-339a8, bh 171b5-172a2, U 400cl5-29, u 272al-7. 

“There can be no consciousness of memory at the basis of the image blue, etc.'. The 
author speaks in this way because he is afraid that someone may believe the opposite. 
Indeed, there are people who think that the images perceived in concentration are a 


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reminder of the skeletons ( kankala ) once seen in a cemetery ( smasana ), etc. To dispel 
this theory, the author says: At the basis of the image blue, etc., there can be no 
consciousness of memory because the object perceived in concentration is immediately 
present. If the image perceived in concentration were the memory of some past day, one 
ought to remember the particular place where the thing had been seen earlier as well as 
the earlier perception. But this is not the case. The knowledge resulting from meditation 
or concentration ( bhavanamayajhana ) is a consciousness of the present; the object seen 
by it is distinct ( spasta ) and immediately present ( saksat ). The consciousness of memory 
has no such object. 

Objection - If the distinctive feature ( muladravya ) of memory is to be a consciousness 
associated ( samprayukta ) with the wisdom stemming from hearing ( srutamayi prajha) 
and with the wisdom stemming from contemplation ( cintdmayT prajha), its twofold 
object ( gocara ) is distinct from consciousness. 

That is not so: stemming from hearing, etc., the twofold consciousness of memory has the 
past ( atita ) as object. And since the past does not exist, the image which it perceives is 
mere concept, for example, the memories of childhood. Therefore, what is remembered 
by this consciousness is mere concept because the object of the mind (so nien) in empty 
(, sunya ). This is like the images of men and women - impure skeletons - perceived 
directly by yogins.” (U) 


9. Among the eleven concepts ( vijhapti ) (in § 2, 5), - ideas that are like a dream (§ 
6), - we understand that the concept of the visual consciousness, etc. 

( caksurvijhanavijhapti ) is mere concept ( vijhaptimdtra ), but how do we know that 
material ideas ( riipavijhapti ), eye, etc. ( caksurddi ), are mere concept? - By 
scripture ( agama ) and by reasoning (yukti ) as above (§ 7). 

If these [material concepts, eye, etc.,] are concept only, why do they have a 
material appearance and form homogeneous and solid series ( samtana )? - 
Because they are the basis ( adhisthana ) or cause of error and other afflictions 
( viparyasadisamklesa ). Otherwise, if these concepts arose without material 
appearance, the error that consists of taking as an object that which is not an 
object ( anarthe 'rtha iti vipayasah) would not occur. If the error would not occur, 


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the afflictions constituting the obstacle of desire ( klesavarana ) and the obstacle of 
knowledge (jheyavarana) would not occur. If the afflictions would not occur, 
purification ( vyavaddna ) also would not occur (see below, § 25). That is why it is 
necessary that these concepts arise in this way with a material appearance. Here 
is a verse (cf. Sutralamkara, XI, 24): 

bhranter nimittam bhrantis ca rupavijhaptir isyate / 

arupinl ca vijhaptir abhavat sydn na cetard// 

“The cause of illusion and the illusion itself are, respectively, material concept 
and non-material concept. If the first were missing, the second would not exist.” 

[138c4] 

9. Comm. Bh 339al3-339b6, bh 172a2-172bl, U 401a4-401b4, u 272a7-273a6. 

Explanation of the stanza: “The cause of illusion, is the concepts that develop similar to 
rupa; the illusion itself is the concepts of the non-material development. According to the 
rule relating to stanzas, the words separated in the phrase are very similar in meaning. If 
cause-concepts did not develop in rupa, result-concepts, nion-material, would not exist 
because without vis ay a, there is no vishayin .” (U) 


10. i - v. Why do concepts i) to v), namely, the concept of body, the possessor of 
the body and the enjoyer ( dehadehi-bhoktrivijhapti ), the concept cognized by the 
preceding ones ( tadupabhuktavijhapti ) and the concept that cognizes the 
preceding one ( tadubhoktrvijnapti ), arise simultaneously ( sahabhu ) and together 
(sahajdta) during all of existence ( kdya = atmabhava)? - Because they are 
destined to maintain (paripur -) birth (jdti ) and pleasure ( upabhoga ). 

vi - xi. Why do concepts vi) to xi), called concept of time ( kdlavijhapti ), etc., 

exist? - Because: 

vi) Beginningless samsara ( anddikdlika ) is never interrupted ( samucchinna ). 

vii) The world of beings ( sattvadhdtu ) is incalculable ( aprameya ). 

viii) The receptacle-world ( bhajanaloka ) is immense (aprameya). 


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ix) Speech ( vyavahara ) which maintains relationships is limitless ( aprameya ). 

x) The variety of pleaasure taken up (parigrhltopa-bhogavisesa ) is infinite 
(aprameya). 

xi) In the pleasant or unpleasant (istdnistavipaka) retribution of the result of 
action ( karmaphala ), the kinds of pleasure (upabhogavisesa) are infinite; the 
kinds of birth, old age and death (jatijaramarana ) that one undergoes are 
infinite (aprameya). [138c 12] 


10. Comm. Bh 339M5-17, bh 172bl-2, U 401b7-19, u 273a6-273b3. 

“ Because they are destined to maintain birth and pleasure : indeed, if these five concepts 
enter into all of existence, all of the existences capable of pleasure are explained. But if 
one or the other of these concepts is absent, the existence is not explicable.” (u) 


11. How are these concepts (vijhapti) established (avasthita) as concept only 
(vijh aptim dtra) ? - Briefly (samasatah), according to a threefold aspect (akara): 

i) According to unicity (tanmatra), because they have no object (artha). 

ii) According to duality (dvaya), because these concepts are supplied with 
image (sanimitta) and vision (sadarsana). 

iifi According to arising as multiplicity (ndndtva), because they arise 
simultaneously with different aspects (ndndvidhdkdra). 

* * * 

\) Thus, all these concepts are uniquely concept since they have no object, 

ii) They are twofold since they are supplied with image and vision. Thus, the 
concept of the eye, etc. (caksurddi-vijhapti) has, as image, (nimitta), the 
concept of color, etc. ( rupddi vijh apti) , as vision (darzana), the concept of 
visual consciousness (caksurjhanavijhapti), and so on up to the concept of 
body consciousness (kdyajhanavijhapti). 


141 



iii) The concept of manas ( manovijnapti ) has, as image, all the concepts from 
the concept of eye up to that of dharma; as vision, it has the concept of 
mental consciousness (m anovijn dnavijn apti) , because the mental 
consciousness is concept ( vikalpa ) and arises similar to all the concepts. Here 
is a verse: 

Yogins wish to understand unicity ( tanmatra ), duality (dvaya) and multiplicity 
( ndnatva ) because the one who has penetrated mind-only ( cittamdtra ) is free 
from mind. [138c23] 


11. Comm. Bh 339b29-339c20, bh 172b2-173a5, U 401c2-25, u 273b3-274a8. 

“Here the prose ( gadya ) and the verse ( gatha ) explain how concept only is established 
because of three characteristics.” (Bh) 

i) Because of unicity. “Since there is merely concept, all concepts are nothing but concept 
because the known object ( yijndtartha ) is not there (akimcit).” (Bh) - “Because of unicity 
(tanmatra), that is to say, that there is no object .... The word matra denies the object. 
The proof of the non-existence of the object has already been made (cf. § 7): the author 
will now go on to a new section.” (U) 

ii) Because of duality. “The author establishes (y yavasthap-) image and vision in one and 
the same consciousness (vijhana). In one and the same concept ( vijnapti ), there is one 
part (bhaga) that is image and a second part that is vision. This is why the visual 
consciousness, etc., is twofold.” (Bh) - Because of duality. “This is a matter of image and 
vision. In one and the same concept, there is image and there is vision. These two parts 
(bhaga), the image part (nimittabhaga) and the vision part (darsanabhaga), are 
simultaneous (sahabhu). They are neither identical with the concept nor different from it. 
The concept of eye up to the concept of body, each according to its type, develops 
( parinamanti ) as all kinds of image-concepts (nimittavijhapti), the concept of color, etc.; 
this is what is called nimittabhaga. The consciousnesses, visual consciousness 
(caksurvijhana), etc., that cognize the object (visaya), that see the object, are called 
darsanabhaga. Or else, the part which is the object cognized (grahyabhaga) is called 
nimitta and the part which is knower subject (gra ha ka bhaga) is called darsana. This is 
what is called duality.” (U) 


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iii) “The author establishes multiplicity. In one and the same concept, the first part 
develops into various images which the second part grasps ( grhnati ) in various ways as 
the case may be ( yathayogam ).” (Bh) - “ Because of multiplicity : that is to say, the 
concept arises under multiple aspects. In one and the same concept, the first part develops 
( parinamati ) in the aspect of an image, object of consciousness ( grahyanimitta ), and the 
second part in the aspect of a vision, subject of consciousness ( grahakadarsana ). These 
two parts arise simultaneously in many different aspects. If one did not accept that one 
and the same consciousness, at one given time, presents all kinds of aspects, this 
consciousness would not be able to cognize several objects simultaneously.” (U) 

The concept of manas has, as image, all the concepts, from the concept of the eye up to 
that of dharma; as vision, the concept of mental consciousness : “This concept of manas 
is able to grasp all objects simultaneously. As image, it has all the concepts from that of 
the eye, which is the dominant power ( adhipatibala ), to that of of dharma; this is its 
image part ( nimitta bhciga). The concept of mental consciousness, which cognizes the 
object, is its vision part ( darsanabhdga ), because this mental consciousness is universal 
concept ( sarvavikalpa ) and arises similar to all concepts.” (U) - “In this third point, 
relative to the mental consciousness only is there variety, because the object which it 
grasps ( grahyavisaya ) is not detenninate ( pratiniyata ). The other consciousnesses have a 
determinate object and lack conceptualization ( vikalpa ). But the mental consciousness is 
conceptual. Therefore one attributes the third point to it alone, namely, the multiplicity of 
images and visions. This is why it is enough to show that this consciousness is concept 
only.” (Bh) 

“Verse: Yogins who understand concept only, duality and multiplicity, crush the external 
object ( bdhyavisaya ) and finally crush the mind that takes the object ( grahakacitta ). 
Since the object ( alambana ) does not exist, the consciousness that takes it 
(grdhaka vijhana ) does not exist either; since the object to be known (jheya ) does not 
exist, the knower (jhatr) does not exist either. Without jheya, there is no jhatr ...” (U) 


12. Some think ( kecin many ante) that the first five consciousnesses do not exist 
but that the mental consciousness ( manovijhana ) takes such and such a name, 
e.g., the name of visual consciousness, auditory consciousness, etc,, according to 


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the support ( asraya ) it takes, the eye, ear, etc., - in the same way that volition 
( cetana ) is called bodily action ( kayakarman ) or vocal action ( vakkarman ) 
according to whether it depends on the body or speech. 

Although arising on a material support, the mental consciousness is not, 
however, without concept: arising on any support whatsoever, the mental 
consciousness together with its various aspects ( nanakarena ) takes on a twofold 
appearance, namely, the appearance of just an object ( arthamatrabhasa ) and the 
appearance of a concept ( vikalpabhasa ). 

In the two worlds endowed with form ( riipidhatu ), the mental consciousness 
relies on the body ( kaya ); consequently, as the material organs ( ruplndriya ) 
which are different from it ( tadanya ) and which rely on the body, it appears 
everywhere ( sthana ) in the aspect of the tangible ( spraOthavya ). 

i) Here is a verse (cf Siddhi, p. 5; Dhammapada, stanza 37): 

duramgamam ekacaram asarlram guhdsayam / 

damayan durdamam cittam tarn ahum briimi brdhmanam // 

“He who tames the stubborn mind that wanders afar, that wanders alone, 
that has no body and that dwells in the cave, him I call brahman.” 

ii) In the same way, (cf. Majjhima, I, p. 295; Samyutta, V, p. 218): imesam 

kho .... pahcannam indriydnam gocaravisayam .... mano paccanubhoti 

mano cesam patisaranam : “The manas senses the object perceived by the five 
organs; the manas is their refuge.” 

iii) Similarly, it is said: “Among the twelve ayatanas in question, the six 
groups of consciousnesses (sadvijnanakaya) are the mana-ayatana.” [139a6] 


12. Comm. Bh 339c23-340bl3, bh 173a6-174b2, U 401c27-402bl0, u 274a8-275a7. 

“Some people think .... : Here the author explains a particular system ( darsanavihesa ). 
One category of bodhisattva gathers everything into one single mental consciousness. 
According to whether it relies on such and such an organ, eye, etc., it takes such and such 
a name, visual consciousness up to mental consciousness, at the moment of its arising. 


144 



Beyond the mental consciousness there is no other consciousness of any other kind. How 
is that? Just as volition : if it relies on the body and moves ( pravartayati ) the body, it is 
called bodily action; if it relies on the voice and moves the voice, it is called vocal action; 
if it is associated with the manas, is is called mental action. It is the same for the mental 
consciousness. 

Objection - If that were so, the mental consciousness would be without conceptualization 
( vikalpa ) like the visual consciousness, etc. (cf. I, § 7; Kosa I, p. 60), since it would have 
a coarse (material) support ( asraya ). The thing supported (asrita) is always in accord 
with its support ( asraya ); thus, because the afflicted manas ( klistamanas ) is the support 
of defilement ( samklesasraya ), the mental consciousness that functions with it is defiled 
( samklista ). To reply to this objection, the bodhisattvas say: arising on no matter what 
support, etc., that is to say, on the eye and the other support-organs, the mental 
consciousness, together with its various aspects, takes on a twofold appearance, namely, 
the appearance of a cognized object ( grahya ) and the appearance of a cognizing subject 
( grahaka ). Then to define these, these bodhisattvas say: the appearance of just an object, 
etc. This means that there is one single mental consciousness of which one part ( bhaga ) 
manifests as the appearance of an imitation-object, while the other manifests as a concept 
about this object ( arthavikalpa ). Thus it avoids the error of being without concepts. 

Moreover, it appears everywhere in the aspect of the tangible : in concentration, it takes 
in and imagines tangibles, heaviness and lightness, without, nevertheless, being distracted 
( viksipta ), because it accompanies these tangibles. This occurs in the two worlds with 
form (rupidhatu) and not in the formless world ( arupyadhatu ). Why? Because in these 
two worlds, this mental consciousness relies on the body a on the material organs 
different from it which rely on the body. Just as the eye and the other material organs that 
rely on the body can do good (hit a) or evil ( upadrava ) to the body, so the mental 
consciousness which, in the two worlds with form, relies on the body, is able to register 
and imagine the body and do good or evil for it.” (U) 

By means of three scriptural texts, the bodhisattvas show that the mental consciousness 
cognizes not only its own object but also those of the other five consciousness, and that, 
consequently, these five consciousnesses are useless. “To establish their system, the 
bodhisattvas cite scriptural stanzas ( agamagatha ) as proof: he who tames the mind which 
wanders afar (because it has all the visayas as alambana), which goes alone (because 


145 



advitiya), which has no body (= vigatakaya) and which dwells in a cave (inhabits the 
cave of the body) (Bh) 


13. When the concept of store-consciousness {dlayavijh dnavijh apti) is considererd 
as an objective concept ( arthavijhapti ), then it must be recognized ( veditavyam ) 
that all the other concepts ( tadanyavijhapti ) make up its concept-image 
( nimittavijhapti ), whereas the concept of mental consciousness 
(m an o vijh an a vijh apti) together with support ( sasrayam ), make up its concept- 
vision ( darsan a vijh apti). The concept-images ( nimittibhuta vijhaptih), being the 
image generating the vision {darsan otpddan im itta), appear as object {arthavad 
dbhdsante ) and play the role of support of arising (utpadasrayaj in regard to 
vision. This is how the existence of concept-only ( vijhaptimdtrata ) is established. 

[ 139a 1 1] 

13. Comm. Bh 340M9-27, bh 174b2-6, U 402M5-25, u 275a7-275b4. 

“If the idea of store-consciousness is considered as an objective concept : objective 
(artha) has the meaning of causal ( hetu ): if the concept of store-consciousness is 
considered as a causal concept, then all the other concepts, concepts of body, etc., 
(kayddivijhapti), make up its concept-image because they are its object 
(dlambananimitta) and its domain (gocara); whereas the concept of mental 
consciousness together with the support - i.e., the sixth consciousness and the support, or 
the manas just past {anantardtita) and the afflicted (klista) manas, because these two 
manas are the support of arising and of the defilement ( samklesa ) of the mental 
consciousness - form its concept-vision ." (U) 


14. How does one explain that, although it manifests, the object does not exist? - 
As the Bhagavat has said: When bodhisattvas have four qualities (gun a ), i.e., 
four knowledges, they understand ( avabudh -) the non-objectivity (anarthakatvaj 
of all concepts ( vijhapti ). These four knowledges are: 


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i) Viruddhavijndnanimittatvajndna : knowledge that one and the same object 
is the cause of opposing consciousnesses. Thus hungry ghosts {preta ), animals 
(i tiryak ), humans ( manusya ) and gods (deva) have differing concepts 

(bh in n a vijh apti) of one and the same thing ( ekadravya ). 

ii) Andlambanavijnaptyupalabdhitvajndna : knowledge that one can perceive 
concepts without object. Thus the past ( atlta ), the future ( andgata ), dream 
(svapna), reflection (pratibimba ) are perceived in the absence of any object. 

iii) Aprayatndvipantatvajndna: knowledge that there would be neither effort 
nor error if the object were real. If the object existed, the consciousnesses 
bearing on this object ( taddlambana vijndna) would be made effortlessly and 
without error since one would be cognizing reality ( tattva ). 

iv) Trividhajndndnukdlatvajndna : knowledge that the object conforms to the 
threefold knowledge: 

(a) For bodhisattvas and those in the dhyana states ( dhydyin ) who have 
attained mastery of mind ( cetavasita ), objects appear as they want them by 
the power of their aspiration (adhimuktibala). 

(b) For yogins who have attained tranquility ( samatha ) and who practice the 
examinaton of dharmas ( dharmavipasyand ), objects appear at the precise 
moment of attention (manasikard). 

(c) For those who have attained nonconceptual wisdom ( nirvikalpakajndna ) 
and who abide there, no more objects appear. 

Thus, because of the close correspondence of the object with this threefold 
knowledge and for the other reasons (hetu) given above, it is proved ( siddha ) 
that the object does not exist. [139a25] 


14b. Here are some verses: 

(a) According to their class, hungry ghosts, animals, humans and gods have 
different concepts of the same object. Therefore we conclude that the object 
does not exist. 


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(b) In the past, etc., in the dream and in double reflection, there is no object 
of consciousness; nevertheless, they can be perceived. 

(c) If the object were truly an object, the wisdom free of concept would not 
arise; without this wisdom, buddhahood could not be attained. 

(d) For bodhisattvas possessing mastery and also for yogins, earth, etc., are 
transformed into whatever substance they wish by the power of their 
aspiration. 

(e) Finally, for the sage (dhlmat) who assures for himself the possession of 
tranquility, objects appear in this way together with the set of their 
characteristics when he reflects on the dharmas. 

(f) When nonconceptual wisdom is attained, no further objects appear. Thus 
it is known that the object does not exist. Since it does not exist, concept is 
not objective. 


14. Comm. Bh 340cl4-29, bh 174b6-175a7, U 402cl l-403a22, u 275b4-276b8. 

“To prove that there is no object, the author cites another agama and another argument. 

i) Viruddhajddnanimittatvajddna: to understand that the nimitta of opposing 

consciousnesses is just a development of the inner mind ( adhyatmikacittaparindma ) and 
that the outer object ( bahyartha ) does not exist ....” (U) - u continues: chit kluri gari la yi 
dwags mams kyis ran gi las kyi mam par smin pahi dban gis mag la sogs pas gad bar 
mthon ba de did la dud hgro da la sogs pas btud ba dad gnas yin pahi bios gnas par byed 
do // mi mams ni ddar ba dad dad ba dad bsal bahi chur rtog cid khrus byed do // hthun 
do // hjug go // nam mkhah mthah yas skye niched la sdoms par hjug pahi lha mams kyis 
ni nam mkhar mthon ste / gzugs kyi hdu ses mam par bsig pahi phyir ro // ddos po gcig 
la phan tshun mi mthun pahi mam par ses pa du ma hbyud ba de ni mi run ba ste / chit 
klun de did mag dad gcin dad phyi sas gad ba dad / dbyug pa dad ral gri thogs pahi mis 
bsruds pa yin na dri €im pa dad bsil bahi chu dad / gnas dad / btun ba la sogs pahi bya 
bahi hos dad nam mkhahi bdag did du ji Itar hgyur te / pha rol gyi don med do // brtags 
pas der snad bar ni run ste / ji skad du 
bud med lus ni gcig pu la/ 


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/ ro dan hdod by a za ba €es/ 

/ kun rgyu hdod can khyi mams kyi/ 

/ mam par rtog pa mam pa gsum mo/ 

€es bsad pa Ita buhol : “There where, by the power of retribution ( vipakabala ) of their 
actions ( svakarma ), hungry ghosts (preta ) see a river (nadi) filled with pus ( puyapurna ), 
animals (tiryak), fish ( matsya ), etc., see a drink ( pana ), a home, and they settle in it. 
Humans ( manusya ) see delicious water, clear and pure: they use it to bathe, quench their 
thirst and wash. As for the gods in concentration ( samahitadeva ) in the sphere of infinite 
space ( akasanantyayatana ), they see only space there because they no longer have 
physical sensation ( rupasamjhd ). But it is impossible in this way to have mutually 
different experiences of one and the same thing if this thing were real. How could this 
same river, full of pus (puya ), urine ( mutra ) and excrement ( purasa ), guarded by armed 
men with sticks and swords ( dandasidharais ca purusair adhisthita), be at the same time 
sweet-smelling ( sugandha ) fresh (sit ala) water, a home and a drink? How could it be 
identical with space? But if it is accepted that the external object does not exist, all this is 
explained. Cf. Sarvadarsanasamgraha, (ed. by Anandasrama, p. 12) where it is said: 
parivrdtkdmukasunam ekasyam pramadatanau / kunapah kamini bhaksya iti tisro 
vikalpanah // : the monk, the lover and the dog have three different conceptions of one 
and the same woman: she is a carcass, a mistress or food.” (u) 

ii) Andlambanavijnaptyupalabdhitvajnana : “The Sautrantikas have proved (cf. Kosa, V, 
p. 58) that the past and the future are cognized without being objects. The non-reality of 
the dream is well known. We have spoken (§ 7) of images perceived in concentration and 
we said (§ 8) that they could not be memories because they are perceived directly. We 
have shown above (§ 7) how the reflection of a face, etc., in a mirror, etc., is nothing but 
what it is ( akimcit ). It is established that consciousnesses bearing on these things have no 
object (< ilambana ).” (u) 

Hi) Aprayatnavipantatvajnana : “The text is clear and needs no explanation. If one 
accepts that objects are really such as they are perceived, one would understand the truth 
(bhuta) and beings ( dehin ) would be delivered (vimukta) effortlessly.” (u) 

iv) Trividhajndnanukulatvajnana: “(a) The ecstatics, the ones who are in dhyana, are the 
sravakas and pratyekabuddhas; dhyana is the one-pointed fixing of the mind 


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(< cittaikagrata ). They are called ’ecstatics' because they practice ecstasy. Who have 
attained mastery of the mind : who have attained aptitude of mind ( cittakarmanyata ). By 
the power of their beliefs, they transfonn earth into water, etc. - (b) For the yogi ns who 
have attained tranquility, who have attained concentration ( samadhi ). Samatha and 
samadhi are synonymous. Because it calms the distractions of the mind ( cittaviksepa ), 
samatha is tranquility.... And who practice examination of the dharmas : who, by a 
practice subsequent to tranquility ( prsthalabdha ), practice vipasyana (or prajna) of the 
dharmas, sutras, etc.” (u) - bh: don gcig la yah ji Ita ji Itar yid la byas pa de Ita de Itar 
mam pa man po snah baho: "one and the same object, according to how it is considered, 
appears to them with its set of characteristics, impermanence, suffering, etc.” - (c) “If the 
object really existed, the acquisition of nonceptual knowledge would no longer be 
explained because the object would be seen as it is from the start. ”(u) 


15. i) If the dependent nature (paratantrasvabhdva ) is the concept-only 
( vijhaptimdtra ) basis of the object ( arth dbh dsdsraya) , how is it dependent and 
why is it called dependent? - Because it stems from ( utpanna ) its own 
propensity seeds ( vdsandbTja ), it is dependent on conditions. Because it is 
incapable of lasting by itself ( svatah ) for a single moment after its arising, it 
is called dependent. 

ii) If the imaginary nature (parikalpitasvabhdva ) is this manifestation of non- 
object as object that is based on the dependent nature ( taddsrito 
'narthasydrthavad abhdsah ), how is it imaginary and why is it called 
imaginary? - Because it is the generating cause ( utpddanimitta ) of errors 
{viparydsd) of the mental consciousness of innumerable aspects 

( apram eydkdra manovijndna ) or imagination (parikalpa ), it is imaginary. 
Because it has no nature of its own {svalaksand) and is present as a pure 
imagination (pankalpamdtra ), it is called imaginary. 

iii) If the absolute nature (parinispannasvabhdva ) is the complete absence in 
the dependent nature {dtyantikabhdvalaksand) of this imaginary nature, how 
is it absolute and why is it called absolute? - Because it is immutable 
(avikara), it is absolute. Because it is the object of the purified mind 


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( visuddhalambana ) and the quintessence of all good dharmas 
{kusaladharmasrestha), it is rightly called absolute. [139b9] 


15. Comm. Bh 341a6-341b4, bh 175a7-175b8, U 403a27-403cl, u 276b8-277bl. 

This paragraph is easy to understand according to the preceding one. The dependent 
nature or mere concept, underlying the imaginary nature, arises from the propensities of 
speech. Thus it depends on conditions and merits the name ‘dependent’. The imaginary 
nature is the fact that the dependent nature is poorly understood. Instead of recognizing it 
as mere concept, it is perceived as a duality consisting of the grasped (object of 
consciousness) and the grasper (subject of consciousness). These mistakes are the work 
of the mental consciousness or imagination (parikalpa ) of innumerable aspects', 
“concerning all kinds of visaya, atman and dharmas ." (U) The absolute nature, which is 
defined as the absence of parikalpita in the paratantra, is the tathata, the true inalterable 
nature and the object of the non-erroneous mind ( visuddhalambana ). The commentaries 
get lost in explaining the details. 


16. An imagination {parikalpa ) and something imagined (parikalpya) are 
required for an imaginary nature (parikalpitasvablidva ). What are imagination, 
the thing imagined and the imaginary nature here? 

i) Imagination is the mental consciousness ( manovijhdna ) because it is 
furnished with conceptions ( savikalpaka ). It has its own speech propensities 
(svabhildpavdsand) as seed; it has also as seed the abhilapavasana of all 
concepts {vijhapti). As a result, it arises with concepts of infinite aspects 
(anantakaravikalpa). Because it imagines by fabricating in every way, it is 
called imagination ( sarvatha kalpena parikalpayatlti parikalpah). 

ii) The thing imagined is the dependent nature (paratantrasvabhdva ). 

iii) The imaginary nature is the aspect ( dkdra ) in which the dependent nature 
is imagined. The ‘aspect’ is the way ( katliam ). 

How does the imagination imagine? What is the object ( alambana ), the grasping 
of characteristics ( nimittograhana ), the belief ( abhinivesa ), the uttering of the 


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voice ( vaksamutthana ), speech ( vyavahara ) and the imputations ( samaropa ) by 
means of which it imagines? - It takes its object by means of the name ( naman ); 
it apprehends the characteristics in the dependent nature; it adheres to them by 
wrong views ( drsti ), it emits voice by inspection ( vitarka ); it speaks by fourfold 
speech: that which is seen, etc. ( drstadivyavahara ); it imputes by attributing 
existence to a non-existent thing. This is how it imagines. [139b23] 


16. Comm. Bh 341b20-341cl, bh 175b8-176a6, U 403cl6-404al4, u 277bl-278a5. 

“An imagination is required, etc.: the author says this so as to analyze imagination. 

i) Imagination is the mental consciousness because it is furnished with conceptions'. 
because it is linked (anubaddha) to the two vikalpas called examination ( nirupana ) and 
memory ( anusmarana ). It has as seed its own speech propensities: in beginningless 
transmigration ( anadikalikasamsara ) there is a mental consciousness, and the seed 
propensities ( vasanabija ) derived from the plurality of speech ( vyavaharaprapahca ) are 
its generating cause ( kanakahetu ). It has also as seed the abhilapavasanas of all 
ideations', it has as cause the abhilapavasanabljas of all the conceptions of infinite aspects 
(anantabhasa), color, etc., because it arises similar to these ideas (cf. § 1 1). As a result, it 
arises with conceptions of infinite aspects. 

ii) The imagined thing is the dependent nature, because a part ( ekadesa ) of this 
dependent nature, the eye and the other nimittas, is what is fabricated. 

Hi) The imaginary nature is the aspect (akara) in which the dependent nature is 
imagined. 'Aspect' is the manner, the particular angle. 

How does the imagination imagine ? The author poses this question in order to explain the 
modalities of the imaginary nature (parikalpitasvabhavaprabheda). It takes its object by 
means of the name: because when one has heard a name (naman), e.g., Devadatta, one 
can imagine the thing ( artha ); but if one has not heard the name, it is not possible to 
conceive of the thing [according to u: lhas sbyin €es bya ba la sogs pahi mih thos nas don 
la kun tu rtog par byed kyi mih ma thos par ni don la mam par rtog par byed mi nus so], 
- It apprehends the characteristics in the dependent nature: it adheres ( abhnivis -) to its 
own mark (svanimitta) because the grasping of characteristics (nimittodgrahana) is 


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conceptualization ( samjha ), and it is in conformity with this conceptualization that it 
engages itself in speech ( anuvyavahriyate ). It adheres there by false views', by means of 
the practice of fivefold examination ( nitirana , nirupana), it produces belief because, after 
having apprehended the characteristics, it adheres there; it is to these characteristics that 
it sticks firmly. After having adhered there, it wishes to speak about it to others and it 
emits voice by means of inquiry. Thus the sutra says: 'It is after having inquired and 
judged that one speaks, not without having inquired, not without having judged’ (vitarkya 
vicarya vacant bhasate navitarkya navicarya ). It speaks by fourfold speech, that which is 
seen, etc.: it speaks by fourfold discourse: that which is seen, heard, felt, cognized 
( drstasrutamatavijhatavavahara ). Thus, in face of a rope ( rajju ) the characteristics 
( nimitta ) of which resemble that of a snake ( sarpa ), one apprehends the characteristics of 
a snake in this rope, sinuosity ( vakratva ), etc., and after having believed in this false 
snake, one wishes to speak about it to others and one says: "I saw a snake! I saw a 
snake!" It is the same here. And hearing that, others impute ( samaropayanti ) a real 
existence to this snake. (U) 


17. Are these three natures ( svabhdvatraya ) different ( bhinna ) or are they the 
same ( abhinna )? - They are neither different nor the same. The dependent 
nature {paratantrasvabhdva ) is dependent ( paratantra ) in one sense (parydyena ), 
imaginary {parikalpita ) in another, absolute ( parinispanna ) in a third sense. 

In what sense is the dependent nature 'dependent'? - Insofar as it depends on 
something else, i.e., the arising of the propensity seeds ( vdsandblja ) (cf. § 15). 

In what sense is it 'imaginary'? - Insofar as it is the object of imagination 
( parikalpa ) and is imagined {parikalpita ) by the latter (cf. § 15, 16). 

In what sense is it 'absolute'? - Insofar as it does not exist in the absolute sense in 
the way it is imagined (cf. § 4, 15). [139c2] 


17. Comm. Bh 341c 1 1-18, bh 176a7-176b2, U 404a22-404b9, u 278a6-278b3. 

“They are not different, because the dependent nature and the imaginary nature are 
respectively existent and non-existent. And yet one can speak about the difference 


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between one existent thing and another existent thing, but not between an existent thing 
and a non-existent thing. Thus the horn of a rabbit (sasavisana), which does not exist, is 
not different from that which it is. They are not the same because existence and non- 
existence do not constitute one and the same thing. It is the same for the dependent nature 
and the absolute nature which are impure ( asudda ) and pure ( suddha ) by nature ( prakrti ) 
respectively.” (U) 


18. How many types ( katividha ) are there in the dependent nature 
(par a tan tras vabh dva) ? - In brief ( samasatah ), there are two ( dvividha ): 
dependence in respect to the propensity seeds (vasanabTja), and dependence 
consisting of a fundamental non-differentiation ( svabhavaparinispanna ) in 
regard to defilement (samklesa) and purification (v yavadana). 

It is dependent because of this twofold dependency. 

The imaginary nature (parikalpitasvabhava ) also is twofold because it is 
imagined by the imagination creating a self-nature (svabhavaparikalpa) and by 
the imagination creating specifications (visesaparikalpa). 

The absolute nature (parinispannasvabhava ) also is twofold. It is absolute by 
virtue of the absoluteness of self-nature ( svabhavaparinispatti ) and by virtue of 
the absoluteness of purity (visuddhiparinispatti). [139c 10] 


18. Comm. 341c26-342a4, bh 176b2-6, U 404M7-23, u 278b3-279a2. 

“Dependence in regard to the propensity seeds : Because it requires causes and 
conditions ( hetupratyaya ) to order to arise, it is dependent. Dependence consisting of a 
fundamental non-differentiation in regard to defilement and purification: because at the 
time of concept ( vikalpakale ) it is of defded nature; in the absence of concept 
(, nirvikalpakale ), it is of purified nature .... 

The imagination creating a self-nature is that which seizes ( upagrhnati ) broadly the 
substrate furnished with attributes ( dharmidravya ), the eye, etc.; the imagination creating 
specifications is that which seizes in detail the various attributes of the thing 
(arthadharma): eternity ( nityata ), impermanence (t anityata ), etc. 


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The absoluteness of self-nature is the stained true nature ( samala tathata ); the 
absoluteness of purity is the unstained true nature ( vimala tathata).’’'’ (U) 


19. i) Furthermore, there are four mental constructions (imaginations) 

( parikalpa ): 

(a) Svabhdvaparikalpa: mental construction creating a self-nature. 

(b) Visesaparikalpa : mental construction creating a specification. 

(c) Nisndta : mental construction belonging to well-endowed beings. The 
mental construction belonging to well-endowed beings is that which 
belongs to beings who are skilled in speech ( vyavahdrakusala ). 

(d) Anisndta : mental construction belonging to poorly-endowed beings. 
The mental construction belonging to poorly-endowed beings is that 
which belongs to beings not skillful in speech. 

ii) Furthermore, there are five mental constructions: 

(a) Naina nisritydrthasvabhdvaparikalpah: by starting from the name, to 
imagine the thing, i.e., such-and-such a word has such-and such a 
meaning. 

(b ) Artham nisritya ndniasvabhdvaparikalpah : by starting from a thing, to 
invent a name, i.e., such-and-such a thing has such-and-such a name. 

(c) Nama nisritya ndmasvabhdvaparikapah : by starting from a name, to 
invent a name. This is to invent a name for a thing which is unknown. 

(d ) Arthdm nisritydsvabhavaparikapah : by starting from a thing, to invent 
the thing. This is to invent a meaning for a thing the name of which is 
unknown. 

(e) Ubhayam nisrityobhayasvabhdvaparikalpah : by starting from both, to 
invent both, i.e., a thing of such-and-such a type ( tddrs) has such-and-such 
a nature and such-and-such a name. [139c 18] 


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19. Comm. Bh 342al4-15, bh 176b7-8, U 404b26-404cl0, u 272a2-5. 


“ Well-endowed those who are skilldl in speech : those who having already used speech 
have at their disposal an instrument to express their mind; poorly-endowed is the 
opposite; this is in regard to oxen, etc.” (u) - “Although they have an imagination, oxen 
are unable to express themselves in phonemes ( aksara ).” (bh) 

“Ndrna nisritya namasvabhavaparikalpah: Thus, a person who is bom and lives on an 
island of sugarcane ( paundradvipa ?) hears the word ’cow' pronounced of which he does 
not kn ow the meaning, has many mental constructions on the word ’cow’. [The translation 
’island of sugarcane’ is uncertain. Ye tseu tcheou (75 and 7; 39; 85 and 6), probably 
synonymous with kan tcho tcheou (99; 140 and 1 1; 85 and 6) is translated into Tibetan as 
li ke (= kha) rahi glih. In the Mahavyut., 4113, there is an equivalence of li kha ra = 
pundra, but in Mahavyut., 5788, li kha ra = sarkara. For Paundra or Pundravardhana, 
Northen Bengal, cf. L. de la Vallee Poussin, Dynasties et Histoire de I’lnde depuis 
Kanishka jusqu’au invasions musulmanes, Paris, 1935, p. 87.] - Artham 

nisrityasvabhavaparikalpah : when one does not know beforehand the relationship 
( sambandha ) between the designation (samjha) and the thing designated ( samjnin ) and 
suddenly one sees a cow ( gokaya ), the mental constructions of cow increase. - Ubhayam 
nisrityobhayasvabhavaparikalpah: being based on a hypothetical name ( aupacarika ) and 
a named hypothetical thing ( abhidheya ), one invents both.” (U) 


20. All in all, there are ten concepts ( vikalpa ). 

i) Mulavikalpa: the root concept, i.e., the store-consciousness. 

ii) Nimittavikalpa : the object concept, i.e., the concepts of color, etc. 

( rupddivijhapti ). 

iii) Nimittabhdsavikalpa: the concept which takes the aspect of an object, i.e., 
the ideas of visual consciousness, etc. ( caksurvijhdnddivijhapti ), equipped with 
their supports (sdsraya). 

iv) Nimittaparinamavikalpa: the concept which is a modification of the object, 
i.e., the modifications resulting from old age, etc. (jarddi ), of pleasant 
sensation, etc. ( sukhavedanadi ), of lust ( ragadi ), of agony ( upadrava ) and 


156 



changes of the seasons ( rtuparivarta ), of the hells, etc. ( ncirakagatyadi ), of the 
world of desire, etc. ( kdmadhdtvddi ). 

v) Nimittdbhdsaparindmavikalpa : the concept which is the modification of 
that which has the aspect of an object, i.e., the modifications brought about 
in the nimittabhasa or the consciousnesses by the preceding modifications. 

vi) Pardnvayavikalpa: the concept by reference, i.e., the concept which 
depends ( anugata ) on the hearing of the bad Dharma ( asaddhannasravana ) 
or the hearing of the good Dharma (saddharmasravana). 

vii) Ayonisovikalpa: the incorrect concept, i.e., the concept resulting from the 
hearing of the bad Dharma: the concept of heretics ( bdhiraka ). 

viii) Yonisovikalpa : the correct concept, i.e., the concept resulting from the 
hearing of the true Dharma: the Buddhist concept. 

ix) Abhinivesavikalpa : the concept adhering to wrong views, i.e., the concept 
associated ( samprayukta ) with the 62 kinds of wrong views ( drstigata ) that 
have as root the wrong view of self ( satkdyadrsti ) resulting from wrong 
contemplation ( ayonisomanasikdra ). 

x) Viksepavikalpa : the distraction-concept, i.e., the ten concepts of the 
bodhisattvas. [140al] 


20. Comm. Bh 342a28-342b27, bh 176b8-178al, U 404c23-405b6, u 279a5-280b4. 

u i) Mulavikalpa : this is the store-consciousness. It is the root of the other vikalpas and is 
itself vikalpa; this is why it is named root-vikalpa. 

ii) Nimittavikalpa : this is matter, etc. ( rupadi ) which thus constitutes an object ( nimitta ). 

Hi) Nimittabhasavikalpa : these are the conceptions of visual consciousness, etc., 
equipped with their supports, because they take the aspect of the object. 

iv) Nimittaparindmavikalpa : this is a vikalpa resulting from modifications of ideas to 
material appearance (cf. no. ii). Modification of old age, etc.', because old age modifies 
ideas to the material appearance. Why? Because outer and inner matter 
( bahyadhyatmikarupa ) is changed by old age. The word ’etc.’ includes sickness ( yyadhi ) 


157 



and death ( marana ). Modification by pleasant sensation, etc.: because pleasant sensation 
modifies the body. Thus it is said that in a happy man, his face ( mukha ) and eyes shine 
( prasadyante ). The word ’etc.’ includes unpleasant sensation ( duhkhavedana ) and neither 
pleasant nor unpleasant sensation ( aduhkhasukhavedana ) also. Modification by lust, etc.: 
because lust modifies the aspect of the body. The word 'etc.' includes hatred ( dvesa ), 
worry ( moha ), anger ( krodha ), etc. Thus it is said that an irritated ( rusita ) man has a bad 
color ( apriyavarna ). Modifications by agonies and changings of the seasons : murder 
(vadha), iron fetters ( bandhana ) modify the body, etc.; the changing seasons also modify 
the color of the outer and inner body, the color of the trees, etc. Thus it is said that the 
body changes under the action of cold ( sitakala ). Modifications by the hells, etc.: the 
word ’etc.’ includes all the bad destinies ( durgati ). It is known that in these places, rupa, 
etc., are changed. Modifications by the infernal destinies, etc. The word ‘etc. includes all 
the bad destinies. We know that in these places, the rupa, etc., is modified. Modifications 
by the world of desire, etc.: the word ’etc.’ includes the fonn realm ( rupadhatu ) because 
in the formless realm (drupyadhdtu) there are no concepts of material appearance. But 
among the gods and in the four dhyanas, beings (saliva) and cosmic matter 
(bhajanarupa) are changed. By the power (prabhava ) of pearls ( mani ), all kinds of lights 
and colors alternate. 

v) Nimittabhasaparinamavikalpa. By virtue of their organ-support ( asrayendriya ), eye, 
etc., the concepts of visual consciousness, etc. ( caksurjhanadivijhapti ), which take the 
aspect of color, etc. (rupayabhasa), undergo all kinds of modifications upon which the 
vikalpas arise. They undergo, according to circumstances ( yathayogam ), the 
modifications of old age, etc., mentioned above. Why? According to whether the eye is 
healthy or dulled, the visual consciousness is clear or blurred. The consciousness is 
changed to the degree that its support is changed. It is the same for the transformation by 
way of pleasant sensation, etc., because in the happy person the mind is collected and in 
the unhappy person it is scattered. It is the same for the modifications resulting from lust, 
agony and the changes of the seasons. Similarly, among the damned and in the desire 
realm, when the body (asrayakaya) changes, the consciousness changes likewise. In the 
formless realm also there are transformations caused by feelings, etc. 

vi) Paranvayavikalpa: this is a vikalpa which has as its cause the meeting with good or 
bad friends, hearing the true or the bad Dharma. 


158 



vii-viii ) The vikalpa of the heretics ( tirthika ), such as Kapila, and that of the orthodox, 
such as the Saugatas, are called ayoniso- and yoniso-vikalpa respectively. These two 
vikalpas are associated, the first with wrong views ( mithyadrsti ) and the second with 
right views ( samyagdrsti ), respectively 

ix) The vikalpa associated with the 62 types of views ( drstigata ) which have as cause the 
wrong view of self ( satkayadrstx ) is the vikalpa of the words ’earlier’, ‘later’ and ‘middle’ 
which is treated by the Brahmajalasutra: "Did I exist in the past?" These vikalpas are 
called abhinivesavikalpa . In the term drstigata, gata has the meaning of 'type' ( akara ). 

x ) That which distracts is called distraction ( viksipyate 'nenti viksepah ): it is a vikalpa. 
That is why one speaks of viksepavikalpa. This vikalpa distracts from nonconceptual 
wisdom ( nirvikalpakajnana ). Why? Because it distracts from the virtue of wisdom 
( prajndpdramita ). Nonconceptual wisdom is the virtue of wisdom. Those are the ten 
vikalpas of the bodhisattvas.” (U and u) 


21. The ten distractions of the bodhisattvas are: i) abhavanimittaviksepa, non- 
existence; ii) bhdvanimitta-viksepa, existence; iii) adhyaropaviksepa, imputation; 
iv) apavadaviksepa, negation; v) ekatvaviksepa, identity; vi) ndndtvaviksepa, 
difference; vii) svabhavaviksepa, self-nature; viii) visesaviksepa, specifications; ix) 
yathdndmd-bhinivesaviksepa, interpreting the object according to the name; x) 
yathdrthandmdbhinivesaviksepa, interpreting the name according to the object. 
[140a5] 


22. i) In order to counteract the concept of non-existence ( vikalpasya 

pratipaksena ), it is said (in the Mahaprajnaparamitasutra, Taisho 220, k. 4, p. 
17b25-17cl6; cf. Sutralamkara, XI, 77): “A bodhisattva being truly a 
bodhisattva ....” (bodhisattva bodhisattva eva sann iti ). 

ii) In order to counteract the concept of existence ( bhavavikalpa ), it is said: 

“ sees no bodhisattva in the absolut sense” ( bodhisattvam na 

samanupasyati). 


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iii) In order to counteract the concept of imputation ( adhyaropavikalpa ), it is 
said: “does not see, in the absolute sense, the name of bodhisattva or the 
virtue of wisdom, or whether he acts or does not act, or form, or feeling, or 
perception, or formation or consciousness. Why? Because name is empty of 
self-nature” (bodh isattvan dm a na sum an upasyati, p raj ft dp dr am itdtn n. s., 
caratlti n. s., na caratiti n. s., rupam n. s., vedanam api n. s., samjhdm api n. s., 
samskaran api n. s., vijhdnam api n. s. tat kasya hetoh. tathdhi narna 
svabhavena siinyam iti ). 

iv) In order to counteract the concept of negation ( apavddavikalpa ), it is said: 
“It is not by means of emptiness (na sunyatayeti). 

v) In order to counteract the concept of identity (ekatvavikalpa), it is said: 
“The emptiness of form is not form (yd rupasya sunyata na tad rupam iti). 

vi) In order to counteract the concept of difference (nanatvavikalpa), it is 
said: “Outside of emptiness, there is no form; form is emptiness, emptiness is 
form” (na cdnyatra sunyataya rupam. rupam era sunyata sunyataiva rupam 
iti). 

vii) In order to counteract the concept of self-nature (svabhdvavikalpa), it is 
said: “Form, O Subhuti, is nothing but a word (ndmamdtram idam Subhute 
yad idam rupam iti). 

viii) In order to counteract the concept of specification (visesavikalpa), it is 
said: There is no arising, no cessation, no defilement, no purification of self- 
nature" (svabhvasya hi notpado na nirodho na samkleso na vyavaddnam iti). 

ix) In order to counteract the concept that is attached to interpreting the 
thing according to the name (yathdndmdrthdbhinivesavikalpa ), it is said: “The 
name is fabricated. But about the dharma of their conception, they discuss it 
in exotic terms and they adhere to it as a result of this discursiveness 
(krtrimam ndma. pratipattidh arm am te agantukena namadhyeyena 
vyavahriyante. vyavahardc cabhinivisante). 

x) In order to counteract the conception that is attached to interpreting the 
name according to the thing (yathdrthandmdbhinivesavikalpa ), it is said: “The 


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bodhisattva does not, in the absolute sense, see all these words; not seeing 
them in the absolute sense, he is not attached to them”, meaning: 
“interpreting them according to the thing” (tani bodhisattvah sarvandmdni na 
samanupasyaty asamanupasyan nabhinivisate yatharthatayety abhiprdyah ). 

The logic applied here to form is to be applied to all the others up to 
consciousness 

To counteract all of these ten distractions ( viksepa ), nonconceptual wisdom 
( nirvikalpakajhdna ) is taught in all the Prajnaparamitas. Thus the entire content 
( sakalartha ) of the Prajnaparamitas consists of an explanation about the 
distractions that are counteracted ( vipaksa ) and the nonconceptual wisdom that 
counteracts them (pratipaksa ). [140a7] 


22. Comm. Bh 342c5-343a8, bh 178al-179a4, U 405bl2-405cl 1, u 280b4-281b5. 

This paragraph is missing in B and H. P and Dh replace it by a quotation from the 
Prajnaparamitasutra (Taisho 220, k. 4, p. 17b25-17cl6) which is also found in the 
Upanibandhana. Cf. Satasahasrika, p. 812, 932 et passim. 

katham punar bhagavan bodhisattvena mahasattvena prajnaparamitayam caravitavyam. 
bhagavan aha. iha saradvatlputra bodhisattvo mahasattvah prajnaparamitayam caran 
bodhisattvam na samanupasyati, bodhisattvacaryam na samanupasyati, prajnaparamitam 
na samanupasyati, prajnaparamitanamapi na samanupasyati, caratfti na samanupasyati, 
na caratfti na samanupasyati, rupam na samanupasyati, vedanam api na samanupasyati, 
samjnam api na samanupasyati, samskaran api na samanupasyati, vijnanam api na 
samanupasyati. tat kasya hetoh. tathahi saradvatiputra bodhisattvo mahasattvah 
svabhavena sunyah evam hi bodhisattvanama bodhisattvanamna sunyam. tat kasya hetoh. 
prakrtir asyaisa tathahi na sunyataya rupam sunyam, nanyatra rupat sunyata, rupam eva 
sunyataiva rupanii na sunyataya vedana sunya, nanyatra vedanayah sunyata, vedanaiva 
sunyata sunyataiva samjna; na sunyataya samjna sunya, nanyatra samjnayah sunyata, 
samjnaiva sunyata sunyataiva samjna; na sunyataya samkarah sunyah, nanyatra 
samskaranam sunyata, samskara eva sunyata sunyataiva samskarah; na sunyataya 
vijnanam sunyam, nanyatra vijnanasya sunyata, vijnanam eva sunyata sunyataiva 
vijnanam. tat kasya hetoh. tathahi namamatram idam yaduta bodhisattvah, namamatram 


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idam yaduta sunyata, namamatram idam yaduta rupam., namamatram idam yaduta 
vedana, namamatram idam yaduta samjna, namamatram idam yaduta samskarah, 
namamatram idam yaduta vijnanam, tathahi mayopamam rupam, mayopama vedana, 
mayopama samjna, mayopamah samskarah, mayopamam vijnanam. maya ca 
namamatram na desastha na pradesastha asad asambhutam vitathasamam mayadarsanam 
svabhavavirahitam asvabhavas canutpada 'nirodhah asthanam na hanir na vrddhir na 
samkleso na vyavadanam. evam caran bodhisattvo mahasattvah kasyacid dharmasya 
utpadam na samanupasyati, nirodham na samanupasyati, sthanam na s., hanam na s., 
vrddim na s., samklesam na s., vyavadanam na s., rupam na s., vedanam na s., samjnam 
na s., samskaran na s., vijnanam na s., bodhir iti bodhisattva iti yad ucyate tad api na s. tat 
kasya hetoh. tathahi krtrimam nama. pratipattidharmam te kalpitagantukena 
namadheyena 'bhutaparikalpitena vyavahriyante, vyavaharac cabhinivisante ; tad 
bodhisattvo mahasattvah prajnaparamitayam caran sarvadharman na samanupasyati 
nopalabhate, asamanupasyan anupalabhamano na manyate nabhinivisate. 


23. If in one sense ( paryayena ) the dependent nature {paratatrasvabhdva ) merges 
with the three natures (cf. § 17), why are these three natures ( svabhavatraya ) not 
identical ( nirvisista )? - Inasmuch as (yena paryayena ) it is dependent 
( paratantra ), it is not imaginary (parikalpita ) and it is not absolute 
( parinispanna ). Inasmuch as it is imaginary, it is not dependent and is not 
absolute. Inasmuch as it is absolute, it is not dependent and not imaginary. 
[140al3] 


23. Comm. Bh 343al5, U 405cl7. 


24. How do we know ( hath am gamyate ) that the dependent nature 
( paratantrasvabhava ), which appears as the imaginary nature 
( parikapitasvabhdva ), is not merged with the latter (na taddtmaka )? - It is 
impossible ( viruddha ) that the thing is merged with the name because the notion 
(buddhi) does not exist prior to the name (ndman), because the name is multiple 
(sambahula) whereas the thing cannot be multiple, because the name is 


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indeterminate ( aniyata ) whereas the thing cannot be composite ( samsrsta ). Here 


are some verses: 

a) Since the notion does not exist prior to the name, since the name is 
multiple and indeterminate, it is proved that the thing cannot be merged 
with the name, that it is not multiple and that it is not composite. 

b) (Cf. Sutralamkara, XIII, 16): 

dharmdbhdvopalabdhis ca nihsamklesavisuddhitd / 

mdyadisadrsT jheyd dkdsasadn tathd // 

“The dharma does not exist but it is seen; it has no stain but there is 
purification. It is like magic, etc. ; it is like space. [141 a2 1 ] 


24. Comm. Bh 343b3-28, bh 179a4-180a2, U 406a4-20, u 281b5-282a6. 

“Because prior to the name, the idea did not exist in the name, it is impossible for the 
thing to merge with the name. If the dependent and the imaginary were identical 
(ekalaksana), it would be necessary that one would have the notion of the thing (art ha) 
independently from the name ( namanapeksam ), as, for example, for the pitcher (ghata). 
Outside of the word pitcher (ghatanaman), there is no notion of pitcher ( ghatabuddhi ) for 
the pitcher ( ghatartha ) because the pitcher has existence by designation only. If the word 
pitcher and the pitcher were identical, the notion of pitcher would exist; but since they 
are not identical, this notion does not exist prior to the word. Consequently, it is 
contradictory that the name and the thing merge. Here, by ’name’, we mean the imaginary 
nature, and by 'thing', we mean the dependent nature [Bh corrected according to bh]. It is 
by the power of the word that the dependent is imagined. - Moreover, there are several 
names for a single thing. If the name and the thing were identical, the thing, like the 
name, should be multiple. In this case, the thing would have several natures (t'i). But it is 
impossible that one and the same thing could have several natures. Therefore, if the two 
merged, a second contradiction would result. - Finally, the name is indeterminate 
(aniyata)-. the word 'puhgava' may be applied to nine different things. If it were admitted 
that the name and the thing are identical, it would be that several different things would 
constitute one and the same nature (t'i). Thus there would result a third contradiction, 


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because it would have to be admitted that very different things ( anekavidhartha ), cows, 
etc., make up one and the same nature. 

The first stanza repeats these ideas. It is proved, etc.: this shows that the dependent and 
the imaginary are not the same thing. 

The dharma does not exist but it is seen : this first part of the stanza is explained to 
students (sisya) by the example of magic. The students experience two difficulties here: 
they ask anxiously: "If the dharma does not exist, how can it be seen; in the absence of 
stain, how can there be purification?" Two examples answer these questions. It is like 
magic, etc. The magical elephant ( mayahastin ) does not exist as a true elephant, 
nevertheless it is seen. It is the same for things ( artha ): they are seen and yet they do not 
exist. It is like space. Space is not soiled ( klista ) by fog ( nlhara ), etc., because it is pure 
by nature (prakrtivisuddha ); nevertheless, when the fog dissipates, we say that space is 
purified. It is the same for dharmas. They are not stained because they are pure by nature; 
nevertheless, when the obstacles ( avarana ) and adventitious ( agantuka ) stains (mala) are 
destroyed, we say that the dharmas are purified.” (Bh) 


25. If it does not such exist as it appears, why is the dependent nature 
( paratantrasvabhdva ) not completely (sarvena sarvam) non-existent? Without the 
dependent nature, the absolute nature (parinispannasvabhdva ) does not exist. If 
the former were missing, how come there would not be universal non-existence 
(sarv an dstitva) ? If the dependent and absolute natures did not exist, defilement 
(samklesa) and purification (vyavaddna) would be absent. But defilement and 
purification do exist (upalabhyante). Thus it is wrong that everything would be 
non-existent. Here is a stanza: 

If the dependent and the absolute did not exist at all, defilement and purification 
would not take place. [140a29] 


25. Comm. Bh 343c8-14, bh 180a2-6, U 406a29-406b5, u 282a6-8 

“Without the dependent nature, the absolute nature does not exist : because stains are 
necessary for there to be purification.” (Bh) 


164 



26. In the Greater Vehicle, the Buddha Bhagavats taught the Vaipulyasutras: in 
this teaching ( desand ), it is said: 

i) How should the imaginary nature (parikalpitasvabhdva ) be conceived 
{katham veditavyah )? It should be conceived by proclaiming it as non-existent 
(n dstipraydyadesan ay a ) . 

ii) How should the dependent nature ( paratantrasvabhava ) be conceived? It 
should be conceived as a magic show ( rndyd ), a mirage ( marici ), a dream 

( svapna ), a reflection (pratibhasa ), an image (pratibimba ), an echo 
( pratisrutkd ), the reflection of the moon in water ( udakacandra ), a magical 
creation ( nirmdna ). 

iii) How should the absolute nature ( parinispanna ) be conceived? It should be 
conceived by proclaiming the fourfold pure dharma ( caturvidha 
vaiyavadanikadharma ). The fourfold pure dharma is: 

(a) The essential purity (prakrtivyavaddna ), i.e., the true nature ( tathatd ), 
emptiness (sunyata), the utmost point of reality ( bhutakoti ), the signless 
(animitta), the absolute (paramdrtha ), the fundamental element 

( dharmadhdtu ). 

(b) The stainless purity ( vaimalyavyavaddna ), i.e., the same essential 
purity as being free of all obstacles ( sarvdvaranahita ). 

(c) The purity of the path leading to the essential purity ( tatprdpakam 
margavyavaddnam), namely, all of the dharmas which are the limbs of 
enlightenment ( bodhipaksyadharma ), the virtues (pdramitd ), etc. 

(d) The purity of the object destined to give rise to the path 

( tajjananartham dlambanavyavaddnam), i.e., the teaching of the true 
Dharma of the Greater Vehicle ( mahdydnasaddharmadesand ). Because 
this teaching is the cause for purity (vyavaddnahetu), it is not imaginary; 
because it is the outflow ( nisyanda ) of the pure fundamental element 
( visuddh ad harm adh dtu) , it is not dependent. 


165 



All the pure dharmas ( vaiyavadanika ) result from ( samgrhlta ) from this 
fourfold purity. Here are some stanzas (cf. Abhidharmasutra, in 
Madhyantavibhanga, p. 112): 

(i) mdyadidesand bhiite kalpitan ndstidesand / 

caturvidhavisuddhes tu parinispannadesand // 

“Concerning the product, we speak of magic; concerning the imaginary, we 
speak of non-existence; but concerning the fourfold purity, we speak of the 
absolute.” 

(ii) suddhih prakrtivaimalyam dlambanam ca margata / 

visuddhdndm hi dharmandm caturvidhagrhltatvam // 

“The purities are the essental purity, the stainless purity, the purity of the 
path and the purity of the object. Indeed, the pure dharmas come from these 
four natures.” [140bl6] 


26. Comm. Bh 344a3-22, bh 180a6-181a2, U 406b22-406cl 1, u 282a8-282b8. 

“ i ) The imaginary nature is proclaimed to be non-existent because it does not exist 
absolutely ( atyantikabhava ). 

ii) The dependent nature is like a magic show, a mirage, etc.: These various points will be 
developed below (§ 27).” (U) 

Hi) There are good definitions in u for the absolute nature and its synonyms: rah b€in 
gyis mam par by ah ba ni so sold skye bo mams kyi ho bo hid yah dag pa gah yin paho // 
de b€in hid ni g€an du mi hgyur bahi phyir chos thams cad kyi spyi mtshan hid yin te / de 
hid la brten nas sems can thams cad ni de b€in gsegs pahi shin paho €es gsuh rab las 
hbyuh ho // stoh pa hid ces bya ba ni kun brtags pa med paho // yah dag pahi mthah €es 
bya ba ni bden pahi mur thug paho // mtshan ma med pa ni gzugs la sogs pahi mtshan ma 
thams cad dan bral bhi phyir ro // don dam pa ni ye ses mchog gis thob par bya bahi 
phyir ro // chos kyi dbyihs ni mam par byah bahi chos mams kyi rgyu yin pahi phyir ro // 
dbyihs kyi sgra ni hdir rgyuhi tshig ste / gser la sogs pahi hbyuh khuh b€in no: “The 
prakrtivyavadana is the true self-nature of ordinary people (prthagjana ). The tathata, 


166 



being unchangeable ( avikara ), is the shared nature ( samanyalaksana ) of all dharmas. It is 
because of the tathata that it is said ( pravacana ): ’All beings ( sattva ) are the seed of the 
tathagata ( tathagatagarbha ).' Sunyata is the absence of mental constructions. [According 
to U: Sunyata is the tathata consisting of ( prabhavita ) the complete absence of the 
parikalpita in the paratantra; [cf. § 4]. The bhutakoti is that which reaches the summit of 
the truth (satyakotinistha). Animitta, because it is free of all marks, material mark, etc. 
(, rupadinimitta ). Paramartha, because it is attained ( adhigata ) by superior knowledge 
( agrajnana ) . _Dharmadhatu , because it is the cause of pure ( vaiyavadanika ) dharmas. 
Here the word dhatu is synonymous with cause. Just as gold ore ( suvarnakara ) [is called 
suvarna [one line is missing from my (Migme Chodron) xerox copy] 

The tatprapakam margavyavadanam is the pure path capable of acquiring ( adhigama ) 
the stainless tathata. Enlightenment ( bodhi ) consists of a stainless unhindered knowledge 
( vimalam apratihatam ca jnanani) free of emotional obstacles ( klesavarana ) and 
obstacles to knowledge (jneyavarana ). Being in accord ( anulomika ) with enlightenment, 
certain dharmas are called limbs of enlightenment ( bodhipaksya ): these are the 37 
categories of dharma, the foundations of mindfulness, etc. ( smrtyupasthanadi ), and the 
ten virtues (paramita ). The virtues are treated below (chapter V). The word ’etc.’ includes 
the entire Noble Path ( aryamarga ). 

Tajjanakam alambanavyavadanam is the preaching of the Noble Path, namely the limbs 
of enlightenment, etc., of which we have spoken.” (U)_ 


27. Why is the dependent nature (paratantrasvabhdva) proclaimed to be like a 
magic show, etc. ( m dyddyupam a ) ? - In order to dispel (nirakr-) all unjustified 
hesitation ( bhrdntydkdnksd ) about this dependent nature in other people . 

Why do others experience unjustified hesitations about it? 

\) They wonder: "How can the non-existent be perceived ( visaya )?" To dispel 
this hesitation, the sutra compares the dependent nature to a magic show 
( mdyd ). 


167 



ii) They wonder: "How can the mind and mental factors ( cittacaitta ) which 
have no object arise?" To dispel this hesitation, the sutra compares the 
dependent nature to a mirage ( marici ). 

iii) They wonder: "In the absence of an object (asaty artha), how can one 
experience pleasant or unpleasant feelings ( istanista upabhoga)V ' To dispel 
this hesitation, the sutra compares the dependent nature to a dream ( svapna ) 

iv) They wonder: "In the absence of an object, how can good or bad actions 
( kusalakusalakarman ) produce ( abhinirvrt -) a pleasant or unpleasant result 

( istdnistaphala )?" To dispel this hesitation, the sutra compares the dependent 
nature to an image (pratibimba ). 

v) They wonder: "In the absence of an object, how can the various rebirths 
(n an dvij hand) arise?" To dispel this hesitation, the sutra compares the 
dependent nature to a reflection (pratibhdsa ). 

vi) They wonder: "In the absence of an object, how can the different kinds of 
speech ( nanavyavahara ) arise?" To dispel this hesitation, the sutra compares 
the dependent nature to an echo (pratisrutkd ). 

vii) They wonder: "In the absence of an object, how can the images perceived 
during correct concentration (samyag-grah akasam ddh igo car a) be 
produced?" To dispel this hesitation, the sutra compares the dependent 
nature to the reflection of the moon in water {udakacandra). 

viii) They wonder: "In the absence of an object, how can the bodhisattvas 
whose mind is unerring ( aviparltacitta ) be reborn at will ( yathdsayam ) for the 
service of beings ( sattvdrthakriya)V ’ To dispel this hesitation, the sutra 
compares the dependent nature to a magic show (parindma ). [140c 1 ] 


27. Comm. Bh 344b9-345a7, bh 181a2-182b8, U 406c25-407a28, u 282b8-283b7. 

“i) The magical elephant ( mayahastin ) is not a real thing {artha) and yet it is perceived 
{visaya). It is the same for the object. 


168 



ii) Here, the mind and mental factors ( cittacaitta ) play the role of mirage 
( marwisthamya ) and the object {artha) plays the role of the water ( toyasthamya ). While 
the mirage does shimmer ( pracarati ), there is no real water ( toyasthamya ), and yet the 
notion of real water ( toyarthabuddhi ) is produced. In the same way, when the mind and 
mental factors shimmer, there is no real object {artha) and yet the notion of object 
(< arthabuddhi ) is produced. 

Hi) In the dream, there is no real object; nevertheless, one knows that various pleasant 
and unpleasant feelings are experienced. It is the same here in the awake state. 

iv) The image is not a real object: it is relatively to the model that one has of the notion of 
image ( pratibimbabuddhi ); nevertheless, there is no reality-’image’ distinct from the 
model. It is the same here. There is no reality 'pleasant or unpleasant result' and yet it is 
perceived. 

v) In a shadow-play (cayakrida), all kinds of reflections ( pratibhasa ) are seen. Although 
these reflections are seen, the reality ’reflection’ is non-existent. It is the same for the 
consciousnesses: these are not different things ( nanavidartha ) and yet they appear as 
different things. 

vi) The echo is not a real sound and yet it is heard. It is the same for superficial speech 
( vyavaharaprapahca ): it is not — [one line missing in my (Migme Chodron) xerox 
copy] 

vii) The moon's reflection in water is not a real thing and yet, thanks to the clearness 
(, ardrata ) and clarity {prasada ) of the water, it is seen in the water. It is the same for the 
concentrated mind {samahitacitta). The objects it perceives ( alambanavisaya ) are not 
real things, yet they are perceived. Here, concentration ( samadhi ) plays the part of the 
water {toyasthamya) because it is fresh and clear. 

viii) The magical creation {nirmana) is not a real object but, by the power of the magician 
{nirmatr), all kinds of things are created. A magically created object {nirmanartha) does 
not fail to be perceived. It is the same here: the existence {kaya = atmabhava) assumed 
{upatta) by the bodhisattva is not real and yet the existence assumed by the bodhisattva 
who is working for the benefit and happiness of all beings {sarvasattvahitasukha) is 
perceived.” (Extracted from Bh) 


169 



The Bhasya gives another interpretation: “There is yet another meaning to these eight 
comparisons of the Bhagavat. The example of the magic show serves to reject the six 
inner bases of consciousness (Oad adhyatmikayatana) ... The example of the mirage 
serves to reject the receptacle world ( bhAanaloka ) ... The example of the dream serves to 
reject the objects of enjoyment, color, etc. (rupadyubhuktavisaya) ... The example of the 
image serves to reject the result of bodily action (kayakarmaphala) ... The example of the 
echo serves to reject the result of vocal action ( vakkarmaphala ) ... Mental action 
(i manahkarman ) is threefold: non-concentrated stage (asamahita bhumih ), concentrated 
stage ( samahita bhumih), and the coming from hearing (srutamaya). The example of the 
reflection serves to reject the result of the mental action of non-concentrated stages ... 
The example of the moon reflected in water serves to reject the result of mental action of 
the concentrated stages ... The example of metamorphosis serves to reject the result of the 
mental action resulting from hearing ...” Cf. the commentary of Sutralamkara, XI, 30. 


28. With what intention (him samdhdya) did the Bhagavat say, in the 
Brahmapariprccha (cf. Visesa-cintabrahmapariprccha, Taishfi no. 585, p. 4b23-24; 
no. 586, p. 36c9; no. 587, p. 66c3-4), that the Tathagata does not see samsara and 
does not see nirvana? - Since the dependent nature (paratantrasvabhdva ) is 
imaginary (parikalpita ) on the one hand and absolute (parinispanna ) on the other 
hand (cf. v. 17), by expressing himself in this way the Bhagavat had in mind the 
identity ( nirvisesa ) of samsara and nirvana. Indeed, in its imaginary part 
(bhaga), this dependent nature is samsara; in its absolute part, it is nirvana. 
[140c6] 

28. Comm. Bh 345al3-22, bh 182b8-183a5, U 407b4-l 1, u 283b7. 

“The Bhagavat had the identity of samsara and nirvana in mind. If mental constructions 
( parikalpita ) are destroyed, there is no longer anything else. One no longer sees samsara. 
When one does not see samsara, one sees tranquility (santa), nirvana. However, here we 
are talking about complete relativity (p’ien yi pou tch’eng), non-difference, in order to 
destroy the erroneous adherence ( vipantabhivesa ) of foolish people (bed a) to a difference 


170 



in nature between samsara and nirvana. The meaning of 'dependent' is also explained, 
because the latter, being based on the two natures, is not determinate ( viniyata ).” (U) 


29. In the Abhidharmasutra, the Bhagavat said: “There are three dharmas: that 
which is part of defilement ( samklesabhagapartita ), that which is included in 
purity (v yavaddnabhagapatita) and that which is included in both 
( tadubhayabhagapcitita ). What did he mean {kirn samdhdya ) by speaking in this 
way? 

i) The imaginary nature ( parikalpitasvabhava ) which occurs in the dependent 
nature (paratantrasvabhava ) falls into the defilement part. 

ii) The absolute nature ( parinispannasvabhava ) which occurs in the 
dependent nature falls into the purity part. 

iii) As for the dependent nature (paratantrasvabhava ), it falls into both parts. 

It was with this intention that the Bhagavat spoke thus. 

Is there an example (drstanta) for this? The example of gold-bearing clay (sa 
khon na gser yod pa = kancanagarbha mrttika, Mahavyut. 7650). Thus, in gold- 
bearing clay, three things are noticed ( upalabhyate ): the earth element 
( prthivldhatu ), the earth (prthivT) and the gold (kahcana). In the earth 
element, the earth, which is not there, is seen (upalabhyate), whereas the gold, 
which is there, is not seen. When one has burned (dah-) the earth element by 
means of lire (agni), the earth does not appear, whereas the gold appears. 

The earth element, when it appears as earth, has a false appearance 
(mithydbhasa); when it appears as gold, it has a true appearance 
(tattvabhasa). Consequently, the earth element falls into both parts [both the 
earth and the gold]. Similarly, when one has not burned concept (vijhapti) by 
the fire of nonconceptual wisdom, the false imaginary nature 
(abhutaparikalpitasvabhava) contained in this concept appears, whereas the 
true absolute nature ( bhutaparinispannasvabhdva ) does not appear. When 
one has burned concept by the fire of nonconceptual wisdom 
(nirvikalpakajhdnd), the true absolute nature contained in this concept 


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appears, while the false imaginary nature does not appear. Consequently, the 
dependent nature which consists as idea to wrong mental construction 
{abb u taparikapa vijh apti) is included in both parts [participates in both 
defilement and purity] and is similar to the earth element in the gold-bearing 
clay. [140c23] 


29. Comm. Bh 345bl 1-19, bh 183a5-183b2, U 407b28-407c9. u 284al-6. 

" Thus in gold-bearing clay .... The earth element (prthivTdhatu ) is solidity ( kakhatatva ); 
the earth ( prthivi ) is form ( rupa ) and appearance ( samsthana ), respectively 
( yathakramam ): ordinary matter ( bhuta ) and derived matter ( bhautika); the gold 
( kancana ) is the seed of gold (bfja). ,, (u) 


30. In some places (e.g., in the Lankavatara, p. 115-116), the Bhagavat said that all 
dharmas are eternal ( nitya ); elsewhere he said that they are transitory ( anitya ), 
and yet elsewhere he said that they are neither eternal nor transitory. What was 
his intention (kim samdhaya) in proclaiming them to be eternal? - The dependent 
nature (paratantrasvabhdva ) is eternal in its absolute part (parinispannabhaga ), 
transitory in its imaginary part {parikalpitabhdga ), neither eternal nor transitory 
in its two parts together. It was with this intention that the Bhagavat spoke in 
this way. 

All distinctions are exactly like this distinction between eternal, transitory and 
their absence of both ( advaya ): happiness ( sukha ), sadness ( duhkha ) and their 
advaya; goodness {subha), malice ( asubha ) and their advaya; emptiness ( siinya ), 
non-emptiness (asunya) and their advaya; the self ( dtman ), the non-self 
(i an atm an ) and their advaya; tranquility (santa), non-tranquility ( asanta ) and 
their advaya; the thing with self-nature ( sasvabhdva ), the thing without self- 
nature {nihsvabhdva) and their advaya; that which arises {utpannd), the non- 
arisen ( anutpanna ) and their advaya; that which has been destroyed {niruddha), 
the non-destroyed {animddha) and their advaya; primordial tranquility 
(adisanta), primordial non-tranquility {anddisanta) and their advaya; the 


172 



essentially nirvanized (prakrtiparinirvrta ), the non-essentially nirvanized 
( aprakrtiparinirvrta ) and their advaya; samsara, nirvana and their advaya, etc. In 
these distinctions (prabheda ), all the enigmas posed by the Bhagavats should be 
understood ( adhigantavya ) in the light of the three self-natures as the teaching 
(parydya) on the eternal, non-eternal, etc. Here are some stanzas: 

(a) Since dharmas are non-existent, since they appear in many aspects 
( anekavidha ), there is neither dharma nor adharma. Thus non-duality 
( advaydrtha ) is proclaimed. 

(b) On the one hand ( ekabhagena ), it is proclaimed (prakas -) that they do not 
exist; on the other hand], ot os proclaimed that they do exist. From both 
sides, it is proclaimed that they are neither existent nor non-existent. 

(c) They are not such as they appear; this is why they are proclaimed to be 
non-existent. But because, nevertheless, they do appear, for this reason they 
are proclaimed to be existent. 

(d) (Cf. Sutralamkara, XI, 50-51). 

svayam svendtmand 'bhdvdt svabhave canvasthiteh / 

grahavat taddbhdvdc ca nihsvabhavatvam isyate // 

“Because they do not exist in themselves, because they do not exist by their 
self-nature, because they do not persist in their self-nature, because they are 
not what they are thought to be, the absence of their self-nature is affirmed." 

(e) nihsvabhdvatayd siddhd uttarottaranisrayat / 

anutpadanirodhadisantiprakrtinirvrtih // 

“The fact results gradually from their absence of self-nature that they have 
neither arising nor destruction, that they are primordially tranquil and 
essentially nirvanized.” [141al6] 


30. Comm. Bh 345cl3-346a7, bh 183b2-184a7, U 408a3-408b9, u 284a6-285a7. 


173 



“In some places the Bhagavat said that all dharmas are eternal, etc.: The paratantra, in 
its dhannata or tathata, is eternal: in its mentally constructed part, it is transitory because 
it does not have eternity. That which is not eternal is called transitory and not that which 
has birth and cessation ( utpadanirodha ). In its two parts together, the paratantra is neither 
eternal nor transitory: this is the fact of being neither one nor the other ( advayatva ). 
Happiness ( sukha ) is the absolute part of the paratantra; sadness ( duhkha ) is the 
imaginary part; their advaya is the paratantra itself, and so on.” (U) 

Explanation of the stanzas according to bh: 

“(a) Since the dharmas are non-existent, there is no dharma; since they appear in many 
aspects, there is no adharma; it is in this sense that the dharmas exist (chos yin no €es bya 
ba tha tshig go). Consequently, since there is neither dharma nor adhanna, non-duality is 
asserted. 

(b) On the one hand, i.e., from the one extreme ( anta ), it is asserted that they do not 
exist : that they are without self-nature ( nihsvabhava ); from the other extreme, it is 
asserted that they do exist, that they do have self-nature. From both sides, it is asserted 
that they are neither existent nor non-existent : by considering ( parigrah -) the paratantra 
that partakes of both natures at the same time ( ghi gain bdag hid can), it is asserted that 
they are neither existent nor non-existent. 

(c) They are not such as they appear, they are not as they are perceived ( upalabdha ): this 
is why they are asserted to be non-existent. But because, nevertheless, they do appear. 
but because it is said that they exist insofar as they are simply appearance (snah ba tsam 
duyod pahi phyiryod pa Fes brjod pas), they are asserted to be existent for this reason. 

(d) Now it will be shown in what sense (him samdhaya) it is asserted that all dharmas are 
without self-nature ( nihsvabhava ). (1) Because they do not exist in themselves', because 
all dharmas do not arise by themselves ( svatah ), independent of conditions ( pratyaya ): 
that is the first meaning of the expression 'without self-nature’. (2) Because they do not 
exist by way of their self-nature. Because once they are destroyed, since the dharmas do 
not re-arise out of their own nature of self ( niruddhdndm punas tenatmananutpatteh), 
they are without self-nature: that is another meaning of the expression 'without self- 
nature’. (3) Because they do not persist in their self-nature. Because, once arisen, they do 
not have the power to last for a single moment (ksana) afterwards, they are without self- 


174 



nature. These three absences of self-nature ( nihsvabhava ) of dharmas are shared with the 
sravakas (sravakasadharana) . (4) Because they are not such as they are thought to be, 
their absence of self-nature is asserted : this fourth absence of self-nature is not shared 
with the sravakas. The dharmas do not exist with the imaginary nature which foolish 
people {bed a) cling to ( parigrhita ). And it is in this sense ( tatsamdhaya ) that here in the 
Greater Vehicle we say that all dharmas are without self-nature. 

(e) From their absence of self-nature, there results the fact .... : from the fact that all 
dharmas are without self-nature, it results that they are unborn, etc. indeed, that which is 
without self-nature is unborn (yo hi nihsvabhavah so ' nutpannah ); that which is unborn is 
unceasing (yo ’nutpannah so ' niruddhah ); that which is unborn and unceasing is 
primordially tranquil (yo 'nutpanno 'niruddhah sa adisantah ); that which is primordially 
tranquil is essentially nirvanized ( ya adisantah sa prakrtiparinirvrtah). This results 
gradually, i.e., these various points are a chain of causes ( uttarottatahetu ).” (bh) 


31. Furthermore, all of the Buddha's words (buddhavdc) should be understood 
( adhigantavya ) in the light of four purposes (abhipraya) and four intentions 
(abhisamdhi). (Cf. Sutralamkara, XII, 16, 18). 

i) Samatdbhiprdya : intention dealing with an identity, e.g., when he said: "It 
was I who at that time was Vipasvin, the perfectly enlightened one" (aharn 
eva sa tasmin samaye vipasvi samyaksambuddho 'bhuvarn; (cf. Sutralamkara, p. 
83, 1. 1). 

ii) Kdlantarabhipraya: intention dealing with another time, e.g., when he said: 
"By merely invoking the name of the Tathagata Bahuratna, one is 
predestined to supreme complete enlightenment" (bahuratnasya tathagatasya 
ndm adh eyagrah an am dtren a niyato bhavaty anuttardydm samyaksam bodhau, 
(ibid. p. 83, 1. 24). Or again when he said: "Those who take a vow in view of 
Sukhavati will be reborn there" (ye sukhdvatydm pranidhanam karisyanti te 
tatropapatsyante, (ibid. p. 83, 1. 4). 

iii) Arthdntardbhprdya : intention dealing with something other, e.g., when he 
said: “When one will have served as many Buddhas as there are grains of 


175 



sand in the Ganges, then one will understand the Greater Vehicle" ( iyato 
gangdnadtvdlukdsamdnabuddhan paryupdsya mahdydne 'vabodha utpadyate 
(ibid. p. 83,1.21). 

iv) Pudgaldsaydbhiprdya : intention dealing with the individual’s dispositions, 
e.g., when he criticized in one person the gift which he had praised in another 
person (yat tad eva dunam kasyacit pudgalasya prasamsate kasyacid vigarhate 
(cf. ibid. p. 83, 1. 5 and 26). It is the same for discipline ( sTla ) and a certain 
meditation ( kacid bhdvana ) as for gift. These are the four intentions. 

Furthermore, there are four motives: 

\) Avatdrandbhisamdhi: the motive of introduction, when, in the Vehicle of 
the sravakas and in the Greater Vehicle, from the point of view of 
conventional truth ( samvrtisatya ), he deals with the existence, respectively, of 
the individual (pudgala ), of the self-nature ( svabhdva ) and of the 
specifications ( visesa ) of dharmas. 

2) Laksanabhisamdhi : the motive of nature, when, in speaking of the nature 
of dharmas, he explains their threefold self-nature ( svabhdvatraya ). 

3) Pratipaksdbhisamdhi: the motive of antidote, when he sets forth the 
practices ( carya ) that counteract the 84,000 obstacles. 

4) Parindmandbhisamdhi : the motive of interpretation [or riddle], when he 
wishes to say something other than what he says. On this subject, here is a 
stanza (cf. Sutralamkara, p. 82, 1. 20): 

asdre saramatayo viparydse ca susthitah / 

klesena ca smamklistd labhante bodhim uttamdm // 

“Taking as solid that which is not solid, completely stuck in error, completely 
stained by desire, they attain supreme enlightenment.” [This riddle means: 
Taking concentration as the main thing, thoroughly fixed in the inverse of error, 
completely worn out by effort, they attain supreme enlightenment]. [14 lb5] 


31. Comm. Bh 346a27-346c7, bh 184a7-185b3, U 408b28-408c28, u 285a7-286a6. 


176 



In the commentaries there are definitions of abhipraya and abhisamdhi that are not at all 
clear. Bh: “There is a difference between abhipraya and abhisamdhi. When the Buddha 
first cognizes (yuan) the thing (che, 6 and 7) and then says it to someone else, that is 
abhipraya. When, from this clarification ( niyama ), he succeeds in introducing it into the 
holy doctrine ( aryadesana ), that is abhisamdhi . - bh: dgohs pa dan Idem por dgohs pa la 
tha dad du bya ba ci yod ce na / bcom Idan hdas kyis gah thugs la b€ag pa dton par 
mdzad pa de ni dgohs pa yin no // gah hid kyis nes par bstan pa la hjug par mdzad pa de 
ni Idem por dgohs pa yin no: “What is the difference between abhipraya and 
abhisamdhi ? When the Bhagavat is teaching ( desayati ), that which he has in his mind 
{cilia) is abhipraya. When, in this way, he introduces (avatarayati) it into the teaching 
( nirdesa ), that is abhisamdhi .” - U: “To see something from afar (yuan kouan) and wish 
to capture ( upadanal ) it, that is abhipraya. Seeing something nearby (kin kouan) and 
wishing to introduce it, that is abhisamdhi." - u: dgohs pa niyid la b€ag pa tsam yin gyi 
pha rol la bltos par ni khas mi len no // Idem por dgohs pa ni de hid pha rol gzud pa la 
bltos paho: “ Abhipraya being a simple fixation in the mind ( mano'vasthapanamatra ), it is 
not an acceptance ( abhyupagama ) relative to something else (parapeksa ). Abhisamdhi 
has, as its purpose, the introduction of it to another {paravataranapeksa).” 

i) Samatabhipraya. “Because all the Buddhas are alike in their collections ( sambhara ), 
etc., the Bhagavat said: "It is I who at that time was Vipasvin". Similarly, when one 
discovers a resemblance with someone else, one says: "That's me." But it is clear that the 
Buddha Vipasvin of the past is not the actual Sakyamuni Bhagavat.” (U) 

ii) Kalantar abhipraya. “Seeing that lazy ( kusida ) people are unable to practice the 
Dharma zealously, the Bhagavat said: ‘Merely by invoking the name of the Tathagata 
Bahuratna, one is predestined’, or: ‘By means of a simple vow, one will be reborn in the 
realm of Sukhavati.’ The Bhagavat had in view the increasing of the roots of previous 
good ( purvakusalamula ) in his listeners and thus to lead them later ( kalantara ) to 
enlightenment and to Sukhavati.” (U) - “It is not enough to invoke a name to attain 
supreme enlightenment definitively. Similarly, when we say that a pana (part of a rupee) 
is worth a thousand panas, we mean that some day or at some other time, this pana will 
be the cause of a thousand panas.” (Bh) 

Hi) Arthantar abhipraya. - luh gi mtshan hid kyi theg pa chert pohi chos las rtogs pahi 
mtshan hid kyi theg pa chen pohi chos ni don g€an te / de la dgohs nas / satis rgyas gah 


111 



gain kluh gi bye ma sued cig la bsnen bkur byas na theg pa chen pohi chos kyi don khon 
du chud par hgyur ro €es bya ba gsuhs te / hphags pa so so rah gis rig paid chos ni rtogs 
par dkah bald phyir ro // hdis ni theg pa chen po la sgra ji b€in par hdzin pa bsal bar rig 
par byaho: “The doctrine of the Greater Vehicle as understanding ( abhisamayalaksana ) 
is something other than the doctrine of the Greater Vehicle as text ( agamalaksana ). This 
is what the Bhagavat had in view when he said: ‘When you have served as many 
Buddhas as there are grains of sand in the Ganges, you will understand the Greater 
Vehicle’, because the holy Dhanna ( aryadesana ), knowable by one's own intuition 
( pratyatmavedya ), is difficult to understand ( durvigahya ). By these words, the Bhagavat 
forbade the literal interpreting of the Greater Vehicle ( yatharutagraha ).” (u) 

iv) Pudgalasayabhipraya. “First the Bhagavat praises a gift made by the miser ( matsara ), 
then he criticizes the same gift made by a generous man (danaruci). First the Bhagavat 
praises the discipline of the undisciplined person ( duhsila ), then he criticizes the same 
displine of the honest person ( silavat ) in order to lead the latter to the cultivation of a 
higher category of good. A certain meditation, i.e., worldly meditation ( laukika 
bhavana ).” (U) 


1. Avataranabhisamdhi. “There are places where the Bhagavat talks about the pudgala, 
about self-nature ( svabhava ) and the specifications ( visesa ) of dharmas: this is in order to 
serve as introduction into the Vehicles, and from the point of view of conventional truth 
( samvrtisatya ). In the same way, as introduction into the Vehicle of the Sravakas, he 
speaks about the existence of apparitional beings ( upapaduka ), etc. As introduction into 
the Greater Vehicle and as reassurance to those who fear annihilation 
(ucchedabhitajana), he says that the mind is eternal, etc. “(U) 

2. Laksanabhisamdhi. “Its purpose is the introduction into the natures of the knowable 
(jheyalaksana) .” (U) 

3. Pratipaksabhisamdhi. “This concerns the 84,000 kinds of conduct (carya) destined to 
counteract (pratipaksa) the evils to be conteracted ( vipaksa ): desire ( raga ), etc.” (U) 

4. Parinamanabhisamdhi. “The motivation of interpretation is the wish to say somthing 
other than what one is saying [cf. bh: gah du tsig gi don g€an du brjod la don de hid g€an 
du ston pa ste\. In the stanza asare saramatayo, the word asara : Because concentration 


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(s amadhi) is not strong and because distraction ( viksepa ) is difficult to overcome, 
concentration is called asara. Considering this concentration as something important 
( tasmin pradhanabuddhih ) is rendered by saramataye. The phrase viparyase ca susthitah 
means 'well settled in the opposite of errors' ( viparvdsa viprayayena susthitah ). Taking 
that which is not eternal to be eternal ( anitye nityam iti), etc., is error ( viparyasa ); taking 
that which is not eternal to be non-etemal is the opposite ( viparyaya ) of error. That is 
what they are well established in {susthitah). In the phrase klesena susamklistah, k/esa 
means effort ( vyayama ), fatigue (srama). Therefore the phrase means: completely 
fatigued by effort and by the length of the time they have set for themselves in the 
interest of beings (s attvartham dfrghakalavyayamasramena pariklistah). This is as in the 
phrase: 'He abides in the long klesa (fatigue) of samsara but only out of great compassion 
{mahakaruna).' The phrase labhante bodhim uttamam is easy to understand.” (Bh) 


32. He who wishes to explain ( nirdis -) the doctrine of the Greater Vehicle in brief 
{samdsatah) must express himself in three points {trividha): i) he must give an 
explanation of dependent production (pratTtyasamutpddanirdesa ), ii) an 
explanation of the nature of dharmas resulting from dependence 
( pratltyasamutpannadharmalaksananirdesa ) and iii) an explanation of the 
meaning of the discourses {uktarthanirdesa). 

i) First, an explanation of dependent production (cf. I, v. 17, 27), by saying 
for example: "Dharmas result from speech-propensities {abhildpavdsand) 
and the latter from the former." Indeed, the retributive consciousness 
{vipdkavijhdna) and the active consciousnesses ( pravrttivijnana ), being 
reciprocal conditions {anyonyapratyayd), arise from one another. 

ii) The dharmas that are active consciousnesses {pravrtti-vijhdnalaksana 
dharma) have concept equipped with image and vision ( sanimitta - 
darsanavijhapti ) as nature ( svabhdva ). (Cf. II, § 1 1). As characteristics 

{ laksana ), they have the basis ( dsraya , i.e., the dependent nature), the 
imaginary nature (parikalpita ) and the absolute nature {dharmata), the 
nature of things): this is how the characteristics of the threefold self-nature 


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itself are explained, as, for example, when one says: "Resulting from concept 
furnished with image and vision, these dharmas have three natures." 

How should the natures of these dharmas be explained? - In the dependent 
nature ( paratantralaksana ), the imaginary nature (parikalpitalaksana ) does 
not exist but the absolute nature ( parinispannalaksana ) is present. Thus, by 
someone who does not see the truth ( adrstatattva ) and by someone who does 
see it, these two natures, imaginary and absolute, are simultaneously 
(ekakdle) not perceived ( anupalabdha ) or perceived ( upalabdha ) as existent 
{sat) and non-existent ( asat ) respectively. In the dependent nature, the 
imaginary is absent but the absolute is present. That is why, when it arises, if 
one perceives its imaginary nature, one does not perceive its absolute nature; 
if one perceives its absolute nature, one does not perceive its imaginary 
nature. Similarly, it is said: “In the dependent, the imaginary is absent, but 
the absolute is present there. That is why, in the dependent, these two 
natures, imaginary and absolute, non-perceived and perceived, are the 
same.” 

iii) What is the explanation of the meaning of the phrases ( uktarthanirdesa )? - 
It consists of explaining ( vibhaj -) a phrase (purvoktapada) spoken first by 
means of the phrases that follow (sesapada), when dealing with the qualities 
of the Buddha (gunadhikaranat ), or when dealing with the aims of the 
bodhisattva ( arthddhikarandt ). [141b24] 


32. Comm. Bh 346cl l-347a23, bh 185b4-186a8, U 409a7-409bl5, u 286a5-287a3. 

i) “The dharmas come from the speech-propensities : The propensities of concept ad extra 
(bahyavikalpavasana) reside in the store-consciousness. With these propensities as cause, 
there arise all the dharmas that have the active consciousnesses as self-nature. And the 
latter from the former. The concept-propensities have these dharmas as cause. This 
shows that the store-consciousness and active consciousnesses are mutual cause.” (Bh) 

ii) Thus, by the one who does not see the truth and by the one who does see the truth, it is 
simultaneously that these two natures, etc.: “The parikalpita and the parinispanna are 


180 



called these two natures. Of these two natures, the first is non-existent, the second is 
existent. He who has not seen the truth (adrstatattva) sees the parikalpita but does not see 
the parinispanna. He who has seen the truth ( dristatattva ), sees, at one and the same 
moment, the parinispanna and does not see the parikalpita. This idea has been explained 
in the stanza.” (Bh) - “At the moment when the one who has not seen the truth sees the 
non-existence of the parinispanna and the existence of the parikalpita in the 
paratantrasvabhava, at that same moment, the one who has seen the truth sees the non- 
existence of the parikalpita and the existence of the parinispanna.” (U) 

iii) “Up to now, the meaning has been explained independently of the intention of the 
authors ( vaktrasayanapeksam ). Now, the meaning of the uttered phrases (uktdrtha) must 
be explained according to the intention of the authors. The phrase gunddhikaranad 
arthadhikaranad va means gunasayad arthasayac ca. The perfection ( paripuri ) or the 
benefit ( upakara ) already gained, already set up, is called quality ( guna ); the search 

( paryesena ) directed towards a benefit not yet acquired but settled [Here a line is 

missing from my [Migme Chodron] xeroxed text]. 


33. 1. The treatise on the qualities ( gunddhikarana ), i.e., the presentation of 
the qualities of the Buddha (cf. Samdhi-ninnocanasutra, § 2, p.32; idem transl. 
by Bodhiruci, Taisho no. 675, p. 665c3-12; idem transl. by Hiuan-tsang, Taisho 
no. 676, p. 688M7-25; Buddhabhumisutra, Taisho no. 680, p. 720c7-16; 
Mahavyutpatti, no. 351-372). 

0) su vis uddh ahu ddh ih : the Buddha's intellect is very pure, 

1) advayasamuddcdrah : he moves in non-duality, 

2) alaksanadharmapardyanah : he penetrates the dharma without nature, 

3) buddhavihdrena viharan : he dwells in the abodes of the Buddha, 

4) sarvabuddhasamatdprdptah: he has attained identity with all the Buddhas, 

5) andvaran agatim gatah : he has arrived at the absence of obstacles, 

6) apratyudavartyadharmah: his doctrine is without decline, 

7) asamhdryagocarah : his domain cannot be reduced, 


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8) acintyavyavasthanah : his system is inconceivable, 

9) tryadhvasamataniryatah : he penetrates the identity of the three times, 

10) sarvalokadhdtuprasrtakdyah : their bodies extend throughout all the 
universes, 

11) sarvadharmanihsamsayajhanah: his wisdom bears on all things without 
any doubt, 

12) sarvacarydsamanvdgatabuddhih : his intellect is endowed with all the 
practices, 

13) nihkdnksadharmajndnah : his knowledge of the dharmas is free from 
error, 

14) avikalpitasanrah : their bodies are unimaginable, 

15) sarvabodhisattvasampratTcchitajndnah: his wisdom is the object of the 
vows of all bodhisattvas, 

16) advayabuddhavihdraparamapdramigatah : he has reached the summit of 
the abode of the Buddhas free of duality, 

17) asambhinnatathdgatavimoksajiidnanisthdgatah : he has reached the 
summit of the unmixed liberating wisdom of the Tathagata, 

18) anantamadhyabuddhabhumisamatddhigatah: he has reached the identity 
of the buddha-realms free from center and periphery, 

19) dharmadhdtuparyantah: he has risen to the fundamental element, 

20) dkdsadhdtuparyavasdnah : he exhausts space, 

21) apardntakotinisthah: he reaches the ultimate end. 

It should be noted that the phrase: “the Buddha's intellect is very pure” has 
the other 21 phrases as its commentary. Thus the nature of the Buddha is 
well explained. [141c5] 

II. “He has a very pure intellect”: The very pure intellect of the Buddha 
results ( samgrhlta ) from nineteen qualities (guna ): 


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1st quality: moving in the absolute sense without obstacle in the knowable 
(jiieya dtyantikdndvarana pravrttigunah). 

2nd quality: penetrating into the highest purity of the Tathagata, the nature 
of which is the non-duality of existence and non-existence 
( [bhavabhavadvayalaksanatathatati-visuddhipravesagunah ). 

3rd quality: uninterruptedly maintaining the spontaneous activity of the 
Buddha ( nirabhogabuddhakriyasamucchinna-sthitigunah ). 

4th quality: possessing the identity of the supports, intentions and actions in 
the dharmakaya ( dharmakaya asrayabhiprayakriyabhedhagunah). 

5th quality: cultivating the antidote to all the obstacles 
(sarvavaranapratipaksabhavandgunah). 

6th quality: escaping from the attacks of all the heretics 
( sarvatTrthikanirdharsanagunah ). 

7th quality: while dwelling in the world, not being confined by human 
relationships ( loke 'pi lokadh arm dsam h diyatva-gun ah). 

8th quality: establishing the doctrine (v yavasthita-dharmagunah). 

9th quality: explaining the past and the future ( vydkaranagunah ). 

10th quality: manifesting the sambhogakaya and nirmanakaya in all the 
universes ( sarvalokadhatusu sambhoganirmanakayapradarsanagunah). 

11th quality: cutting through doubt ( samsayacchedana-gunah ). 

12th quality: introducing into all kinds of practices 
( n an deary dp ra vesagun ah). 

13th quality: cognizing the arising of dharmas to come 
(i amutradharmotpadajnanagunah ). 

14th quality: appearing in accordance with the aspirations of beings 
( yathadhimuktiprakasanagunah ). 

15th quality: engaging in disciplining beings by means of an immense troop 
(aprameyakayena sattvavinaya-prayogagunah). 


183 



16th quality: attaining to the perfection of the virtues in an equalized 
dharmakaya ( samadharmakaye paramitanispatti-gunah) 

17th quality: manifesting various buddha-fields in harmony with the 
aspirations of beings ( yathadhimuktisambhinna - 
buddhaksetrapradarsanagunah). 

18th quality: unlimited extension of the three bodies of the Buddha 
(buddhatrikayapradesaparicchedagunah). 

19th quality: devoting himself until the end of time to transmigration for the 
benefit and well-being of all beings 
(i dsamsdrakotisarvasattvahitasukhopasthdnagunah ). 

20th quality: indestructibility ( aksayatvagunah ). [141cl9] 


33. Comm. Bh 347b20-348a8, bh 186a8-187b2, U 409cl 1-41 lb3, u 287a3-291b4. 

U comments at great length on this passage as follows: 

'"The Buddha’s intellect is very pure (, suvisuddabuddhih ); this first phrase is explained by 
the other 21 phrases for a good explanation ( subhasita ) consists of explaining one and the 
same quality by numerous qualities. 

1) Moving in the asbolute sense without obstacle in the know able (jheya 
dtyantikavaranapravrttigunah ): this 1 st quality explains the phrase: the Buddha moves 
within nonduality (advayasamuddcarah). The Buddha's wisdom is completely without 
any obstacle because he is without attachment ( asahga ) and without obstacle ( avarana ) 
in regard to substances of all kinds (sarvadravyavisesa). This is not like the sravakas, 
etc.; their wisdom is twofold, sometimes encountering an obstacle, sometimes not 
encountering an obstacle, or it moves in duality. But here, in the case of the Buddha, 
there is no question of a twofold samudacara; that is why we say advayasamuddcarah. 
For this reason the Buddha has a very ’ pure intellect because he possesses the perfection 
of wisdom and the suppression of the defilements [in Tibetan, ye ses dan spans pa phun 
sum tshogs pa = jhanaprahanasampad]. The following phrases will be expressed in a 
corresponding manner. 


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2) Penetrating the highest purity of tathata, the nature of which is the nonduality of 
existence and non-existence (bhavabhavadvayalaksana-tathathtivisuddhipravesagunah): 
this 2 nd quality explains the phrase: the Buddha penetrates the dharma without nature 
(alaksanadharmapardyanah). This tathata possesses an absolute nature 
( parinispannalaksana ), it does not possess imaginary nature (parikalpitalaksana). 
Consequently, it has a nature of nonduality ( advayalaksana ): it does not have a nature of 
non-existence ( abhavalaksana ) because it really exists; it does not have a nature of 
existence ( bhavalaksana ) because it is not as it is imagined. Penetrating the highest 
purity, this pertains to the high purity of the tathata ( tathatativisuddhi ) for, of all the 
dharmas, it occupies first place because it is free of all adventitious stains 
(agantukamala). The Buddha penetrates this tathata himself and makes others penetrate 
it: this is why it is called ativisuddhipravesaguna. The phrases should be connected thus: 
the Buddha has very pure intellect because he himself is pure and because he makes 
others pure. 

3) Uninterruptedly maintaining the spontaneous activity of the Buddha 
(nirdbhogabuddhakriydsamucchinnasthitigunahf. this 3 ld quality explains the phrase: the 
Buddha dwells in the abodes of Buddha (buddhavihhrena viharan). The Buddha does not 
exert any effort in all his activities and he can abide amongst beings uninterruptedly as is 
suitable (yathayogam ) in a stable manner in the abodes ( yihara ) of the aryas, devas and 
Brahma. This is not so for the sravakas who must make an effort (dbhoga) to procure the 
interest of beings. It is not like the tlrthikas who do have abodes, but lower ones. The 
devaviharas are the four dhyanas; the brahmaviharas are the four limitless practices 
(apramdna): loving-kindness (maitrf), etc; the aryaviharas are emptiness ( sunyata ), 
signlessness ( animitta ) and other vimoksamukhas. 

4) Possessing the identity of the supports, the intentions and the activities in the 

dharmakaya (dharma kaya asrayabhipraya-kriyabhedagunah ): this 4 th quality explains 
the phrase: the Buddha has attained identity with all the Buddhas 

(sarvabuddhasamatapraptah). Identity of the supports, because all the Buddhas rely on 
pure knowledge ( visuddhajhana ). Identity of intentions, for all have the high aspiration 
(adhyasaya) of procuring the benefit and welfare of all beings 

(sar'vasattvahitasukhakriya). Identity of activities, because all the Buddhas procure the 


185 



interest of others ( parartha ) by means of their sambhogakaya and nirmanakaya. It is not 
like the sravakas, etc., who have only the support. 

5) Cultivating the antidote to all the obstacles (sarvavaranapratipaksabhavanagunah): 
this 5 th quality explains the phrase: the Buddha has attained the absence of obstacles 
(andvaranagatim gatah ). Having practiced ( abhyas -) the noble path (dryamdrgd) which 
counteracts every obstacle of passion, every obstacle to knowledge 
(. sanwklesajheyavaranapratipaksa ) and which consists of universal knowledge 
(sarvakarajhana ) and mastery of concentration ( samadhivasita ), the Buddha has reached 
a state that is the basis of the suppression of any traces ( yasana ) of obstacles. 

6) Escaping the attacks of heretics (sarvatirthikanirdharsanagunah): this 6 th quality 

explains the phrase: the doctrine of the Buddha is without decline 

(apratyudavartyadharmah) for its twofold law - the doctrine ( desana ) and the 
understanding ( adhigama ) - cannot be shattered by others, since there is no other law 
superior to his. 

7) While abiding in the world, not being diminished by human relationships ( loke 'pi 
lokadharmasamharyatvagunah ): this 7 th quality explains the phrase: the domain of the 
Buddha cannot be diminished ( asamharyagocarah ). The place where one always 
circulates in the world is that person's 'domain'. Although he circulates in the world, the 
Buddha, who experiences neither fondness ( anunaya ) nor revulsion ( pratigha ), is not 
diminished by the eight worldly concerns ( astau lokadharmah ), gain ( labha ), loss 
(alabha), etc. [cf. Mahavyutpatti, 2342-2348], Thus it is said: ‘The Buddhas always 
circulate in the world in order to procure the benefit and welfare of all beings, but the evil 
vikalpa of the hot wind of the eight dharmas cannot upset them or hinder them.’ 

8) Establishing the doctrine (vyavasthititadharmagunah): this 8 th quality explains the 
phrase: the Buddha has an inconceivable system (vyavasthitadharmagunah) . The twelve- 
membered doctrine, sutra, etc., ( sutradidvadasahgapravacana ), is called system 
(■ vyavasthana ) because the Buddha establishes ( vyavasthapayati ) such and such a self- 
nature ( svalaksana ) or general nature ( samanyalaksana ). Since this sytem is not 
perceived by the intellect of fools ( balabuddhyavisayatvat ), since it is superior in the 
world ( lokottara ), it is inconceivable. The inconceivability of what the Buddha 
establishes is a quality connected as above. 


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9 ) Explaining the past and future (vyakaranagunah): this 9 th quality explains the phrase: 
the Buddha penetrates the sameness of the three times (tryadhvasamatdniryatah). The 
Buddha can move equally throughout the three times or through eternity because in the 
equality of the three times, he is able to cognize past ( atita ) and ( andgata ) future things 
that have occurred or will occur. The Buddha explains them ( vyakr -) just like present 
things (pratyutpanna ). 

10) Manifesting a sambhogakaya and nirmanakaya in all the universes 
( sarvalokadhatusu sambhoganirmanakayapradarsanagunah ): this 10 th phrase explains 
the phrase: the bodies of the Buddha extend throughout all the universes 
(, sarvalokadhatuprasrtakbyah ). According to the beings to be disciplined ( vineya ), the 
Buddha penetrates into the universes and manifests his twofold form there for their 
welfare (hit a) and their happiness ( sukha ). 

11) Cutting through doubt (samsayacchedanagunah): this 11 th quality explains the 
phrase: the knowledge of the Buddha concerns everything without there being any doubt 
(sarvadharmanihsamsayajhanah) . The Buddha is completely resolved ( niyata ) on all 
objects (visaya). If he were not himself decisive on all dharmas, he could not cut through 
the doubts of others: lacking decisiveness ( niyama ), one cannot cut through doubt. 

12) Introducing into all kinds of practices (ndndcarydpravesagunahf. this 12 th quality 
explains the phrase: the Buddha's intellect is endowed with all the practices 
(sarvacarydsaman vdgatabuddhih ) . 

13) Cognizing the arising of dharmas to come ( amutradharmotpdda-jhdnagunah ): this 
13 th quality explains the phrase: the Buddha's knowledge of the dharmas is free from 
error (nihkdhksadharmajhdnah). In saying that a certain person possesses no roots of 
good (kusalamula), the sravaka aryas discourage him; but the Buddha Bhagavat foresees 
the arising in the future of a good dharma in that person, for he actually perceives the 
seeds of subtle roots of good ( suksmakusalamula ) in future rebirths for they are 
accompanied by them. 

14) Manifesting in accordance with the aspirations of beings 
(yathadhimuktiprakasanagunah): this 14 th quality explains the phrase: the bodies of the 
Buddha are not imaginary (avikalpitasarirah). Although he manifests his bodies in the 
color of gold, etc., - in confonnity with the diverse aspirations of beings - his bodies are 


187 



not imaginary; it is like the pearl ( mani ), the ferryboat ( vadya ), as is said in the 
Tathagataguhyasutra, Taisho no. 312. 

15) By means of an immense troop, he works to discipline beings ( aprameyakayena 

sattvavinayaprayogagunah ): this 15 th quality explains the phrase: the Buddha’s 
knowledge is the object of the vows of all the bodhisattvas 

(sarvabodhisattvasampratticchitajhanah). Wishing to convert beings, he works by means 
of an immense troop of bodhisattvas. And the bodhisattvas, by means of the Buddha’s 
dominant power (< adhipatabala ), hear the doctrine first and attain great bodhi. 
Bodhisattvas of other classes gather and transmit this doctrine which is propagated in an 
uninterruped succession. This is how they reach the knowledge which is the object of the 
vows of all bodhisattvas. 

16) Attaining the perfection of virtues in an equalized dharmakaya (samadharmakaye 
paramitanispattigunah): this 16 th quality explains the phrase: the Buddha has reached the 
nondual summit of the abode of the Buddhas (advayabuddhavihdraparamaparamigatah). 
Whatever is nondual ( advaya ) is equalized ( sama ). In the equalized dharmakaya, the 
virtues that are in the fruitional state (phalavasta ) are perfected (cf. chap. IV, § 1). Or 
again, that which is neither more nor less is equalized. In the dharmakaya, the virtues are 
perfected: they have neither more nor less. This is not like the virtues in the bodhisattva 
levels which consist of degrees. 

17) Manifesting various buddhafields conforming to the aspirations of beings 
(yathadhimuktisambhinnabuddhaksetrapradarsanagunah): this 17 th quality explains the 
phrase: the Buddha has reached the summit of the unadulterated liberating knowledge of 
the Tathagata ( asambhinnatathagatavimoksajhananisthagatah ). Seeing the different 
aspirations of beings, the Buddha manifests diverse buddhafields of gold, silver, etc., 
which are unadulterated. When aspirations are formed (sammukhibhavanti), the Bhagavat 
makes everything appear in confonnity with the wishes of beings. Because there is 
nothing that he does not know, we speak of the vimoksajnana of the Tathagata. Here 
vimoksa is in place of adhimukti. 

18) Unlimited extension of the threefold body of the Buddha 
(buddhatrikayapradesaparicchedagunah): this 18 th quality explains the phrase: the 
Buddha has reached the identity of the buddhafields free from center and periphery 


188 



(anantamadhyabuddhabhumisamatadhigatah). Just as the universe is free of center and 
periphery, so the buddhafield is of unlimited space. Or else, the extension of the universe 
is unlimited, and the threefold body of the Buddha found there is of the measure of the 
universe and completely penetrates it. Indeed, the threefold body, the dharmakaya, etc., 
dwells in this universe since there is no other place. Or finally, the threefold body, 
dharmakaya, etc., which penetrates equally into the buddhafield, is free of center, limit 
and edge because it penetrates everywhere in order to procure the welfare of beings. But 
it is not by way of its self-nature ( svabhavah ) that it is is without limit [for it transcends 
infinity ?]. 

19) Being dedicated to the benefit and happiness of ail beings 
( dsamsdrakotisarvasattvahitasukhopasthdnagunah ) until the end of transmigration : this 
19 th quality explains the phrase: the Buddha rises up as far as the funadamental element 
(dharmadhatuparyantah) . Being very pure ( ativisuddha ), the fundamental element gives 
rise to the doctrine, sutra, etc. ( sutradidharma ) which is its natural result ( nisyanda ). 
Rising up to this fundamental element, the Buddha will be able to be dedicated to the 
welfare and happiness of beings as is suitable (yathayogam ). 

20) Indestructibility (aksayatvagunah): this 20 th quality explains the phrase: the Buddha 
exhausts space (dkdsadhdtupajyavasdnah) . Space has non-resistance as its nature; for 
activity, it does not resist bodies offering resistance (sapratigh adra vya) . As such, it is a 
dhatu because it has a self-nature ( svalaksana ). It does not have the nature of showing 
holes ( kiipa ), alternating light and darkness ( andhakara ). This space has no limit, no end, 
no diminishing, no arising, no cessation; it does not involve change; always it lends itself 
to the containing of all bodies. Similarly, the dharmakaya has the nature of being 
dedicated to the welfare and happiness of all beings; until the exhaustion of the universe, 
it procures the welfare of beings without cessation. 

21) In the phrase 'indestrucutibility, etc.,' the word ’etc.’ designates the last quality 
(nistagunah). This quality explains the phrase: the Buddha reaches the ultimate end 
(aparantakotinisthah). This quality, which consists of attaining the ultimate end, is 
equivalent to a perpetual non-interruption ( nitydsamuccheda ): this is attaining the ’end 
without future end’. Indeed, the Buddha's qualities will never be exhausted because the 
number of beings to be converted ( vineyasattva ) will never be exhausted. 


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* H= H= 


Adorned with these qualities, the Buddha has a very pure intellect ( suvisuddhabuddhih ); 
thus the Bhagavat is distinguished from the sravakas, pratyakabuddhas and bodhisattvas 
because of his pure intellect. 

1 ) How does he obtain this very pure intellect? Next, it is said: lie moves in nonduality 
(advayasamudacaralf). On the other hand, the sravakas, etc., have a twofold samudacara 
with regard to the objects to be cognized (jheyavisaya ), namely, knowledge (jhana) and 
unafflicted ignorance. The Buddha, not having this twofold samudacara, possesses the 
perfection of knowledge ( jhanasampad ). 

2) To explain the perfection of the cutting thyrough of the afflictions (prahanasampad) in 

the Tathagata, next it is said: he penetrates the dhanna without nature 

( alaksanadharmaparayanah ). This is non-abiding nirvana ( apratisthitanirvana ) the 
nature of which is to be disgusted with samsara and nirvana [cf. u: hkor ba dan mya nan 
las hdas pahi mtshan hid dan mi mthun pahi mtshan hid mi gnas pahi mya nan las hdas 
paid phyir ro\. 

3) By what means (it pay a) does he gain this nirvana? Next the answer is: he resides in 
the abodes of the Buddha (buddhaviharena viharan ). Since the Bhagavat abides in 
emptiness ( sunyata ) and in great compassion ( mahakarund ), he resides neither in samsara 
nor nirvana. 

4) Is this abode ( vihara ) of the Buddha shared with others ( anyasadharana ) or is it 
reserved ( asadharana ) for the Buddha? Then the answer is: he has obtained equality with 
all the Buddhas ( saiwabuddhasamatapraptah ), because the Buddhas follow one another 
and are united with one another in all points ( sarvakaresu ). The preceding shows the 
perfection of self-interest ( svakarthasampad) in the Buddha. 

5) Wishing to explain the perfection of altruism (pararthasampad) and to show that the 
Buddha possesses the means to counteract (pratipaksa ) all the obstacles ( avarana ) that 
fetter the beings to be disciplined ( vineya ), next it is said: he has attained the absence of 
obstacles (andvaranagatim gatah). 


190 



6) There are beings, Mara, etc., capable of causing the doctrine to decline and causing the 
interest of beings ( sattvartha ) to decline; but here, there is nothing like that. That is why 
it is said: his doctrine is without decline (apratyudavartyadharmah) . 

7) There is no height or no depth that can hinder the Buddha from acting for the good and 
happiness of beings ( sattvahitasukha ). That is why it is then said: his domain cannnot be 
diminished (asamharyagocarah) . 

5) Concerning the means ( upaya ) that allow the Buddha to procure the interest of beings, 
next it is said: his system is inconceivable (acintyavyavasthanah) . 

9) Are these efforts the same or different in all the Buddha Bhagavats? They are not 
different. Why? Because he penetrates the identity of the three times 
(tryadhvasamatanirydtah) . All the Buddhas procure the interest of beings in the same 
way throughout the three times. 

10) Does the Buddha procure the interest of beings in this way gradually ( anukramena ) 
in each universe one by one? No. Why? Because his bodies are extended in all the 
universes (sarvalokadhdtuprasrtakdyh) and manifest the perfect Buddha fully (yugapad) 
in all the universes. 

11) In order to show that the Buddha can cut through doubt that arises on any point, next 
it is said: his knowledge pertains to everything so that there is no doubt 
(sarvadharmanihsamsayajhanah) . 

12) Since the beings to be disciplined ( vineyasattva ) are of different lineages 
(bhinnagotra), it is necessary to discipline them by appropriate means (upaya). To 
indicate this knowledge of skillful means ( kusa/opayajhana ) of the Buddha, next it is 
said: his intellect is endowed with all the practices (sarvacaryasamanvagatabuddhih). 

13) Basing himself on the abilities and inabilities of the beings to be disciplined 
(■ vineyasattva ), the Buddha distinguishes skillfully. That is why it is said next: his 
knowledge of the dharmas is free of error (nihkdhksadharmajhdnah). 

14) In the beings to be disciplined, whether they are of bad, correct or mixed practices 
( pratipatti ), the aspects in which the Buddha manifests are not imaginary. In order to 
show this, next it is said: his bodies are not imaginary (avikalpitasanrah) . 


191 



15) In order to attract and give support to the sravakas and bodhisattvas of indeterminate 

lineages ( aniyatagotra ), the Buddha praises the Greater Vehicle. To show this, next it is 
said: his knowledge is the obejct of the vows of all the bodhisattvas 

(sarvabodhisattvasampraticchitajhana). 

16) A certain category of beings to be disciplined wonders if the Sastri (or the Buddha) is 
omniscient ( sarvajha ) or non-omniscient. To remove this doubt, it is then said: he has 
reached the summit of the nondual Buddha abodes 
(advayabuddhavihdraparamaparamigatah). Listening to all the Buddhas, he has obtained 
the same words. 

17) It is asked whether all the Buddhas come down to one and the same nature. To 
remove this doubt, it is then said: he has reached the summit of the unadulterated 
liberating knowledge of the Tathagata (asambhinnatathdgatavimoksajhdnanisthdgatah). 

18) If they are neither identical nor different, what is their nature? To reply to this 
question, it is then said: he has reached the identity of the buddha realm free of center 
and periphery (anantamadhyabuddha-bhumisamatddhigatah) . 

19) Since eternity ( nityata ) and non-eternity ( anityata ), etc., are completely the outcome 
of the two extremes ( antadvayalaksana ), is the Buddha then without nature? In order to 
refute this objection, it is said next: he rises up to the fundamental element 
(dharmadhdtuprayantah) . Purity ( parisuddhi ) and absence of all empty proliferation 
(nihprahca) are the natures of the dharmadhatu). 

20) How long do these types of activities for the benefit of beings last? Next, the answer 
is: he exhausts space (akasadhatuparyvasdnah) and he attains the ultimate end 
(aparantakotinisthah) . 


34. 1. The presentation of purposes (arth ddh ikaran a) : when the bodhisattva is 
endowed with thrty-two attributes ( dharma ) he is called bodhisattva. What are 
these thirty-two attributes? 

0) These bodhisattvas have the high aptitude of working for the benefit and 
happiness of all beings (sarvasattva-hitasukhakriyddhyasayah). 

la) They introduce beings into omniscience ( sarva-jhdndvatdrakah ). 


192 



2a) They cognize themselves completely (ahum kim iti parijanan). 

3a) They have conquered pride ( n irgh atitasam an ah). 

4a) Their lofty aptitude is firm ( drdhddhydsayah ). 

5a) They possess (i) unfabricated loving-kindness ( akrtrimamaitryah ), (ii) 
unbiased predispositions in regard to friends and enemies 
( m it ram itrasanacittah) , (iii) profound love extending to the limits of nirvana 
( anirvanakoter atyantikapremakah). 

6a) They express themselves in measured words with smiling face 
(, mitapadasmitamukhapiirvabhilapT ). 

7a) Their compassion is unlimited (aparicch inn a-m ah dkarun ah). 

8a) They watch over the burdens they have taken on ( attabharesv analasah). 

9a) Their zeal is indefatigable ( aparikh in nam an as ah ) . 

10a) They are insatiable in hearing and doctrine (srutarth atrptah ) . 

11a) (i) They see the faults of their own errors ( svaskhalitadosadarst ), (ii) 
they reprimand the faults of others without anger 
( paraskhalitaniskrodhoddesakah ). 

12a) They practice the mind of enlightenment in all their postures 
(sarveryapathesu bodhicittaparicarakah). 

13a) (i) They practice generosity without any wish for reward 
( vipakanirapeksadanah ); (ii) their morality does not depend on rebirths in 
the course of existence ( sarvabhdvagati-janmdnisritasTlah ); (iii) their patience 
is not disheartened by anyone ( sarvasattvesv paratihataksantih); (iv) their 
energy collects all the roots of good ( sarvakusalamula-samgrdhakavTrtah ); (v) 
they practice a dhyana that excludes the non-material world 
(< dmpyadhdtuviskambhidhydnah ); (vi) they practice wisdom endowed with 
means ( updyasamanvdgataprajhdh ); (vii) their means are drawn from the 
four elements of conversion ( catu hsamgrah a-vastugrh It op ay ah ) . 


193 



14a) (i) They have the same loving-kindness toward honest and dishonest 
people ( sTlavadduhsTlesv ad vayam aitryah ) ; (ii) they listen to the doctrine 
respectfully (satkrtyadh arm a-sra vanah); (iii) they dwell in the forest 
respectfully ( satkrtyaranyanivasT ); (iv) they disdain all the frivolities of the 
world ( lokavaicitryanabhiratah) ; (v) they have no desire for the Lesser 
Vehicle ( hmayananabhilasT ); (vi) they see the advantages of the Greater 
Vehicle (m ah ay an an usamsa-preksT) ; (vii) they abandon bad friends 
( papamitra-parityaktah ); (viii) they are attached to good friends 
( kalydn am itrasrayah ). 

15a) (i) They practice the four limitless ones ( caturbrahma - 
viharaparicarakah ); (ii) they play with the five supernatural faculties 
( pancdbhijnavikrditah); (iii) they take refuge in knowledge (jndnapratisdrT). 

16a) (i) They do not abandon beings given to good or bad practices 
(pratipattim ithydpratipattin isrita-sattvdn iksepakah ) ; (ii) they have precise 
language ( ekavacanavddX ); (iii) they esteem the truth ( satya-bahukarah ); (iv) 
they are preceded by the mind of enlightenment ( bodhicittapurvamgamah ). 

These sixteen phrases explain the first phrase: “The bodhisattvas have as 
their lofty predisposition the accomplishing of benefit and happiness for all 
beings”. [142al2] 

II. The phrase “They have as their lofty predisposition the accomplishing of 
benefit and happiness for all beings” is explained by sixteen actions 
( karman ), which are: 

lb) The action of successive effort (paramparaprayoga-karma). 

2b) Non-erroneous action ( aviparydsakarma ). 

3b) The action of personal effort independent of another's invitation 
( parodyojandnapeksam svatahprayogakarma). 

4b) Immutable action ( aksobhyakarma ). 

5b) Disinterested action ( niramisakarma ) defined by the three phrases of no. 
5a. It consists of (i) absence of self-interested views ( dmisasamsargah ), (ii) 


194 



absence of fondness for benefactors and aversion for evil-doers 
( upakartrapakartranunayapratighabhavah ), (iii) continuity in later existences 
(jan m an tar an uparivartan am). 

6b) Action of body and speech conforming to the lofty predisposition 
( tadanukulavakkayakarma ) defined by the two phrases of no. 6a. 

7b) Equality of action in regard to fortunate, unfortunate, neither fortunate 
nor unfortunate beings ( du kh as ukh ad vayes u samatakarma). 

8b) Courageous action ( adlnakarma ). 

9b) Action without retreating ( avivartanlyakarma ). 

10b) Action that consists of taking possession of means 
( upayaparigrahakakarma ). 

lib) Action tending to expel that which is to be counteracted 
(vipaksan irakaran akann a) defined by the two phrases of no. 11a. 

12b) Action that consists of ceaseless reflection on bodhicitta ( samitam 
tan m an asikdrakarm a). 

13b) Action that consists of going towards the spiritual good 
(visesagamanakarma) defined by the seven phrases of no. 13a. It consists of 
the good practice of the six virtues ( satparamitasamyakprayogah ) and the 
practice of the elements of conversion ( samgrahavastuprayogah ). 

14b) Action of perfect effort ( nispattiprayogakarma ) defined by the eight 
phrases of 14a. It consists of (i) serving good people ( satpurusapasrayah ), (ii) 
hearing the true doctrine ( saddharmasravanam ), (iii) living in the forest 
(aranya-nivasah), (iv) fleeing from bad distractions ( asubhavikalpa - 
parityagah), (v) the quality of reflection ( manasikaragunah ) defined in no. 14a 
by two phrases, (vi) the quality of good company ( sahayagunah ) defined by 
two phrases of no. 14a. 

15b) Perfect action ( nispannakarma ) defined by three phrases in no. 15a. It 
consists of (i) the purity of infinite practices ( apram an a vis u ddhih ) , (ii) taking 


195 



power (prabhavapraptih ), and (iii) the quality of realization 
(adhigamagunah). 

16b) Stabilizing action oflofty predisposition (tatprasthdn akarm a) defined by 
the four phrases of no. 16a. It consists of (i) the quality permitting the 
directing of assemblies ( samghaparinayakagunah ), (ii) intellectual and moral 
direction given unhesitatingly ( nihsamsayavavaddnusasanam ), (iii) joining 
material interests with the doctrine ( dm isadh arm aiklbh avail ) and (iv) 
undefiled mind ( asamklistacittam ). 

Note that the first phrase has been subdivided (prabhinna ) into these thirty- 
two phrases. Thus a stanza says: Starting from the first phrase, there are 
various phrases concerning the qualities (guna ) of the Buddha; starting from 
the first phrase, there are various phrases concerning the various purposes of 
the bodhisattva. [142b4] 


34. Comm. Bh 348b23-349b2, bh 187b2-189a5, U 41 Icl6-413b4, u 291b4-295a7. 

Here again is the commentary of U at length. 

“The thirty-two attributes of the bodhisattva are explained by sixteen actions. Their lofty 
predisposition is to act for the benefit and happiness of all beings 
(sarvasttyahitasukhakriyddhydsaya.il). There can be benefit (hita) without happiness 
(sukha), e.g., in very impassioned ( tivraraga ) people who practice celibacy 
( brahmacarya ) with difficulty. There can be happiness without there being benefit, e.g., 
among beings of desire ( hdod pa can) who enjoy all kinds of reprehensible objects 
(nanasavadyavisaya). There can be benefit and happiness at the same time, e.g., among 
only slightly impassioned people ( parittaraga ) who practice celibacy easily. [These 
definitions of hita-sukha occur in u but are absent in U: phan pa ni phyi ma la bde ba ste 
.... bde ba ni da Itar gyi dgah ba ste .... phan pa dan bde ba ni Itar dan ma lions pa na 
dgah ba ste. That is to say, hita is future benefit ( amutrakusala ); sukha is present joy 
( pratyutpannapnti ); hita-sukha is present and future joy.] The bodhisattvas wonder: 
"What shall I do so that all beings may obtain benefit and supreme ( anuttara ) 
happiness?" Predisposition ( asaya ) has faith ( sraddha ) and aspiration ( chanda ) as nature 


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[dad pa dan dun pahi no hid\. In the bodhisattva this predisposition is raised to a high 
degree; that is why we speak of their lofty predisposition ( adhyasaya ). 

1) They introduce beings into omniscience (sarvajhdjnandvatarakah): this is explained 
by the action of successive effort (paramparaprayogakarma), like a lamp (dip a) that 
transmits the flame to a thousand lamps. By virtue of this action, the lofty predisposition 
of working for the benefit and happiness of beings succeeds in manifesting. In the 
following phrases as well, this predisposition will be explained in a corresponding 
manner. 

2) They know themselves perfectly (aham kim iti parijdnan ): this is explained by non- 
erroneous action (aviparyasakarma) . Some people sometimes have the lofty 
predisposition of working for the benfit and happiness of beings, but it is mistaken 
(vipatyasa); that is why they themselves must know what their value really is. Because of 
this knowledge, non-erroneous action is spoken of. The bodhisattvas tell themselves: "I 
have only such and such knowledge ( sruti ) and such and such wisdom (prajha ); I know 
that my information about the doctrine ( desanagama ) has such and such power." They 
make non-erroneous effort in confonnity with what is suitable (yathdyogam). Thus a 
stanza says: “All those who evaluate themselves and zealously seek out what they are 
seeking will succed in reaching their goal without tiring.” Such stanzas must be explained 
at length. 

3) They have vanquished pride ( nirghatitamanah ): this is explained by the action of 

personal effort independent of others' invitation (parody ojananapeksam 

svatahprayogakarma) . Without being invited by others, they go to find them themselves 
to preach the holy doctrine to them. 

4) Their lofty predisposition is solid ( drdhadgyasayah ): this is explained by immutable 
action (aksobhyakarma) , because the sufferings of samsara cannot turn them away from 
the resolutions ( citta ) they have made. 

5) They possess unfabricated loving-kindness (akrtrimamaitryah), intentions impartial 
towards their friends and their enemies (mitramitrasamacittah), profound love extending 
to the limit of nirvana (anirvanakoter atyantikapremakah): this is explained by the three 
kinds of disinterested action (niramisakarma) . (i) If the action is mixed with biased 
views ( amisasamsrista ) as a result of this biased affection, the loving-kindness is 


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contrived ( krtrima ) and is conceived only temporarily. But if the action is not mixed with 
biased views ( dmisasamsrsta ), the loving-kindness is not contrived and is never 
abandoned, (ii) If loving-kindness is practiced while one is based on biased affection, one 
experiences fondness ( anunaya ) for one's friends and revulsion ( pratigha ) for one's 
enemies; the predispositions are not impartial. But if one is based on a disinterested 
predisposition, one acts in the same way towards both, (iii) If loving-kindness is 
practiced with a biased predisposition, the loving-kindness will last only until the end of 
this life. But if one practices loving-kindness without biased predisposition, the kind 
predisposition ( maitricitta ) will last forever throughout all rebirths. That is why the 
bodhisattvas have profound love until the end of nirvana. 

6) They express themselves in moderate words with a smiling face 
(mitapadasmitamukhapurvabhilapi): this is explained by the twofold action of body and 
speech (vakkayakarman) conforming to the lofty predisposition of working for the 
welfare and happiness of all beings. 

7) Their great compassion is unlimited ( aparic chinn amahakarun ah ): this is explained by 
equal action towards unfortunate, fortunate and neither fortunate nor unfortunate beings 
(duhkasukhadvayesu samatakarma). If they felt compassion only for the unfortunate and 
not for the fortunate or indiffererent beings as well, their action would not be equal for 
they would be acting with bias. But the great compassion of the bodhisattvas extends to 
all beings, fortunate, unfortunate, neither fortunate nor unfortunate, who are all subject to 
the sufferings of transmigration. Their equal compassion makes no distinctions. This is 
why it is called action of equality. 

8) They watch over the burdens they have accepted (attabharesv analadah): this is 
explained by courageous action (admakarma) . They are specially attached to the 
salvation (uttar ana) of all beings as though to a heavy load. In the face of this heavy 
load, their courage never fails; they do not retreat before this pain but they adapt 
themselves to this burden. That is why courageous action is spoken of. 

9) Their zeal is indefatigable (aparikhinnamanasah): this is explained by action that does 
not turn back ( avivartamya karma ), for the bad actions ( duscarita ) of beings to be 
converted ( vineyasattva ) cannot deter them from acting in confonnity with their lofty 
predisposition of working for the welfare and happiness of beings. 


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10) They are insatiable in listening and insatiable to the doctrine (srutarthatrptah): this 
is explained by action that consists of providing oneself with means 
(upayaparigrahakakarma). Listening (sruta) is the doctrine, sutras, etc. that one has 
heard; this is not a question of hearing just anything at all. The doctrine ( artha ) is the 
points of the teaching explained by these sutras. Towards this listening and doctrine the 
bodhisattvas are insatiable ( asamtusta ); these are the skillful means with which they 
provide themselves in order to ripen (paripaka) beings. That is why it is called action 
consisting of providing oneself with means. Being insatiable in listening and the doctrine, 
they discipline according to their ... [A few words are missing here from my (M.C.) xerox 
copy]. 

11) They see the faults of their own errors (svaskhalitadosadarsi) and reprimand the 
faults of others without anger (paraskhalita-niskrodhoddesakah ): this is explained by 
action tending to expel that which is to be counteracted (vipaksanirakaranakarma). That 
which is to be counteracted ( vipaksa ) is desire ( raga ), hatred ( dvesa ), etc. To expel them 
is to distance oneself from them. Seeing the faults of their own errors, the bodhisattvas 
quickly expel them and are able to criticize the faults of others. But it is with dignified 
words that they make this reprimand and not otherwise. Thus the sutra says: “The person 
who is given to misconduct ( mithyacara ) incurs the blame of others; this person will 
never have the right to criticize the wrong-doings of another.” People also say: “If one 
commits faults oneself, after some time one does not notice them; one does not avoid 
them as one should: prideful people will have no merit.” To blame angrily the faults of 
others is not doing good and is not practicing means. If your words lack dignity, others 
will turn their back on you and will continue their bad conduct. Thus a stanza says: “If 
one reprimands the faults of others with the kindness ( maitri ) one feels for an only child, 
one will certainly succeed in strengthening them so that they will no longer sin in the 
future.” 

12) In all their postures, they cultivate the mind of enlightenment (sarveryapathesu 
bodhicittaparicarakah): this is explained by the action consisting of ceaselessly 
reflecting on this thought (samitam tanmanasikarakarma), for they continually cultivate 
the mind of enlightenment in all their activities. Thus it is said in the 
Gocaraparisuddhisutra: “Seeing a seated posture, they have this thought: 'I wish that 


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beings may sit on the throne of enlightenment ( bodhimanda ).' “ Cf. other stanzas of this 
type. 

13) They practice generosity without any wish for reward (vipakanirapeksaddnah) and 
the other phrases of § 13a up to their means are drawn from the four elements of 
conversion (catuhsamgraha-vastugrhitopayah): this is explained by the action of going 
towards the spiritual good (visesagamanakarma) defined by the seven phrases of § 13b, 
namely, the six virtues ( paramita ) and the four elements of conversion ( sarngrahavastu ). 
Having expelled the wrong-doings to be counteracted ( vipaksadosa ) of § 12, the 
bodhisattvas attain the fullness of going towards the spiritual good 
(■ vises agamanaparipuri ) in the successive bhumis, pramudita, etc.; and this is why it is 
said that they have accomplished what was to have been accomplished ( krtakrtya ). 

In the seven phrases of § 13a, the first four perfections are easily understood. The rest 
will be briefly explained: 

Phrase 5: They practice a dhyana that excludes the formless realm 

(arupyadhatuviskambhidhyanah): bodhisattvas are not born into the formless realm 
because they do not see any possibility of working there for the welfare and happiness of 
beings. They do not join those who enter into the formless concentrations because they 
do not consider them as the source of many qualities ( sarnbahulagunasraya ); that is why 
they avoid them. 

Phrase 6: They practice a wisdom endowed with means ( upayasamanvagataprajhah ). To 
cultivate ( abhyas -) the marvellous wisdom ( prajna ) associated with great compassion 
0 mahdkarundsamanvdgatd ) is to work for the welfare and happiness of beings. If this 
wisdom were to be lacking, the welfare and happiness of beings would not be assured, for 
it is especially for them that the state of buddhahood (buddhaphala) is sought. Thus a 
stanza says: “Exercising wisdom and compassion together is to work for the welfare and 
happiness of others. By working appropriately in the interest of others, one is completely 
oriented towards bodhi.” 

Phrase 7: The four elements of conversion {sarngrahavastu) are generosity ( dana ), kind 
words {priyavadita ), service {arthacarya) and the pursuit of a shared goal 
(samanarthata). By generosity, the bodhisattvas win others over ( adadati ); by kind 
words, they skilfully ( upayena ) explain the nature of things (dharmalaksana); by service, 


200 



they encourage them as necessary ( yathdyogam ) to practice good; by pursuit of a shared 
goal, they cause them to acquire special qualities ( asadharanaguna ) later. Or also, by 
generosity, they make others a receptacle of the law ( dharmabhajana ); by friendly words, 
they inspire them to adhere to the law (. dharmadhimukti ); by service, they lead them to 
correct practices in conformity with adhesion to the law; by pursuit of a shared goal, they 
make them acquire special qualities ( asadharanaguna ) later. Or else, by generosity, they 
make another to become a receptacle of the doctrine ( dharmabhajana ); by kindly words, 
they inspire him to adhesion to the doctrine ( dharmadhimukti ); by service, they lead him 
to the right practices confonning to this adhesion to the doctrine; by the pursuit of a 
shared goal, they cause the practices carried out by another to become pure ( visuddha ) 
and sublime. The bodhisattvas, by these elements of conversion, embrace the essence of 
means ( upayasvabhava ). 

14) They have the same benevolence towards honest and dishonest people 
(siiavadduhsiiesv advayamaitryah) and the other phrases of § 14a up to: they have 
recourse to good friends ( kalyanamitrasrayah ): this is explained by the action of 
perfected effort ( nispattiprayogakarma ) and the six phrases of § 14b. Because this effort 
leads to perfection, it is called perfected effort : it is an action. The six phrases of § 14b: 
the sendee of good people (satpurusapasrayah), etc., explain the eight phrases of § 14a 
taken from the sutra, beause the last two phrases of § 14b: the quality of reflection 
(manasikaragunah) and the quality of good companions (sahagunah) each explain two 
phrases of § 14a. (i) People who possess good discipline are called honest (. sflavat); those 
who possess bad discipline are called dishonest ( duhsTla ). One listens with respect to 
these two categories of people who are able to preach the law so that it may be heard with 
respect, to whom the bodhisattvas attach the label ’good friend’ ( tesu 
kalyanamitrasamjham utpadayanti), without making any distinction; this is why it is said 
that bodhisattvas have the same benevolence towards honest and dishonest people. 
Actually, in regard to dishonest people, one cannot say in the absolute sense ( atyantena ) 
that they are not good friends. Thus a stanza says: “Whoever possesses a satisfactory 
discipline (however tiny) and can teach eloquently for the benefit of many people, he 
should be venerated like the Great Teacher because he is like him inasmuch as people 
like his good sermons, (ii) They listen to the law respectfully (satkrtyadharmasravanah): 
concerning the vast meanings that are explained, one should listen to the law by means of 


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sixteen practices, (iii) They dwell respectfully in the forest {satkrtydranyani vast). That 
which is farther than one krosa from a town is called a forest', to live there is to dwell 
there. By dwelling there appropriately without strolling about is to dwell there 
respectfully, (iv) They disdain all the frivolities of the world ( lokavaicitrydnabhiratah) : 
they distrust all worldly frivolities, singing, laughing, dancing, etc. To do that is to avoid 
the evil preoccupations associated with desire ( raga ), etc. (v - vi) The quality of 
reflection ( manasikaragunah ), because the bodhisattvas have rejected the Vehicle of the 
sravakas and pratyekabuddhas and are filled with desire for the qualities of the Greater 
Vehicle, (vii - viii) The quality of good comapanions ( sahdyagunah ), because the 
bodhisattvas distance themselves from bad friends (papamitra ) and stay close to good 
friends ( kalyanamitra ). 

15) They practice the four immeasurables (caturbrahmaviharaparicarakah), they play 
with the five supernatural faculties (pahcdbhijhdvikriditah), they take refuge in 
knowledge (jnanafi. this is explained by perfect action (nispannakarma) . The action of 
perfect nature ( nispannalaksana ) is called perfect action. Here the word ’action’ is 
synonymous with ’mark' (rtags = lingo). The three phrases of § 15b: purity in infinite 
practices (apramanavisuddhih), etc., explains the three phrases of § 15a: they practice 
the four immeasurables (caturbrahmaviharaparicarakah), etc. (i) The four 
immeasurables {calvary apramanani), namely, loving-kindness ( maitri ), compassion 
{karuna), joy ( mudita ) and equanimity {upeksa), are called limitless practices. The four 
inner qualities of the bodhisattva become manifest outwardly by means of them because, 
their purity ( visuddhi ) being perfect, these practices are the mark {lingo) of purity, (ii) 
The fact of playing with the five supernatural faculties is a power ( prabhava ). The 
knowledge that destroys the impurities {asravakshayajhana) or liberating knowledge 
( vimoksajndna ) is called great power {mahaprabhava); or rather, by great power one 
understands the abhijna of the bodhisattvas. These abhijnas are also a mark of perfection 
{nispattilihga). (iii) The quality of realization {adhigamagunah), i.e., that which they 
have realized, made present, mastered: this explains the phrase: they take refuge in 
knowledge (jhanapratisari) . Individual knowledge (pratyatmajhana ) is called refuge in 
knowledge ; this is not the awareness of a simple object {artha), but it is taking refuge in 
one’s own vijnana. 


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16) They do not abandon beings who are given up to good or bad practices 
(pratipattimithyapratipatti-nisritasattvaniksepakah): like the other phrases of § 16a, this 
one is explained by stabilizing action ( tatprasthdnakarma) and the four phrases of § 16b. 
The stabilization of the lofty predisposition of acting for the welfare and happiness of 
beings is an action; that is why one speaks of the stabilizing action, (i) The quality that 
permits the directing of assemblies (samghaparinayakagunah) . Sending away dishonest 
(< duhsila ) people and gathering honest ( silavat ) people, bodhisattvas wish alike to cause 
them to leave the bad states ( akusalat sthanad vyutthanam) and introduce them into the 
good states ( kusale sthane pratisthapanam ); this is not to abandon them, (ii) They have 
precise speech (ekavacanavadi): bodhisattvas teach (avavdda) and exhort ( anusasana ) 
with precision and unhesitatingly because their speech ( vacana ) is dignified ( adeya ). If 
speech is not precise, it is not dignified, (iii) They esteem the truth (satyabahukarah). 
Material interests ( amisa ) and the doctrine ( dharma ), which are dual, are united and form 
a single kind of generosity. To accumulate wealth or to accumulate the doctrine is the 
same thing. Bodhisattvas distribute them equally in conformity with their earlier promise. 
This generosity exists only in the present. Thus a stanza says: “The offering of material 
goods causes beings to exhaust their life ( ayus ), the offering of the doctrine causes them 
to attain heavenly calm.” (iv) They are preceded by the mind of enlightenment 
(bodhicittapurvamgamah): this is explained by the phrase: the undefiled mind. Embraced 
by the mind of enlightenment, bodhisattvas in all their activities are without desire and do 
not seek the offerings of others, etc. They seek only the approach ( adhigama ) to supreme 
enlightenment ( anuttarabodhi ). 


NOTES to CHAPTER II 


1. The three natures have been studied in Samdhimir., Chap. VI -VII; Lankavatara, p. 67- 
68, p. 130-133; Bodh. bhumi, p. 37-38; Sutralamkara, XI, 13, 38; Madhyantavibhanga, 
Chap. Ill: Tattvaparicchedah, p. 1 10-165; Trimsika, p. 39 (4)- 42 (8); Siddhi, p. 514-561; 
Treatise by Vasubandhu-Nagarjuna on the three natures, MCB, II, 1932-33, p. 147- 161. 
Madhyamika works: Madhyamakavrtti, p. 274, 445, 553; Madhymakavatara, p. 166, 195. 
- Preparation for the doctrine of the three natures in the Prajnas and the Madhyamaka: 
Samdhinir., Introduction, p. 14-16; Abhis. alam al. , p. 47; Madhyamakavatara, p. 101; 
Bodhicaryavatarapanjika, p. 361 (4). 


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2. Paratantra, in Samdhinir., VI, § 4-1 1; Trimsika, p. 39 (19-27); Siddhi, p. 526; 
Madhymakmavatara, p. 139. 

The eleven vijnaptis, below, § 5, 10; Siddhi, p. 514. 


3. Parikalpita, in Samdhinir., VI, § 4-1 1; Lankavatara, p. 1 13 (17-22); Trimsika, p. 39 
(27-40); Siddhi, p. 527. 


4, Parinispanna, in Samdhinir.,, VI, § 4-1 1; Madhyantavibhanga, p. 1 13 (17-22); 
Trimsika, p. 39 (27) - 40 (5); Siddhi, p. 527. 

Examples illustrating the theory of the three natures: optical illusion (Samdhinir., VI, § 7; 
Madhyamakavrtti, p. 373; Madhyamakavatara, p. 102, 109; Bodhicaryavatarapanjika, p. 
363-365); crystal (Samdhinir., VI, § 8); water in mirage, (Upanibandhana, 
Madhyantavibhanga, p. 220 (8); magical elephant (Madhyantavibhanga, p. 220 (2)). See 
below, § 27. 


4 . Example of the dream: Lankavatara, p. 91 (1-7); Vimsika, kar. 17b-c, p. 9-16); 
Madhyantavibhanga, p. 113; Siddhi, p. 429. - Same example used by Samkara, ad 
Brahmasutra, II, 1, 14 : sarvavyavahardndm eva prag brahatmatavijnanat 
satvat\>oppatteh, svapnavvavaharasveva prak prabodhat', idem, ad Brahmasutra, 2, 29; 
111,2,4. 


7. The demonstrtion of vijnaptimatrata will be continued in § 1 1 and § 14. See Trimsika, 
p. 35-36; Siddhi, p. 416-432. In Lankavatara, exception being made for the sagathakam, § 
44, 77, there is the expression ‘cittamatra’; cf. p. 70 (18), 104 (8), 208 (13). 


8. On smrti, cf. Vimsika, p. 9 (6-8). 

The skeletons seen in a cemetery: allusion to asubhabhavana practiced by yogins; cf. 
Vinaya, III, p. 68; Dlgha, II, p. 296; Majjhima, III, p. 82; Anguttara, III, p. 323; 
Dhammasangani, p. 55; Atthasalini, p. 1 15; Visuddhimagga, p. 178; Siksasamuccaya, p. 
209; Bodhicaryavatara, VIII, 83; IX, 41; Kosa, VI, p. 149; Kosavyakhya on the five 
vimuktyayatanas, p. 54 (1); Madhyantavibhanga, p. 78 (3). 


9 . Same objection and same response in Sutralamkara, p. 428. 


11 . The thesis of Asanga is repeated by Dharmapala who refers to Samgraha, cf. Siddhi, 
p. 523: " The citta-caittas develop into two bhagas by the power of perfuming (v as ana). 
These two bhagas, thus developed, arise from causes and are paratantra. But by 
relationship with the two bhagas, the imagination conceives wrong notions .... The two 
bhagas, conceived under these various modes, take the name of parikalpita." - The 
opinion of Sthiramati is opposed to this thesis; cf. Siddhi, p. 522: " The impure citta- 
caitta, by reason of an abhutavasana which is beginningless - although it is of unique 


204 



nature, it arises in the mode of duality, as darsanabhaga and nimittabhaga. These two 
bhagas exist as point of view ( ruci ), they do not exist as proof ( yukti ). The Madhyanta 
states that these two characteristics are imaginary." The passage of the 
Madhyantavibhanga cited here occurs in kar. I, 13 a-b, p. 46 (19): dvayabhdvo hy 
abhavasya bhavas ca sunyalaksanam: "The non-existence of the two (grahya and 
grahaka) and the existence (underlying) this non-existence, such is the essence of the 
void (or the absolute)." 

On the theory of the bhagas or amsa, cf. Siddhi, p. 125-131, where there is a rich 
bibliography. 


12 . On this theory of certain bodhisattvas, cf. Siddhi, p. 4-5, 396. Volition ( cetana ) is 
called kaya- vak-, manah-karman, according to whether it moves the body, the speech, or 
is associated with the manas: this is the Sautrantika thesis (cf. Kosa, IV, p. 12; 
Karmasiddhi, v. 46-49) and the Vijnanavadin thesis (cf. Siddhi, p. 51-52). 

According to Kosa, I, p. 59-61, the five vijnanas involve vitarka and vicara ( = 
svabhavavikalpa)', the sixth involves the vikalpa of nirupana and anusmarana as well. 

The presence of the tangible in the dhyanas: Kosa, VIII, p. 154. 

Manas caisam pratisaranam : Samyutta, V, p. 218; Kosavyakhya, p. 703 (15). On the 
other hand, the Darstantikas say: "The manovijnana has a distinct object: it does not 
pertain to the object of the five vijnanas, caksurvijnana, etc." (Vibhasa, in Kosa, VIII, p. 
242). 


13 . On the development of the alaya, cf. Lankavatara, p. 54 (10): dehabhogapratisthanam 
alayam khyaayate nrnam ; p. 56 (7): alayavijnanam 
svacittadrsyadehapratisthabhogavisayam yugapad vibavayati. For the 
Madhyantavibhanga, p. 16-17, the vijnana arises in a threefold appearance: 
arthasattvapratibhava ( = alayavijnanam sasamprayogam), atmapratibhasa ( = klistam 
manah sasamprayogam), vijnaptipratibhasa ( = sasamprayogam caksurjnanadisatkam). 


14 . The sutra of the four knowledges, probably taken from the Abhidharmasutra is 
reproduced in the Abhidharmasamuccayavyakhya, Taisho 1616, p. 7 1 5b 1 9-7 15c 1 , and 
Siddhi, p. 421-423. These four knowledges are: 

i. Viruddhajnananimittatvajnana. - The example of water seen by the pretas, etc., in 
Madhyamakavatara, p. 164 (12); Vimsika, p. 4 (2-6); Nyayavarttika, p. 528 (12). 

ii. Andlambanavijnaptyupalabdhitvajhdna. Cf. below, § 27. 

iii. Aprayatndviparitatvajndna. Cf. Samdhinir., Ill, § 3; Sutralamkara, XI, 24; 
Acintyastotra in Bodhicaryavatara, IX, 6: indriyair upalabdham yat tat tattvena bhaved 
yadi, jata tattvavido bald tattvajhanena kirn tada. 

iv. Trividhajndndnukulatvajnana involves a threefold knowledge designated by Siddhi 
as: 

a) Vasitdjndndnuvartakajndna. This concerns the cetovasita already mentioned in 
chap. I, § 60, dealing with the adhimuktibala of the yogins. The results of this vasita are 


205 



described in Dasabhumika, p. 70; Bodh, bhumi, p. 352 (7): yathepsitam ca 
sarvaddhikaryam karoti. Sarvapranidhdndni casya yathakamam samrdhyanti. yadyad 
eva vastu yathadhumucyate tat tathaiva bhavati. See also Madhyamakavatara, p. 163 (8). 
Some concrete examples in Samyutta, I, p. 116: dkankhammano ca pana bhante Bhagava 
Himavantam pabbatarajam suvannamtv eva adhimucceyya, suvannan ca pabbatassmatv, 
Kathavatthu, II, p. 608: ayasma Pilindavaccho ranno Magadhassa Seniyassa 
Bimbisarassa pasada suvannan teva adhimucci suvanno ca pana asi. 

b) Pravicayajhdndnuvartakajhdna. On samatha and vipasyana, cf. Divyavadana, 
p. 95; Anguttara, II, p. 494; Samdhinir., VIII, § 1-18; Bodh. bhumi, p. 260 (15) - 261 (5); 
Madhyantavibhanga, p. 151 (20), 215 (8); Siddhi, p. 596. 

c) Nirvikalpakajndndnuvartakajndna. Nonconceptual wisdom will be the subject 
of chap. VIII. It is, in essence, nonperception ( anupalambha ). 


14 b. Missing in the four Chinese versions. It may be found in the 
Abhidharmasamuccayavyakhya, Taisho 1606, p. 7 1 5b 19. 


16. The abhutaparikalpa is studied in detail in Madhyantavibhanga, p. 30-45. The 
functioning of the imagination involves alambana, nimittodgrahana = samjhd 
(Kosavyakhya, p. 37 (5), abhinivesa or belief by means of the five drstis (five drstis in 
Kosa, V, p. 15; Madhyantavibhanga, p. 240 (4); Siddhi, p. 256; sixty-two drstigatas in 
Brahmajalasutta, DTgha, I, p. 12-39; Samyutta, IV, p. 286; Patisambhidamagga, I, p. 130; 
Cullaniddesa, p. 271; Nettipakarana, p. 96, 1 12, 160; Kosa, IX, 265; below, § 20, no. 9, 
vaksamutthana (cf. Kosa, II, p. 174; the phrase vitarkya vicd/ya is in Majjhima, I, p. 301; 
Samyutta, IV, p. 293; Kosavyakhya, p. 139 (10); fourfold vyavahara (cf. DTgha, III, p. 
134; Cullaniddesa, p. 276; Itivuttaka, p. 121; DTgha, III, p. 232; Suttanipata, st. 1086, 

1 122; Samdhinir., II, § 3; IX, § 14; Kosa, IV, p. 160), samaropa (for the example of the 
rope taken to be a snake, cf. notes and references to chap. Ill, § 8). 


17. See Siddhi, p. 530-532. 


18-21. Many lists of vikalpa, parikalpa, kalpa, viksepa. Two v. in Bodh. bhumi, p. 51 
(21); Madhyantavibhanga, p. 31 (6); Samgraha, II, v. § - Three v. in Kosa, I, p. 60; 
Abhidharmasamuccayavyakhya, Taishfi 1616, p. 703al3-19; Siddhi, p. 390; 
Dharmasamgraha, § 135. - Four p. in Samgraha, II, § 19. - Five p. in Samgraha, II, § 19; 
Sutralamkara, XI, 77. - Six viksepa in Madhyantavibhanga, p. 214 (10). - Seven v. in 
Abhidharmasamuccayavyakhya, Taishfi 1606, p. 703al9-27. - Eight v. in Bodh. bhumi, 
p. 50 (23) - 51 (13) ; Vikhyapana, Taishfi 1602, p. 558b 14 - 558c3. - Nine v. in Abhis. 
alam. al, p. 69 (14). - Ten viksepas in Samgraha, II, § 21; Sutralamkara, XI, 77. Twelve § 
in Lankavatara, p. 128 (4) - 129 (1 1). - See Abhis. alam al., p. 66 seq.; Siddhi, p. 520- 
522. 


206 



22. Borrowed from Mahaprajnaparamitasutra, Taisho 220, k. 4, p. 17b25 - 17c 16, and 
from Sutralamkara, XI, 77. Not translated by Buddhasanta or by Hiuan-tsang. However, 
the latter passes over it in his translation of the upanibandhana. 


24 . For the explanation of the last stanza, cf. Sutralamkara, p. 88: dharmabhavas ca 
dharmopaladhis ceti trasasthanam nihsamklesata ca dharmadhatoh prakrtya visuddhata 
ca pascad iti trasasthanam baldnam, tad yathakramam mayadis adrsyenakasad rsyena 
ca prasadhayams tatas trasam pratisedhayati tatha citre natonnatasadrsyena 
lutitaprasasitatotyasadrsyena ca yathakramam. These last two examples along with a 
slightly different application are found in Samdhinir., VII, § 28; VIII, v. 28. 


25. Seems to be an objection by the Madhyamikans for whom the paratantra does not 
exist. 


26. Has been borrowed from the Madhyantavibhanga, p. 1 12, which itself depends on the 
Abhidharmasutra. For the terms designating the absolute, cf. Siddhi, Appendix II: Notes 
on the tathata or dhannata, p. 743-757. 


27. On the dharmas comparable to a magical show, see the following texts: 

1) Samyutta, III, p. 142: 

Phenapindupmam rupam // vedana bubbulupama // 

mancikupama sahha // sahkhdra kadalupama // mayupamahca vihhanam // 
dipitadiccabandhuna // 

ii) Vajracchedika, An. Oxon., p. 46: tadyathakase tar aka timiram dfpo mayavasyaya 
budbudam / svapnam ca vidyud abhram ca evatn dras tavyain samskrtam // 

iii) Samdhinir., Chap. I, § 4-5; Lankavatara, p. 29 (15-17), 42 (1-2), etc.; Dasabhumika, 
9 th dharmasamata, p. 47 (15): sarvadharmamaya- 

svapnapratibhdsapratisrutkodakacandrapratibimbanirmdnasamata: Avatamsakasutra, 
Taisho 279, chap. 29 on the ten ksantis ; Satasahasrika, p. 1209; Lalitavistara, p. 181 (21). 

iv) Catuhsataka, XIII, kar. 25, cited in Madyamakavrtti, p. 173 (3), 552 (2): 

aldtacakranirmdnasvapnamdydmbucandrakaih / dhumikdntahpratisrutkdmancyabhraih 
samo bhavah // 

v) Mahavyutpatti, no. 854. 

vi) Nirvikalpakapravesa dharanl, in Trimsika, p. 40 (25): tatprsthalabdhena jhanena 
mdydmaricisvapnapratisrutkocandra-nirmitasamdn sarvadharman pratyeti. 

vii) Sutralamkara, XI, 29: 

mdydsvapnamancibimbasadrsah prodbhasasrutkopama /vijheyo- 
dakacandrabimbasadrsa nirmanatulyah punah // 

viii) Madhyantavibhanga, p. 220: 


207 



yatha maya svatmany avidyamane na hasty adyatmana prakhyanad hastyadibhavena 
nastiti hastyadibhavena nastiti savathaiva nasti. him tarhi napi nasti tasya 
bhrabtimatrastitvaditi. hastyadyakarena prakhyayamanasya bhrantimatrasyatitvan na 
sarvatha nasti. tatharto 'pi yatha grahyagrahakatvena prabhasate tatha naivasti. tasya 
traidhatukacitta-caittasvarupasya tathaprakhyayamanasya bhrantimatrastitvan napi 
nasti. astisabdena inancisvanodaka-vandradayo drstanta yathayogam veditavya iti na hi 
mancisvapnodakacandradayoyatha stnpumatmana prakhyayante tatha sand na ca santy 
eva bhrantimatrastitvat. evam artho 'pfti vistarena pratyekam yojayitavyam. atra 
cadisabdena gandharva-nagarapratisrutkadayo veditavyah. 

ix) Siddhi, p. 532. 


28. Cf. Visesacintabrahmaparipriccha, transl. Dharmaraksha, Taisho 585, p. 4b23-24: 
“One does not obtain either samsara or nirvana"; transl. Kumarajlva, Taisho 586, p. 36c9: 
"The Buddhas do not attain samsara nor do they attain nirvana"; transl. Bodhiruci, Taishfi 
587, p. 66c3-4: "I do not obtain samsara, I do not obtain nirvana." 


29. Example of gold purified by menas of fire: Bodh. bhumi, p. 331 (11): 

tadyatha suvarnam prakrtistham yatha agnau praksipatyate daksena karmarena tatha 
tatha visuddhataratam gacchati. 


30. Conerns the three nihsvabhavatas. For the phrase nihsvabhavah sarvadharmah , cf.: 

i) Samdhinir. VII, § 1 seq.: 

nihsvabhavah sarvadharma anutpannah sarvadharma adisantah prakrtiparinirvrtah. 

ii) Ratnameghasutra in Madhyamakavrtti, p. 225 (9) and Subhasitasamgraha: 

adisanta hy anutpannah prakrtyaiva ca nirvrtah / dharmas te vivrta natha 
dharmacakrapravarane // 

iii) Sutralamkara, XI, 5 1 : 

nihsvabhavataya siddha uttar arottaranisrayat / anutpannaniruddha- 
disantaprakrtinirvrtah // 

iv) Gaudapada, IV, 93: 

adisanta hy anutpannah prakrtyaiva sunivrtah / 

For the doctrine, see also Yogacaryabhumi, Taisho 1579, p. 702bl7-702c3; Vikhyapana, 
Taisho 1602, p. 557M7-24; Vikhyapanakarika, Taisho 1603, p. 586c26-27; 
Abhidharmasamuccaya, Taishfi 1605, p.688a5-8; Abhidharmasamuccayavyakhya, Taishfi 
1606, p. 751c25-752al8; Siddhi, p. 556-561. 


31. On the expressions samdhi, samdha, abhisamdhi, abhipraya, see Bodh. bhumi, p. 56, 
108,174,301-305 


208 



33. The twenty-one Buddha qualities (one general quality because of twenty special 
qualities) are found in: 

i. Samdhinir., Tib. § 2 and Chin. § of Bodhiruci, Taisho 675, p 665c3-12, and of Hiuan- 
tsang, Taisho 676, p. 688M7-25. Introduction of Paramartha, Taisho 667, p. 71 lb27- 
71 1 c 1 5. 

ii. Buddhabhumisutra, Taisho 680, p. 720c7-16. 

iii. All versions of Samgraha 

iv. Mahavyutpatti where these qualities occur in the list of the 93 
tathagatamahatmyanamanis. 

In paragraph 33 II, a new series of qualities explaining the preceding ones. But the 
versions differ as to number: the Tib. verse and Buddhasanta indicate 19 qualities and 
cite 20 of them; Paramartha and Dhannagupta indicate 21 and cite 20; Hiuan-tsang 
indicate 21 qualities and cite 20 but end their enumeration by the word ’etc.’ According to 
the Chinese version of the Upanibandhana by Hiuan-tsang, this ’etc,' means 'the last 
quality' ( nisthaguna ) explaining the epithet aparantakotinistha, the 22 nd mahatmyanaman 
in the list in the Mahavyutpatti. 

The Buddha qualities are presented differently in Sutralamkara, XX-XXI, 43-61; Bodh. 
bhumi, p. 375 to the end. 


34. Lamotte says he has not found anywhere a similar explanation regarding the 
bodhisattvas, but it may be gleaned from Sutralamkara, XIX, 63-80; Bodh. Bhumi, 
anudharmayogasthanam, p. 301 seq.; Mahavyutpatti, 806-884. Bodh. bhumi gives details 
on asayasuddhi, p. 333 (5); samacitta, p. 286 (11); adeyavacanata, p. 29 (3); 
samgrahavastu, p. 217-230. the apramanas or brahmaviharas, p. 241 (15); the abhijnds, 
p. 58 (13); avavadanusasana, p. 1 1 1-1 12. 


Continuation of Chapter II 

34. Kasyapaparivarta, § 23-25, p. 47-50 contains the original Sanskrit of chapter II, § 34, 
the reconstituted translation of which follows: 

When the bodhisattva is endowed with 32 attributes, he is called 'bodhisattva' 

( dvatrimsadbhir dharmaih samanvagato bodhisattvo bodhisattvo ity ucyate). What are 
these 32 ( katame dvdtrimsadbhih )? They are (yad uta ): 

0. Having the high intention of working for the benefit and happiness of all beings 
(< hitasukhadhyasayataya sarvasatvesu). 

1. Introduction into omniscience (sar vajndjndnd va tar a n a tayd ) . 

ii. Knowing his own worth and consequntly not criticizing the skill of others (kim aham 
argamiti paresam jnanakunsanata ) [Lamotte: akunsanata for akutsanatal ] 

iii. Suppressing pride ( n i radii im ana tayd ) . 

iv. Having a steady high aspiration ( drdhadyasayataya ). 


209 



v. Having (1) unfabricated benevolence ( akrtrimapremataya ), (2) impartial feelings with 
regard to friends and enemies ( mitramitresu samacittataya), (3) extreme friendliness 
lasting until the end of nirvana (atyantamitrataya yavan nirvanaparyantataye). 

vi. Telling the truth [Lamotte: Vol. I, fasc. 1, p 45, 1. 10: correct tshig nan pa to tshig ran 
pa] and expressing oneself with a smiling face ( anrtvakyatd 
smitamukhapiirvabhibhasanata). 

vii. Having unlimited great compassion for all beings ( sarvasatvesv 
aparicinnamahakarunata). 

viii. Watching over the accepted burdens ( upadattesu bharesu. v. s. d. 

ix. Having indefatigable zeal ( aparikhinnamdnasataya ) 

x. While seeking the holy Dharma, being insatiable in hearing and in the doctrine 
(saddharmaparyestim arabhyatr ....[Lamotte: probably atrptih] srutarthyataya). 

xi. (1) Seeing the wrongs of one's own faults (citmaskhalite.su dosadarsanataya ); (2) 
criticizing without anger the faults of others (paraskhaiitesv arustapatticodanataya). 

xii. In all postures, using the mind of awakening (s arvairyapathesu 
bodhicittaparikarmataya). 

xiii. Practicing (1) a generosity that does not look for repayment (vipdkdpratiknksina 
tyagah), (2) a discipline that does not depend on births in the cycle of existence 
(sarvabhavagatyupapa .... nihsritam [Lamotte: probably upapatty anihsritam], (3) a 
patience that is not disheartened by anyone (sarvasatvesv apratihata ksantih), (4) an 
exertion that gathers all the roots of good (sarvakusalamula-sammaddnanaya viryam ), 

(5) dhyana sheltered from the fonnless realm (arupya .... parikarsitam [Lamotte: 
probably drupyadhatu-parikarsitam] dhyanam), (6) wisdom endowed with all the means 
(updyasamgrhfta prajha), (7) skillful means associated with the four factors of 
conversion (catuhsamgrahavastusamprayuktd upaya [Lamotte: probably upayah]) 

xiv. (1) Having the same benevolence for honest or dishonest people (sTlavadduhsT 

yataya maitrata ), (2) listening respectfully to the Dhanna (satkrtya dharmasravanam), 
(3) living respectfully in the forest (satkrtydranyavasah), (4) disdaining all the frivolities 
of the world (sarvalokavicitrikesv anabhiratih), (5) not desiring the Lesser Vehicle 
(hinaydndsprhanatd), (6) seeing the advantages of the Greater Vehicle (mahayane 
cdnusamsasamdarsitaya), (7) giving up bad friends (papamitravivarjanat .... [Lamotte: 
probably vivarjanata ]), (8) serving kind friends (kalyanamitrasavanata). 

xv. (1) Establishing the four brahmanical practices (caturbrahma-viharamspadanata), 

(2) playing in the five abhijnas (pahcbbhijhb-vikndanata ), (3) taking refuge in wisdom 
(jhanapratisaranata). 

xvi. (1) Not abandoning beings given up to good practices or bad practices 

( pratipattivipratipattisthitanam satvdndm anutsargah), (2) having ‘cut and dried’ 
language ( ekamsavacanata ), (3) valuing the truth (satyagurukata), (4) being preceded by 
the mind of awakening (bodhicittapurvamgamata). 


210 



CHAPTER III 


ENTRANCE INTO THE NATURES OF THE KNOWABLE 

( jneyalaksanapravesa ) 


1. The natures of the knowable ( jheyalaksana ) have been presented in chapter II; 
how should the entrance into the natures of the knowable {jneyalaksanapravesa ) 
be understood? 

These are the mental states perfumed by great hearing 
{, bahusrutabhdvitdvasthah ). 

These states are not mingled with the store-consciousness 
(dlayavijndnendsamgrhitdh). 

Like the store-consciousness, they are seeds (dlayavijndnavad bljtbhutah). 

They are merged with right attention {yonisomanasikarena samgrhTtah). 

They arise under the aspect of texts and theses {dharmdrthabhdsenotpanndh). 
They are like cognizable substances ( grahyadravya-sthamyah ). 

They are mental discourse endowed with vision (sadarsan a-nt an ojalpdh). [142b9] 


1. Comm. Bh 349M2-21, bh 191b8-192a6, U 413bl3-412c8, u 295a7-295b8. 

“How does the bodhisattva who has practiced the sixteen activities [treated in chap. II, 
§34, p. 145] reach full understanding ( abhisamaya ) of the natures of the knowable? This 
is what the author is going to explain. 

These are states perfumed by the great hearing, i.e., states ( avastha ) characteristic of a 
mental series ( cittacaittasamtana ) perfumed ( bhavita ) by the great hearing ( bahusruta ) of 
the texts ( dharma ) and theses ( artha ) of the Greater Vehicle. Those in whom the hearing 
(or the knowledge of the texts) is inferior are not able to reach full understanding 
{abhisamaya). In the Aryarahulasutra, Rahula said: 'My only wish is that the Bhagavat 


211 



would teach me full understanding', and the Bhagavat replied: 'Have you already 
understood the basket of the holy texts ( saddharmapitaka )?' Rahula replied: 'No, 
Bhagavat.' Then the Bhagavat said to him: ‘First you must understand the basket of texts.’ 

They are not mingled with the store-consciousness because these states follow from 
( sravanti ) the very pure fundamental element ( ativisuddhadharmadhatu ) and counteract 
( pratipaksa ) the store-consciousness. They are not mixed since they oppose ( viruddha ) 
one another (cf. chap. 1, § 45). 


2. Who is it who enters into the natures of the knowable (jheyalaksana )? - The 
bodhisattva who has perfumed ( bhavand ) his mental series ( cittasamtdna ) by 
means of the great hearing ( bahusruta ) of the doctrine of the Greater Vehicle, 
who has served (dradhand) innumerable Buddha avatars 
( apramdnaprddurbhdva ), who, with single faith ( ekadhimukta ), has fully 
accumulated the roots of good ( kusalamula ), and has thus fully accomplished the 
accumulations of merit and wisdom (punyajhanasambhara ). [ 142b 13] 


2. Comm. Bh 349b26-349cl5, bh 192a6-192bl, U 413cl2-20, u 295b8-296a3. 

“Each agent ( karaka ) assumes an activity ( kdritra ) and a being endowed with activity. 
That is why the author puts a question to the writer of the entry by asking: Who can 
enter ? In answer to this question, he says: The bodhisattva who has perfumed his mental 
series by the great hearing of the Greater Vehicle : with the great hearing derived from 
the doctrine of the Greater Vehicle, he has perfumed his series. Who has served 
innumerable Buddha avatars : thanks to this series thus perfumed, he has been able to 
meet and serve the avatars of the Buddas. Who, with single faith ... : having served the 
Buddhas, he has developed profound faith ( sraddha ) in the doctrine of the Greater 
Vehicle from which bad friends (papamitra ) are unable to turn him away. For these three 
reasons, i.e., great hearing of the Greater Vehicle, etc., he has accumulated innumerable 
roots of good ( apramana kusalamula). Thus he is called a bodhisattva endowed with 
merit and wisdom.” (U) 


212 



3. Where does the bodhisattva enter? - Amidst this mental discourse ( manojalpa ) 
furnished with vision (sadarsana) that has the appearance of texts and theses 
(dh arm drth abhdsa) and that comes from the doctrine of the Greater Vehicle 
(m ah dydn adh arm an vaya), the bodhisattva enters into the stage where faith is 
practiced ( adhimukticaryabhumi ), into the path of seeing ( darsan am drga) , into 
the path of meditation ( bhavanamarga ) or the final path ( nisthdmdrga ). - He 
enters into the adhimukticaryabhumi because, being based on what has been 
said to him ( anukathitam ), he adheres ( adhimucyate ) to the purely ideational 
nature of all dharmas (saw adh arm an dm vijhaptimatram). - He enters into the 
darsanamarga because he penetrates mental discourse correctly 
( yathabhutaprativedha ). - He enters into the bhavanamarga because he trains in 
counteracting all the obstacles ( sarvavaranapratipaksabhavand ). - He enters into 
the nisthamarga because he has eliminated the obstacles. [142b 17] 


3. Comm. Bh 349c20-350a4, bh 1 92b 1-8, U 413c25-414a5, u 296a3-8. 

“Now the author is going to explain the categories and aspects (akara) of the entry 
( pravesa ). The mental states ( manobhumi ) are called mental discourse (manojalpa) with 
examination ( vitarka ) and analysis ( vicara ) (cf. Siddhi, p. 385). These mental words have 
the doctrine of the Greater Vehicle as the cause of their arising, i.e., this doctrine 
(desanadharma) is the cause which gives birth to them.” (Bh) 

“Amidst these mental words, some bodhisattvas enter into the stage where faith is 
practiced ( adhimukticaryabhumi ) because, being based solely on the teaching received 
(sravana), they adhere to the vijnaptimatrata of all the dharmas. - Others enter into the 
path of seeing (darsanamarga) because they penetrate this word correctly. To penetrate 
correctly is to understand (pratividh -) that it is without dharma or artha, without grahya 
or grahaka. - Others enter into the path of meditation (bhavanamarga) because they train 
in counteracting (pratipaksa) the obstacle of the afflictions and the obstacle to knowledge 
(klesajheydvarana). - Finally, others enter into the final path (nisthammarga) because 
they are very pure (ativisuddha) and freed from obstacles (avarana). These four things 
are the stages of entry (pravesdvastha )( ’ (U) 


213 



4. How ( kena ) does the bodhisattva enter into the natures of the knowable? - He 
enters: 


(i) by putting to work the roots of good ( kusalamulabalddhisthana ), 

(ii) by rousing his courage in three ways (trividh acittottdpan a ) , 

(iii) by eliminating four blockages (catusth an aprah ana), 

(iv) by being zealous (apramdda) in a continuous and respectful 

( sdtatyasatkrityaprayoga ) effort applied to tranquility (samatha) and insight 
(vipasyana) concerning the texts ands theses (dh arm drthdlam bana). [142b20] 


4. Comm. Bh 350a8-13, bh 192b8-193a4, U 414a8-l 1, u 296a8-296bl. 

“How does he enter? The author asks about the cause of entry (proves ahetu). He replies: 
By putting to work the powers of the roots of good, etc. Nevertheless, despite the power 
of the roots of good, his courage may sag ( cittam avalfyate). That is why the author adds: 
By rousing his courage in three ways, etc. (U) 

Cittotapana and catuhsthanaprahana will be studied in § 5 and 6 respectively. In 
Chinese, cittotapana is rendered by lien mo sin (120 and 9; 112 and 11; 61) and in 
Tibetan by sems sbyoh ba (cf. Mahavyut. 1826, sbyahs pa = uttapta). According to U, 
uttapana means tsh'e kiu (118 and 6; 134 and 1 1), 'stimulate-raise up'; according to u, rab 
to hdzin pa, 'stimulate', and rnon por byed pa, 'diminish' ( tikshmkara ). 

By being zealous in a continuous respectful effort : continuous (satatya), i.e., eternally 
used (rtag tu bya ba); respectful (satkrtya), i.e., deferential ( gurukara ). - The expression 
satatyasatkrtyaprayoga occurs in Sutralamkara, X, 3, p. 50. 


5. The three cittottapanas are: 

i) The bodhisattva thinks:Innumerable human beings 
(aprameyamanusyasattva) in innumerable universes ( aprameyalokadhatu ) 
reach supreme perfect enlightenment (anuttaraydm samyaksambodhdv 
abhisambuddhd bhavanti) each moment." This reflection consitutes the first 
stimulant for courage ( cittotapana ). 


214 



ii) He thinks: "It is with these intentions (dsaya) that beings practice 

(sum udddcaran ti) generosity and the other perfections ( ddnddipdramitd ). I too 
am going to attain such intentions. By means of them I shall cultivate the 
perfections (pdramitabhavana ) without too much trouble ( alpakrcchrena ) and 
I shall reach perfection (paripiiri )." This reflection consitututes the second 
stimulant. 

iii) He thinks: "Beings equipped with limited moral goodness 
(sapratighakusaladharmasamanvdgata) are reborn after death with the 
perfections of existence ( kdyasmpad) of their choice ( yathdkdmam ). As for 
myself, admirably endowed with limitless moral good ( apratighakusaha ), why 
should I not obtain universal perfection ( sarvasampad) at that moment?" 

This is the third reflection. Here are some stanzas: 

(i) (Cf. Sutralamkara, X, 11). 

manusabhutah sambodhim prapnuvanti pratiksanam / 

aprameya yatah sattvd lay am nato 'dhivdsayet // 

“Since throngs of beings in human condition reach enlightenment at each 
instant, discouragement should not be permitted.” 

(ii) (Translated from H). It is with the intentions of a pure mind that 
generosity, etc. is practiced. The Victorious Ones (jina ) who have acquired 
them can cultivate generosity, etc. 

iii) (Translated from H). After death, good people obtain the 
perfections of their choice (yathakamasampad). Why should not very good 
people, who have cut through the obstacles, not obtain the most excellent 
perfections? [142c6] 


5. Comm. Bh 350a23-350b26, bh 193a4-193b6, U 414a20-414c4,u 296bl-297a8. 

“In order to counteract the threefold discouragement, it suffices to practice the threefold 
stimulant. How? If the bodhisattva hears it said that the supreme perfect enlightenment is 
great (adhimatra), profound (gambhira), vast ( visala ) and difficult to obtain ( durlabha ), 


215 



his courage sags ( cittam avaliyate ). To counteract this discouragement, he practices the 
stimulants.” (Bh) 

“i) Innumerable human beings in innumerable universes, etc. This explains the first 
stimulant. When he contemplates the series of other delivered beings, his courage 
increases and he no longer feels discouraged. [He says to himself in fact: If, in the human 
destinies, innumerable beings in innumerable universes at each moment come to supreme 
perfect enlightenment, why should not I myself come to that point? Cf. Bh.] 

ii) It is with these intentions, etc. This explains the second stimulant. I also have acquired 
such intentions, i.e., his intentions are free of obstacles ( vibandha ) because they are 
strangers to avarice ( matsarya ), desire ( kama ), wickedness ( vyapada ), laziness 
(, kausidya ), languor-torpor ( styanamiddha ) and ignorance ( avidya ). By means of them, 
without too much trouble, I will cultivate the virtues and come to perfection : having 
obtained these higher intentions, I will spontaneously ( svarasena ) cultivate generosity, 
etc. and quickly reach perfection ( paripuri ). 

iii) Beings endowed, etc. This explains the third stimulant. Equipped with a limited moral 
goodness, i.e., equipped with moral goodness of worldly order ( laukikakusala ). Because 
it has not suppressed the obstacles ranged against it ( vipaksavarana ), it is limited 
(supra ti glia). As for myself, admirably endowed, etc.: I, who have cut through the 
obstacles ranged against it, have acquired a moral goodness free of obstacles. Why 
should I not later obtain full complete Buddhahood {paripurnabuddhata )? To rouse 
courage is to excite and raise it by reinforcing it and combatting discouragement. 

Some stanzas summarize these ideas: 

(i) Since beings in the human condition, etc. Timidity and weakness are called 
discouragement (laya). The author exhorts ( samadapayati ) the bodhisattva not to become 
discouraged. If he says: "I am incapable of reaching supreme perfect enlightenment", that 
is timidity and weakness. The author exhorts him not to say that he is incapable and 
consequently not to be discouraged. Thus a stanza says: Innumerable beings 
( aprameyasattva ) in the ten directions ( dasadis ) at each moment ( pratiksanam ) reach 
Buddhahood ( sugataphala ). These people ( purusa ) and myself are equal. It's not 
necessary to be discouraged in the least. 


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(ii) It is with the intentions of a pure mind that generosity is practiced, etc.: Generosity is 
not practiced with a bad ( akusala ) mind or a morally indeterminate ( avyakrta ) mind, etc. 
Here it is a matter of pure mind only. Some people ( loka ) practice generosity with a bad 
{akusala) mind, a morally indeterminate ( avyakrta ) mind or a distracted {viksipta) mind 
because they are looking for certain forms of existence ( bhava ) or wealth ( bhoga ). This is 
not the case for the bodhisattva: he seeks only supreme perfect enlightenment {anuttara 
samyaksambodhih). These intentions {as ay a) are the cause permitting the development of 
generosity, etc., without obstacle, as was said above (cf. Prastavana, § 3, p. 7; chap. IV, § 
1). The Victorious Ones who have acquired them can develop generosity, etc. The 
bodhisattvas are called victorious (jina) because they have already acquired these high 
intentions. By means of them, the perfections of generosity, etc. operate spontaneously 
{svarasena). ... By virtue of this detennination {niyama), the bodhisattvas cut through 
obstacles {pratipaksa ) to the virtues, and because they have cut through these obstacles, 
the perfections of generosity operate spontaneously {svarasena) without effort 
{anabhoga). By ’etc.’ is meant the other five perfections, from discipline (sila) to wisdom 
( prajha ). 

(Hi) Good people, after their death, etc. This concerns those who are good from the 
mundane level {laukikakusala). At the end of their life, they obtain the perfections of 
their choice : as result, they obtain the personal perfections of the mundane order which 
they wished for; thus they come to be reborn at the summit of existence {bhavagra). As 
for those very good ones who have cut through the obstacles, i.e., who are good without 
any obstacles, why should they not obtain the perfected perfections? Why should they not 
obtain the perfect Buddhahood {sampurnabuddhata) that they wish for? (U) 


6. [Catuhsthanaprahana]: 

1. By abandoning reflection (manasikdraprahanat), the bodhisattva rejects 
( parityajati ) the customary reflections of the sravakas and the 
pratyekabuddhas. 

2. By abandoning perplexity and hesitation (vimatikdnksdprahandt), he 
rejects any doubt {vicikitsd) regarding the Greater Vehicle. 


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3. By abandoning adhesion to dharmas (dh arm abh inivesaprah an at), he 
rejects adhesion to the belief in ‘me’ ( dtmagrdha ) and belief in ‘mine’ 
(atmlyagraha) in regard to dharmas heard and thought 

( srutacintitadharma ). 

4. By abandoning concepts ( vikalpaparhdndt ), he arrives at no longer 
meditating ( manasikr -), no longer conceiving ( viklp -) any object ( nimitta ) 
directly present ( pur at ah sthitani) or prepresented in concentration 

( sthdpitam ). Here is a stanza 

(cf. Sutralamkara, XIX, 50): 

purath sthdpitam yac ca nimittam yat sthitani svayam / 

sarvatn vibhdvayan dhundn labhate bodhim uttamdm // 

“By not conceiving any object formed in concentration or present by itself, 
the sage comes to superior enlightenment.” [142cl3] 


6. Comm. Bh 350c25-351al8, bh 193b6-194a3, U 414cl2-22, u 297a8-197b6. 

“Now the author explains the abandonment of the four blockages ( catuhsthanaprahana ) 
[mentioned in § 4], By abandoning reflection : he rejects the thoughts customary to the 
Vehicles of the sravakas and the pratyekabuddhas. By suppressing perplexity and 
hesitation : he suppresses perplexity ( vimati ), error ( viparyasa ) and doubt ( vicikitsa ) 
concerning the depth ( gambhirya ) and vastness ( vaipulya ) of the Greater Vehicle. [Bh 
gives as example the philosophical perplexities about the doctrine of the three natures.] 
By abandoning adherence: in regard to dharmas heard and thought, he cuts through the 
belief in 'me’ and 'mine' (dtmdtmTyagrdha ) . Adherences expressed by saying: "I hear, I 
think; this is what I have heard, this is what I have thought", all these adherences 
(< abhinivesa ) do not exist, for the bodhisattva has attained full realization ( abhisamaya ) of 
the Absolute ( paramartha ). By abandoning concepts: whether it is a matter of objects 
directly present ( puratah sthitani) or fabricated objects like the skeletons ( kahkala ) 
created ( sthapita ) in concentration ( samadhi ), the bodhisattva has neither reflection 
(ma nasi kara) nor concept ( vikalpa ) about all the objects that he perceives 


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(alambanavisaya). He even arrives at cutting all adherence to and all concepts about the 
Buddhas, bodhisattvas, the paramitas and other similar things.” (U) 


7. (Translated according to H). 

Why and how does the bodhisattva enter ( kena katham pravisati )? 

1) He enters as a result of mental discourse ( manojalpa ) derived from the 
hearing-propensity ( srutavasananvaya ) resulting from correct attention 

( yonisomanasikara samgrhlta), which has the appearance of texts and theses 
(dh arm drth abh dsa) that are equipped with vision (sadarsana). 

2) He enters by four investigations ( paryesana ): 
ndmarthasvabhdvavisesaprajhaptiparyesand 

(i) ndmaparyesand : discovering that the name is simply a mental 
word; 

(ii) arthaparyesand : discovering that the thing is simply a mental 
word; 

(iii) ndmdrthasvabhavaprajnaptiparyesand : ddiscovering that the self- 
nature attributed to the name or the thing is only a designation; 

(iv) namdrthavisesaprajnaptiparyesana : finding that the characteristics 
attributed to the name or the thing are only designation. 

3) He enters by means of four precise knowledges ( yathdbhutaparijhdna ): 
ndmavastubhdvavisesaprajnaptiyathdbhutaparijndna : [to be analyzed as 
above] 

(i) ndmayathdbhutapanjndna : correct knowledge that the name is 
simply a mental word, etc., because all of that does not exist ( anupalabdha ). 

Thus the bodhisattva who makes the effort (prayunkte ) to enter into Concept- 
only (vijnaptimatra) understands ( sampratipadyate ), with regard to mental 
words ( manojalpa ) that appear as phonemes and theses ( aksardrthdbhdsa ), 
that the name-phoneme ( aksarandman ) is only a mental word; he 
understands that the entity based on this name-phoneme 


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(aksaran dm an isritdrth a) is only a mental word; he understands that the self- 
nature (svabhava) and the specifications ( visesa ) attributed to this name or 
this entity are mere designations {prajhapti ). 

When he sees the name and phoneme as merely a simple mental word, he 
sees that the self-nature and characteristics attributed to this name or this 
entity are purely designations {prajhapti ): since the self-nature and the 
characteristics are without objective nature (arthalaksana), they are also 
nonexistent. It is by means of these four investigations and by means of these 
four correct knowledges that, within these mental words of the appearance of 
phonemes and theses, the bodhisattva enters into Concept-only 
( vijhaptimatrata ). [142c26] 


7. Comm. Bh 351a20-351bl7, bh 194a3-194bl, U 414c23-415b5, u 297b6-298b3. 

" Why and how does he enter? The author asks this question in order to explain the reason 
and manner of entering . 

1) Here he explains the reason for entering: as a result of mental words that are derived 
from the hearing propensity, i.e., that have as cause the hearing-propensity. Since the 
stages of entering of which we have spoken above (§ 1, 3), come from the propensity of 
the Greater Vehicle, we know that they come from {samgrhita) the absolute nature 
( parinispannasvabhava ). 

2) He explains the manner of entering: by four investigations ... and by four correct 
knowledges ... This is to know correctly that the self-nature and characteristics attributed 
to the name or the thing are simply designations, that there is no real object there that 
exists. That is why it is said that all of that is also non-existent. First, one finds (tch'ouei 
k'ieou = nirupana ) that the self-nature and the characterstics attributed to the name or the 
thing are mererly designation; next, one knows correctly that all of that is non-existent 
absolutely. At the moment of the discovery {nirupana), there is examination {paryesana)', 
at the moment one knows correctly that that does not exist, there is the fourfold correct 
knowledge ( yathdbhutaparijhdna ).” (Bh) 


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In Bh and U there is a series of valuable definitions: “Paryesana is van dag par dpyod pa 
= samyagvicara, correct reasoning. Yathabhutaparijnana is mi dmigs pa = anupalabdhi, 
non-perception” (bh). “Paryesana is tch'ouei k'ieou king kien = ties par rtog pahi mam 
pahi Ita ba = nirupanakaradarsana, vision in the fonn of analysis. Yathabhutaparijnana 
is /due ting king tche = ties pahi ye shes = viniyata or niscitajnana, certain knowledge. 
‘Name’ is words such as ’matter', 'sensation', etc. ( rupavedanadipada ); ‘artha or ‘vastu’ is 
the aggregates ( skandha ), the elements ( dhatu ), the bases of consciousness ( ayatana ), 
etc., designated by these words (padakaya)\ visesas are the general characteristics, i.e., 
pennanence, suffering, etc., attributed to nama and artha.” (U). 


8. How is this entry into Concept-Only ( vijhaptimatrata ) made and what is it 
like? 

1) One enters into unity ( tanmdtra ), into duality pertaining to image and 
vision (sanim ittadarsan ad vaya) and into multiplicity (ndndtva). Indeed, name 
( Hainan ), entity {artha), self-nature ( svabhava ), specific characteristics 
(visesa), - these six things {artha) are non-objective {anarthaka); they appear 
in the nature of an object and a subject of consciousness 

( grdhyagrdhakabhdvena ) and they arise simultaneously in the appearance of 
multiform objects {ndndvidhdrthdbhdsena). 

2) One enters in the same way that one identifies a rope ( rajju ) which seems 
in the darkness {andhakara) to be a snake {sarpa). Since it does not exist, the 
snake seen in the rope is an illusion {bhrdnti). Those who have recognized 
that it does not exist (cf. H) reject the notion of snake {sarpabuddhi) and keep 
the notion of rope {rajjubuddhi). But the rope itself, if reduced to its subtle 
elements ( suksmakara ), is an illusion itself, for it has color {rahga or rupa), 
smell {gandha ), taste {rasa) and tactile {sprastavya) as specific characteristics 
{laksana). 

Thus, when any reality {bhiitdrtha) has been denied {nirhrtya) to the six types 
of mental words {manojalpa) which appear as phoneme or as thing 
{aksardrthdbhdsa) - just as the notion of snake is abandoned by means of the 
notion of rope - the notion of Concept-Only {vijhaptimdtratabuddhi) 


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underlying the mental words should be abandoned by means of the notion of 
the absolute nature (parinispannasvabhavabuddhi ), just as the notion of rope 
is abandoned by means of the notion of color, etc. [143a8] 


8. Comm. Bh 35 lb28-35 lc 10, bh 194M-5, U 415bl6-415cl4, u 298b3-299a6. 

“Here the author asks about the entry itself and about an example to which it can be 
compared. 

1) Unity (tanmatra) is the vijnaptimatrata, the fact that there is Concept-Only. Duality of 
image and vision ( sanimittadarsanadvaya ) means the consciousness ( yijhana ) furnished 
with image and vision. That which appears as the cause or the object of the consciousness 
is called image ( nimitta ). Multiplicity ( nanatva ): this consciousness, which is single, 
manifests in the form of various aspects (ndndkdra). These manifestations are 
simultaneous; it is not a question of separate manifestations in accordance with an 
accelerated process (sou tsi = asutaravrtti). These three points constitute the entrance.” 
(Bh) - All this is explained in chap. II, § 11. 

“2) In the way in which one identifies a rope which in the darkness seems to be a snake : 
by this comparison ( dristanta ) the author shows how one penentrates ( pratividh -) the 
three natures ( svabhavatraya ). - (i) Thus, in the rope the snake is an illusion ( bhrdnti ), 
because there is no snake. Similarly, in the paratantra (mental discourse appearing as 
phoneme and thing), there is really no parikalpita (the six objects, name, etc.), because 
the parikalpita does not exist. - (ii) The notion of snake is abandoned by means of the 
notion of rope. Similarly, the notion of parikalpita, i.e., the six objects, is abandoned by 
means of the notion of paratantra which is defined as Concept-Only (cf. chap. II. § 3). - 
(iii) Finally, the notion of rope is abandoned by means of the notion of the subtle 
elements ( suksmabhaga ) that make up the rope, color, etc. Similarly, the erroneous 
notion ( viparftabuddhi ) of paratantra is abandoned by means of parinispanna. A verse 
says: One takes a rope to be a snake; then one examines the rope and one understands 
that it is not a snake; finally, when one examines the parts constituting the rope, one 
knows that it itself is just as false as the snake.” (U) 


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9. Thus, by entering into the mental speech ( manojalpa ) which is the apparent 
object ( nirbhasarthalaksana ), the bodhisattva has entered into the imaginary 
nature (parikalpitasvabhava ); by entering into Concept-Only ( vijnaptimatra ), he 
has entered into the dependent nature ( paratantrasvabhava ); how does he enter 
into the absolute nature (parinispan n asvabhdva) ? - He enters by abandoning 
( nirakarana ) even the notion of Concept-Only (vijn aptimdtrasam jhd) . Then, for 
the bodhisattva who has destroyed ( vidhvams -) the notion of object 
( arthasamjha ), the mental words ( manojalpa ) resulting from the propensity of 
the dharmas that have been heard ( srutadharma-vasananvaya ) have no 
possibility ( avakasa ) of arising in the appearance of an object and consequently 
no longer arise as an idea either. When the bodhisattva abides in name-without- 
concept in regard to all objects ( sarvdrthesu nirvikalpakanama), when he abides 
in the fundamental element ( dharmadhdtu ) by means of direct perception 
ipratyaksayogena), then he attains the nonconceptual knowledge 
( nirvikalpakajnana ) in which the object ( alambana ) and the subject of 
consciousness ( alambaka ) are completely identical ( samasama ). This is how the 
bodhisattva enters into the absolute nature. [143al6] 


9. Comm. Bh 351c20-352a4, bh 194b5-195a3, U 415c23-416al5, u 299a6-299b8. 

"By entering into the mental speech which is the apparent object, the bodhisatWa has 
entered into the imaginary nature: he understands that it is the mental speech that appears 
as object and that the imaginary object does not exist; thus he has entered into the 
imaginary nature. By entering into Concept-Only, he has entered into the dependent 
nature: he understands that Concept-Only, in contact with ignorance ( avidya ), although 
not an object, appears as object; thus he has entered into the dependent nature. To explain 
how he enters into the absolute nature, the author says: For the bodhisattva who has 
destroyed the notion of object, mental words have no possibility of arising in the 
appearance of an object: they have no power to arise in the appearance of an object. And 
consequently no longer arise as idea either, because if the object of consciousness 
( grahya ) does not exist, the subject of consciousness ( grahaka ) does not exist either; 
Concept-Only in turn cannot develop an object. When the bodhisattva abides in name- 


223 



without- concept in regard to all objects, etc. All objects, i.e., the sutras etc. The domain 
( gocara ) where names are applied is here called all objects. There are ten kinds of names 
(cf. the following paragraph): the first nine deal with concepts ( savikalpaka ), the tenth is 
free of concept ( nirvikalpaka ) about all dharmas. The bodhisattva abides in name- 
without-concept in regard to all dharmas. Thus it is said that everything is but a name and 
that this name can produce everything. Here the ideas ( vijhapti ) that appear as object are 
metaphorically ( upacara ) called ’name' . He abides by direct perception in the 
fundamental element : he adheres ( adhimukti ) to the dharmadhatu by means of 
introspection ( pratyatmagati ). 

Object and subject of consciousness are completely identical for conconceptual 
knowledge because, just as the object ( alambana ) does not exist, the subject ( alambaka ) 
does not exist either. That is why object and subject are identical. Thus the bodhisattva 
has entered into the absolute nature.” (U) 


10. Here is a stanza: 

Entities ( dharma ), individuals (pudgala ), texts ( dharma ), theses ( artha ), 
generalities ( samksepa ), particularities ( vistara ), phonemes (gotra ), impure 
beings ( asuddha ), pure beings ( suddha ), summit (anta): these are the various 
domains (gocara) of name. [143al9] 

10. Comm. Bh 352a8-26, bh 195a3-195bl, U 416al9-28, u 299b8-300a5. 

“It was said above (§ 9) that the bodhisattva abides in name-without-concept in respect to 
all objects (sarvarthesu nirvikalpakanama). Now the author explains in this stanza the 
various objects belonging ( visayaprabheda ) to name. 

1) Dharmanaman (things): form ( rupa ), sensation ( vedana ), etc. 

2) Pudgalanaman (individuals): names occuring in the Buddhist teachings 

(buddhadesana), e.g. Devadatta, etc., Dharmanusarin (DTgha, III, p. 105, 254; etc.), etc. 


224 



3) Dharmanaman (texts): sutra, geya, etc. [These are the Buddhist scriptures in nine or 
twelve divisions, cf. Majjhima, I, p. 133; Anguttara, II, p. 103, 178; III, p. 86 seq.; 177 
seq.; Puggala, p. 43; Milinda, p. 344; Mahavyut., 1266-1278; Siddhi, p. 614.] 

4) Arthanaman (theses): that which is enunciated in these scriptures, e,g., (Dhammapada, 
v. 294): Having killed his mother and father and two ksatriya kings, having destroyed the 
kingdom and its subjects, the brahmin is innocent ( mataram pitaram hantva, rajano dve 
ca khattiye, rattham sanucaram hantva, amghoyati brahmano). - See chap. VII, § 1 1. 

5) Samksepanaman (generalities): e.g. (Vinaya, V, p. 86; Samyutta, III, p. 133: IV, p. 28, 
401; Sutralamkara, XVIII, 101: Kosa, IX, p. 252): All dharmas are not a self ( sabbe 
dhamma anatta; sarve dharma anatmana iti). 

6) Vistaranaman (particularities): e.g. (Vinaya I, p. 1 3): Form in particular is not a self 
(rupam anatta). 

7) Gotranama (phonemes): the vowels and consonants (akshara vyahjana) that are the 
cause of language. 

8) Asuddhanaman (impure beings), e.g. ordinary people (prthagjana ) defded by the 
stains of the afflictions ( klesamala ). 

9) Suddhanaman (pure beings), e.g., the aryas who have effaced the stains ( vigatamala ). 

10) Antanaman (climax): the mixed objects ( samsrstalambana ), e.g. prajnaparamita, the 
ten bhumis, etc., which have as object a mixture ( samsrstartha ).” (U) 


11, Thus this bodhisattva, by entering into Concept-Only ( vijhaptimdtrata ), has 
entered into the natures of the knowable ( jheyalaksana ). By means of this entry, 
he has entered into the first bhumi, the Joyous (pramuditd ), he penetrates 
thoroughly ( supravidhyati ) the fundamental element ( dharmadhdtu ), he is born 
into the family of the Tathagatas ( tathagatagotra ), he acquires the mind of 
equality ( samatdcitta ) in regard to all beings ( sattva ), in regard to all the 
bodhisattvas and in regard to all the Buddhas. Such is the path of seeing 
(darsanamdrga). [ 1 43 a23 ] 


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11. Comm. Bh 352b3-13, bh 195bl-4, U 416b4-19, u 300a5-300b4. 


He is born into the family of the Tathagatas: “he causes his Buddha-family to be 
unbroken.” (Bh) - “By family of the Tathagatas is meant the dharmadhatu of the Buddha. 
To realize it, to become integrated into it, is called to be born into the family. Because the 
bodhisattva has the excellent knowledge concerning the dharmadhatu, because he 
transforms his former individuality ( asraya ) and acquires a new one, he causes his seeds 
(bija) of Buddha to be unbroken ... (U) 

He acquires the mind of sameness in regard to all beings, because he sees that all these 
beings are alike without 'self ( andtmdna ). Thus it is said in the Tathagatagarbhasutra, 
Taishfi 666, p. 457c8, that all beings are embryos of the Tathagata ( tathagatagarbha ). He 
acquires the mind of equality with regard to all the bodhisattvas, because he knows the 
identity of their predispositions ( asayasamata ). These bodhisattvas are all prepared to 
bring about the welfare and happiness of all beings (chap. II, § 34). He acquires the mind 
of equality with regard to all the Buddhas because he knows their identity of dharmakaya 
(cf. chap. X, § 3, no. 3; § 33). Such is his path of seeing, because he sees the excellent 
dharmadhatu which he has not seen previously ( apurvadrsta ).” (U) 


12. Again, for what reason does he enter into Concept-Only ( vijnaptimdtra )? By 
means of a supramundane ( lokottara ) cognition of tranquility and discernment 
(samata vipasyandjndna) concerning mixed dharmas (samsrstadh arm a lam haka), 
by a subsequent cognition (prsthalabdhajhdna) of every type of concept 
(ndndvijnapti) , cutting (prahanya ) all the seeds (blja) of the store-consciousness 
with their images ( sanimitta ), the bodhisattva cultivates the seed of contact 
( sparsabTja ) with the dharmadhatu. Transforming his support (pardvrttdsraya ), 
securing all the attributes of the Buddha ( buddhadharma ), he attains 
omniscience ( sarvajndjndna ): for this reason he enters into Concept-Only. 

This subsequent cognition (prstalabdhajhdna ), which considers every creation 
( prabhava ) coming from the store-consciousness and every object of concept 
( vijhaptinimitta ) as a magic show ( mdyd ), etc., is, in its essence, free of errors 
( prakrtyaviparlta ). Thus, in the same way that the magician ( mdydkdra ) is free of 
doubt about the things produced by magic ( mdydkrtadharma ), so this 


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bodhisattva is always unmistaken ( viparyasa ) when he speaks of cause (hetu) and 
result (phala). [143b2] 


12. Comm. Bh 352b22-352c5, bh 195b4-196a3, U 416b27-416c28, u 300b4-301b2. 

“The author asks about the usefulness (prayojana ) of entry into Concept-Only. In the 
end, he answers that it is aimed at obtaining the omniscience needed to bring about the 
welfare and happiness of beings to be converted ... 

By a supramundane cognition of tranquility and discernment concerned with mixed 
dharmas ]: This cognition concerns mixed dharmas because it focuses on the correct 
( prabhavita ) true nature ( tathata ), the shared nature ( samananyalakshana ) of all 
dharmas. The object of this cognition, i.e., all the dharmas contained in the teaching of 
the Greater Vehicle, have tathata as self-nature (cf. chap. VIII, § 5). This cognition, 
concerning tathata, penetrates the nature of all dhannas. Otherwise, nonconceptual 
knowledge ( nirvikalpajhana ) would not be produced for a long time. This cognition is 
supramundane because it is pure ( anasrava ) and free of concept ( nirvikalpaka ). It is a 
cognition of tranquility and discernment, i.e., a concentrated cognition free of error 
( samdhitdviparitajndna ). By means of a subsequent cognition of every type of concept : he 
establishes that the dharmas with their nature of cause and result, whether of inferior or 
superior order, are merely concepts of grahya and grahaka ... The bodhisattva cultivates 
the seed of contact with the dharmadhatu, i.e., he cultivates the propensity of great 
hearing ( bahusrutavasana ) of the Greater Vehicle (cf. chap. I, § 45; chap. Ill, § 1) .... 
Transforming his support : because, by penetrating the tathata, his mind and mental 
factors ( cittacaitta ) become immaculate ( nirmala ), or because the tathata itself is pure. 
Securing all the attributes of the Buddha : the powers ( bala ), the fearlessnesses 
( yaisaradya ) and the other attributes of the Buddha. He acquires omniscience, i.e., the 
immaculate unhindered knowledge (vimalam apratihatam ca jhanam) of the Buddha. 

This subsequent cognition, etc.: the author explains the role of subsequent cognition. 
Every creation coming from the store-consciousness : in speaking of creation, the author 
mentions the cause. In speaking of every object of concept, he mentions result. It is a 
matter of grahaka and grahya. The subsequent cognition that takes them as a magical 


227 



show, etc., is free of error by essence, because by considering, in accordance with the 
truth, the dependent nature as a magical show, etc., one avoids error (cf. chap. II, § 27). 

In the same way that a magician is free of all error about magical things : the magician is 
free of error about the plants ( trna ), trees ( vrksa ), etc., that are the causes of magic, 
because he sees them correctly; the magician is free of error about the elephant ( hastin ), 
the horse ( asva ), etc., because he sees them correctly. In the same way the bodhisattva 
who has seen the truth ( drstasatya ) correctly sees the non-existence of grahya and 
grahaka. When he attains the truth, he produces this subsequent cognition {prstalabdha ), 
generator of speech ( vaksamutthapaka ), of conventional order ( samvrti ), but pure. At the 
time when he knows cause and result and when he preaches the law, he is free of error. 
His listeners ( sravaka ) are subject to error, but when the propensity of the teachings 
(srutavasana) has perfumed their mental series {prabandha ), they are freed of error 
progressively ( anukramena ) and by degrees ( sanais ) and thereby accomplish what they 
had to do ( krtyanusthana ). This subsequent cognition is likewise free of concepts 
( nirvikalpa ) and is unstained ( aklista ).” (U) 


13. In the course of this entry into Concept-Only ( vijhdptimdtratdpravesa ), there 
are four factors leading to penetration ( nirvedhabhdglya ) which rest on four 
concentrations ( samddhi ). How? 

1) By the four investigations (paryesana ) during the lesser patient 
acceptances regarding the non-existence of the object ( arthabhdve 
mrduksdntih), there is a concentration called acquisition of light 
(dlokalabdhasamadhi) which is the basis ( asraya ) for the factor leading to 
penetration called heat ( usmagata ). 

2) During the greater patient acceptance regarding the non-existence of the 
object (arthabhdve adhimatraksantih), there is a concentration called increase 
of light (dlokavrddhisamddhi) which is the basis of the summit ( murdhan ) 
state. 

3) In the course of the four correct cognitions (yathabhutaparijhana ), the 
entry into Concept-Only (vijhdptimdtratdpravesa) and the certainty of the 
non-existence of the object (arthdbhdvaniscaya) constitute the concentration 


228 



penetrating a part of reality ( tattvarthaikadesanupravistasamadhi ): it is the 
basis of the patient acceptance furthering the truth ( satyanulomikl ksantih). 

4) Next ( tadanantaram ), the abandonment of the concept of Concept-Only 
( vijnaptimatrasamjnavidhvamsa ) constitutes the concentration immediately 
preceding the path of seeing ( dnantaryasamadhi ): it is the basis of the highest 
worldly dharmas ( laukikagradharma ). 

These four concentrations are close to the complete understanding 
( abhisamaya ). [143b 11] 


13. Comm. Bh 352cl5-27, bh 196a3-5, U 417a8-26, u 301b2-302a3. 

“Everywhere, at the time of arriving at complete understanding ( abhisamaya ), there are 
four factors leading to penetration ( nirvedhabhagiya ) ... 

1) By means of the four investigations', as we have seen above (§ 7), they consist of 
finding that the name ( naman ), the entity ( artha ), their self-nature ( svabhava ) and their 
characteristics ( visesa ) are merely designations (prajhapti ). - During the lesser patient 
acceptance regarding the non-existence of the object : during this lower prajna which 
delights in the non-existence of the object. - There is a concentration called acquisition 
of light'. light, because it illumines the knowledge of the non-existence of the object; 
acquisition because it is in conformity with the desired result. This concentration, which 
begins to acquire the knowledge of the non-existence of the object, is called acquisition 
of light, as when one starts to get fire, etc. - It is the basis of the factor leading to 
penetration called heat', heat is the wholesome roots ( kusalamula ) similar to heat. When 
fire is produced by rubbing ( manthana ) two sticks together, heat is the mark ( nimitta ) of 
fire; similarly here, these wholesome roots are the mark of knowledge of reality 
( tattvajhana ). Concentration is the support, i.e., the cause of this factor of penetration. 
Penetration ( nirvedha ) means complete understanding ( abhisamaya ); factor ( bhagiya ) of 
penetration means the patient acceptance of the non-existence of self of dhannas 
(dharmanairdtmyaksdnti) .... 

2) During the higher patient acceptance with regard to the non-existence of the object 
(arthabhave adhimatraksantih), there is a concentration called increase of brilliance 


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(dlokavrddhisamadhi), which is the support of the highest state. It is called ’highest' 
(murdhan) because it reaches the highest point of activity of the wholesome roots 
[according to u: rtse mo ni dge bahi rtsa ba gyo bahi rtse morphyin pahi phyir ro ]. 

3) In the course of the four correct cognitions', these are, as we have seen above (§ 7), 
certainty ( niscaya ) as to the non-existence of name, entity, etc. When this certainty is 
present, one enters into Concept-Only which appears like a name, etc.; one understands 
with certainty that there is no object. The concentration penetrating a portion of reality', 
it has entered into a portion (ekadesanupravista) because it penetrates ( pratividhyati ) 
only the non-existence of grahya. Thanks to it, one knows that the object does not exist, 
but one is unable to abandon Concept-Only in its aspect of grahaka. That is why this 
concentration is the basis of the patient acceptance furthering the truth. It furthers the 
truth because it is close to it, because in leaving behind the existence of grahya, one 
comes to understand the non-existence of grahaka [according to u: gzuh ba med pa la 
brten nas hdzin pa yah med par rtogs par hgyur bahi phyir ro].” 


14. Thus the bodhisattva has entered into the bhumis, has acquired the path of 
seeing (darsan am dr go) and has entered into Concept-Only ( vijhaptimdtrata ). 
How does he practice the path of meditation (bhavan dm dr go) ? 

In the ten bodhisattva bhumis as they are described (yathoktavyavasthdna ) and 
that are ( upasthita ) the totality (s a mgr ah a) of all the sutras, the bodhisattva 
practices ( abhyasyate ), over the course of many thousands of cosmic periods 
(sambahulasatasahasranayutakotikalpa), the supramundane ( lokottara ) gnosis of 
tranquility and discrimination ( samathavipasyandjhdna ) concerning mixed 
dharmas (samsrstadh arm dlambaka), as well as the subsequent cognition 
(prsth talabdh ajhdn a) . In that way, he transforms his basis (dsrayaparavrtti) ; then 
he exerts himself ( prayuhkte ) to attain the three bodies ( trikaya ) of the Buddha. 
[143b 1 6] 

14. Comm. Bh 353a5-13, bh 196a5-196bl, U 4 1 7b3- 1 1, u 302a3-6. 


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“In the ten bodhisattva bhumis as they are described : in the ten bodhiattva bhumis 
according to the decription given [in chap. V]. The cognition of tranquility and 
discernment concerns mixed dharmas: it concerns the general characteristic 

(sdmdnyalaksana) and does not have concepts ( vikalpa ) as object. It is a supramundane 
cognition, i.e., an nonconceptual wisdom ( nirvikalpakajhana ). The subsequent cognition 
is a descriptive cognition ( vyavasthanajhana ). We cannot say that it is simply mundane 
because it is not exercised in the world. Nor can we say that it is exclusively 
supramundane because it manifests in confonnity with the world. That is why it cannot 
be defined with precision.” (Bh) 

“In that way, the bodhisattva transforms his support : over the course of many periods 
( kalpa ), he cultivates nonconceptual wisdom and subsequent cognition and thus reaches 
the transformation of the support (cf. chap. IX), i.e., the purification of his mental series 
(< cittacaittasamtanaparisuddhi ). Then he exerts himself to attain the three bodies of the 
Buddha : this will be explained at length below (chap. X).” (U) 


15. What is the difference ( visesa ) between the two realizations ( abhisamaya ), 
that of the sravakas and that of the bodhisattvas? - The abhisamaya of the 
bodhisattva is distinguished from that of the sravakas by way of ten superiorities 
(visesa): 

1) Alambanavisesa, by its object, because it concerns the Greater Vehicle. 

2) Nisrayavisesa, by its basis, because it rests upon the great accumulations of 
merit and wisdom ( mahapunyajhanasambhara ). 

3) Prativedhavisesha, by its penetration, because it penetrates the non- 
existence of self of the individual and of entities (pudgaladharmanairdtmya ). 

4) Nirvanavisesa , by its nirvana, because it takes possession of ( parigrhndti ) of 
the non-stable nirvana ( apratisth ita-n irvdna ) . 

5) Bhumivisesa , by its levels, because it brings deliverance ( nihsarana , 
nirydna ) by means of the ten levels. 


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6) Parisuddhivisesa, by its purity, because it abandons the propensities of the 
passions ( klesavdsandsamudghdta ) and purifies the buddhafields 
(buddhaksetraparisodhana). 

7) Svaparasamacittatdpraptivisesa, by the acquisition of the mind of equality 
with respect to self and others, because it never ceases to endeavor to ripen 

( paripaka ) beings. 

8) Janmavisesa, by its arising, because it arises in the tathagata family 
(i tathagatagotra ). 

9) Upapattivisesa, by its appearances, because it always appears in the 
assemblies surrounding the Buddhas ( buddhaparsanmandala ). 

10) Phalavisesa, by its results, because it bears fruit having innumerable 
qualities ( apramdnaguna ): the ten powers ( bala ), the fearlessnesses 

( vaisdradya ), the attributes special to the Buddha ( dven ikab u ddh adh arm a ) . 
[143b28] 

15. Comm. Bh 353a26-29, bh 196bl-3, U 417b23-417c20, u 302a6-303a4. 

“There are ten or eleven kinds of differences between the abhisamaya of the sravakas and 
that of the bodhisattvas, [ten in the Tib B Dh, eleven in P H, which considers the sixth 
visesa as a twofold superiority]: 

1) Alambanavisesa. The bodhisattva abhisamaya has the dharmas of the Greater Vehicle 
as object of the threefold wisdom, wisdom born from learning ( srutamayi prajna ), etc. 
The sravaka abhisamaya has the dharmas of the Lesser Vehicle as object . 

2) Nisrayavisesa. The accumulation of merit (punyasambhara ) consists of the threefold 
practice (prayoga) of generosity (dana), morality (sila) and patience ( ksanti '). The 
accumulation of wisdom ( jndnasambhara ) consists of the practice of zeal ( virya ), 
meditation ( dhydna ) and the wisdom {prajna ) of hearing, etc. [In fact, zeal belongs to 
both accumulations, cf. below, § 18a, comm.] We say ’accumulation’ (sambhara) because 
accumulation takes place over innumerable kalpas. 


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3) Prativedhavisesa. The sravaka abhisamaya penetrates the pudgalanairatmya only, the 
bodhisattva abhisamaya penetrates both the pudgala- and the dharmanairatmya. 

4) Nirvanavisesa. The bodhisattva abhisamaya, using both compassion ( karuna ) and 
wisdom (prajha) as means ( upaya ), has, as nirvana, the fact of not dwelling in either 
samsara or nirvana (cf. chap. IX, § 1). The sravaka abhisamaya has, as nirvana, simply 
the unconditioned ( asamskrta ) (cf. Kosa, I, p. 7). 

5) Bhumivisesa. The bodhisattva abhisamaya bases itself on the ten bhumis in order to 
obtain deliverance ( nihsarana , niryana). There is nothing in the Lesser Vehicle about 
these levels. 

6) Parisuddhivisesa. The bodhisattva abhisamaya cuts through the afflictions (kies a) with 
their predispositions ( savasana ); it is able to purify all the buddhaficlds. The sravaka 
abhisamaya, while cutting through the afflictions, does not cut through their 
predispositions and does not purify the buddhafields. Predisposition ( vasana ) here means 
an afflicted behavioral pattern without, however, there being afflictions (cf. chap. X, § 
21). 

7) Svaparasamacittatapraptivisesa. The bodhisattva abhisamaya perceives (saksatkr-) the 
identity of self and other ( svaparasadharmya ) and exerts itself uninterruptedly in 
ripening (paripacana) beings. On the other hand, the sravaka abhisamaya distinguishes 
between self and other; it pursues solely one's own interest (svakartha) and not that of 
others (par art ha). 

8) Janmavisesa. The bodhisattva takes birth in the family of the tathagata 
(tathagatagotra), in the dharmadhatu (cf. above, § 1 1). He is a true son of Buddha. He is 
like a prince born into a family of a cakravartin and possessing the marks, wheel, etc. 
This is not the case for the sravaka: he is like the son of a slave (dasaputra), bom into a 
family of low extraction (cf. u: ma rabs kyi rigs bran khol gyi bu b€in no). 

9) Upapattivisesa. The bodhisattva is always in the great assmblies surrounding the 
Buddhas, seated on a lotus throne with legs crossed (padmamande paryahkam abhujya 
nisannah); until he becomes Buddha, he takes on apparitional births (upapaduka) (cf. 
chap. VI, § 5, no. 3). Great assemblies of the Buddha means a pure element 
(anasravadhatu), a buddha-land (buddhavisaya) (cf. chap. X, § 30). This is not so for the 
sravaka who is bom in the womb of a mother (matuh kuksau), etc. 


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10) Phalavisesa. The bodhisattva is adorned ( alamkrta ) with innumerable qualities 
( guna ): powers ( bala ), fearlessnesses ( vaisaradya ), etc.; he can effortlessly ( anabhoga ) 
bring about the welfare of all beings (, sarvasattvartha ); he has access ( adhigama ) to the 
dharmakaya (cf. chap. X, § 3): this is his supreme fruit. The others have a suppression 
defiled by rebirths as fruit (ace. to u: zag pa dan bcas pahi skye ba med pa = 
sd.sra van u tpclda ) . ” (U) 


16. Here are some verses: 

i) agantukatvaparyesa anyonyam ndmavastunoh / 

prajhapter dvividhasydtra tanmdtratvasya caisand // 

Investigation concerns the mutual independence of name and entity. In their 
twofold aspect as well, it finds a simple single designation. 

ii) By correct cognition ( yathabhutaparijhdna ), we see that the object does not 
exist, that there is just a threefold concept ( kalpatraya ). 

The object being non-existent, the threefold concept does not exist either, and 
we enter into the three natures. [143c4] 


16. Comm. Bh 335b6-22, bh 196b4-197a4, U 417c26-418al5, u 303a4-303b4. 

“In these two stanzas the author recapitualtes the investigations (paryesana) and their 
results, the yathdbhutaparijnana, in order to facilitate understanding. 

i) Investigation concerns the mutual independence of the name and the entity, the name is 
independent ( dgantuka ) of the entity and likewise, the entity is independent of the name 
(cf. chap. II, § 24). This is not the theory of those who want the word ( sabda ) and the 
entity ( artha ) to be always joined ( nityasambaddha ), arising simultaneously [ace. to u: ji 
Itar kha cig sgra dan don rtag hbrel pa ni lhan cig skyes paho €es bya la sogs par sems 
pa Ita bu ni ma yin no ]. In their twofold aspect as well, he finds a simple single 
designation: in the self-nature ( svabhava ) and the specifications ( visesa ) attributed to 
name and entity, he finds only a simple concept ( prajhaptimatra ). How is that? Self- 


234 



nature and specifications lead to a simple concept, to the expression of a simple 
designation. There is neither real self-nature nor real specifications. 

ii) By means of correct cognition : This is a matter of the four correct cognitions 
(yathdbhutaparijnana) resulting from the four investigations ( paryesana ). We see that 
there is no object : we see that the object is non-existent from the beginning; that there is 
only threefold concept : the concept of name ( namavikalpa ), the concept designating a 
self-nature ( svabhavaprajhaptivikalpa ) and the concept designating specifications 
( visesaprajhaptivikalpa ). The latter being non-existent, the former does not exist either, 
i.e., the object ( artha ) being non-existent, the threefold concept does not exist either. And 
we enter into the three natures : as was said above (§ 8), we enter into the three natures 
( svabhavatraya ) . 

Stanza i) (7): By seeing that the name ( naman ) and the entity ( vastu ) are independent 
(dgantuka) of each other, we enter into the imaginary nature (parikalpitasvabhava ). 

Stanza i) (2): By seeing that their self-nature ( svabhava ) and their specifications (vises a) 
are mere concept ( vikalpamatra ), mere designation (prajhaptimatra ), we enter into the 
dependent nature ( aparatantrasvabhava ). 

Stanza ii): It deals with the entry into the absolute nature (parinispannasvabhdva ). First 
we reject as imaginary (parikalpita) just the object of mind (cittavisaya) distinct from the 
mind. Then, we abandon concept ( vikalpa ) itself. The latter does not exist since its object 
does not exist. Otherwise, bondage (bandhana) and deliverance (vimoksa) would not take 
place, purity and defilement would not exist.” (U) 


17. Stanzas (avavadd) of instruction taken from the Yogavibhangasastra: 

i) The concentrated ( samahita ) bodhisattva sees that images (pratibimba) are 
merely mind (manas). Driving away the notion of object ( arthasamjhd ), he 
understands (avadharayate) that just his mind exists ( svasamjnd ). 

ii) Abiding thus in the inner mind (antascitta), he knows (pratilabhate ) that 

the cognized object ( grdhya ) does not exist; consequently he knows that the 
cognizing subject (grahaka ) does not exist either. Later, he experiences 
(sprsati) non-perception ( anupalambha ). [143c9] 


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17. Comm. Bh 353b28-353c9, bh 197a4-197b3, U 418a21-418b3, 303b4-304a2. 


“Who is able to investigate and obtain the result in that way? To answer this question, the 
author has two stanzas: 

i) The concentrated bodhisattva sees that images are merely mind : he sees that the 
images perceived in concentration (samadhigocarapratibimba) in the appearance of texts 
(dharma) and theses ( artha ) are just his inner mind. As the sutra comments: I have said 
that the object of consciousness ( vijhandlambana ) is formed by a mere concept (cf. chap. 
II, § 7). Here, ’bodhisattva' means the one who sees. He is concentrated: his mind is one- 
pointed. Driving away the notion of object: excluding the notion of object from these 
images, he understands that just his mind exists. He concludes: These objects (nimitta) 
that have the appearance of texts and theses are merely a development (parinama) of my 
concentrated mind. 

ii) Thus he abides in the inner mind: i.e., at this moment his mind dwells in mind itself. 
He understands that the cognized object does not exist: consequently he knows that the 
cognizing subject does not exist either: First he understands that the grahya is non- 
existent, that if the svabhava of the grahya is non-existent, the svabhava of the grahaka, 
superimposed on the svabhava of the grahya, is itself non-existent. Later, he experiences 
non-perception: after that, he penetrates tathata where perception of both svabhavas are 
absent.” (U) 

These two stanzas are cited in Siddhi, p. 581: The concentrated bodhisattva sees that the 
images are mind only: [this is usmagata]. The notion of things having been expelled, he 
sees that only his mind exists: [this is murdhana]. Abiding thus in inner mind, he knows 
that grahya does not exist: [this is lesser ksanti]; then when grahaka as well does not 
exist: [this is the other two ksantis]; later he contacts anupalambha: [this is the entry into 
tattvadarsanamarga] . 


18. Now, drawn from the Mahayanasutralamkara (VI, 6-10), here are other 
stanzas on clear understanding (realization) ( abhisamaya ): 


236 



i) sambhrtya sambhdram anantapdram jhdnasya punyasya ca bodhisattvah / 

dharmesu cintasuviniscitatvaj jalpanvayam arthagatim paraiti// 

“Having collected a limitless accumulation of wisdom and merit, having 
reached complete certainty of the texts by reflection, the bodhisattva 
understands that the object has its origin in speech.” 

ii) arthan sa vijndya ca jalpamatran samtisthate tannibhacittamatre / 

pratyaksatam eti ca dharmadhatus tasmdd viyukto dvayataksanena // 

“Having recognized that objects are nothing other than words, he settles into 
Concept-Only appearing as object. The fundamental element is present to his 
eyes; this is why he is free of duality.” 

iii) ndstlti cittat par am etya buddhya cittasya nastitvam upaiti tasmat/ 

dvayasya nastitvam upetya dhlmdn samtisthate 'tadgatidharmadhatau // 

“By means of his intellect he understands that that which is other than mind 
is not so; this is why he recognizes the non-existence of the mind itself. The 
wise person who has understood the non-existence of duality settles into the 
fundamental element that is beyond this duality. 

iv) akalpandjhdnabalena dhlmatah samdnuydtena samantatah sadd/ 

tadasrayo gahvaradosasamcayo mahagadeneva visam nirasyate// 

“In the wise person, by the power of the concept-free cognition that always 
accompanies equality everywhere, the basis, a mass of errors like a thicket, is 
driven out just as poison is expelled by a powerful antidote.” 

v) munivihitasudharmasuvyavastho matim upadhdya samuladharmadhatau / 

smrtigatim avagamya kalpamatram vrajati gunarnavapdram asu dhlrah // 

“Established in the good law prescribed by the Sage, fixing his mind in the 
fundamental-element-root, understanding that the activity of memory is only 
concept, the brave bodhisattva rapidly reaches the other shore of the ocean 
of qualities.” [143c20] 


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18. Comm. Bh 353c22-354b6, bh 197b3-198b8, U 418bl6-419al6, u 304a2-305b3. 

“i) Having collected a limitless accumulation of merit and wisdom (sambhrtya 
sambharam anantapdram jhanasya punyasya ca). The first three perfections ( paramita ), 
generosity ( dana ), etc., are the accumulation of merit. The sixth, the perfection of 
wisdom ( prajhaparamita ), is the accumulation of wisdom. Zeal ( virya ), effort, penetrates 
both accumulations. It is the same for trance ( dhyana ): when it concerns the infinite 
(apramana) practices, it enters into the accumulation of merit; otherwise, it enters into 
the accumulation of wisdom. Having accumulated (sambhrtya) means having fulfilled 
( paripurya ). This fulfilling ( paripurana ) which extends over portions of incalculable 
time ( asamkhyeyakalaprabheda ) is limitless (anantapara). The bodhisattva, having 
reached perfect certainty in the texts (dharmesu cintasuviniscitatvat): by means of a 
cognition subsequent to concentration ( samddhiprsta/abhdhajhdna ), he understands 
perfectly ( niscaya ) all the dharmas, sutra, etc., and he has suppressed all hesitation 
( yicikitsa ). He understands that the object has its origin in words (jalpanvayam 
arthagatim paraiti): he understands that all objects ( artha ) are only mental words 
( manojalpa ) and have concepts ( yikalpa ) as cause. [Ace. to u: tshigs su bead pa hdis ni 
tshogs kyi lam bstan to: this stanza explains the sambharamarga]. 

ii) Having recognized that objects are just words, he settles into Concept-Only of the 
appearance of object (arthan sa vijhaya ca jalpamatran samtisthate tannibhacittamatre): 
when he has recognized that all objects are just mental words ( manojalpa ), he settles his 
mind and dwells in Concept-Only of which the many developments ( nanaparinama ) in 
the semblance of an object. Indeed, the bodhisattva has attained certainty ( viniscaya ). 
The first part of stanza ii) deals with the nirvedhabhagiyavastha of the bodhisattva. 
Stanza i) dealt with the prayogavastha. 

The fundamental element is present before his eyes; that is why he is free of duality 
(pratyaksatam eti ca dharmadhatus tasmad viyukto dvayalaksanena). Having penetrated 
the non-existence of the object, being settled in Concept-Only, he is able to suppress the 
duality of grahya and grahaka and directly perceive non-duality ( advaya ), the absolute 
( paramartha ), the dharmadhatu, because the arising of the certainty of his cognition 
( viniscitajnana ) is based on the dharmadhatu. This second part of stanza ii) and stanza iii) 
which follows deal with the darsanamargavastha. 


238 



iii) Now it is necessary to explain how the dharmadhatu is present before his eyes 
( pratyaksatam eti). By means of his intellect he understands that that nothing other than 
his mind exists; that is why he recognized the non-existence of mind itself (nastfti cittat 
param etya buddhya cittasya nastitvam upaiti tasmat). He knows that nowhere is there 
any perceived object ( alambanavisaya ) outside of the mind. Since this object does not 
exist, the mind which perceives it ( alambakacitta ) does not exist either. The wise person 
who has understood the non-existence of duality (dvayasya nastitvam upetya dhiman). 
The wise person ( dhunat ) is the person endowed with great wisdom ( prajha ). To know 
with certainty ( viniscaya ) the non-existence of duality ( dvayasya nastitvam ) is to 
penetrate ( pratividh -) the imaginary nature (parikalpita ). The non-existence of duality is 
called the original non-existence of object and subject ( dlambanalambakayor 
adinastitvam). He settles into the fundamental element that is beyond this duality 
(samtisthate 'tadgatidharmadhatau) . Samtistha- means to rest (stha) in equality ( samata ). 
Completely free of grahya and grahaka, the dharmadhatu is beyond duality. The 
dharmadhatu perceived in this way is not false; it is a true dharmadhatu. 

iv) In the wise person, by the power of nonconceptual cognition (akalpanajhanabalena 
dhimatah: by the power ( anubhava ) contained in this nonconceptual cognition 
( n ir vika I pakajhana ) of the bodhisattvas. This wisdom accompanies equality always and 
everywhere (samanuyatena samantatah sada). It accompanies everywhere (samantatah) , 
i.e., inwardly and outwardly ( adhyatmabahirdha ). It accompanies equality (sama), 
because if grahya does not exist, then grahaka does not exist either. Seeing an identity of 
nature ( svabhavasamata ) like space ( akasa ) in the dharmas, sutras, etc., this knowkedge 
accomapanies equality. It accompanies it always (sada), i.e., throughout all time. - The 
support, a heap of faults like a thicket, is expelled (tadasrayo gahvaradosasamcayo 
nirasyate). By support (as ray a) is meant the cause (hetu) of defiled ( samklesika ) 
dharmas. It is a heap of faults (dosasamcaya) because the propensities (vasana) of the 
faults (dosa), i.e., the defiled dharmas, are piled up there. It is like a thicket ( gahvara ) 
because it is hard to penetrate (duranupravista). As poison is expelled by a powerful 
antidote (mahagadeneva visam). This phrase is easy to understand. Since it drives away 
faults (dosa), this knowledge is like an antidote (agada). Stanza iv) deals with the 
bhavanamargavastha . 


239 



v) Established in the good law prescribed by the Muni 
(munivihitasudharmasuvyavasthah): established in the holy dhanna proclaimed by the 
venerable Muni, the Buddha. Fixing his mind on the fundamental-element-root (matim 
upadhaya samuladharmadhatu. He fixes his mind on the holy dharma that is well-taught 
(suvyavasthapite dharme ), taught by the Buddha, and on the dharmadhatu-root. Root 
(mu/a) because it is the cause of awakening (avabodha), or because it bears on ah the 
dharmas. Indeed, ah dharmas have the ten bhumis as root. It is called dharmadhatu 
because ah dharmas exist by means of it. It is the emptiness ( sunyata ) of dharmas. 
Understanding that the activity of memory is nothing but concept ( smrtigatim avagamya 
kalpamatram). Subsequent cognition (prsthalabdhajhana ) functions by being based on 
the dharmadhatu. He understands that the activity of memory is mere concept ( vikalpa ), 
that, apart from concept, there is no dharma committed to memory. Memorized dharmas, 
such as sutras, etc., and the memorized paramitas with their results, have an imaginary 
nature (parikalpita ) and do not exist. The brave bodhisattva rapidly attains the other 
shore of the ocean of qualities (vrajati gunarnavaparam asu dhTrah) : by means of 
realization (abhisamaya) which is gradually developed, by nonconceptual knowledge 
(nirvikalpakajhana) and subsequent cognition (prsthalabdhajhana ), the bodhisattvas 
rapidly attain the perfection of ah the qualities (sarvagunaparipuri), i.e. buddhahood 
(i buddhata ).” (U) 


CHAPTER III NOTES 


Preliminary Note: 

Chapters III to X make up a whole; they could be entitled ’the process of purification in 
the Greater Vehicle’. - Chap. Ill is dedicated to the path (marga) and its five stages 
(avastha); this path seems to be an ever more profound penetration into the three natures 
(s vabhava) or the three characteristics (laksana) of things. This chapter is entitled ’entry 
into the characteristics of the knowable’ (jheyalaksanapravesa). - The path has as cause 
the mundane practice of the six virtues (paramita ); it has as result the possession of the 
same virtues in the supramundane state. Chap. IV, which deals with these virtues, is 
rightly called 'cause and result of entry’ (pravesahetuphala ). - The cultivation (bhavana) 
of the six supramundane virtues involves ten progressive stages called bhumis which 
constitute the strictly-called career of the bodhisattva. Chap. IV, dedicated to these 
bhumis, is entitled ’the various developments of the cause and the result'. 
(hetuphalabhavanaprabheda). - The ten bhumis in the development of the six virtues are 


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modelled on the threefold training ( siksa ): morality, concentration and wisdom. Chap. VI 
deals with excellent morality ( adhisila ), chap. VII with excellent mind ( adhicitta ) and 
chap. VIII with excellent wisdom (adhiprajna). This excellent wisdom is none other than 
nonconceptual wisdom ( nirvikalpakajndna ) acquired on the entry into the first bhumi and 
perfected during the course of the following bhumis up to full blossoming. - Coming out 
of the tenth bhumi, the bodhisattva has attained the fruit of his practices; he has cut all the 
seeds of defilement. This is why chap. IX is called ’fruition-cutting’ ( phalaprahana ), i.e., 
the cutting of the defilements which is the result of the three trainings. This chapter 
briefly describes the state of Buddhahood: the old individuality of the bodhisattva is 
changed ( asrayaparavrtti ); while remaining in samsara in order to save beings, he 
himself is in nirvana: this is what is called apratisthitanirvana. - An immaculate and 
unhindered wisdom ( virnalam apratihatam ca jnanam) which is expressed in the three 
bodies ( trikaya ) of the Buddha corresponds to the fruit of Buddhahood. Chap. X is 
dedicated to it; it is entitled ’the wisdom of the fruit’ ( phalajnana ). 

Chap. Ill, which could be improved by being better organized, deals with the path 
(marga) and its stages ( avastha ) which are enumerated in § 3: 

i) Sambhar avastha, stage of gathering. The bodhisattva cultivates conviction ( adhimukti ) 
in the vijnaptimatrata of all dharmas (cf. § 2). He devotes himself to an infinity of 
excellent practices ( paramacarya ) of which some are described in § 4-6. This period 
extends from the first production of the mind of enlightenment ( bodhicittotpada ) up to 
the production of usmagata. 

ii) Prayogavastha, the preparatory stage. The bodhisattva progressively tames the 
concepts of object and subject ( grahyagrahaka ) and thus ’prepares’ the seeing of reality 
(tattvadarsana). To this effect he cultivates the nirvedhabhagiyas of the Greater Vehicle 
and the coreesponding samadhis (cf. § 7 and 13) of which the following is a comparative 
table: 


Usmagata 

Fourfold lower paryesana 

Alokaladbdha 

Murdhan 

Fourfold higher paryesana 

Alokavrddhi 

Satyanulomikl- 

Fourfold lower yathabhuta- 

Tattvarthaika- 

ksanti 

parijnana 

desananupra- 

vistasamadhi 

Laukikagra- 

Fourfold higher yatha- 

Anantarya- 

dharma 

parijhana 

samadhi 


241 



This stage marks the end of the first asamkhyeyakalpa (cf. chap. V, § 6) and the end of 
the adhimukticaryabhumi. 

iii) Prativedhavastha, stage of penetration. In one moment the bodhisattva reaches full 
understanding ( abhisamaya ) of reality and produces nonconceptual wisdom 
(nirvikalpakajndna). See § 9 and 1 1 . This stage, which is instantaneous and constitutes 
the path of seeing ( darsanamarga ) of the bodhisattva, marks the entry into the first 
bhumi. 

iv) Bhavandvasthd, the stage of meditation. The bodhisattva ’meditates' on what he has 
'seen' in the third stage and perfects intuitive wisdom (cf. § 14). This stage lasts from the 
mind of residing in the first bhumi ( sthiticitta ) until vajropamasamadhi at the end of the 
tenth bhumi, It lasts for two asamkhyeyakalpas (cf. chap. V, § 6). 

v) Nisthavastha, final stage. The bodhisattva leaves the obstacles ( klesajneyavarana ) and 
dwells in anuttara samyaksambodhih. Having become buddha, he converts beings and 
causes them to enter into the vijnaptimatrata. 

Some more- or less-developed accounts of the Greater Vehicle in Abhisamayalamkara, 
chap. V, p. 27 seq.; Sutralamkara, VI, 6-10 (= Samgraha, III, § 18); XIV, 1-22 
( sambhara ), 23-27 (prayoga ), 29-41 ( darsana ), 42-51 ( bhavana ); Madhyantavibhanga, 
tatravastha, p. 188-192; Abhisamayasamuccaya, T 1605, k. V, p. 682b21 seq.; Trimsika, 
p. 42 (12) seq.; Siddhi, p. 562-611; Bu-ston, I, p. 1 17. 

On the path in the Lesser Vehicle, Kosa, V, p. IV-XI (resume); L. de La Vallee Poussin, 
MusTla etNarada, MCB, V, 1937, p. 192 sq. 

Comparison of the sravaka, pratyekabuddha and bodhisattva paths. E. Obermiller, 
Coctrine of P. P., AO, XI, 1932, p. 13-47. 

* * 

§ 1. Manojalpa, mental discourse, synonym of manovijnana. - Cf. Uttaratantra, p. 133; 
Sutralamkara, ad XI, 7 ( manojalpair id samkalpah ); ad XIV, 23 ( tathabhuto bodhisattvah 
samahitacitto manojalpad vinirmuktam sarvadharman na pasyati 
svalaksanasdmdnyalaksandkhyan manojalpamatram eva khyati ); Trimsika, p. 32 (19) 

( vitarkah patyesako manojalpah ); Siddhi, p. 385, 386, 586. 

§ 2. Sambharavastha: Trimsika, kar. 26, p. 42 (12); Siddhi, p. 564-574. Sambhara in the 
Lesser Vehicle: Jataka, I, P- 1 ( bodhi ); Theragatha comm. p. 214) ( vimokhhkas -); 
Mahavastu, I, P- 239 (5) kusalamulas -); II, P- 286 (7) ( sambharato punydnam ); III, P- 250 
(9) ( dharmas -); Lalitavistara, p. 35 (12) (punyas-, jnans-a, samathas-, vidarsanas -); 
Saundarananda, XVII, st. 15; Kosa, VII, p. 80. - Sambhara in the Greater Vehicle: 
Karunapundarlka, p. 104 (long list); Madh. vrtti, p. 357 (1) ( prajnopdyamahdkarunds -, 
Siksasam., p. 191 (4) ( dharmas-, jndnas- ) ; Sutralamkara, XVIII, 38-41 (types, essence, 
etymology, result); Bodh. bhumi, p. 258 (25) (2 bodhis); Madhyantavibhanga, p. 213 ( S . 
of the sravaka and the bodhisattva); Siddhi, p. 564. 

Adhimukti, adherence, forms the essential of this stage and the following one. Beyond 
the references already given for chap. II, § 13, for the Hmayana, see DTgha, I, P- 174; 
Anguttara, V, p. 36; Patisambhida, I, P- 124; Milinda, p. 161, 169; Vibhanga, p. 340, 341; 
Sumangalavilasim, I. p. 44, 103; Mahavastu, I, P- 159 (15), II, p. 309 (14); Lalitavistara, 
p. 10 (11), 32 (20), 33 (6), 433 (11); Avadanasataka, I, p. 8 (1 1), 1 12 (8), 285 (5); Kosa, 

I. p. 40; II, p. 204; VII, P- 70. 85. - For the Mahayana, see Saddhannapundanka, p. 25, 


242 



31, 49, 53, 1 10, etc. (see also adhimucyate, p. 187, 232, 255, etc.); Bhadramaya, p. 101 
(ed. Regamey); Samadhiraja (ed. Regamey), XIX, 2-4, XXII, st. 44; Lankavatara, P. 42 
(12), 172 (2), 194 (16); Kasyapa, § 16, p. 35; Dasabhumika, p. 7, 11, 14, 20, 29, 38, 40, 
41, 56, 68, 70, 73, 75, 76, 78; Samdhinir., index; Madh. vrtti, p. 159 n., 268 n., 337 (6), 
338 (11), 358 n., 443 (1); Siksasam., p. 171 seq. ( sunayadh -); Sutralarnkara, I. 13-18; X 
as a whole; Bodh. bhumi, p. 95 (13), 195 (12); Uttaratantra, p. 158, 163, 164; Trimsika, 
p. 25 (20); Madhyantavihanga, p. 190-192; Siddhi, p. 173, 563, 565, 572, 661, 731. 

Adhimukticaryabhumi, which is the subject of the following §: Kosa, IV, p. 224; Abhis. 
al. al., p. 64 (6); Samdhinir. IX, v. 3; Dasabhumika, introduction; Madh. avatara, p. 13; 
Sutralarnkara, IV, 2; XI, 75; XIV, 1; XVI, 76; XX, 24-27, 41; Madhyantavibhanga, p. 

130 (5), 190 (5), 204 (14), 205 (7); Siddhi, p. 731. 

§3. See preliminary note. 

§ 4 - 6 . Deal with the four practices in the Sambharavastha: 

i) Accumulation by gathering the roots of good: see references to sambhara above and in 
§ 2 - 

ii) Struggle against discouragement: Sutralarnkara, X, 1 1; Siddhi, p. 574. 

iii) Elimination of the four stoppings: a) sravakapratyekabuddha- 

manasikdraparivarjana, Sutralarnkara, XIII, 14-15 ; b) vimativicikitsa-prahana, definition 
in Kosa, V, p. 2, 31; Kasyapa, v. 7, p. 16; Trimsika, p. 29 (27); Madhyantavibhanga, p. 
73(19); Siddhi, p. 347; Lankavatara, p. 117(15), 1 18 (14-17); c) 
dharmabhinivesaprahana = suppression of atmatmiyagraha, Samdhinir., p. 41, 161; 
Siddhi, p. 250; d) vikalpaprahana, Sutralarnkara, XIX, 50 where the verse is commented 
on in a slightly different way. 

iv. Continuous effort applied to samatha and vipasyana, see below, § 12. 


§ 7 . Deals with the prayogavastha and is to be complemented by § 13. 

Paryesana: defined in Trimsika, p. 32 (19) (paryesako manojalpah kim etad id 
nirupanakarapravrttah vitarkah ), Siddhi, p. 385, 389, 390. - The four paryesanas are 
defined in Sutralarnkara, XIX, 47; Bodh. bhumi, p. 53 (6-16); 

Abhidharmasamuccayavyakhya, T 1606, k. XI, p. 745b28 seq.; Siddhi, p. 576-577. - See 
the definitions in Bodh. bhumi, p. 53: tatra ndmaparyesand yad bodhisattvo namni 
ndmamatram pasyati. evam vastuni vastumatradarsanam vastuparyesana. 
svabhdvaprajnaptausvabhdvaprajnaptimdtradarsanam svabhdva-prajnaptiparyesand. 
visesaprajnaptau visesaprajnaptimdtradarsanam visesaprajnaptiparyesand. sa 
namavastuno bhinnam ca laksanam pasyaty anuslistam ca. 
namavastvanuslesasamnisritam ca svabhavaprajnaptim pratividhyati. 

Yathabhutaparijnana: Sutralarnkara, XIX, 48-55; Bodh. bhumi, p. 53 (17) -55 (3); 294 
(14 - 20); Abhidharmasamuccayavyakhya, T 1616, k. XI, p. 475c20 seq.; Siddhi, p. 577 
{namaisendgatam yathdbhuta-parijhanam, etc.). 


§ 8. This paragraph has been studied by E. Obermiller, Nirvana according to Tibetan 
Tadition, IHQ, X, 1934, p. 242-244. 


243 



For singleness, duality and multiplicity, see notes to chap. II, § 11. 

The example of the rope mistaken for a snake has already been encountered in chap. II, § 
16. See also Kosa, VI, p. 258; Lankavatara, p. 327 (10); Madgyantavibhanga, p. 14 (6), 
28 (17); Madh. vrtti, p. 220 (8), 523 (1); Cittavisuddhiprakarana, st. 68-69. - Example 
also used by Samkara in comm, to Mandukyop., Anandasrama, p. 8: yasya 
dvaitaprapahcasyopasame ‘dvaitapratipattT rajjvdm iva sarpadivikalpopasame 
rajjutatvaparipattih ; p. 40: sarpadivikalpa-pratisedhenaiva rajjusvarupapratipattivat 
avasthasyevatmanas tuiyatvena pratipipadayisitatvat; comm, on the Brahmasutras, I, 1, 
4, p. 60: sydd etad evamyadi rajjusvarupasravana iva arpabhrantih nivarteta. See also 
O. Lacombe, L ’Absolu selon le vedanta, 1937, p. 209. 


§ 9. Describes the arrival at darsanamarga by means of the practice of the 
nirvedhabhagryas. This passage, obscured by its extreme conciseness, should be 
compared with Madhyantavibhanga, p. 26 (20) - 27 (18), of which the following is the 
text and translation: 

visaydnupalabdhim asritya vijnaptimdtrasyapy anupalabdhir jdyata iti / yatha na 
vijhanad bahih parikalpitam grhyam astiti vijnaptimatdtratdbalena manogrhydbhdvam 
pravisati tatha grhydbhdvabalena vijnaptimdtrasyapy abhavam pratipadyate / grahyam 
eva hy apeksya tadgrahakam vyavasthapyate / grahyabhave grahkasambhavat / evam 
asallaksanam grahyagrahakayoh parikalpitarupayoh pravisati / nabhutaparikalpasyeti 
darsanam bhavati / kim artharn pnuah prathamata eva vijnaptimbtrasyaivbbhavam na 
vibhavayati / grdhyapratibaddhatvdd dhi grdhakasydlambamydrthabhdve 
blambanasvabhbvavindsat sukham pravisati / anyatha bhavapavadam eva kwyat / 
grahyagrahakayoh parasparanirapeksatvat / imam ca grdhyagrdhakavikalpdtitam 
jhanabhumim sambharesu nirantaram pravartamanah prathamakalpasamkhyeya- 
parisamaptau pravisati / evam vijhaptimatram idam nisritya 
rupadyabhavabhavnaalokottaramargasya prathamasvabhava usmagatakhyah 
saparivarah samadhir amukhibhavati / tasyanantaram murdhakhyah / tasyanantaram 
asesagrahyanupalambhad grahakanupalambhanukulah kshntyakhyah samadhih / 
tasyamanataram arthanupalabdhim nisritya vijnaptimdtrasyapy anupalabdhim 
bhavantato laukibgradharmakhyah prajnadisahita saparivarah samadhir amukhibhavati / 
tadananataram darsanamargah / tatraiva ca sarvatragadharmadhatvadhigamat 
prathamam bhumim pravisati / 

“By virtue of non-perception of the object, the non-perception of Concept-only is also 
engendered. Just as the bodhisattva penetrates the object of mind thanks to the notion of 
Concept-only - a notion expressed by saying that the imagined object does not exist 
outside the consciousness - in the same way he discovers the non-existence of Concept- 
only thanks to the notion of the non-existence of the object. Indeed, it is by correlation 
with the object that the subject is assumed: if the object does not exist, neither does the 
subject. Thus it is established that the bodhisattva penetrates the unreal character of 
object and subject which are essentially imaginary, but not the unreal nature of false 
imagination. Why does the bodhisattva not recognize the non-existence of Concept-only 
right from the start? Because subject is li nk ed to object; it is only when the non-existence 
of the perceived object is demonstrated that the reality of the object of consciousness 
disappears, and then the bodhisattva penetrates safely into a purely spiritual universe. On 
the contrary, if the bodhisattva recognized the non-existence of the subject from the start, 


244 



he would proceed to the complete negation of all reality by being unaware of the 
interdependence of subject and object. The bodhisattva who has uninterruptedly practiced 
the path of preparation attains, at the end of a first incalculable period, the stage of 
knowledge that transcends the distinction between object and subject. Thus, thanks to this 
notion of Concept-only, a concentration called ’heat' along with its retinue is brought 
about, a realization of the nonexistence of matter, etc., the first stage in the supramundane 
path. After that comes the concentration called 'the highest state’. Then come the 
concentrations called ’patience' which, by non-perception of any object whatsoever, 
furthers the non-perception of the subject. Then follows, along with its associates and 
accompanied by wisdom, the concentration called 'the highest of worldly dharmas’, a 
concentration which, being based on the non-perception of objects, produces the non- 
perception of Concept-only as well. Immediately after this is the path of seeing; this is 
where the bodhisattva, attaining the omnipresent fundamental element, penetrates into the 
first bhumi.” 

A similar explanation will be found in the Bodhicaryavatara, IX, 33-35: Panjika, p. 414 
seq. 


§ 11 . Describes the darsanamarga. This marks the beginning of the practice of the 
bhumis, the beginning of dharmadhatuprativedha (cf. Madhyantavibhanga, p. 101 (11); 
252-253), birth into the buddhagotra (cf. Bodh. bhumi, p. 78 (23)); Madhyantavibhanga, 
p. 56 (3), 195 (15), the beginning of the nirvikalpajnana here called the 'mind of 
sameness' ( samacitta ) and in chap. X, § 5, no. 5, the ’knowledge of equality' 

(samatacitta). 

That equality is one of the main characteristics of nirvikalapaka-jnana comes under chap. 
VIII, § 5, where it is said that tathata, the shared nature of all dharmas, is the object of 
nirvikalpakajnana. This is why Trimsika, p. 43 (18), defines this knowledge as samam 
andlambyalambakam nirvikalpam lokottaram jnanam. 

On samata, equality, samatajnana, knowledge of equality, samatacitta, the mind of 
equality or unified state of mind that considers all beings as equal universally, without 
mind of attachment or aversion, see Abhiniskramanasutra, T 190, k. XXXIII, p. 805c; T 
261, k. IX, p. 905a-c; Lankavatara, p. 147 (3 - 4), 168 (144) - 169 (3); Sutralamkara, IX, 
70-71; Siddhi, p. 743 seq.; four samatas, ( aksara , vak, kaya, dharma) in Lankavatara, p. 
141-142; four samatas ( sattva , dharma, bodhi, prajha) in Samdhinir., VIII, v. 21; five 
samatas in Bodh. bhumi, p. 286 (11) and Sutralamkara, XIV, 30-31; ten samatas in 
Avatamsaka, T 279, k. XXX, p. 164b; k. XXXVI, p. 191b; k. XXXVII, p. 193c; in 
Buddhabhumisutrashastra, T 1530, k. V, p. 3 13c 1 . 

Here the mind of equality concerns all beings, 1) because they are equally anatmana (cf. 
Madyantavibhanga, p. 100 (8-1 1): svaparasamatam pratilabhate. yo ‘ ham sa paroya va 
parah so 'ham iti paratratmani ca sunyatdyd abhedadarsanat svaparatmani ca 
sunyataya adhedadarsan at svaparatmanor abhedam manyate ), 2) because all beings are 
the tathagatagarbha, cf. Tathagatagarbhasutra, T 666, p. 457c8; Adhyardhasarika, T 241, 
k. I, p. 780b26; T 242, p. 783al 1; Sutralamkara, IX, 37; Lankavarara where the the 
tathagatagarbha, which is prakrtiprabhasvara, nitya, dhruva, siva, sasvata, dwells in the 
body of all beings ( sarvasattvadehantargata , p. 77 (16) has the name alaya 
(i alayavijhanasamsabdita , p. 220 (14) and transmigrates ( samsarati , p. 242 (2)); E. 


245 



Obermiller, Doctrine of the P. P., p. 331, 32, 45, 99; Uttaratantra, p. 82, 89, 104, 108, 

1 14; Siddhi, p. 30, 1 10, 754-757; Mahaparnirvanasutra, in Hoemle, Maniscript Remains, 
p. 94. - Concerning the asayasamata of the bodhisattvas and the dhannadhatusamata of 
the Buddhas, see Sutralamkara, XIV, 30. 


§ 12 . Samatha-vipasyana. In the Hmayana, Majjhima, I, p. 494; III, p. 289, 297; 

Samyutta, IV, p. 194-195, 295, 350, 352; V, p. 52; Anguttara, II, p. 157; 

Dhammasangani, p. 60; Lalitavistara, p. 35 (14-15) (samatha-vidarsana); Dlvya, p. 95; 
Kosa, V, p. 99; VI, 280, 301; VII, p. 21; VIII, p. 131, 146, 157. - In the Mahayana, 
Samdhinir. VIII, v. 1-18; Bodhicaryavatarapankika, p. 344 (1); Sutralamkara, XVIII, 66- 
68; Bodh. bhumi, p. 209(2) (s.-v. paksyam dhyanam ); p. 260 (1) -261 (5) (four kinds of 
samatha); Madhyantavibhnga, p. 151 (20), 214 (2), 215 (8), 272 (19); Siddhi, p. 334, 370, 
383, 596; E. Obermiller, Doctrine of the P. P., p. 16, 17, 20, 27, 68. 

Knowledge of mixed object ( samsrstadharmdlambanam jhanam): below, chap. VII, § 4; 
chap. VIII, § 19, no. 3; Samdhinir. VIII, § 13-16. 

The ideas have been summarized by L. de la Vallee Poussin in Siddhi, p. 597: After 
reflecting ( cintana ), which is the discursive understanding of the Buddha's teaching, 
samatha, which is ‘linking the mind with the ineffable reality’, enters into contact with 
the true nature of the dharmas, dharmata', samatha makes vipasyana possible. The mind, 
perfumed by samatha, discerns and cognizes the dharmas according to dharmata, 
according the the preceding cintana. 

Example of the magician is developed at length in Samdhinir., I, § 4; Astasahasrika, p. 

21 . 


§ 13 . See the synoptic table of the paryesana— yathabhutaparijnanas, nirvedhabhagiya and 
samadhi in the preliminary note to this chapter. 

Nirvedhabhagiya. In the Hmayana: Dlgha, III, p. 251, 277; Samyutta, V, p. 345; 
Anguttara, III, p. 427; Vibhanga, p. 330; Nettippakarana, p. 21, 48, 143 seq., 153 seq.; 
Visuddhimagga, p. 15, 88; Divya, p. 50 (8); Kosa, VI, p. 164-177; Kosavyakhya, p. 97 
(14), 247 (25), 678 (6).; Treatise on the Sects by Vasumitra, Asia Major, II, 1925, p. 26, 
56. - In the Mahayana: Abhis. alamkara, I. st. 26, p. 5; V, st. 1-4, p. 27; Abhis. al. al, p. 

36 (25), 63 (22), 663 (12) seq.; E, Obermiller, Doctrine of the P. P., p. 73, 78, 84, 86; 
Analysis of the Abhis. alamkara, COS no, 27, 1933, p. 8-9, 63; Madh. vrtti, p. 362 n.; 
Bodhicaryavatarapanjika, p. 426 (5); Sutralamkara, VI, 9; XIV, 23-26; 
Abhidharmasamuccayavyakhya, T 1606, k. VIII, p. 734c6; Uttaratantra, p. 86; 
Madhyantavibhanga, p. 27 (8-18), 78 (16), 156 (18), 178 (23), 179 (2, 6, 20), 180 (7); 
Siddhi, p. 575-584, 602-603. Abhis. al. al., p. 63 (22) seq. should be cited: evain 
krtadharmapravicayah krtadharmaapravicayah samahutacittas ca 
sarvadharmanirdtmyam bhavayan kramena yada prthagbhutbrth-dbhinivesbbhbvad 
Tsarspastajhanalokena manomatram eva pasyatitadasyosmagatavastha. sa 
evatralokalabdho nama saadhir ucyate mahayane. -yada tasyaiva dharmalokasya 
vrddhyartham nairdtmya-bhdvandydm viryarambhena madhyaspasto jhanaloka bhavati 
murdhavastha. sa eva vrddhaloko nama smamadhih. -yada tu cittamatravasthanena 
spastataro bahyarthabhinivesabhavo jhanaloko jayata tada ksantyavastha. 


246 



grahyakarabhavanupravesat tattvdrthiaikadesapravisto nama samadhih. - yaddpimar 
arthagrahakaviksepanabhaso jnanaloka nispadyate tada laukikdgradharmdvasthd. sa 
evanantaryo nama samadhih. Sarvs caita avastha drdhadhimuktito 
'dhimukticaryabhumir ucyate. 


§ 14 . Bhavanamarga. See the references to the path of the Mahayana above. 


§ 15 . Fifteen differences between the abhisamaya of the sravakas and the bodhisattvas, 
cf. Abhidhannasamuccaya, T 1605, k. 7, p. 690c2 seq.; Abhidharmasamuccayavyakhya, 
T 1606, k. 13, p. 757a seq. 

For abhisamaya in general, see Kosa, VI, p. 122, p. 185 (various modalities); 
Sutralamkara, IX, 70; Madhyantavibhanga, p. 71 (21), 123 (6), 163 (17); Trimsika, p. 42 
(9); Siddhi, p. 601-605; E. Obenniller, Dotrine ofP. P., p. 7-9, 13, 15, 49, 52; 
Uttaratantra, p. 94. - List of six abhisamayas in Vikhyapana, T 1602, k. 17, p. 562c 13; 
Siddhi, p. 602. - List of ten abhisamayas in Abhidharmasamuccayavyakhya, T 1606, k. 
13, p. 756cl. - List of eighteen abhisamayas in Vikhyapama, T 1602, k. 17, p. 562c27. 


§ 16 . The relationships between name and thing have already been studied in chap. II, § 
24. They will be taken up again in chap. VIII, § 7. On this difficult question, see 
Tattvasamgraha, XVI Sabdhdrtha-pariksa, I, p. 274-366; Vigrahavyavartani, French 
trans. By S. Yamaguchi, JA, 1929, p. 1-86; Tibetan text and English trans. In G. Tucci, 
Pre-Dihnaga Buddhist texts on Logic from Chinse Sources , 1929; Sanskrit text, reently 
discob=vered and pub. By K. P. Jjayaswal and R. Aamkrtyayana, in appendix, JBORS, 
XXIII, 1937, part III. 


17 . Stanzas cited in Siddhi, p. 581. 


247 



CHAPTER IV 


CAUSE AND RESULT OF ENTRY 

(pravesahetuphala) 


1. In Chapter III, the entry into the natures of the knowable 
( jneyalaksanapravesa ) has been explained; how should the cause ( hetu ) and 
result ( phala ) of this entry be conceived? - By means of the six mundane virtues 
( pdramitd ): generosity ( ddna ), morality (sTla), patience ( ksanti ), zeal ( vlrya ), 
meditation ( dhydna ) and wisdom (prajnd ). 

How does one enter into Concept-Only (yijnaptimdtratd) by means of these six 
virtues; how do the six virtues result from this entry? 

1) The bodhisattva is not attached to pleasures ( bhogesv asamraktah), does 
not transgress against morality ( sTlesv anapattikah), is not disturbed by 
suffering ( duhkhesv aksobhyah), is not lazy in practice ( bhdvandydm 
akusldah); abandoning the causes of distraction ( viksepahetu ) and fixing his 
mind one-pointedly ( cittam ekdgrlkrtyd), he correctly analyzes dharmas 

( yoniso dharmdn pravicinoti) and, based on these six virtues, he enters into 
Concept-Only. 

2) Having entered into Concept-Only, the bodhisattva acquires the six 
virtues contained (parigrhTta ) in the high pure aspiration ( suddhadhyasraya ). 
Thus, without even making an effort to practice ( vinam api samuddcdra- 
prayogena) the six virtues, the bodhisattva develops ( bhdvayati ) the six 
virtues in a continous uninterrupted manner ( satatasamitayogena ) by means 
of his adherence to the teachings ( desaanddhimukti ), by means of his 
contemplation ( manasikdra ) of kindness ( dsvddand ), acceptance (anumodand) 
and rejoicing ( abhinandand ), and arrives at perfection {paripuri ). [144a4] 


1. Comm. Bh 354b23-354c4, bh 198b8-199a3, U 419b7-419cl, u 305b3-306a6. 


248 



“At the time of the preparatory practice (prayoga ), the cause (hetu) of entry into 
Concept-Only ( vijhaptimdtra ) is the six mundane virtues ( laukikaparamita ) ... By means 
of these six virtues, the bodhisattva enters into Concept-Only. Having entered, he 
acquires an excellent result (because they are supramundane) contained in the high pure 
aspiration (suddadhyasaya) . 

Thus, even without exerting himself in practicing the six virtues, the bodhisattva 
cultivates the six virtues in a continuous and uninterrupted way and reaches perfection. 

Objection : If the bodhisattva does not make an effort to practice the virtue of morality, is 
he not immoral (< duhsTla )? - This objection is not valid because the bodhisattva neglects 
only the coarse effort ( stulaprayoga ). If he neglected every effort at morality, the 
objection would be valid. But since he neglects only coarse effort, the objection is 
invalid. 

By his adherence to the teaching : even though the relative teaching on the six virtues is 
very profound ( gambhira ), the bodhisattva has faith in it. 

Reflection of acceptance (dsvddandmanasikdra): this is to think of the virtues as 
qualities. [Cf. u: pha rol tu phyinpa mams la yon tan blta ba ]. 

Reflection of approbation (anumodandmansikdra): this is to rejoice ( pramud -) in the 
virtues located in one's own mental series ( svasarntana ) or in the mental series of the 
other beings ( parasamtana ) in all the universes (lokadhdtu) of the ten directions 
(< da sadis ). 

Reflection of rejoicing (abhinandandmanasikdra): this is to say 'In the future, I hope that 
I and others will never abandon these virtues and will bring them to perfection.’ “ (U) 


2. Here are some stanzas: 

a. (1) The bodhisattvas accumulate ( sambibhrati ) pure dharmas 
( sukladharma ), 

(2) They obtain keen acceptance (tlksnaksdnti). 


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(3) In the profound ( gambhlra ) and vast ( vipula ) doctrine ( ilesana ) of 
their vehicle, 

b. (4) they see merely a simple concept ( kalpamatra ). 

(5) They acquire nonconceptual wisdom ( n irvikalpakajh an a). 

(6) Their zeal ( chanda ) and their faith ( adhimukti ) being pure 
(sitddha), their aspiration (a say a) is pure. 

c. (7) Previously and at present, in the unfolding of the law 
(dh arm an isyan da) they see the Buddhas. - 

(8) They understand that enlightenment ( bodhi ) is close, and they 
attain it without difficulty ( akisaraldbhin ). 

These stanzas explain the group of characteristics ( laksana ) of the pure 
aspiration ( suddhasaya ) in its eight aspects ( dkdra ), namely, accumulation 
( sambhara ), patient acceptance ( ksanti ), object ( dlambana ), reflection 
( manasikdra ), antidote (pratipaksa), self-nature ( svabhdva ), prediction ( linga ) 
and advantages ( anusamsa ). The lines of the stanzas should be understood in 
this order. [144al5] 


2. Comm. Bh 354cl6-355al0, bh 199a3-199b5, U 419cl2-420al, u 306a6-306b8. 

“Here the author explains the pure high aspiration ( suddhadhyasaya ), of which he 
indicates the accumulation {sambhara), higher patient acceptance ( adhimatraksanti ), 
object (dlambana), reflection ( manasikdra ), counteragent (pratipaksa), self-nature 
(svabhdva), prediction (linga) and quality (guna). 

(1) The bodhisattvas accumulate the pure dharmas: first, at the stage where faith is 
practiced (adhimukticaryabhumi), they gather the accumulations (sambhara). The 
accumulation of pure dharmas (sukladharmaparipurana) is the equipment. 

(2) They attain a keen patient acceptance : abandoning lower (mrdu) and medium 
(madhya) patient acceptance, they retain only superior (adhimatra) patient acceptance, 
the dharmanidhyanaksanti. When this ksanti is present, there is superior patient 
acceptance. 


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(3) In the profound and vast doctrine of their vehicle ... : the object ( alambana ) of the 
high aspiration is the profound and vast doctrine ( aryadesana ) of the Greater Vehicle. It 
is profound ( gambhira ) because its object (art lia) is subtle (. suksma ): this is the non- 
existence of self of dhannas (dharmanairdtmya). It is vast ( vipula ) because it is endowed 
with power ( anubhdvasamprayukta ): these are the concentrations called 'embryo of 
space’ ( gaganagarbhadisamadhi ). (Cf. chap. VII, § 3). Such is the object of the high 
aspiration. 

(4) They see only a simple concept : they understand that all dhannas are nothing but 
concept ( vikalpamatra ): this is the reflection ( manasikara ). 

(5) They acquire nonconceptual wisdom : this is the counteragent (pratipaksa ). 

(6) Their zeal and adherence being pure, their aspiration is pure: such is the self-nature 
(svabhava) of the high aspiration that has faith (sraddha) and zeal ( chanda ) as self- 
nature.” (U) 

“(7) Previously and at present, in the unfolding of the law they see the Buddhas. 
Previously, i.e., prior to the purity of aspiration (prag a say a visuddhya vast hay ah ) ; now, 
i.e., during this purity of aspiration. They see the Buddhas: this is the prediction (lingo). 
In the unfolding of the law: i.e., in the state of absorption (samapattyavastha). 

(8) Finally, the quality ( guna ) of the aspiration: they understand that enlightenment is 
close, for they attain it without difficulty. In this state, they see that enlightenment (bodhi) 
will soon be acquired. Using superior means (upaya), they attain it without difficulty.” 
(Bh) 


3. (Cf. Sutralamkara, XVI, 1): 

samkhydtha tallaksanam anupurvl niruktir abhydsagunas ca tdsdm / 

prabhedanam samgrahanam vipakso jiieyo guno 'nyonyaviniscayas ca // 

[The sections of this chapter are]: number (§ 4), nature (§ 5), order (§ 6), 
etymology (§ 7), development (§ 8), subdivisions (§ 9), content (§ 10), opposing 
vices (§ 11), benefits (§ 12), mutual inclusion (§ 13). 


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4. [Number of paramitas]: Why are there only six paramitas? - There are six 
because they were established (i) to counteract the opposing vices 
( vipaksapratipaksavyavasthita ), (ii) because they are the source of acquiring all 
the Buddha attributes ( sarvabuddhadharmasamudagamapadasthana ) and (iii) 
because they promote the ripening of all beings ( sarvasattva-paripakanulomika ). 

(i) The virtues of generosity ( ddna ) and morality ( shlla ) counteract 

( pratipaksa ) the causes of not setting out on the journey ( aprasthanahetu ), 
which are attachment to pleasures ( bhogasanga ) and attachment to one's 
family (grhasaiiga). 

The virtues of patience ( ksanti ) and zeal ( vlrya ) counteract the causes of 
drawing back ( vivartanahetu ) after having set out. The causes of withdrawing 
are the pain resulting from the bad treatment imposed on transmigrating 
beings ( samsarasattvamithyapratipattyutpannaduhkha ) and the fatigue 
resulting from the long practice of the good ( cirakalasukla - 
paksaprayogaparikheda). 

The virtues of meditation ( dhydna ) and wisdom {prajna) counteract the 
causes of destruction ( viprandsahetu ) after setting out and withdrawing. The 
causes of destruction are distraction ( viksepa ) and false wisdom ( dusprajftd ). 

Thus the virtues are established as six in number in order to counteract the 
opposing vices. 

(ii) ‘Non-distraction’ ( aviksepahetu ) in the virtues or the virtue of meditation 
is ensured by the first four virtues, the causes of non-distraction. As a result 
of this non-distraction, one understands completely and perfectly 

( yathabhuta-samyagavabodha ) the reality of dharmas ( dharmatattva ): this is 
the virtue of wisdom; thus one acquires ( samuddgama ) the attributes of 
Buddha. Since these virtues are the source (padasthdna ) of acquiring 
( samuddgama ) all the attributes of Buddha, therefore they are are fixed in 
number as six. 

(iii) The virtue of generosity helps beings ( sattvopakara ), the virtue of 
morality keeps them from being tormented ( sattvdnupaghdta ), the virtue of 


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patience endures torment ( upadhatamarsana ), the virtue of zeal accomplishes 
duty ( krtyanusthana ): thus, by these beneficial causes ( upakarahetu ), beings 
gain the aptitude for maturation (paripakakarmanyata ). Next, by the virtue of 
meditation, which concentrates the unconcentrated mind ( asamahitacittasya 
samddhdndt), and by the virtue of wisdom, which liberates the 

concentrated mind (sum dh itacittasya vimocanat), these beings who have 
listened to the preaching are ripe (paripakva ). Thus, since these virtues 
promote the maturation of all beings ( sarvasattvaparipdka ), they are fixed as 
six in number. [144b7] 


4. Comm. Bh 355b4-16, bh 199b5-200a4, U 420a22-420bl8, u 306b8-307b4. 
The explanation is unnecessary. 


5. Nature of the paramitas. 

How is their nature ( laksana ) to be thought of? - As consisting of six 
excellences (paramata). (Cf. Abhis. al al, pg. 246 (23)). 

i) Excellence of support ( dsrayaparamatd ), because they have the mind of 
enlightenment as basis ( bodhichittdsrayatvdt ). 

ii) Excellence of means ( vastuparamatd ), because they put all the means to 
work ( sdkalyavastusamuddcdrdt ). 

iii) Excellence of function ( adhikdraparamatd ), because they have as their 
duty the welfare and happiness of all beings ( sarvasttvahitasukhddhikdratvdt ) 


iv) Excellence of skilful means ( upayakausalyaparamata ), because they are 
contained in intuitive wisdom ( nirvikapajndna-parigrahdt ). 

v) Excellence of application (parindmaparamatd ), because they are applied to 
supreme perfect enlightenment (anuttarasamyak-sambodhiparinatatvat). 


253 



vi) Excellence of purity ( visuddhiparamata ), because they ensure the 
suppression of the obstacle of desire and the obstacle to wisdom 
( klesajheyavarananivaranasamudagamat ). 

Is all generosity virtue and is all virtue generosity? - Four alternatives 
( catuskotika ) are possible: there may be generosity without there being 

virtue, etc. These four alternatives apply in turn ( yathayogam ) to the other 
virtues in the same way as to generosity. [144b 17] 


5. Comm. Bh 355b27-355cl5, bh 200a4-200b7, U 420b28-420cl 1, u 307b5-308a3. 

“As a result of what nature is generosity, etc., called virtue? Ordinary people, sravakas as 
well, etc., are also familiar with generosity; this is why it is absolutely necessary to 
clarify what nature makes generosity a virtue.” (Bh) 

ii) Excellence in resource: “Not everyone puts to work all inner ( adhyatmika ) and outer 
( bahya ) resources. Only the bodhisattva can put them to work.” (Bh) - “By generosity, 
etc., one gives ( parityaga ) all kinds of inner and outer resources. ”"(U) 

(iv) “ Because they are contained in nonconceptual wisdom. Thus generosity is triply pure 
( trimandalaparisuddha ), because it rejects any concept ( vikalpa ) about the thing given 
(deya), the donor ( dayaka ) and the receiver (pratigrahaka ).” (U) - See Notes to this 
chapter. 

Here are the four envisaged alternatives ( catuskotika ): “(a) There can be generosity 
without there being virtue: generosity lacking the six excellences, (b) There can be virtue 
without there being generosity: for example, morality provided with the six excellences. 
(c) There can be generosity and virtue at the same time: generosity endowed with the six 
excellences, (d) There can be neither generosity nor virtue: for example, morality lacking 
the six excellences.” (U) 


6. Order of the paramitas. 

Why are the virtues given in this order ( anukrama )? - Because the earlier 
ones promote the arising of the later ones. [144b 19] 


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6. Comm. Bh 355c 18-19, bh is lacking, U 420cl4-17, u 308a3-5. 

"Because the earlier ones promote the arising of the later ones : the bodhisattva detached 
from wealth engages in morality ( bhogesv asakto hi sTlam samatte ); once into discipline, 
he becomes patient ( silavdn ksamo bhavati ); once patient, he endures adversity and 
undertakes zeal ( ksamavan pratikulasaho viryam arabhate ); having undertaken zeal, he 
concentrates his mind ( arabdhavnyas cittam samadhatte ); having concentrated his mind, 
he understands correctly ( samahitacitto yathabhutam prajhati )." (U) Cf. comm, to 
Sutralamkara, XVI, 14. 


7. [Etymology of the paramitas]. What is the etymology ( nirukti ) of these 
virtues? - By transcending ( paramTbhuta ) all the wholesome roots ( kusalamula ), 
generosity ( ddna ), etc., of ordinary people ( laukika ), of the sravakas and 
pratyekabuddhas, they come to the other shore (paramita ): these are the virtues 
( paramita ). 

i) It drives away (apanayati) avarice ( matsarya ) and poverty ( daridrya ); it 
brings great wealth ( mahdbhoga ) and an accumulation of merit 

( punyasambhara ): this is generosity (ddna). 

ii) It calms ( samayati ) immorality (dauhslla) and the bad destinies ( durgati ); 
it brings good destinies ( sugati ) and the concentrations ( samddhi ): this is 
morality (slla). 

iii) It destroys (ksayati) anger ( kruddhi ) and enmity (vaira); it accomplishes 
good (ksemamkara) for self and others ( svapara ): this is patience (ksdnti). 

iv) It frees ( vimocayati ) from laziness (kausTdya), from wrong-soing (papa) 
and unwholesome dharmas (akusaladharma); it ensures the growth (vrddhi) 
of innumerable wholesome dharmas (apramanakusaladharma): this is zeal 
(vlrya). 

v) It drives away (vidhamati) distractions (viksepa); it ensures the return of 
the mind to itself (antascittavihara); this is meditation (dhydna). 


255 



vi) It suppresses all erroneous views ( drstigata ) and all wrong knowledge 
(dusprajnd); it understands dharmas correctly and in all ways ( samyak 
sarvaso dharman prajdndti ): this is wisdom (prajnd ). [144c 1 ] 


7. Comm. Bh 356a3-13, bh 200b7-201a5, U 420c28-421a4, u 308a5-308bl. 

“The author explains the general etymology ( samanyanirukti ): by transcending all the 
roots of good of ordinary people, of the sravakas and the pratyekabuddhas, they reach 
( mita ) the other shore (para). This is why they are called paramita. Paramita is 
synonymous with excellence. Then the author explains the particular etymologies. Thus 
generosity, at the moment of cause ( hetu ), drives away avarice and poverty; at the 
moment of fruit (phala ), it brings great riches and an accumulation of merit. The other 
specific etymologies are easy to understand.” (u) 


8. [Cultivation of the paramitas]. How should the development (bhavand) of 
these virtues be thought of? In brief (samdsatah), there are five cultivations: 

i) cultivation preparatory to practice ( samuddcdra-prayogabhdvand ), 

ii) development of faith ( adhimuktibhavand ), 

iii) development of contemplation ( manasikdrabhavand ), 

iv) development of skill in means (updyakamalyabhdvand), 

v) development of the accomplishment of the virtues to be practiced 
(krtydnmthdnabhdvand). 

For the first four cultivations, see above. 

The development of accomplishment of duty: the spontaneous activity of the 
Buddhas ( andbhogabuddhakriyd ) is uninterrupted ( asamucchinna ); they 
cultivate the virtues even when their virtues are perfected 
( pdramitdparipurikdle ). 

The development of contemplation consists of cultivating the contemplations 
of kindness ( dsvddand ), of symapthetic joy (anumodana) and of rejoicing 


256 



( abhinandand ), by incorporating ( parigrah -) them into the six dispositions 
(as ay a): insatiable disposition (atrptdsya), disposition lasting for a long time 
(dirghaprabandhasaya), joyous disposition (muditasaya), beneficent 
disposition (upakardsaya), magnanimous disposition ( mdhdtmydsaya ) and 
holy disposition (kalyanasaya). 

i) (a) Considering all the incalculable periods that extend up until the 
attainment of supreme complete enlightenment as one single moment, the 
bodhisattva would like to sacrifice his own body at every moment; filling 
universes as numerous as the sands of the Ganges with the seven jewels, the 
bodhisattva would like to offer them as a gift to the Tathagatas: such is his 
conduct until he is seated on the throne of enlightenment, because the 
disposition for generosity of the bodhisattva is insatiable (yad bodhisattva 
yavanto 'samkhyeyakalpa y air anuttardyam samyaksambodhav 
abhisambudhyate tdvata ekaksanikrtya pratiksanam dtmabhdvam parity ajet / 
evam ca gangdnadlvdlukdsamdn lokadhdtun saptaratnaparipurnan krtva 
tathdgatdndm pratipddayed a bodhimandanisadandt/ atrpta eva bodhisattvasya 
dandsaya iti. - For the same length of time, at every moment, he would wish 
to adopt the four postures in the trichiliomegachiliocosm filled with fire; 
even deprived of every resource, he would wish to keep the thought of 
morality - patience - zeal - meditation - wisdom in his mind: such is his 
conduct until he is seated on the throne of enlightenment, for the 
bodhisattva's disposition for morality - patience - zeal- meditation - wisdom 
is insatiable. Such is the bodhisattva's insatiable disposition (yat tavatkalam 
eva trisdhasramahd-sahdsralokadhdtdv agniparipurne caturvidham 
Tryapatham kalpayet / evam ca sarvopakaranavisamyukto 'pi 
silaksdn ti vTryadhydn aprajii dcittam sdksdtkurydd a bodhimandanisadandt / 
atrpta eva bodhisattasya sTlaksdntmryadhydnaprajhdsaya iti /ay am 
bodhisattvasydtrptdsayah). 

(b) Until he sits on the throne of enlightenment, the bodhisattva does not 
abandon this insatiable disposition. Such is his long-enduring disposition (yad 
bodhisattvas tarn atrptdsayam a bodhimandanisadandn na sramsayatiti / ay am 
tasya dirghaprabandhasayah). 


257 



(c) By helping beings by means of the six virtues, the bodhisattva is more 

joyful than the beings whom he has helped. It is not the same for the latter. 
Such is the bodhisattva's joyful disposition ( muditataras ca bodhisattvo 
bhavati sadbhih pdramitdbhih sattvdn upakurvan / na tv eva te sattvd 

upakriyamana iti/ ay am bodhisattvasya muditasayah). 

(d) The bodhisattva considers the beings whom he helps by means of the six 
virtues as more beneficent than himself, and thinks of himself as less 
beneficent than them. Such is the beneficent disposition of the bodhisattva 

( upakdrakatarams ca bodhisattvas tan sattvdn dtmanah samanupasyati /yesdm 
tathd sadbhih pdramitabhir upakaroti ndtmdnam iti /ay am bodhisattvasya 
upakarasayah). 

(e) The bodhisattva applies all the roots of good that he has thus accumulated 
by means of these six virtues to beings so that they may obtain the reward 
they wish for. Such is the bodhisattva's magnanimous disposition (yad 
bodhisattva evant satparamitopacitakusalamulani sattvesv istaphalavipdkatvena 
parinamayatlti / ay am bodhisattvasya mdhatmydsayah). 

(f) The bodhisattva shares all the roots of good that he has thus accumulated 
by means of the six virtues among all beings and applies them to 
supreme complete enlightenment. Such is the holy disposition of the 
bodhisattva (yad bodhisattva evam satparamitopacitakusalamulani 
sarvasattvasddh dr an an i krtvdnuttardydm samyaksam bodhau 

parinamayatlti / ay am bodhisattvasya kalydnasayah). 

This is how the bodhisattva cultivates the contemplation of kindness 
(dsvddan dm an asikdra) incorporated ( parigrhlta ) into the six dispositions. 

ii) The bodhisattva is in agreement with ( anumodate ) the roots of good 
(kusalamula) of the innumerable bodhisattvas who devote themselves to 
developing these six dispositions. This is how the bodhisattva cultivates the 
contemplation of sympathetic joy ( anumodandmanasikdra ) incorporated into 
the six dispositions. 


258 



iii) Finally, the bodhisattva rejoices in seeing all beings cultivate the six 
virtues contained in these six dispositions ( sarvasattvanam 
satpdramitdbhdvandm saddsayaparigrhitdm abhinandati) and wishes that he 
himself will never abandon the development of these six virtues as long as he 
is not seated on the throne of enlightenment (cf. H). This is how the 
bodhisattva cultivates the contemplation of rejoicing 
(abhinan dan dm an asikdra) incorporated in the six virtues. 

All who hear about the development of contemplation ( manasikdrabhdvand ) 
by the bodhisattva - a development incorporated in the six dispositions - and 
who produce a mind of faith ( sraddhdcitta ), acquire infinite merit 
( apramdnapunya ) and destroy all the obstacles of their wrong-doings 
( duskrtdvarana ). What then could be said of the bodhisattvas themselves? 
[145al 1] 

8. Comm. Bh 356b24-356cl0, bh 201a5-201b5, U 421bl4-421c23, u 308bl-309bl. 
“Cultivation ( bhavana ) is repeated pratice ( abhyasa ). There are five kinds of cultivation: 

i) Cultivation prepratory to practice: This is the non-erroneous practice 

( aviparitapra vrtti) of generosity, etc. A stanza says: That donor ( danapati ) is excellent 
who, endowed with faith ( sraddhavant ), gives with respect (satkrtya), at the desired time 
(kale), with his own hand (svahastena), etc. (Cf. Kosa, IV, p. 235; Anguttara, III, p. 172: 
saddhaya danam deti, sakkaccam det, kalena danam, anuggahitacitto danam deti, 
attanan ca par an ca anupahacca danam deti ) ... 

ii) The development of aspiration is to produce aspiration ( adhimukti ) by means of faith 
(sraddha) and zeal (chanda), by adhering trustfully ( abhisampratyaya ) to the holy 
doctrine ( aryadesana ) of the Buddha, and by showing zeal (chanda). A stanza says: Even 
though he may be unable to benefit, he adheres to the Buddha's doctrine. Endowed with 
faith and zeal, his good intentions (asaya) are always active and know no laziness 
(kau sidy a). 


259 



iii) The development of contemplation is the cultivation contained in the contemplations 
of acceptance ( asvadana ), approbation ( anumodana ) and rejoicing ( abhinandana ), as 
was said above (§1). 

iv) The development of skillfulness in means is the development contained in 
nonconceptual knowledge (nirvikalpakajhdna), as was said above (§ 5). 

v) The development of accomplishment of the virtues to be practiced : The virtues are 
complete ( parpurna ) in the Tathagatas. But for the welfare of others ( parartha ) and by 
the power of an earlier vow (purvapranidhananvedha ), they practice the virtues of 
generosity, etc., that they have to practice effortlessly ( anabhoga ) and according to 
feasibilty ( yathakalpam ).” (U) 

The end of the paragraph is modeled after the commentary on the Sutralamkara, XVI, 16. 


9. [Subdivisions of the paramitas], What are the subdivisions of these virtues? - 
Each is of three types: 

i) (1) Generosity of the Dharma ( dharmadana ), (2) material generosity 
( dmisadana ) and (3) generosity of safety ( abhayaddna ). 

ii) (1) Morality of abstention ( samvarasTla ), (2) morality of collecting the 
wholesome dharmas (, kusaladharmasamgrahakaslla ) and (3) morality for the 
service of others ( sattvdrthakriydslla ). 

iii) (1) Patience to bear abuse (apakaram arsan aksdn ti) , (2) patience to accept 
suffering ( duh kh ddh i vdsan dksdn ti) and (3) patience to contemplate the 
Dharma (dharm an idhydn a-ksdlti) . 

iv) (1) Zeal with which to arm oneself ( samndhavTrya ), (2) zeal to exert oneself 
( prayogavlrya ) and (3) zeal without timidity, stepping back or satiety (i akin am 
aksobhyam asamtusti vTryam). 

v) (1) Meditation of abiding ( vihdradhydna ), (2) meditation of production 
( abhinirhdradhydna ) and (3) meditation for the service of others 

( sattvarthakriyadhyana ). 


260 



vi) (1) Preparatory nonconceptual wisdom (nirvikalpika prayogika prajha), 

(2) fundamental nonconceptual wisdom ( nirvikalpika prajha) and (3) 
subsequent nonconceptual wisdom ( nirvikalpika prsthalabdha prajha). 
[145al9] 

9. Comm. Bh 356c20-357a27, bh 201b5-202b7, U 422a3-422b4, u 309bl-310a5. 

“Each virtue is subdivided into three types and the author explains their specific 
characteristics. 

i) (1) Generosity of the Dharma (dharmadana): to preach the law, the sutras, etc. with an 
undefiled mind (aklistacitta) . Generosity of the Dharma serves to strengthen 
(; upastambha ) the roots of good in others. 

(2) Material generosity (amisadana): to offer vital provisions 

( jmtapariskaraparityaga ) with an undefiled mind. Material generosity serves to 
strengthen the body (kayo) of others. 

(3) Generosity of safety, to stop violent people ( ghatakanivarana ) and to save timid 
people ( bhirnparitrdna ). 

Generosity of the Dharma serves to strengthen ( upasatambha ) the roots of good 
( kusalamulla ) in others; material generosity serves to strengthen the body of others, and 
generosity of safety serves to strengthen the minds ( citta ) of others. 

ii) (1) Morality of absten tion (samvarasila): to engage in abstaining from unwholesome 
dharmas ( akusaladharmasamvarasamadana ). Insofar as it abstains from evil (papa), 
from unwholesome actions of body, speech, etc., (akusalakayavagadikarma), it is 
abstention (samvara), and this abstention is a discipline ( sila ). It supports the following 
two moralities, because by abstaining, one is able to cultivate the roots of good 
(kusalamula) such as worship of the Buddha (buddhapujana), etc., and do good for 
others (sattvarthakriya). 

(2)Morality collecting wholesome dharmas ( kusaladharma-samgrahakasila ): serves to 
acquire all the attributes of the Buddha ( buddhadharma ) such as the powers ( bala ), the 
fearlessnesses ( vaisaradya ), etc. 


261 



(3) Morality for the service of others ( sattvarthakriyasila ): supporting the activity of 
beings in conformity with the Dharma, sharing irreproachable actions equally 
(niravadyakarma), it ripens ( vipacayati ) beings. 

iii) (1) Patience to bear abuses ( apaharamarsanaksanti ): the cause for the maturation of 
beings (sattva vipakapra vrttihetu ) . 

(2) Patience to accept suffering (duhkhadhivasanaksanti): the cause for the quality of 
Buddha because, without withdrawing, it bears the various sufferings, e.g., cold (sita), 
heat ( usna ), hunger ( bubhisksa ) thirst (pipasa). - 

(3) Patience to contemplate the Dharma (dharmanidhydnaksanti): the basis (as ray a) 
for the two preceding patiences. It is the patience with regard to the profound ( gambhira ) 
and vast ( vipula ) Dharma. 

iv) (1) Zeal to arm oneself (samndhavTry a): at the beginning, one encourages oneself by 
saying: "I am going to do something." This explains the first word of the sutra (DTgha, 
III, p. 237, etc.; commentary to Sutralamkara, XVI, 68), 'Sthamavan', i.e., vigorous. 

(2) Zeal to exert oneself (prayogavuya): at the time of acting ( prayoga ), to develop the 
effort conforming to aspirations ( yathasayam ). This explains the next word of the sutra, 
’Vhyavan’, i.e., energetic. 

(3) Zeal without timidity, stepping back or satiety (alinam aksibhyam asamtusti viryam, 
cf. Sutralamkara, XVI, 68b): not to abandon the action undertaken in conformity with 
one's aspirations until one sits on the throne of enlightenment (a bodhimandanisadandt). 
It is without timidity (alma) because it does not step back in the face of fatigue; it is 
without withdrawal because its courage does not yield before the insults of another 
( parapakara ); it is insatiable (asamtusta) because in the interval leading up to 
enlightenment, it energetically develops the wholesome (kusalapakha) without yielding 
to laziness (kausidya). These three expressions, respectively, explain the words of the 
sutra: 'Utsahi drdhaparakramo aniksiptadhurah kusalehu dharmesu', i.e, courageous, 
firm in its march, not rejecting the the yoke of accomplishing wholesome dharmas. 

v) (!) Meditation of abiding (viharadhyana): it aims at attaining a present fortunate abode 
(drstadharmasukhavihara). Free of pride (mana), wrong views ( drsti ) and thirst (trsna), 
it is pure (suddha). 


262 



(2) Meditation of production (abhinirharadhyana): aims at producing higher qualities 
( guna ), such as the superknowledges (abhijna), etc. 

(3) Meditation of accomplishing duty (krtyanusthanadhyana): aims at rendering service 
(< arthakriya ) to all categories of beings because it suppresses ( nivrmoti ) the sufferings of 
famine ( durbhiksa ), sickness ( vyadhi ), fear ( bhaya ), etc. 

vi) (1) Preparatory nonconceptual knowledge (nirvikalpika prayogika prajhaf precedes 
realization ( abhisamaya ); it is the knowledge of superior means ( upayajhana ). 

(2) Properly called nonconceptual knowledge (nirvikalpika prajhaf. the knowledge of 
abhisamaya. 

(3) Subsequent nonconceptual knowledge (nirvikalpika prsthalabdha prajhaf follows 
abhisamaya; it is a conventional cognition (samvrttijhdna) giving rise to all kinds of 
predictions, etc. (nanddharmadesanasamutthapaka).” (U) - For this threefold wisdom, 
see chap. VIII. 


10. [Content of the paramitas], What is the content of these virtues ( tdsam 
samgrahah katharn drastavyah )? - These virtues contain ( samgrhnanti ) all the 
wholesome dharmas ( kusaladharma ) insofar as they have virtue as their nature 
( laksana ); they promote ( dnulomika ) the virtues and are their outcome 
( nisyanda ). [145a21] 


10. Comm. Bh 357bl-8, bh 202b8-203a3, U 422b6-18, u 310a6-310b3. 

" What is the content of these virtues? It is asked how these virtues (paramita ) and the 
wholesome dharmas ( kusaladharma ) are mutually inclusive ( anyonyasamgrhita ). 
Because they include all the good dharmas : i.e., the virtues suffice to include all the good 
dharmas and in turn these good dharmas include the virtues. Here, by wholesome 
dharmas is meant all the factors of awakening (bodhipaksikadharma). They have virtue 
as their nature : thus, faith (sraddha), truth ( prasrabdhi ), etc., promote virtue. They are its 
result : thus, the six superknowledges (abhijna), the ten powers (bala) and the other 
qualities (guna) are derived from the virtues.” (Bh) 


263 



11. [Vices opposing the paramitas]. How do the vices opposing ( vipaksa ) the 
virtues include (samgrh n an ti) all the defilements ( samklesa )? - Insofar as they 
have these vices as their nature ( laksana ), that they are their cause ( hetu ) and 
their fruit (phala ). [145a23] 


11. Comm. Bh 357bl 1-15, bh 203a3-6, U 422b20-24, u 310b3-5. 

“The vices opposing ( vipaksa ) the virtues are avarice ( matsarya ), immorality ( dauhsila ), 
anger ( krodha ), laziness ( kausidya ), distraction ( viksepa ) and faulty wisdom 
( dusprajna ).” (U) 

“Having explained how the virtues include all the pure dharmas ( sukladharma ), the 
author is now going to explain how the vices opposing these virtues include all the 
defiled dharmas (sa inkles ikadharma). The defilements have these vices as their nature : 
they have desire ( raga ), etc. as their characteristic. They are the cause of these vices : they 
are the cause of avarice, etc.; i.e., lack of faith ( asraddha ), wrong views ( mithyadrsti ), 
etc., are the cause of avarice, etc. They are the fruit of these vices : they are the fruit of 
avarice, immorality, anger, etc.” (Bh) 


12. [Benefits of the paramitas]. What are the benefits ( anusamsa ) of these 
virtues? - In the course of transmigration ( samsara ), the bodhisattvas take 
possession ( parigrhnanti ) of the following benefits: mastery ( aisvarya ), high birth 
( mahajanma ), great entourage of followers and servants ( mahapaksapanjana ), 
successful efforts in a great work ( mahdkarmdnte ), absence of torment 
( anupaghata ) and the weak afflictions ( mrduklesa ), skill in the arts, letters and 
classical sciences (silpasdstra-vidydsth an akausalya) : this happiness ( abhyudaya ) is 
impeccable ( niravadya ), lasts until the attainment of the throne of enlightenment 
(d bodhimaiidanisadandt), is devoted to the service of all beings 
( sarvasattvdrthakriyopasthita ); it consitutes the benefits of the bodhisattvas. 
{145bl]a 


264 



12. Comm. Bh 357b23-357cl, bh 203a6-203bl, U 422c2-17, u 310b5-31 la4. 


“Now the author will explain the benefits ( anusamsa ) and the qualities ( guna ) of the 
virtues. Mastery ( aisvarya ) is the advantage coming from the virtue of generosity 
( danaparamita ). The final phrase: 'this happiness is impeccable' up to: 'and constitutes 
the benefits of the bodhisattva' should be applied to the entire passage. - High birth 
(mahajanma) is the benefit coming from the virtue of morality ( silaparamita ). High birth 
means a good destiny (sugati). - Great entourage of followers and servants 
(mahapaksaparijana) is the benefit coming from the virtue of patience ( ksantiparamita ). 
Follower (paksa) is synonymous with family ( kutumba ) and servant (parijana) is 
synonymous with server (das a). - Success in efforts in a great work (mahakarmante 
prayogasiddhih) is the benefit coming from the virtue of zeal ( vfryaparamita ). The great 
work (mahakarmanta) is that of a cakravartin, etc. The efforts ( prayatna ) dedicated to it 
are called prayoga. The resultant success ( krtyanusthana ) is called siddhi because the 
benefit which it brings encounters no obstacles (apratigha). - Absence of torment and 
weak passions are the benefit coming from the virtue of meditation (dhyanaparamita) 
because meditation weakens ( vidhamati ) the power ( prabhava ) of the torments and 
passions. - Skill in the arts, letters and classical sciences 
(silpasastravidyasthanakausalya) is the benefit coming from the virtue of wisdom 
(prajhaparamita) ." (U) - “ This happiness is impeccable : this is not so for the heretics 
( tirthika ); they have happiness but it is reprehensible (savadya). Moreover, their 
happiness is transitory ( anitya ) whereas the fruits of the virtues are eternal; it is affirmed 
that they last until the attainment of the throne of enlightenment (a 
bodhimandanisadanat). Furthermore, in the heretics, happiness is concerned solely with 
personal interest (svartha) and not with the interest of all beings (parartha ); they are not 
dedicated to the service of all beings. By contrast, the marvelous fruits which come from 
the virtues are dedicated to the sendee of all beings (sarvasattvarthakriyopasthita). Thus 
the virtues bear fruits of marvellous benefits, irreproachable fruits, etc.” (Bh) 


13. [Mutual inclusion of the paramitas], How is the mutual inclusion 
(anyonyaviniscaya) of these virtues to be understood? The Bhagavat designated 
all the virtues sometimes by the name of generosity ( ddna ), sometimes by the 
name of morality (slid), sometimes by the name of patience ( ksdnti ), sometimes 


265 



by the name of zeal ( vlrya ), sometimes by the name of meditation ( dhydna ) and 
sometimes by the name of wisdom (p raj ft a). What was his intention ( samdhi )? - 
He wanted to say that, in the practice (prayoga ) of each virtue, there is the 
intervention of all the virtues. [145b8] 


1 3 . Comm. Bh 3 57c 1 0- 1 6, bh 203b 1 -4, U 422c24-423a7, u 3 1 1 a4-3 1 1 b 1 . 

“In the Trimsatikaprajnaparamitasutra it is said: When one speaks of one virtue, one is 
speaking of all the virtues. What does that mean? It means that in the practice of one 
single virtue, all the other virtues are involved. Thus, when one practices generosity 
(dana), one disciplines ( samvr -) the body (kdya) and the speech (vac); thus there is the 
involvement of the virtue of morality ( sf/a ), and so on up to: when one practices 
generosity, one understands the cause (hetu) and the fruit ( phala ); thus there is the 
involvement of the virtue of wisdom ( prajna ). It is the same for the other involvements.” 
(Bh) 


266 



NOTES TO CHAPTER IV 


Preliminary Note. 


References on the paramitas: 

In the Hmayana: dasa paramlyo, Jataka, I, p. 73 (32); Cariyapitaka, collection of short 
tales illustrating the seven paramita, trans. B. C. Law, Anthologies of the Pali Canon, III, 
1938, p. 95 sq.; R. C. Childers, Diet of Pali, s.v. paraim, p. 334 sq.; B. C. Law, Concepts 
of Buddhism, 1938, p. 5; Mahavastu (with many examples from the Jatakas), III, P- 226 
(2) seq.; Lalitavisatara, p. 2 (5), 8 (2), 34 (29) seq., 274 (21), 414 (19), 427 (17), 435 
(10).; numerous examples of the virtues in Jatakamala, Avadanasataka, 

Avadanakalpalata; Divya, p. 95, 127, 490; Kosa, IV, p. 1 1, 231; VIII, p. 78, 82. 

In the Mahayana: Mahavyut. 913-924; Dharmasamgraha, XVII, XVIII; 
Pancavimsatishahasrika (ed. N. Dutt), p. 187-190; Saddharmapundarlka, p. 17 seq., 142, 
256, 259, 264, 332, etc.; Dasabhumika, p. 63, 72, 81, 04; Bhadramayakara, p. 80. 94, 

103; Lankavatara, p. 236 seq.; Samdhinir. IX, v. 9-27 (lengthy developments of the first 
six p., of the last four p., order, subdivisions, name, opposing vices, retribution, defiled 
p., visuddhi shared and special to the p., permanence, vipakaphala, prabhava, hetu,phala 
and artha, nihsvabhava and p., paramita, upaparamita and mahaparamita ); Madh. 
avatara (treats one p. by means of bhumi); Siksasam. p. 187 et passim; Bodhicaryavatara 
and Panjika entire; Sutralamkara, XVI (with the same subdivisions as the Samgraha), 
Bodh. bhumi, p. 1 14-216; Abhidharmasamuccayavyakhya, T 1606, k. XI and XII, p. 
746cl7 seq.; Madhyantavibhanga, p. 205-208; Siddhi, p. 620-638. 

1. We must distinguish: the cause of entry, namely the improperly-called mundane 
paramitas, practiced prior to abhisamaya, before the bhumis; the fruit of entry, namely 
the properly-called virtues of the supramundane ( lokottara ) state, purified by means of 
nirvikalpakajnana and cultivated in the bhumis. On this subject: 

Bodhicaryavatarapanjika, p. 345 (8-10): evain ete danadayahsatkrtya sambhrta api 
prajham antarena na saugatapapadhigamahetavo bhavanti n api paramitavyadesam 
labhante. prajhakrtaparisuddhobhajah punar avyahatodarapravrttitaya tadanukala, 
anuvartamanas taddhetubhavam adhigacchanti. paramitanamadhheyam ca labhante. 

Madhyantavibhanga, p. 204 (22): prathamayam bhumau dharmadhatoh 
sarvatragatvabodhal lokoyyatah paramitah pratilabhante. purvam tu 
prathamabhmuiprayogasamgrhitd laukika evety atah prathamayam bhumau 
pratilambhaparamatety ucyate. 

Comm, on Namasarnglti, cited in Siddhi, p. 627: ete danadayah sambodhicittapurvakah 
sarvasattvesu maitrasayaparinamitah paramitanama labhante. tali punar laukika 
lokottaras ca. tatranivaritatmaadyupalambha laukikah. skandhadisv 
anatmadyadhimoksapravrttas tattvadhigama-paribhavitas ca. - See also Madh. avatara, 
p. 30-3 1 . Also the distinction between upaparamita and paramita in Samdhinir. IX, v. 27; 
Lankavatara, p. 236-237; Siddhi, p. 637. 


267 



2 . Each supramundane virtue is itself incorporated into the excellent pure proclivity: 
suddhadhyasaya. This proclivity is a quality of the bodhisattva in the first seven bhumis 
(Sutralamkara, IV, 2). The bodhisattva who possesses it is madhyapaka (Bodh. bhumi, p 
86 (5)). It is of five types (Sutralamkara, XX, 6) or of fifteen types (Bodh. bhumi, p. 3 13 
(7) sq.). It constitutes the sixth paramata of the paramitas (below, § 5). It is essentially 
altruistic ( sarvasattvahitasukhadhyasaya ). 


4 . The number of the p. is fixed at six for many reasons: Samdhinir., IX, v. 9, no. 4 (two 
reasons); Sutralamkara, XVI, 2-7 (six reasons: asamklesam avipantakrtyarambham 
cadhikrtya, parartham atmartham carabhya, sakalapararthadhikarat, 
samastamahayanasamgrahadhikar at, sarvakaramargadhikarat, siksatrayam adhikrtya ); 
Siddhi, p. 627 (four reasons). 


5 . Paragraph reproduced textually, with the indication of its author ( ity aryasangah), by 
Haribadhadra in his Abhisamayalamkaraloka, ed. Wogihara, p. 245 (23). It is a question 
of the six excellences (paramata ) of the p. 

The fourth paramata, upayakausalya, has the effect of making the p. triply pure 
(, trimandalaparisuddhaka ) by incorporarting them into the nirvikalpakajnana. Thus the 
generosity of the bodhisattva is triply pure because he makes no distinction between the 
gift given (deya), the donor (dayaka) and the recipient ( pratigrahaka ). On 
trimandalaparisuddhi or trikotisuddhi, cf. Mahavyut., 2547: Satasahasrika P.P., p. 92 (5) 
- 93 (1); Pancavimsatisahasrika, p. 264 (16-22); Bodhicaryavatara, IX, st. 168; - 
Sampanjika, p. 604 (5-6); Uttaratantra, p. 120, 254; Siddhi, p. 629 n.; Samgraha, below, 
chap. VII, § 9, no. 1 . - Cf. Kosa, IV, p. 234-238. 

Siddhi, p. 626, has seven para mat as instead of six: pratistha-, asraya-, adhyasaya-, 
vastu-, upayakausalya-, parinama-, parisuddhi- . Cf. the seven paramatas of the Parama 
bodhih, Bodh. bhumi, p. 89 (12). 

Twelve paramatas in Madhyantavibhanga, p. 202-209: audarya-, ayatatva-, adhikara-, 
nairantyarya-, akrcchratva-, vittatva-, parigraha-, arambha-, pratilambha-, nisyanda, 
nispatti-. 


6. Order of the p.: Samdhinir., IX, v. 11; Sutralamkara, XVI, 214; 
Abhidharmasamuccayavyakhya, T 1606, k. XI, p. 747b26; Siddhi, p. 628. 


7. Etymology of the p.: Kosa, IV, p. 231; Madh. avatara, p. 30; Samdhinir., IX, v. 13; 
Sutralamkara, XVI, 15; Abhidhanna-samuccayavyakhya, T 1606, k. XI, p. 747c21 seq.; 
Siddhi, p. 628. - F. W. Thomas, JRAS, 1904, p. 547. 


8. Cultivation of the p. Two theories presenting some differences: on the one hand, the 
Samgraha, on the other hand the Sutralamkara, XVI, 16, the 

Abhidharmasamuccayavyakhya, T 1606, k. XII, p. 748b21 seq. and Siddhi, p. 629. The 
Sutralamkara distinguishes: 


268 



i. upadhisamnisrita bhavana which is fourfold: hetu-, vipaka-, pranidhana-, 
pratisamkhydnasamnisrita. 

ii. manasikdrasamnisritd bhavana which is fourfold: manasikara being of adhimukti, of 
bsvbdand, of anumodand and of abhinandana cf. Samgraha). 

iii. dsayasamnisrita bhavana which is sixfold: the asaya being atrpta, vipula, of mudita, 
upakara, nirlepa and kalyana (cf. Samgraha). 

iv. upayasamnisrita bhavana which is threefold, each virtue before being triply pure 
(triman da la pa ris u ddh i ) . 

v. vibhutvasamnisrita bhavana which is threefold: kaya-, cajya- and desandvubhutva. 

For more information, see Siddhi, p. 629. 


9 . Subdivisions of the p.: 

Division into three types (with some differences): Dharmasamgraha CV-CX; Samdhinir., 
IX, § 12; Sutralamkara, XVI, 17-18 ( dana ); XVI, 37 (sila); XVI, 38 ( ksanti ); xvi, 39, 68 
( virya ); XVI, 25 ( dhyana ); XVI, 27 ( prajna ); Bodh. bhumi, p. 200-201 ( virya ); p. 207 
(10) (dhyana)', p. 212 (prajna ); Abhidharmasamuccayavyakhya,T 1606, k. XII, p. 749c3- 
10); Siddhi, p. 620-624 (p. 621, correct alma, avivartya, analamta to alma, aksobya, 
asamtustivuya). 

Division into seven types: Abhidharmasamuccayavyakhya, T 1606, k. XII, p. 749c23- 
750a6. 

Other subdivisions in Bodh, bhumi. 

Virya is always defined by the sutra: Sthamavan .... kusalesu dharmesu. This sutra is 
found everywhere: Dlgha, III, p. 237, 268, 285; Majjhima, I, p. 356; II, p. 95, 128; 
Samyutta, V, p. 197 seq.; Anguttara, I p. 1 17, 244-246; III, p. 2, 11, 65, 152 seq.; IV, p. 3, 
110, 153 seq., 234, 352-353, 357; V, 15, 24, 27-28; Udana, p. 36; Sutralamkara, ad XVI, 
68; Siddhi, p. 330. - Cf. W. Geiger, Pali Dhamma, 1920, p. 111. 


10 . Content of the p.: Sutralamkara, XVI, 29; Abhidharma-samuccayavyakhya, T 1606, 
k. XII, p. 750a7 seq. 


11 . Vices opposing the p.: Samdhinir. IX, § 14; Sutralamkara, XVI, 30-36 (seven sakti 
opposite to each p.); Madhyantavibhanga, p. 94-96; Abhidharmasamuccaya, T 1606, k. 
XII, p. 750a25. 


12 . Benefits of the p., Samdhinir., IX, 15; Sutralamkara, XVI, 36-70; 
Abhidharmasamuccayavyakhya, T 1606, k. XII, p. 750a29 seq.; Siddhi, p. 630. 


13 . Mutual inclusion of the p.: Sutralamkara, XVI, 71; Siddhi, p. 630. 


269 



Excluding any error, the Trisatika P.P. cited here by the Basya, cannot be found either in 
the original or in Chinese or Tibetan translation. It is mentioned in Mahavyut. no. 1374 
and in the Namasamgiti, cf. P. Vaidya, Etudes sur Aryadeva et son Catuhsataka, 1923, p. 
44. 


270 



CHAPTER V 


THE VARIOUS DEVELOPMENTS OF CAUSE AND FRUIT 

( hetuphalabhavanaprababheda ) 


1. A) In Chapter IV the cause and result of entry into the characteristics of the 
knowable ( jheyalaksanapravesahetuphala ) has been explained. How should the 
diverse cultivations ( bhavanaprabrabheda ) of this cause and fruit be understood? 
- As the ten stages ( bhumi ) of the bodhisattva. What are they? 

i) Pramudita bhumih, the joyous level. 

ii) Vimala bhumih, the stainless level. 

iii) Prabhakarl bhumih , the shining level. 

iv) ArcismatT bhumih , the blazing-wisdom level. 

v) Sudurjaya bhumih, the difficult to conquer level. 

vi) Abhimukhi bhumih, the revealed level. 

vii) Duramgamd bhumih, the far-gone level. 

viii) Acald bhumih, the immovable level. 

ix) Sddhumatl bhumih, the excellent-intelligence level 

x) Dharmameghd bhumih, the cloud of Dharma level. 

B) Why is their number fixed as ten? - Because they counteract (pratipaksa) the 
ten opposing ( vipaksa ) kinds of ignorance ( avidyd ). In fact, ten kinds of ignorance 
arise opposing the tenfold dharmadhatu that is to be known ( dasavidha 
jheyadharmadhatu). 

What is the tenfold dharmadhatu that is to be known? 

i) In the fist bhumi, the dharmadhatu should be known as universal reality 
( sarvatragdrtha ). 


271 



ii) In the second bhumi, as excellent reality ( agrartha ). 

iii) In the third bhumi, as reality with excellent outcome ( nisyandagrartha ). 

iv) In the fourth bhumi, as ungraspable reality ( aparigrahartha ). 

v) In the flflth bhumi, as reality with no difference in series 
(sain tdndbh in n drth a ) . 

vi) In the sixth bhumi, as reality beyond defilement and purification 

( nihsamklesavisuddhyartha ). 

vii) In the seventh bhumi, as reality free from multiplicity ( ananatvartha ). 

viii) In the eighth bhumi, as reality free from decrease and increase 

(< anapacayopacayartha ), as reality supporting mastery of characteristics 
(n im ittavasitasrayarth a) and as reality supporting mastery of the 
buddhafields ( ksetravasitasrayartha ). 

ix) In the ninth bhumi, as reality supporting mastery of knowledges 
( jnanavasitasrayartha ). 

x) In the tenth bhumi, as reality supporting mastery of action 

( karmavasitasrayartha ) and as reality supporting mastery of dharammukha 
and samadhimukha ( dhdranlsamadhimukha-vasitdsraydrtha ). 

Here are some stanzas (cf. Madhyantavibhanga, karika XIV-XVI, p. 97 seq): 

a) Universal reality and excellent reality, reality with excellent outcome, 
ungraspable reality, reality with no difference in series, 

b) Reality beyond defilement and purification, reality free of multiplicity, 
reality free of decrease and increase and support of the fourfold mastery. 

c) The ignorances relative to the dharmadhatu constitute the ten 
undefiled obstacles ( aklistdvarana ). The bhumis counteract the ignorances 
opposing the ten bhumis. 

These ignorances are undefiled ( aklista ) for the sravakas but defiled ( klista ) 
for the bodhisattvas. [ 145c 1 3] 


272 



1. Comm. Bh 358al6-358cl, bh 203b4-204b4, U 423b6-424a2, u 31 lbl-312b8. 

“Questions and answers relating to the various cultivations of the cause and result. What 
is the tenfold dharmadhatu that is to be known? In the first bhumi, it should be known as 
universal reality ... and in the tenth, as reality supporting mastery of action and mastery 
of dharam- and samadhi-mukha. Being of ten types, this dharmadhatu is to be known 
(jneya); that is why it is called the tenfold dharmadhatu to be understood ( dasavidha 
jneyadharmadhatu). In each bhumi there is a special dharmadhatu to be understood but 
the power of ignorance does not allow it to be known. In order to counteract these 
ignorances, the ten bhumis are established. The opposing obstacles ( vipaksavarana ) 
being of ten types, ten bhumis are established. What are these ten opposing obstacles? 

(1) Prthagjanatva, the quality of the ordinary person. 

(2) Mithyapratipatti, bad behavior in respect to beings: reprehensible physical acts, etc. 

(3) Dhandhatva, slowness or failure of memory ( musitasmrtitd ) in regard to the dharmas 
of hearing ( sruta ), contemplating ( cinta ) and meditating ( bhavana ). 

(4) Suksmaklesasamudacara, the activity of subtle desire coming from the erroneous 
innate view of self ( sahajasatkayadrstisamgrhita ). Since this desire is of a lower 
category, since it is not the object of a spontaneous act of attention ( manasikara ) and 
since it has been practiced for such a long time, it is subtle ( suksma ). 

(5) Hinayanaparinirvana, complacency with the nirvana of the Lesser Vehicle. 

(6) Sthulanimittasamudacara, adhering to the existence of the coarse marks of defilement 
and purification. 

(7) Suksmanimittasamudacara, adhering to the existence of the subtle marks of arising 
and cessation. 

(8) Nirmittabhisanskara, the need for the practice of will in order to produce 
contemplation free of concept. 

(9) Sattvarthakriyanabhisamskara, the lack of application in the service of beings, 

(10) Dharmesu vasitapratilambhah, the absence of mastery of the dharmas. [For the 
exact meaning of these technical terms, cf. Siddhi, p. 639 seq.] 


273 



In Tibetan, these ten obstacle-ignorances are: (1) so sold skye bo hid; (2) bden pa la lus 
la sogs pas phyin ci log tu sgrub pa; (3) bul ba nid; (4) no ns mons pa phra ba kun tu rgyi 
ba; (5) theg pa dman pas mya nan las hdah ba; (6) mtshan ma rgya chen po la kun tu 
spyod pa: (7) mtshan ma phra mo la kun tu spyod pa; (8) mtshan ma med par mhon par 
hdu byed pa; (9) sems can gyi don byed pa la mhon par hdu byed pa med pa; (10) thob 
par by ad bahi chos la gtso bor by a med pa]. 

(i) Sarvatragartha: this dharmadhatu of the first bhumi is omnipresent because there is 
no dhanna that is non-substantial ( andtman ). The person who knows this enters into the 
first bhumi. 

(ii) Agrartha : this dharmadhatu of the second bhumi is excellent in all its qualities. The 
person who knows this enters into the second bhumi. 

(iii) Nisyandartha: The doctrine ( desand ) of the Greater Vehicle which follows from this 
dharmadhatu of the third bhumi is excellent. The person who knows this enters into the 
third bhumi. 

(iv) Aparigrahartha: this dharmadhatu of the fourth bhumi cannot be conceived of as 
’mine’ (dtmiya) or taken as one's own; it is like an individual from Uttarakuru who cannot 
be imprisoned. When one attains ( adhigama ) this dharmadhatu, one cannot say "It is 
mine." The person who knows this enters into the fourth bhumi. 

(v) Samtdndbhinndrtha: in this dharmadhatu of the fifth bhumi there is no difference in 
nature; it is like the eye, etc., which, in the various series of beings ( sathmsamtanavisesa ) 
separately, shows no differences. The person who knows this enters into the fifth bhumi. 

(vi) Nihsamklesavisuddhyartha: in this dharmadhatu of the sixth bhumi there is no 
defilement from the beginning because it is naturally nondefiled ( aklista ). Since it is not 
at first defiled, it is not later purified. The person who knows this enters into the sixth 
bhumi. 

(vii) Ananatvartha : although the texts, sutras, etc., ( sutradhidharma ) may have given all 
kinds of definitions ( vyavasthana ) for this dharmadhatu of the seventh bhumi, 
nevertheless, it is without differences. The person who knows this enters into the seventh 
bhumi. 


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(viii) Anapacayopacayartha : this dharmadhatu of the eighth bhumi does not diminish 
when the defilement ( samklesa ) decreases and does not increase when the purity 
( visuddhi ) increases. Nim itta vas itasrayartha : this dharmadhatu is the support of the 
mastery over characteristics. The mastery over characteristics that is obtained is called 
mastery of marks because the characteristics of gold, silver, etc., appear at will 
( yathakamam ). - Ksetravasitasrayartha: this dharmadhatu is the support of mastery of the 
buddhafields. The mastery which one obtains over the buddhafields is called mastery in 
ksetra : if one wishes that the ksetra be transfonned into jewels, etc., it occurs as one 
wishes (cf. chapter I, v. 60; chapter II, § 14). The person who knows this enters into the 
eighth bhumi. 

(ix) Jndnavasitdsrayartha: this dharmadhatu of the ninth bhumi is the support of the 
mastery of analytical knowledge ( pratisamvid ). [According to U: one realizes the virtue 
of knowledge (jndnapdramitd ); with regard to all texts, one does not stick to them 
literally (yathdrutam) but one grasps the hidden meaning ( abhisamdhi); one ripens all 
beings correctly and one experiences the supreme happiness of the Dharma.] The person 
who knows this enters into the ninth bhumi. 

(x) Karmavasitasrayartha : this dharmadhatu of the tenth bhumi is the support of the 
mastery of action, physical activities, etc. ( kayadikarmar ), and the support of the mastery 
of dharani- and samadhi-mukha. The person who knows this enters into the tenth bhumi. 

These ignorances are undefiled in the sravakas, because they do not wish to enter into 
the bhumis.” (Bh) 


2. i) Why is the first bhumi called Joyous ( pramudita )? Because, thanks to it, for 
the first time ( prathamata eva) one obtains for the first time the faculty 

(samarthya) of ensuring one's own interest and that of others 
( svapardrthasiddhi ). 

ii) Why is the second bhumi called Stainless ( vimald )? Because it avoids the 

stains of immorality ( dauhsllyamala ). 

iii) Why is the third bhumi called Shining (prabhakart )? Because, with the 
immutable ( acyuta ) meditative stabilizations ( samddhi ) and absorptions 


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(samapatti) assupport (asraya), it is the support of the great brilliance of the 
Dharma (mahddharmaprabhd). 

iv) Why is the fourth bhumi called Blazing Wisdom ( arcismdti )? Because the 
auxiliary dharmas of enlightenment ( bodhipaksyadharma ) burn away 

( dahanti ) all the obstacles ( sarvavarana ). 

v) Why is the fifth bhumi called Difficult to Conquer ( sudurjaya )? Because it 
is difficult to realize on account of the mutual opposition between knowledge 
of the truth ( satyajndna ) and mundane knowledge ( laukikajnana ). 

vi) Why is the sixth bhumi called Revealed ( abhimukhi )? Because it makes 
the virtue of wisdom (prajhaparamita) present ( abhimukhi) with the 
knowledge of dependent origination (pratTtyasamutpdda ) as support. 

vii) Why is the seventh bhumi called Far-Gone ( duramgama )? Because it 
reaches the end (nisthdgata) of the practice of effort (prayogiki carya). 

viii) Why is the eighth bhumi called Immovable ( acald )? Because it is not 
disturbed by any sign ( nimitta ) or any exercise of will ( abhisamskarana ). 

ix) Why is the ninth bhumi called Excellent Intelligence ( sadhumati )? 
Because it attains the higher liberated knowledges (pratisamvijndna ). 

x) Why is the tenth bhumi called Cloud of Dharma ( dharmameghd )? Because 
it attains a combined knowledge of all the dharmas (samsrstdlam ban a 
sarvadh arm ajhdna) which includes all the dharani- and samadhi-mukhas, 
hides (chddayati) the broad obstacles ( visalavarana ) as the cloud (meg ha) 
hides space ( dkdsa ) and fulfills (paripiparti) the dharmakaya. [145c28] 


2. Comm. Bh 358cl8-359al9, bh 204b4-205b6, U 424al7-424c3, u 312b8-314a5. 

Here the author justifies the use of the terms (sabdapravrttihetu). 

“i) Pramudita, Joyous, because, thanks to it, for the first time the faculty of ensuring 
one's own interest and that of others. At the moment of full realization (abhisamaya), the 
bodhisattvas obtain the higher faculty of ensuring their own personal interest and that of 
others and thereby experience great joy ( pramoda ). The sravakas, etc., who, at the 


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moment of full realization, obtain only the faculty of ensuring their own personal interest, 
do not experience such joy; that is why there is no question of the Joyous bhumi for 
them. If this joy is absent in the first bhumi, it will be absent also in the following 
bhumis, because it is the first ( purvamgama ). 

ii) Vimala, Stainless, because it avoids the stains of immorality. In this bhumi, since 
morality is present naturally ( prakrtya ), it avoids all the stains of immorality. 

iii) Prabhakan, Shining, because with the meditative stabilizations and absorptions as 
support ... In this bhumi extraordinary ( adbhuta ) meditative stabilizations are evidenced, 
the brilliance of knowledge {jhanaprabha ) shines forth. Because it illumines the 
dharmas, it is called blazing ( prabhakan ). That which does not perish after having been 
obtained is called immutable ( acyuta ). The meditative stabilizations of the order of 
concentration ( dhyana ) are called 'samadhi', the meditative stabilizations of the formless 
realm ( arupya ) are called 'samapatti'. Or rather, samadhi is the one-ponted fixing of the 
mind ( cittaikagrata ) and samapatti is the concentration ( samadhana ), the realization 
(. saksatkara ). This bhumi is the support of the great brilliance of the Dharma : on this 
bhumi, the bodhisattvas are endowed with concentrations and, because they do not lose 
them, they obtain the brilliance of knowledge {jhanaprabha ) of the dharmas of the 
Greater Vehicle, sutras, etc. Being the causal support ( asrayahetu ), this bhumi is called 
shining. 

iv) Arcismati, Blazing Wisdom. Since the fire ( arcis ) of wisdom (mati = prajha) occurs 
on this bhumi, it is called the bhumi of blazing wisdom. In this expression, all the 
auxiliary dharmas of enlightenment ( bodhipaksyadharma ) are called ’fire' {arcis) because 
they bum away the obstacles {avarana). When these auxiliaries of enlightenment are 
abundant, the defilements ( klesa ) are entirely consumed. 

v) Sudurjaya, Difficult to Conquer. The knowledge of the absolute truth 
( paramarthasatyajhana ) is free of concepts ( nirvikalpa ); mundane knowledge 
{laukikajhana) which deals with writing (7/p/), gestures {mudra), crafts {silpa), sciences 
(sastra), etc., is conceptual {savikalpa). As the knowledge of absolute truth 
( paramarthasatya ) and the knowledge of contingent truth {samvrtisatya) are in 
opposition ( viruddha ), it is difficult to produce them by bringing them together. This 


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bhumi, which joins them so that they do not contradict each other in any way, is very 
difficult to overcome. 

vi) Abhimukhi, the Revealed bhumi, because the supreme virtue of wisdom 
( prajndpdramita ) is present here ( abhimukhi ). In this bhumi, the absorption on dependent 
origination (pratftyasamutpadavihara ) is attained ( adhigama ); the power of the 
knowledge bearing on dependent origination ( pratityasamutpddajndna ) makes the virtue 
of wisdom, nonconceptual ( nirvikalpa ) and supreme ( anuttara ), manifest in its 
sovereignty. One knows that all dharmas are neither defiled (, samklista ) nor purified 
( visuddha ). 

vii) Duramgama, the Far-Gone bhumi, because it reaches the limit of the exertion of 
effort. In this bhumi the exertion of effort (prayogikT carya )) is complete (paripurna). But 
even though all the marks ( nimitta ) of the dharmas are immobilized (acala, anihjya), 
there is still effort ( abhoga ) in the signless ( animitta ). 

viii) Acala, the Immovable, because all the marks ( nimitta ) and all the practices of will 
(abhisamskarana) cease to disturb the mind. In this seventh bhumi, one is no longer 
disturbed by any notion ( nimitta ) because all notions are no longer active ( asamudacarat , 
but that does not take place easily or spontaneously ( svarasena ) because one no longer 
strives (prayoga). In the eighth bhumi, since there is no further striving, there is no more 
abhoga. This is the difference between the seventh and the eighth bhumis. 

ix) Sadhumati, Excellent Intelligence, because it attains the four liberated higher 
knowledges (pratisamvid) (cf. chap. X, § 14). The knowledge of the pratisamvids is the 
best of all the knowledges. This knowledge is wisdom (mati = prajha), hence the name 
'sadhumatf. The four pratisamvids are those of the Dharma, of meaning ( artha ), of 
etymology ( nirukti ) and of prophecy (pratib liana ). By means of dharmapratisamvid, one 
completely knows ( abhijhana ) the phrases (pada ) of all the texts ( dharma ); by 
arthapratisamvid, one completely penetrates (prativedha ) the value (naya, vidhi) of every 
meaning (artha); by niruktipratisamvid, one completely discerns (pravicaya ) all 
languages ( ghosa ); by pratibhanapratisamvid, one can preach the Dharma in all ten 
directions as is needed ( yathayogam ). Because in this bhumi one acquires for the first 
time the knowledge of the pratisamvids not yet acquired, it is called the bhumi of 
excellent intelligence. 


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x) Dharmamegha, Cloud of Dharma, because it attains the combined knowledge of all 
Dharma, sutras, etc. This knowledge bears on all dharmas, sutras, etc., which are not 
separate from tathata, in a combined way. This knowledge, which has as object ( visaya ) 
the general characteristic ( samanyalaksana ) of all dharmas, is like a great cloud ( megha ). 
(a) The dharani- and samadhi-mukhas are like pure water. This knowledge contains them 
like the cloud contains water, for it has the excellent faculty ( samarthya ) of giving rise to 
them, (b) Moreover, like a great cloud hides ( chadayati ) space ( akasa ), this combined 
knowledge of all dharmas hides the two obstacles, the obstacle of the passions and the 
obstacle to knowledge ( klesavarana ) which are broad ( visa/a ) and infinite ( ananta ) like 
space. Here ’hide' ( chadayati ) means to suppress ( nirharati ), to cut ( prahanti ). 

c) Finally, just as a great cloud causes clear fresh water to rain down which fills 
( paripiparti ) space {akasa), so this combined knowledge of all dharmas emanates 
innumerable excellent qualities ( aprameyaguna ) which fill .... the dharmakaya.” (U) 


3. How are these bhumis acquired ( bhumilabdha )? - In four ways (cf. 
Sutralamkara, XX-XXI, 41): 

i) By acquiring convinced adherence ( adhimuktildbdha ), by adhering to the 
bhumis. 

ii) By acquiring the practices ( caritalabdha ), by acquiring the ten textual 
practices {das a dharmacarita ) relating to these bhumis. 

iii) By acquiring penetration (prativedhalabdha ), for when the fundamental 
element (dharmadhatu) is penetrated in the first bhumi, all the other bhumis 
are penetrated. 

iv) By acquiring the achievement {nispattildbdha), by reaching the summit 
{n isth dgam ana) of the development (bhavana) of these bhumis. [146a4] 


3. Comm. Bh 395a25-26, bh 205b6-7, U 424c8-20, u 314a5-314bl. 
“The author says that there are four ways of acquiring the bhumis: 


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i) By acquiring convinced adherence, by adhering to the bhumis : one affirms 
(< avadharana ) that the doctrine ( desanadharma j relating to the bhumis is correct. 

ii) By acquiring the practices, by acquiring the ten textual practices relating to these 
bhumis : one acquires the ten textual practices relating to the doctrine: these consist of 
copying ( lekhana ), veneration (pujana ), making known ( dana ), hearing ( sravana ), 
reciting ( vacana ), reading ( udgrahana ), explaining (prakasana), studying ( svadhyayana ), 
meditating on ( cintand ), putting into practice ( bhavana ) the doctrine ( desanadharma ) 
relating to the bhumis (cf. Mahavyutpatti, 903-9120. 

iii) By acquiring penetration, for all the other bhumis are penetrated, when the 
fundamental element has been penetrated in the first bhumi'. When one has completely 
understood ( samyagavabodha , pratipatti ) the first bhumi, one quickly penetrates all the 
following bhumis. A stanza says: When the first knot of bamboo is broken ( venusamdhi ), 
the other knots are quickly broken; in the same way, if one acquires correct knowledge of 
the first bhumi, the others bhumis will be quickly gained.” (U) 

“iv) By acquiring the achievement, by reaching the summit of development of these 
bhumis : when one has cultivated the bhumis, one reaches the summit.” (Bh) 

The commentary to Sutralamkara XX-XXI, 41, is even more precise: catiuvidho 
bhummam labdhah / adhimuktilabho yathoktadhimuktito 'dhimukticaryabhumau / 
caritalabho dasau dharmacaritesu vartanat tasyam eva / paramarthalabhah 
paramarthaprativedito bhumipravese / nispatti-labhas cavinivartamyabhumipravese / 


4. How should the cultivation ( bhavana ) of these bhumis be understood? The 
bodhisattva who, bhumi by bhumi, cultivates tranquility ( samatha ) and 
discernment ( vipasyand ), cultivates them in five ways (pancavidha). What are 
these five ways? He cultivates them: 

i) by combined cultivation ( samsrstabhdvand ), 

ii) by signless cultivation ( animittabhdvand ), 

iii) by effortless cultivation ( andbhogabhdvand ), 

iv) by intensive cultivation ( uttaptabhavana ), 


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v) by insatiable cultivation ( asamtustabhavana ). 

By means of this fivefold cultivation, the bodhisattva produces 
( abhinirvartayanti ) five results (phala ) (cf. Sutralamkara, XX-XXI, 31): 

(1) At each moment, the bodhisattva melts away the support of all the 
weaknesses ( pratiksanam sarvadausthulyasrayam dravayati). 

(2) He achieves the suppression of multiple concepts and thus achieves 
pleasure in the garden of Dharma ( ndndtvasamjndvigatim ca 
dharmaramararim pratilabhate). 

(3) He understands completely the brilliance of the Dharma, immense and of 
limitless aspect ( aparicchinndkdram ca sarvato 'pramanam dharmdvabhdsam 
samjanlte). 

(4) The marks, auxiliaries of purity and unfabricated, make their appearance 
in him ( avikalpitanl casya visuddhibhdgiydni ninimittani samudacaranti). 

(5) For the fulfillment and attainment of dharmakaya, he takes possession of 
the always most perfect cause ( dharmakayaparipuriparinispattaye ca uttardd 
uttarataram hetusamparigraham karoti). [ 1 46a 1 1 ] 

4. Comm. Bh 359b6-25, bh 205b7-206a7, U 424c28-425a29, u 314bl-315a7. 

“ From bhumi to bhumi: the bhumis being many ( aneka ), the author repeats the word. 
Tranquility ( samatha ) is the concentration ( samadhi ) that counteracts (pratipaksa) 
distractions ( viksepa ); discernment ( vipasyana ) is a wisdom (prajna) that counteracts 
errors ( viparyasa ). In the bhumis, both practices are cultivated by five kinds of repeated 
practice ( abhyasa ). These five types are combined cultivation, etc.: 

i) Combined cultivation : is the cultivation of the bhumis after having joined them all 
together in a single heap (nasi). 

ii) But other objects of meditation, skeletons ( kankmala ), etc., are likewise joined 
together in a single heap in order to be cultivated. - To reply to this objection, the author 
adds: signless cultivation , because by avoiding all distinctions, the dharmadhatu, which is 
free of all signs, is cultivated. 


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iii) Although there may be cultivation of the signless, there could be effort ( abhoga ). In 
order to show that this cultivation does not require effort {abhoga) and functions 
spontaneously {svarasena), the author then says: effortless cultivation, because it 
functions spontaneously beyond any effort. 

iv) Although the cultivation may occur without effort and spontaneously, it may 
eventually be superior {vara) or inferior {avara). That is why the author adds: intensive 
cultivation, intensive meaning 'strong' {adhimatra). 

v) Although the cultivations may be intensive, one might feel satisfied after a minor 
result {samtusti) and say to oneself: "I have practiced everything, why should I do 
anything else?" - That is why the author adds finally: insatiable cultivation. Signless, 
effortless and intensive cultivation are not enough. Why? Because in order to attain 
buddhahood, it is necessary to practice zealously. 

* * * 

(1) At each moment the bodhisattva melts away the support of all the weaknesses. The 
store-consciousness {dlayavijhana) is called support of the weaknesses 
{dausthulyasraya). [According to bh, the eternal propensity-seed of the obstacle of the 
passions and the obstacle to knowledge {klesajheyavaranayor anadikalika vasana) is 
called weakaness (. dausthulya )]. To decrease the mass of the alaya is to cause it to melt 
{dravayati). This is the way an elixir {bhaisajya, rasayana) causes a mass of illnesses 
(y yadhi) to melt. 

(2) He achieves the suppression of multiple concepts and in this way the pleasure of the 
garden of the Dharma. He suppresses the notions of atman, of Dharma, of Buddha, etc. 
The garden is a place where one can walk about. The Dharma is the dharmadhatu. This 
Dharma being a garden, one may speak of the garden of the Dharma. The satisfaction 
{trpti) found there is called pleasure in the garden of the Dharma. To feel this pleasure is 
to find pleasure in the garden of the Dharma. It is like a king who has a garden {drama) 
and a marvellous forest {vana) near his palace {prasada ) and who experiences great 
satisfaction in walking there; the dharmadhatu is like this garden. 

(3) He understands completely the brilliance of the Dharma, immense and of limitless 
aspect. He penetrates ( pratividhyati ) precisely the brilliance of the infinite {ananta) 
teaching which is without limit in the ten directions {dasadis). Because he illumines the 


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practices ( caiya ), he is called the brilliance of the law. He is like the light derived from 
the study ( svadhayana ) of a text ( grantha ). 

(4) The signs, auxiliaries of purity, non-fabricated, manifest in him. The future 
buddhahood ( buddhata ) is called purity. The marks that bring it along are called 
auxiliaries of purity. These unfabricated marks manifest in him like the white parasol 
(. sitachattra ), etc., of a Buddha or a cakravartin. 

(5) For the fulfillment and the attainment of dharmadhatu, he makes use of the ever most 
perfect cause. The tenth bhumi is called fulfillment ( paripuri ) of the dharmadhatu; 
abiding in the Buddha bhumi is called attainment ( parinispatti ) of the dharmadhatu. The 
cause that produces this bhumi of the Buddha, being excellent ( bahvantaravisista ), is 
called the perfect ( uttara ) cause. Being an accumulation (it pa cava) of earlier causes, it is 
called the ever most perfect ( uttarad uttaratarah). 

These five cultivations (bhavana) in the appropriate order ( yathakramamam ) produce 
these five results (phala ).” (U) 


5. As the main statement (pradhdnatah ), ten virtues are cultivated in the ten 
bhumis, one main virtue for each bhumi. In the first six bhumis the six virtues, 
referred to in chapter IV, § 1, are practiced; on the last four bhumis, the four 
following virtues: 

i) The virtue of skill in means ( upayakausalyaparamitd ). Sharing amongst all 
beings the roots of good accumulated by the six virtues, they are applied to 
supreme perfect enlightenment (satparamitopacitakusalamuldni 
sarvasattvasadharanani krtvd anuttardydm samyaksambodhait parindmayati ). 

ii) The virtue of vow (pranidhdnapdramitd ). By formulating various vows 
(ndndpranidhdndny abhinirvrtya), one unites (samgrhndti) the causes 

( pratyaya ) of the virtues for a later time (amutra, dyatydm) . 

iii) The virtue of power (balapdramitd). The six virtues are ceaselessly active 
(satatam samuddcatanti) by the power of contemplation (pratisamkhydna ) and 
of meditation (bhavana) (cf. Anguttara, I, p. 52). 


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iv) The virtue of knowledge ( jnanaparamita ). The six virtues esrablish 
{vy avasthapay anti) the knowledge by means of which enjoyment of the 
Dharma ( dharmasambhoga ) is experienced ( anubhavati ) and beings are 
ripened ( paripacayati ). 

Furthermore, these four virtues come from ( samgrhlta ) the nonconceptual 
knowledge ( nirvikalpakajhana ) and subsequent knowledge 
( tatprsthalabdhajhana ) of the virtue of wisdom ( prajhaparamita ). 

But it is not true that in each bhumi all the virtues are not cultivated. This 
teaching is contained in the Paramitapitaka. [146a24] 


5. Comm. Bh 359cl0-360a29, bh 206a7-207b4, U 425bl3-425c20, u 315a7-316a5. 

“As the main statement, the ten virtues are cultivated in the ten bhumis. Does the author 
speak of these different cultivations (bhavandprabeheda) strictly (niyamena) or in 
general? In each bhumi in particular, the ten virtues are cultivated at one and the same 
time; this is why it cannot be said strictly that each particular bhumi cultivates one 
particular virtue alone. But as the author says: as main heading, he avoids this error 
(< dosa ). Here he is thinking of only the main development which does not exclude the 
cultivation of the other virtues. Thus a sutra says: In the first bhumi, the virtue of 
generosity ( danapmaramita ) is the main paramita, but all the other virtues are also being 
cultivated. And so on for the other bhumis. 

The six virtues which have been considered are cultivated in the first six bhumis'. in the 
first six bhumis, Pramudita, etc., the six virtues, generosity ( dana ), etc., are cultivated. In 
the last four bhumis, the following four virtues', in the next four bhumis, Duramgama, 
etc., the following four virtues: skillfulness of means ( upayakausalya ), etc. 

i) Skillfulness of means. To seek for nirvana ( nirvanaprarthana ) without abandoning 
samsara ( samsaraparityaga ): this is what is called skillfulness of means. To share 
amongst all beings the roots of good accumulated by the first six virtues - in the interest 
of beings ( sattvarthaya ), not to abandon them - this is 'not to abandon samsara'. To apply 
these roots of good to supreme perfect enlightenment in order to acquire the supreme 
enlightenment of the buddhas ( anuttara buddhabodhih ): this is 'to seek for nirvana'. [Cf. 


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Bh: Skillfulness in means demonstrates wisdom ( prajna ) and compassion {koruna). To 
share amongst all beings the roots of good accumulated by the first six virtues is to show 
great compassion. To apply these roots of good to supreme perfect enlightenment, to not 
seek the opulent happiness of a Sakra, etc., to not incur afflictions (kies a) by means of 
complete knowledge: this is wisdom. Endowed with skill in means, one remains in 
samsara but one is not stained by it. This is why we speak of skillfulness in means.] 

ii) By formulating various vows, one unites the causes of the virtues for a later time. One 
seeks the causes (pratyaya) of the virtues in the world to come (andgataloka). Also, in 
the interest of beings (sattvartha) and in order quickly to acquire buddhahood 
(buddhata), nirvana, one formuulates the following vow: "I formulate the vow to go later 
and be reborn there where there are virtues." Such vows being innumerable ( apramana ) 
and infinite (ananta), we speak of them as various. 

iii) By the power of contemplation and meditation . In this virtue of power, it is said that 
there is a twofold power, and the other powers are included in it as well. [Bh: Another 
sutra (cf. Anguttara, I, p. 52) says: There are two powers, namely, the power of 
contemplation and the power of meditation ( dve 'mani balani ... patisahkhanabalan ca 
bhavanabalah ca). And even if the power of meditation were lacking, one cultivates the 
virtues energetically by means of the power of contemplation. By saying that, thanks to 
it, the virtues are endless in activity, the role of the virtue of power is demonstrated.] 

iv) The six virtues establish the knowledge by means of which one experiences the joy of 
the Dharma and one ripens beings. The six virtues, generosity, etc., establish this 
knowledge and, in turn, this knowledge establishes the six virtues ... This is what is called 
experiencing the joy of the Dharma. By means of this wonderful knowledge, one knows 
perfectly: ‘This is generosity ( dana ); this is morality (sf/a); this is patience ( ksanti ); this 
is zeal (virya); etc’. Such teachings encourage all kinds of beings and this is what is 
called ripening beings. 

Moreover, these four virtues, etc., up to: come from subsequent knowledge : the four 
virtues in question, the virtue of skillfulness of means, etc., come from ( samgrhita ) 
nonconceptual knowledge and subsequent knowledge. If ten virtues are posited, the sixth, 
wisdom (prajna ), is only fundamental nonconceptual knowledge 

(mulanirvikalpakajnana); if six virtues are posited, the sixth (or wisdom) gives rise 


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(, samgrhita ) at one and the same time to both nonconceptual knowledge 
(i nirvikalpakajnana ) and subsequent knowledge (prsthalabdhajnana ) because, in the 
course of the subsequent knowledge, the last four virtues occur equally in the sixth virtue 
(or wisdom) that contains them. 

This teaching is contained in the Paramitapitaka. The entire doctrine (. desanadharma ) of 
the Greater Vehicle is called the pitaka of the virtues. From that, we know that, at one 
and the same time, all the virtues are cultivated in all the bhumis.” (U) 


6. How long a time ( kiyatkalam ) does it take to reach the completion of the 
development ( bhdvandparipiiri ) of the ten bhumis? - Five individuals (pudgala) 
reach the completion (paripiiri) after three incalculable periods 

( k alp as am khyeya) . (Cf. Sutralamkara), XIX, 63). 

The person who adheres to the Dharma ( ddhimoksika pudgala ) reaches the 
completion of his development after the first incalculable period. The person 
who is inspired by excellent pure proclivity ( suddhadhyasayika ), whether he 
courses in the signs ( nimittacdrin ) during the first six bhumis or whether he 
courses in the signless ( animittacdrin ) during the seventh, reaches the completion 
of his development after the second incalculable period. Finally, the person who 
courses in spontaneous activity ( anabhisamskdracdrin ) comes to the completion 
of his development after the third incalculable period, going from the eighth to 
the tenth bhumi. 

Here is a stanza: 

When he is endowed with pure strength ( subhabala ) and with excellent 
power ( pranihitabala ), when he is of strong mind ( drdhacitta ) and of 
advancing progress ( visesagamana ), it is said that the bodhisattva 
energetically cultivates the three incalculable periods. { 146b4] 

[Addition by Paramartha]: 

The bodhisattva career may require seven or thirty-seven incalculable 
periods. What are the seven asamkhyeyakalpas? Prior to the bhumis, there are 
three; during the bhumis there are four. The three asamkyeyas prior to the 


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bhumis are the asamkhyeya of the indeterminate ( aniyata ) bodhisattva, the 
asamkhyeya of the determined ( niyata ) bodhisattva and the asamkhyeya of the 
bodhisattva who has received the prediction ( vyakarana ). The four asamkhyeyas 
during the bhumis are the asamkhyeya of bhumis one to three, based on the three 
ti (149 and 9; cf. Taisho 1595, p. 230c23), the asamkhyeya of bhumis four 
to six based on equanimity ( upeksa ), the asamkhyeya of bhumis seven and eight 
based on pacification ( vyupasama ?) and the asamkhyeya of bhumis nine and ten 
based on wisdom ( prajna ). 

What are the thirty-seven asamkhyeyas? The three asamkhyeyas of the 
upayabhumi: the asamkhyeya of the sraddhacarya, the asamkhyeya of the 
udyogacarya (?) and the asamkhyeya of ts'iu hiang hing ( pratipadanacharya ?). 
Then three asamkhyeyas for each of the ten bhumis, entrance, abiding and 
emerging. These are the asamkhyeyas necessary to arrive at completion (paripiiri ) 
of the development of the ten bhumis. 


6. Comm. Bh 360bl l-360c2, bh 207b4-208a7, U 426al-22, u 316a5-316b8. 

“ Five individuals arrive at completion after three incalculable periods. This is a question 
here of different states ( avasthaprabheda ) assumed by one and the same person 
( pudgala ). These states are five in number: state of adhimoksika, etc., as is said below: 

i) The adhimoksika: he has not yet realized the true nature ( tathata ) and bases himself 
only on adherence to the Dharma ( adhimoksa ) in order to zealously cultivate the 
practices ( carya ). He reaches the completion of his development ( bhavanaparipuri ) after 
the first incalculable period. 

ii) The suddhadhyasayika: he has obtained the excellent pure proclivity 

(suddhadhyasaya) and zealously cultivates the practices. When he abides on the first six 
bhumis, he is called nimittacarin; when he abides on the seventh bhumi, he is called 
animittacarin. These two types of individuals reach the completion of their development 
after the second incalculable period. 

iii) The person who is above that, from the eighth to the tenth bhumi, is called 
anabhisamskaracarin. He reaches completion of his development after the third 


287 



incalculable period. On the eighth bhumi, effortless practice ( anabhisamskaracarya ) has 
not been achieved ( nispanna ). In the ninth and tenth bhumi, this practice has come to its 
achievement. 

It is a matter here of one and the same individual ( pudgala ) who, associated 
( samprayukta ) with different states, takes on five different aspects. It is like the aspects of 
srotaapanna, etc., assumed by one and the same individual (cf. Kosa, II, p. 134-136). But 
samsara has been going on ( prabandhena pravartate) since all eternity (anddhikalat); to 
what extent ( kiyata ) do we speak of an excellent development ( bhavana ) going on for 
three incalculable periods? - In order to reply to this question, the author cites the stanza: 

When he is endowed with pure strength and excellent power. The power of the roots of 
good ( kusalamulabala ) is called pure power ( subhabala ); i.e., the bodhisattva is endowed 
with the power of the roots of good. The power of great vows ( mahdpranidhdnabala ) is 
called excellent power ( pranihitabala ); i.e., the bodhisattva is endowed with the power of 
great vows. Endowed with the power of the roots of good, he is able to conquer 
(i abhibhu -) the opposing roots ( vipaksa ); endowed with the power of great vows, he is 
always attached to spiritual friends ( kalyanamitra ). 

When he is of strong mind and advancing progress. While skilfully abandoning bad 
friends ( papamitra ), he never abandons (parityaj -) the great mind of enlightenment 
(mahabodhicitta). The good dharmas ( kusaladharma ) which he cultivates in the present 
and the future continue to increase ( vrdh -), never diminishing (pranas-). When the 
bodhisattva is endowed with the power of the roots of good ( kusalamulabala ) and the 
power of great vows (mahdpranidhdnabala), when his great bodhicitta is solid (drdha) 
and irreversible, when the good dharmas that he has cultivated increase {yrdh-) from 
moment to moment ( pratiksanam ), when he is not sati Tied (samtus-) with what he has 
already obtained, then it is said that he cultivates the three incalculable periods in an 
excellent way." (U) 


NOTES TO CHAPTER V 

Preliminary Note'. 

References to the bhumis or levels: 


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Innumerable documents analyzed by J. Rahder, Dasadbhumikasutra, Intro., p. iii-xxviii; 
La carriere du Saint bouddhique, BMFJ, II, 1929, p. 1-22; art. Chi in Hoboggirin, p. 283 
sq.; L. de La Vallee Poussin, Les degres de la carriere du Bodhisattva, append, to 
Siddhi, p. 726-730; N. Dutt, Aspects of Mahay ana Buddhism, 1930. chap. IV, p. 238-289. 
Some important texts: Mahavastu, I, p. 64 (2), 76 (1 1), 77 (140 seq., 84 (12) seq., 436 n.; 
Lalitavistara, p. 35 (22); Mahavyut., 1140-1147; 886-895; Dharmasamgraha, LXIV- 
LXV; Satasahasrika P.P., chap. X, p. 1454 (ten bhumis); p. 1473 and 1520 (seven 
bhumis); Panca-vimsatisahasrika (ed. N. Dutt), p. 214-225; Abhis. alamkara, I st. 48-70 
( parikarman in order to reach the ten bhumis); Abhis. al. al, p. 99-104; E. Obermiller, 

The Doctrine of P.P., p. 51-57; Avatamsaka, T 278, k. XXIII, p. 542a seq.; Samdhinir. 

IX, v. 1-7; Lankavatara, abhis amayaparivarta, p. 21 1-216 (treats especially the ten 
bhumis); entire Dasabhumikasutra; Madh. avatara (systematic study of the bhumis and 
paramitas, p. 249-317; Sutralamkara, IV, 2 ( bhumi and cittotpada ); XIX, 1 1 ( aryabhumi ); 
XX-XXI ( anispannanispanna bhumih ); XX-XXI, 32-40 (etymology); 
Madhyantavibhanga, p. 97-107 ( bhumisv avaranam), p. 204-205 ( bhumi and paramata ); 
Bodh. bhumi, viharapatala, p. 317-358 (seven bhumis which make up thirteen vi haras ); 
Siddhi, p. 164-166, 273, 330, 510, 547, 613-619, 655, 662, 726, 729, 732; 
Yogacaryabhumi, T 1579, LXXIX, p. 737b29-738a3. 


1. The tenfold dharmadhatu that is to be cognized in the ten bhumis is studied in 
Madhyantavibhanga, p. 100-107 and, under the name of tathata, in Siddhi, p. 658-660 
(where, for the most part, the restored tenns should be corrected according to the 
Madhy anta-vibhanga) . 

The ten (eleven) opposing obstacles are studied in Siddhi, p. 639-657. Here are some 
references on this subject: 

i. Prthagjanatva (involves esentially the error of adherence to the atman and to dharmas): 
Sumangalavilasim, I, p. 59; Mrs. Rhys-D., Buddh. Manual of Psychological Ethics, p. 
258; S. Z. Aung, Compendium of Phil., p. 49, 50; Mahavastu, I, p. 78, 102, 437; 
Divyavadana, p. 133 (9), 419 (17), 429 (17); Kosa (opinions of different sects), I, p. 79- 
80; II, p. 191-193, 204; III, p. 128; VI, p. 232, 235, 241, 250; Treatise on the sects of 
Vasumitra in J. Masuda, p. 24, 26, 30. 38, 42, 49, 50, 52, 59. 68; Dasabhumika, p. 1 1, 12, 
16, 17, 43, 65; Madh. vrtti, p. 489; D. T. Suzuki, Index to the Lankavatara, 1934, p. 124, 
s.v. balaprthagjana; Madhyantavibhanga, p. 59 (22), 60 (20), 188 (13 -14), 196 (12) 

( prthagjanatvastha ); Siddhi, p. 58, 71, 112, 639-644. 

iii. Dhandhatva: Abhis. al. al., p. 670 (5); Bodh. bhumi, p. 9 (19), 15 (22), 175 (12). 176 
(6-19), 218 (9), 322 (26); Siddhi, p. 645. A list of eleven dausthulyas and twenty-two 
sammohas corresponds to these eleven dvaranas in Samdhinir., IX, § 5; 
Yogacaryabhumi, T 1579, k. 78, p. 730a7 sq. 


2. Names of the bhumis: besides the Dasabhumika and Madh, avatara, see Samdhinir., 
IX, v. 4; Sutralamkara, XVIII, 67-68; XX-XXI, 32-40; Madhyantavibhanga, p. 97 (11)- 
98 (10); Bodh. bhumi, p. 332-355. 

On abhoga, effort, which disappears in the eighth bhumi, DTgha, I, p. 37 (= manasikaro 
samannaharo ); Sumangalavilasam, I, p. 122; Vibhanga, p. 321; Kathavatthu, II, p. 349; 


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Milinda, p. 97; Visuddhimagga, p. 164, 325, 354; Mahavastu, II, p. 358 (7), 360 (9), 550 
n.; Kosa, II, p. 154; III, p. 200; VI, p. 154; VII, p. 88, 90; VIII, p. 148; Abhis. al. al., p. 
102 (17), 125 (16); Dasabhumika, p. 64, 67; Samdhinir., IX, v. 4. 5; Lankavatara 
(i anabhoga ), p. 42 (8), 161 (1), 

181 (1), 266 (8), 299 (2), 351 (5); Madh. vrti, p. 335 n.; Siksasam., p. 267, 271; Bodh. 
bhumi, p. 88 (22), 346 (14), 350 (12); Madhyantavibhanga, p. 98 (7), etc.; Trimsika, p. 
20 (12), 28 (5); Siddhi, p. 146, 335, 616-617. 


3. Acquisition of the bhumis: Sutralamkara, XX-XXI, 41. 

The ten dharmacaritas: Mahavyut., 903-912; Samdhinir., VII, v. 19, 31.; 
Madhyantavibhanga, p. 21 1 (13) seq. (good definitions); Abhis. al. al, p. 219. 


4 . Cultivation of the bhumis and their five fruits: Sutralamkara, XIV, 19-22; XX-XXI, 
31. 

On the distinction between the paripuri and parinispatti (or visuddhi) of the dharmakaya 
in the tenth and eleventh bhumois respectively, cf. Sutralamkara, XIV, 22; 
Madhyantavibhanga, p. 206 (4): bodhisattvaparinispatti, etc. 


5. All the paramitas are present in the bhumis, but each bhumi had a predominant 
paramita: Madh, avatara, p. 23 (Museon, 1907, p. 272). 

The last four paramitas in general: Samdhinir., IX, v. 10; Siddhi, p. 623-624. - In 
particular: 

i. Upayakausalya- : Sutralamkara, XVIII, 69-70; Bodh. bhumi, p. 261-264 (twelve 
aspects); Madhyantavibhanga, p. 94 (21), 95 (24), 97 (3), 208 (4). 

ii. Pranidhana- : Involves live vows, of which the fifth is tenfold: cf. Bodh. bhumi, p. 274 
(23) - 276 (1); Siddhi, p. 623-624; Madhyantavibhanga, p. 94 (23), 96 (6), 97 (3), 106 
(3), 208 (11); Sutralamkara, XVIII, 74-76; Dasabhumika, p. 14-17. - The ten 
pranidhanas, Siksasam., p. 291-295. 

iii. Bala- : Siddhi, p. 624 (correct cintanabala to pratisamkhyanabala), 

Madhyantavibhanga, p. 94 (23), 97 (3), 106 (11) and especially 208 (16). - On the two 
balas, Anguttara, I, p. 52; Digha, III, p. 213. 

iv. Jnana- : Madhyantavibhanga, p. 94 (24), 97 (3), 106 (19), 208 (23), 251 (15). 

Why the four last paramitas are included in the sixth, Samdhinir., IX, § 10; Siddhi, p. 
630. 

6. See L. de La Vallee Poussin, Duree de la carriere du Bodhisattva, Sidhi, p. 731-733; 
Bu-ston, History of Buddhism, I, p. 1 19-124. 

Without being complete, the following may be mentioned: 


290 



Three asamkhyeyas: Kosa, III, p. 188; IV, p. 224; Sutralamkara, XIX, 64; Bodh, bhumi, 
p. 255 (15)-356 (2). 

Four asamkhyeyas and one hundred kalpas; Pali sources, Cariyapitaka, I, p. 1; Jataka, I, 
p. 2; Anguttara, II, p. 142; Milinda, p. 232, 289. 

Seven asamkhyeyas: Lalitavistara, p. 10 (4), Madh, vrtti, p. 321(4). 

Ten asamkhyeyas: Nikayabheda of Vinltadeva, Tg. Mdo XC. Thirty-three asamkhyeyas; 
Samgraha, Paramartha’ version. 

Three, seven or thirty-three asamkhyeyas; Abhis. al. ah, p. 988 (14) sq. 


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CHAPTER VI 


THE OBSERVANCE OF EXCELLENT MORALITY 

( adhisTlam siksa) 


1. The various cultivations ( bhavanaprabheda ) of the cause ( hetu ) and the result 
( phala ) have been explained. How should the superiority ( visesa ) of excellent 
morality ( adhisTla ) be conceived? - As it is said in the Bodisattvabhumi, in the 
chapter on Acceptance of the Bodhisattva Discipline 

(bodhisattvasamvarasamadana). In brief ( samdsatah ), it is superior because of 
four superiorities (visesa): 

i) superiority of types (prabhedavisesa ), 

ii) superiority consisting of shared and unshared rules 
(sadharandsadharanasikshavisesa), 

iii) superiority of extent (vaipulyavisesa), 

iv) superiority of depth (gambluryavisesa ). [146b 10] 

1. Comm. Bh 360c 13- 18, bh 208a8, U 426a28-426b2, u 316b8-317a2. 

“That which one observes ( siksate ) by basing oneself on excellent morality ( adhisTla ) is 
called observance of excellent morality ( adhisTlam siksa). As it is said in the 
Bodhisattvabhumi in the chapter on acceptance of the bodhisattva discipline : as this text 
explains it at length in the chapter on the sflaparamita (cf. Bodhisattvabhumi, sllapatala, 
p. 137-188”; [but Lamotte thinks this reference is not correct]. “ Because of four 
superiorities : these superiorities are explained at length below.” (U) 


2. Superiority of types (prabhedavisesa ), because it consists of the morality of 
abstention (samvaraslla), the morality of gathering the good dharmas 


292 



( kusaladharmasamgrahakasXla ) and the morality of service to beings 
(, sattvarthakriyasTla ). 

The morality of abstention is the basis ( nisraya ) of the other two moralities. 

The morality of gathering good dharmas is the basis for acquiring the attributes 
of Buddha (b u ddh adh arm as am u d again a ) . 

The morality of service to beings is the basis for ripening of beings 
( sattvaparipacana ). [ 1 46b 1 5 ] 

2. Comm. Bh 360c27-29, bh 208a8-208bl, U 426b7-16, u 317a2-6. 

“Superiority of types is the fact that the bodhisattvas possess the three kinds of morality 
all at the same time (cf. chap. IV, § 9), namely, the morality of abstention, the morality of 
gathering good dharmas and the morality of service to beings, whereas the vehicle of the 
sravakas, etc., possesses only the first, namely, morality of abstention. This is why the 
bodhisattvas are superior to the sravakas. The morality of abstention consists of the 
commitment ( samadana ) to abstain ( virati ) from bad dharmas of all kinds. The morality 
of gathering good dharmas consists of acquiring ( samudagama ) all the buddha attributes, 
the powers ( bala ), the fearlessnesses ( vaisaradya ), etc. The morality of service to beings 
consists of not desiring one's own happiness ( svasukha ), but introducing beings as much 
as one can into the three vehicles ( triydna ), destroying ( prahdna ) the suffering of 
transmigration ( samsaraduhkha ) and realizing ( adhigama ) the happiness of nirvana 
(, nirvanasukha ). The morality of abstention is the basis of the other two moralities : it is 
the cause ( hetu ) of the other two moralities because, when one has disciplined the body 
(kayo), speech (vac) and mind (manas), one can unmistakenly ( viparyasa ) be assured 
(samudagama) of all the pure buddha attributes ( visuddhabuddhadharma ), one can ripen 
( paripacana ) all beings by introducing them into the three vehicles. This is not the case 
for the sravakas, etc.” (U) 


3. Superiority consisting of shared and unshared rules: 


293 



i) The rule ( siksa ) of the bodhisattvas is shared ( sadharana ) with the sravakas 
insofar as it is forbidden to the bodhisattvas to commit ( samudacar -) natural 
( prakrtisavadya ) wrongdoings. 

ii) The rule of the bodhisattvas differs ( asddhdrana ) from that of the sravakas 
insofar as the bodhisattvas can commit wrongdoings of disobedience 

( pratiksepanasavadya ). According to this latter rule, there where the sravaka 
commits a wrongdoing ( apatti ), the bodhisattva does not; there where the 
bodhisattva commits a wrongdoing, the sravaka does not. 

iii) The morality (sTla) of the bodhisattva is on the physical ( kayayika ), vocal 
( vacika ) and mental ( mdnasa ) levels; that of the sravakas extends only to the 
physical and vocal levels. For this very reason, the bodhisattva commits 
wrongdoings of mind (cittapatti) whereas the sravaka does not. 

In summary ( samdsatah ), the bodhisattva can accomplish {samudacar-) and 
observe ( siks -) any physical, vocal or mental action {kdyavdgm an askarm a) 
favorable to beings ( sattvopakdraka ) provided that he is blameless ( niravadya ). 
This is how the superiority consisting of shared and unshared rules is to be 
conceived. [146b23] 


3 . Comm. Bh 36 1 a9-20, bh 208b 1 -209a 1 , U 426b24-426c2, u 3 1 7a6-3 1 7b8 . 

“i) Killing ( pranatipata ), theft ( adattadana ), illicit sex (kamamithydcara), etc., resulting 
from lust, etc., are natural wrongdoings (prakrtisavadya ). They are forbidden to both 
bodhisattvas and sravakas. 

ii) Cutting plants {trnachedana), etc., which is not the result of concupiscence, is a 
wrongdoing of disobedience (prakti-ksepanasavadya ). The bodhisattva who sees in these 
wrongdoings of disobedience the benefit of beings ( sattvartha ) is blameless {niravadya) 
on committing them and can accomplish all of them. This is not so for the sravaka.” (U) 

According to this last rule, there where the sravaka commits a wrongdoing, the 
bodhisattva does not : thus the sravaka who leaves during the rainy season commits a 
wrongdoing. On the contrary, when he sees a benefit for beings in leaving and does not 
leave, the bodhisattva commits a wrongdoing; if he does leave, he does not commit a 


294 



wrongdoing. [According to bh: nan thos kyi Ituh bar hgyur ba de la byan chub sems 
dpahi Ituh ba med do €es bya ba ni ji Itar dbyar gyi nan du nan thos mams son bar gyur 
na Ituh ba yin no / sems can gyi don mthoh la ma son na byan chub sems dpah mams kyi 
Ituh ba yin la / son na ni Ituh ba med do.] 

“iii) For this very reason, the bodhisattva commits wrondoings of mind whereas the 
sravaka does not : they are guilty only of inwardly producing bad thoughts of desire 
(kama), of killing ( vyapada ), etc., even without arousing ( samutthd -) actions of body or 
speech following these thoughts. 

In summary, the bodhisattva can accomplish and observe any physical, vocal or mental 
action favorable to beings, provided that he is blameless, i.e., any action that ensures the 
welfare (hit a) and happiness (sukha) of beings, without thereby arousing (samutthd-) the 
passions, lust, etc. ( ragadiklesa ) in himself or in others. The bodhisattva is able to 
accomplish all these acts. (U)” - “It may happen that, while favoring beings, the action is 
not blameless; for example, having illicit sex with a woman belonging to someone else. 
To avoid this type of action, the author says: provided that he is blameless .” (Bh) 


4. Superiority of scope ( vaipulyavisesa ), which is fourfold: 

i) Scope consisting of many immense rules (nan dp ram an a-siksdvaipulya) . 

ii) Scope consisting of increase of immense merits (apramdna- 
punyaparigrahavaipulya). 

iii) scope consisting of the increase of inclinations to work for the benefit and 
happiness of all beings ( sarvasattvahita-sukhakriydsayaparigrahavaipulya ). 

iv) scope consisting of establishing supreme perfect enlightenment 
(anuttarasamyaksambodhinisrayavaipulya). [ 146b27] 

4. Comm. Bh 361a25-361b5, bh 209al-6, U 426c7-15, u 317b8-318a4. 

“i) Scope consisting of numerous and immense rules', the rules ( siksapada ) observed by 
the bodhisattvas are both many and immense; by means of them they ensure the ripening 
( paripaka ) and service (upakara) of all beings. 


295 



ii) Scope consisting of increase of immense merits : the bodhisattvas gain an immense 
accumulation of merit ( punyasambhara ). This is lacking in the sravakas. 

iii) Scope consisting of increase of inclinations to work for the benefit and happiness of 
all belongs: encouraging beings to practice the wholesome is called ’inclination to work 
for the benefit' (hitakriydsaya); wishing that a certain person ( pudgala ), by means of this 
benefit, will gain a higher fruit is called 'inclination to work for the happimness' 
(, sukhakriyasaya ). 

iv) Scope consisting of establishing supreme complete enlightenment : by this morality the 
bodhisattvas establish supreme perfect enlightenment. This is lacking in the sravakas.” 
(Bh) 


5. i) Finally, superiority of depth {gambhlryavisesa ) is the fact that by virtue of 
his skillful means, even if he commits the ten types of evil actions, the 
bodhisattva does not incur any blame but gains immense merit and quickly 
attains complete perfect enlightenment (tatra gambhlryaviseso yad bodhisattva 
evatnvidhenopdyakausalena dasavidham prdndtipdtddikarma samudacarati 
tenanavadyas ca bhavati, apramanam ca punyam prasuyate, anuttardydm ca 
samyaksambodhau ksipram abhisambudhyate). 

ii) Moreover, fabricated actions of body and speech ( nirmana - 
kdyavdkkarman ) should be thought of as the profound morality 

( gdmbhlraslla ) of the bodhisattva. By means of these actions, the bodhisattva 
exerts kingship ( rajya ) and by imposing ( samdarsana ) all kinds of torments 
( vihethana ) on beings, he introduces (niksipati) them into the discipline 
( vinaya ). 

iii) Exhibiting all kinds of Jatakas, he causes torment ( badhana , upadravd) to 
some beings, grants his favors ( upakdra ) to others and, having inspired faith 
(sraddha) in them, he assures their maturation ( paripaka ). Such is the 
superiority in depth {gambhlryavisesa ) of the bodhisattva's morality (slla). 
[146c6] 


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5 . Comm. Bh 36 1 b 1 5-36 1 c6, bh 209a6-209b7, U 426c24-427a 1 0, u 3 1 8a4-3 1 8b6. 

“i) Superiority in depth is the fact that, by virtue of his skillful means, the bodhisattva , 
etc. Here the power ( samarthya ) of the skillful means ( upayakausalya ) belonging to the 
bodhisattva is explained. For example, a bodhisattva knows that a certain person 
( pudgala ) is about to commit an evil ( akusala ) deed, an action of immediate retribution 
(anantaryakarman), etc. The bodhisattva knows the evil intention of this person by 
means of his knowledge of others’ minds (paracittajhana , cf. chap. X, § 15). Having no 
other method of deterring this person from this action and knowing well that the person 
in question, by this action, is going to fall away from his good destiny ( sugati ) and fall 
into an unfortunate destiny ( durgati ), the bodhisattva says to himself: “I am going to 
commit this action [i.e., kill this person]. Without a doubt, I shall fall into an unfortunate 
destiny, but I prefer to go there myself and deliver this person. By killing him, I will 
cause him a small suffering ( kimcitka duhkha) for a moment, but I will do it so that later 
on ( samparaya ) he will experience much joy ( sukha )." Then the bodhisattva, like a 
physician ( vaidya ), anns himself with courage and kills this person. By doing that, he 
incurs not the slightest blame. Indeed, he earns much merit and, by means of this merit, 
quickly arrives at supreme complete enlightenment. Such a discipline is profound.” (Bh) 

[This case is explained even more clearly in the Bodhisattvabhumi, p. 165-166: asti ca 
kimcit prakrtisavadyam api yad bodhisattvas tadrupenopayakausalena samudacarati 
yenanapattikas ca bhavati bahu ca punyam prasuyate. yathapi tad bodhisattvah coram 
taskaram prabhutanam pranisatanam mahatmanam 

sravakapratyekabuddhabodhisattvanam vadhayodyatam amisakimcitkahetoh 
prabhutanantaryakarmakriyaprayuktam pasyati. drstva ca punar evam cetasa cittam 
abhisamskaroti. yady apy aham enam praninam jrvitad vyaparopya narakesupapadyeya. 
kamam bhavatu me narakopapattih. esa ca sattva anantaryam karma krt\>a ma bhun 
narakaparayana id. evamasayo bodhisattvas tarn praninam kusalacittam avyakrtacittam 
va viditva rtvyamanah anukampacittam evayatyam upadaya jrvitad vyaparopayati. 
anapattiko bhavati bahu ca punyam prasuyate ]. 

“ii) Furthermore, the fabricated actions of body and speech should be thought of as 
profound morality. By means of them, the bodhisattva exerts kingship and, while causing 
all kinds of torment to beings, he introduces them into the discipline. That which has 
change ( nirmana ) as self-nature is called fabricated. Here we should know that the king, 


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the role which the bodhisattva is playing, ceaselessly reproduces in his governing the 
actions of Sudhanakumara (see Notes ). 

iii) Manifesting ail kinds of jatakas : e.g., the Visvantarajataka where the Bodhisattva 
gives his son and daughter to the brahmin (see Notes). This is a matter of a fabricated 
action (nirmdna). He causes torment to some beings and grants his favors to others : in 
the final analysis, bodhisattvas do not torment some and favor others [cf. chap. X, § 36, 
commentary]. This is what is called superiority in depth.” (Bh) 


6. In brief ( samdsatah ), it is by virtue of the fourfold superiority ( visesa ) that the 
bodhisattva's moral discipline (silasamvara) is superior ( visista ). By virtue of 
these aspects (prabheda ), the various observances ( siksaprabheda ) of the 
bodhisattva are infinite ( apramdna ), as is said in the 
Vinayaghosavaipulyasutra. [ 1 46c9] 


6. Comm. Bh 361cl0-l 1, bh 209b7-8, U 427al4-16, u 318b6-8. 

Here we have spoken of the four kinds of superiorities. But in the 
Vinayaghosavaipulyasutra the hundred thousand kinds of superiorities are explained in 
detail. (Bh) 


NOTES TO CHAPTER VI 


Preliminary Note : 

Chapters VI to VIII are dedicated to the three siksas, well-known in the Pali sources. Cf. 
tisso sikkha, Samyutta, III, p. 83; Patisambhida, I, p. 46 seq.; Milinda, p. 133, 237; 
Mahaniddesa, p. 39; explained as adhisfla-, adhicitta-, and adhipahha-sikkhd, Anguttara, 
I, p. 234 seq; Nettippakarana, p. 126; with the synonyms samvara, samadhi and patina, 
Visuddhimagga, p. 274; P. V. Bapat, Vimuyyimagga and Visuddhomagga, 1937, p. 70. - 
Sanskrit sources in Kosa, VI, p. 225, 230-231; VIII, p. 130. 

* * * 

For sila, morality, in the Pali sources, see references in Davids-Stede, Pali Dictionary. 
For sfla in the Mahayana, bodhisattvasila, see Siksasamuccaya with many sutra 
references; Bodhicaryavatara and Panjika, Adikarmapradlpa in L. de La Vallee Poussin, 
Bouddhisme, etudes et materiaux, 1898, p. 186 sq.; Bodh. bhumi, silapatala, p. 137-188; 


298 



adhisilavihara, p. 333-335; Yogacaryabhumi, T 2579, k. XL-XLII, p. 510 seq.; 
Bodhisattvapratimoksasutra, ed. N. Dutt, IHQ, VII, 1931, p. 259-286, etc.; 
Brahmajalasutra in J. de Groot, Le Code du Mahayana en Chine, 1893; Das tibetische 
Brahmajalasutra, trans. F. Weller, ZII, 10, 1935, p. 1-61 (This has nothing in common 
with the preceding reference); Hobogitin, art. Bosatsukai, p. 142 sq. 

Also: L. de La Vallee Poussin, Le Vinaya et la purete d’intention, BCLS, 1929, p. 201- 
217; Morale bouddhique, 1927, p. 64; Bouddhisme, opinions sur Vhistoire de la 
dogmatique, 1925, p. 302, 334; P. Oltramare, Hist, des idees thosophiques, II, 1923, p. 
379; N. Dutt, Aspects of Mahayana Buddh., 1930, p. 290: The Vinaya of the 
Mahayanists; E. Waldschmidt, Bruchstiicke des Bhiksumpratimoksa, 1926. 


2. The three kinds of sfla or the three 'masses of protection’: Sutralamkara, XVI, 37; 

Bodh. bhumi, p. 138(24) - 140 (27); Siddhi, p. 621, 631; Yogacaryabhumi, T 1570, k. XI- 
XLII, p. 510 seq.; Dasabhumivyakhyana, T 1522, k. IV, p. 145. - see Hobogirin, art. 
Bosatsukai, p. 143-146. 


3. The natural sins (prakrtisavadya ), (cf. Kosa, IV, p. 83; Bodh. bhumi, p. 164 (20), 165 
(2), 165 (25), are forbidden to bodhisattvas as well as to sravakas. Natural sin means acts 
evil in themselves: above all, the ten akusalakarmapatha, killing, theft, etc. (cf. 
Mahavyut., 1687-1698). 

By contrast, the sins of disobedience (pratiksepanasavadya ) forbidden to the sravakas, 
are allowed for the bodhisattva if the welfare of beings requires them to be committed. "It 
is a matter of certain actions not evil in themselves, but forbidden to the monastic by the 
Buddha who meticulously regulated the monastic regime: the monk should have only one 
robe, only one begging bowl; he should not eat after the noon meal; he should not sit 
down with dangling legs; he should not use perfumes or ointments, etc." (L. de la Vallee 
Poussin). These precepts number about 250. See H. Kern, Manual of Indian Buddhism, 
1896, p. 73-76; M. Nagai, Buddhist Vinaya discipline or buddhist commandments, in 
Buddhistic Studies by B. C. Law, 1931, p. 365-382; J. Przyluski, Le concile de Rajagrha, 
1926, p. 71, 86. - On the altruistic nature of the precepts of the Mahayana, hobogirin, p. 
142. 


5. In view of the excellence of his upayakausalya, the bodhisattva can commit murder, 
etc., in the service of beings. This crime is, for him, meritorious. Cf. Bodh. bhumi, p. 164 
(20) - 167 (26); L. de La Vallee Poussin, Le Vinaya et la purete d’intention, p. 212, sq. - 
The story is known of the Jyotis who commit lust out of charity. Upayakausalyasutra in 
Siksam., p. 167 (3-10); Bodhisacaryavatarapanjika, V, 84, p. 138-139. 

The fabricated actions of body and speech by which the bodhisattva practices his 
sovereignty over beings are studied in the Bodh. bhumi, p. 63-65. This concerns the 
nairmaniki rddhih involving kdva- and vagnirmana. It is distinguished from the 
parinamiki rddhih which will be studied in chap. VII, § 7. - The Bhasya gives the 
example of the act of the bodhisattva Sudhanakumara which is related at length in the 
Gandavyuhasutra. Finally, the bodhisattvas appear in all forms of possible existence in 
order to aid and save beings. See especailly Vimalaklrtinirdesa in Siksasam. - The 


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bibliography of the Visvantarajataka is considerable: Jataka, no. 547, VI, p. 479-596; 
Jatakamala, no. 9, p. 51-67; Avadhanakalpalata, no. 93. 

Finally, the bodhisattvas appear in ah possible sorts of forms of existence in order to aid 
nd save bings.See especially the Vimalaklrtinirdesa in Siksasam., p. 324-327 (trans. 
Bendall-Rouse, 1922, p. 290-91; M. Winternitz, Der Mahayana Buddhismus, 1930, no. 
19, p. 37-39); Hobogirin, art. Bosatsu, p. 139. - There is a large bibliography on the 
Visvantarajataka: Jataka, no. 547, VI, p. 479-596; Jatakamala, no. 9, p. 51-67 (trans. J. S. 
Speyer, p. 71-93); Avadanakalpalata, no. 93, ed. S. C. Das-H. M. Vidhyabhusana, p. 645- 
661; F. A. Schiefner-W. R. S. Ralston, Tibetan Tales, no. 16, p. 257-272; Cariyapitaka, I, 
np. 9 (trans. B. C. Law, p. 100-105); G. P. Malalasekera, Diet, of Pali Proper Nmes, II, 
1938, p. 944; E. Chavannes, Cinq cents contes et apologues. III, no. 500, p. 362; IV, p. 
247-248; R. Gauthiot, Une version sogdienne du Vessantara Jataka, JA, 1912, p. q63- 
193, 429-510; L. Finot, BEFEO, 1903, p. 320-334; A, Foucher, BEFEO, I, 365; J. Bacot, 
Drimedkundan, Une version tibetaine dialogue du Vessantara Jataka, JA, 1914, p. 22 1 - 
305; A. K. Coomaraswamy, Some early Buddhist reliefs identified, JRAS, 1928, p. 390- 
398; O. Siren, An Exhibition of early Chinese sculptures, 1928, p. 127-134; T. N. 
Ramachandran, Buddhist sculptures from a stupa near Goli village, Gun tur District, 

Bull. Madras Govt. Museum, vol. 1, no. 1, 1929; S. Karpeles, Chronique de l’ecole 
Frangaise d’ Extreme-Orient, BEFEO, 1931, p. 331. 


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CHAPTER VII 


OBSERVANCE OF EXCELLENT MIND 

( adhicittam siksa) 


1. The superiority of excellent morality ( adhisTlavisesa ) has been explained in 
chapter VI. How should the superiority of excellent mind ( adhicittavisesa ) be 
conceived? - In brief ( samasatah ), it should be thought of as being of six types 
( prabedha ). 

The adhicitta is superior: 

i) in its object ( alambanaprabheda ), 

ii) in its variety ( nundtvaprabedha ), 

iii) in its quality of counteragent (pratipaksa-prabheda ), 

iv) in capability ( karmanyaprabedha ), 

v) in product ( abhinirharaprabedha ), 

vi) in actions ( karmaprabedha ). [146c 15] 


1. Comm. Bh 361c 18, bh 209b8, U 427a26-427b2, u 318b8-319al. 

“Just as the excellent morality of the bodhisattva differs from the morality of the sravaka, 
so his excellent mind differs from the mind of the sravaka; that is why the author asks 
this question. Superiority of six types : this is the general answer to the question; the types 
are explained separately below.” (U) - “In the expression excellent mind, the word ’mind’ 
is used in the sense of mental concentration ( caittasika samadhi ).” (u) 


2. Superiority of object ( alambanavisesa ) because the adhicitta concerns 
(i dlambate ) the doctrine of the Greater Vehicle ( mahdydnadharma ). [146c 15] 


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2. Comm. Bh 361c20-21, bh 209b8-210al. U 427b4-4, u 319al-2. 


“The doctrine of the Greater Vehicle, i.e., the profound and vast 
doctrin e(gambhTravipuladesana) contained in the Bodhisasattva-pitaka. The adhicitta is 
superior to the concentrations ( samadhi ) of the sravakas who do not have such an 
object.” (U) 


3. Superiority in variety ( nanatvavisesa ), because there is an infinite ( apramana ) 
variety of concentrations ( samadhinandtva ), such as the Mahayanaloka 
(Brilliance of the Greater Vehicle), the Sarvapunyasamuccaya (Accumulation of 
all merit), the Samadhirajabhadrapala (King of concentrations, Good 
Protector), the Suramgama (Heroic march), etc. [146c 17] 


3. Comm. Bh 361c24-26, bh 2 10a 1-2, U 427b7-9, u 319a2-5. 

“The types of samadhi acquired by the bodhisattvas are infinite, but here, in brief, those 
that are at the top of the list ( purvamgama ) are cited here, the word etc. designating all 
the others. In the vehicle of the sravakas, etc., the names are unknown, still less the 
possession of them.” (U) 

In u are found the definitions of the four samadhis, which is missing in U: gah la shoms 
par €ugs na theg pa chen pohi chos mthah dag snan ba de theg pa chen po snan bahi tin 
he hdzin to // gan du bsod nams thams cad y an dag par bsags te / bdag gir by as par gyur 
pa de ni bsod nams thams cad yah dag par bsags pa €es byaho // tin he hdzin gyi rgyal 
po bzah skyoh ni / hjig rten gyi rgyal po b€in du tin he hdzin thams cad kyi bdag po ste / 
gah yod na phyogs bcu mams su da Itar nyuh bahi dus kyi sans rgyas bcom Idan hdas 
mams mhon sum du mthoh bar hgyur baho // dpah bar hgro ba ni tin he hdzin mams kyi 
mchog ste / dmag mi mams kyi nan na dmag dpon dpah bo b€in du bdud kyi tshogs 
hjoms par nus paho. - This means: “The concentration in which the entire doctrine 
(sakaladharma) of the Greater Vehicle shines brilliantly is the Mahayanaloka. - That in 
which all merits ( punya ) are gathered ( sarncita ) and appropriated ( svikrta ) is called 
Sarvapunyasamuccaya. - The Samadhiraja-bhadrapala, like a king of the land ( lokaraja ) 


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is the chief one of all the samadhis. By means of its presence, the Buddha Bhagavats of 
the present time ( pratyutpannakala ) and of the ten directions ( dasadis ) are seen face to 
face ( abhimukha ). - The Suramgama is the best (vara) of the samadhis; like a hero (sura), 
the head of the anny (aksauhimpati) in the midst of his soldiers (kataka), he is able to cut 
the troops of Mara to pieces (pramardana ).” 


4. Superiority as counteragent (pratipaksavisesa ), because the knowledge that 
bears on all the dharmas in a combined way (sarvadharmasamsrstdlambana 
jhiina ), just as one nail is driven out by another nail (dnTpratydnlnirhdrayogena, 
cf. Mahavyut., 6865), eradicates (nihsdrayati) all obstacles and weaknesses 
(avaranadamthulya) occurring in the store-consciousness (dlayavijitdna). 

[146cl9] 

4. Comm. Bh 361c29-362a3, bh 210a2-4, U 427b 12- 15, u 319a5-8. 

“Knowledge in regard to the combined object (samsrstadharmdlambana jnana) appears 
as the antidote to all the obstacles (sarvavaranapratipaksa). It is like a thin nail 
(suksmani) that drives out a thick nail (sthulani). Indeed, the propensity seeds 
(vasanabija) of the defiled dharmas (samklesikadharma) that reside in the store- 
consciousness (mulavijnana = alayavijnana) are coarse (stula) and the counteracting 
path (pratipaksamarga) able to eradicate them is subtle (suksma)." (Bh) 

“The true nature (tathata), the object of nonconceptual knowledge (nirvikalpakajndna) is 
made up (prabhavita) of the nature common to all dharmas 
(sarvadharmasamanyalaksana). That is why this nonconceptual knowledge is called 
knowledge in regard to the combined object (samsrstdlambana). The concentration 
(samadhi) producing this counteracting knowledge (pratipaksajnana ) is also called 
antidote (pratipaksa ). The noble path (aryamarga), which is subtle (suksma), is like a 
thin nail, whereas the seeds that are counteracted (vipaksabTja), which are coarse, are like 
a thick nail.” (U) 


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5. Superiority of capability ( karmanyatavisesa ) because, while abiding in the bliss 
of dhyana ( dhyanasukha ), the bodhisattva takes birth (janma parigrhnati) 
wherever he wishes. [146c21] 


5. Comm. Bh 362a6-8, bh 210a4-5, U 427M7-19, u 319a8-319b2. 

Cf. u: las su run ba hid kyis rab tu dbye ba ni bsam gtan gyi bde ba dag gis gnas nas 
bsam gtan las yohs su ma hams pa b€in du ji Itar hdod pa gah du sems can gyi don niton 
ba der skye ste / tin lie hdzin las su run bahi phyir ro // hdi hdra bahi tin he hdzin gyi las 
su sun ba hid ni nan thos la sogs pa hid la med do\ "Superiority of capability 
( karmanyatavisesa ) because, while abiding in the bliss of dhyana ( dhyanasukha ) and 
without falling away from bliss, he takes birth according to his choice (yathakamam ) 
wherever he sees usefulness for beings ( sattvartha ), for his samadhi lends itself to action. 
Such capability of concentration (samadhikarmanyata) does not occur in the sravakas, 
etc. 


6. Superiority in products ( abhinirharavisesa ), because the adhicitta produces 
( abhinirharati ) the unobstructed ( apratihata ) superknowkedges ( abhijhd ) in all 
the universes ( lokadhdtu ). [146c23] 


6. Comm. Bh 362a 1 1-12, bh 210a5-6, U 427b21-22, u 319b2. 

"Superiority in products, because the power of concentration ( samadhibala ) produces all 
types of unobstructed superknowledges ( ndnapratihatdbhijha ) in all the universes.” (U). - 
Cf. Chap. X, § 15. 


7. Superiority in actions ( karmavisesa ), because the adhicitta produces 
(i abhinirharati ) the great magical powers ( mahdrddhi , cf. Bodh. bhumi, p. 58-63): 

1) causing something to shake ( kampana ), 

2) flaming (jvalana ), 


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3) illuminating ( spharana ), 

4) making visible ( vidarsana ), 

5) transforming ( anyathibhavakarana ), 

6) going and coming ( gamana ), 

7) concentrating and developing ( samksepaprathana ), 

8) introducing all rupa into his body ( sarvarupakayapravesana ), 

9) taking on the ways of those whom he meets (sabh agatopasam kran ti ) , 

10) appearing and disappearing ( avirbhavatirobhava ), 

11) subjugating to his will ( vasitvakarana ), 

12) subduing the magical power of others (pararddhyabhibhava ), 

13) giving the light of intellect ( pratibhdddna ), 

14) giving memory ( smrtiddna ), 

15) giving bliss ( sukhaddna ), 

16) emitting light rays ( rasmipramoksa ). [146c26] 

7. Comm. Bh 362al7-362b7, bh 210a6-210b7, U 427b26-427c3, u 319b2-8. 

The parinamiki riddhih, studied in detail in the Bodhisattvabhumi, p. 58-63, is 
summarized as follows by L. de La Vallee Poussin in Siddhi, Appendix, p. 892-793. 

The magical power of transformation manifests in sixteen ways: 

1) kampana, causing to shake. - The Tathagata or the bodhisattva who possesses either 
mastery in concentration or agility of mind (fitness, karmanyata), causes a monastery, a 
house, a village and city ( gramagara ), a field, hell, the realm of animals, pretas, human, 
gods ... up to ... an infinite number of great chiliocosms, to shake. 

2) jvalana, to blaze. - He blazes at the upper part of his body while at the same time the 
lower part emits streams of cold water, and vice versa. He is completely on fire and emits 
blue, green, red, white, light red ( manjistha ), crystal-clear (sphatikavarna) rays of light. 


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3) spharana, to illumine. - He fills monasteries, etc., as in 1) with light. 

4) vidarsana, to make visible. - He makes all the classes of beings ( sramana ... 
mahoragah parsadah) see the realms, the buddha fields with their inhabitants, etc. 

5) anyathibhavakarana, transmutation. - By means of adhimukti, i.e., 'intense application 
of the mind, excellent action of will', he changes the great elements (earth, water, etc.) 
one into another, and also changes color-shape ( rupa ) into sound, etc. 

6) gamandgamana, going and coming. - He passes through obstacles, walls, etc.; he rises 
up to the Akanistha heaven in his material body formed by the four great elements. 

7) samksepaprathana, concentrating and developing. - He reduces mountains to the size 
of atoms and inversely. 

8) sarvarupakayapravesana.- He introduces all rupa (villages, mountains, etc.) into his 
body ( sarvarupakayam atmakaye pravesayati ), in the presence of a large company that 
recognizes itself as having entered into his body. 

9) sabhagatopasamkranti- He takes on the appearance, the ways of speaking, etc., of any 
company that he meets, ksatriya, etc. (cf. DTgha, II, p. 109). 

10) dvirbhdvatirobhava - He appears and disappears a hundred times, a thousand times, 
etc., in the presence of a numerous company. 

1 1) vasitakarana. - He causes the creatures of all the realms to come, go, stop, speak 
according to his will. 

12) pararddhyabhibhava. - He 'controls' the magical power of others. The Tathagata 
surpasses the magical power of all the magicians. The same for the bodhisattva who has 
arrived at the summit ( nistha ), who is living his last or next-to-last existence, with the 
exception of the Tathagata and the bodhisattvas of ra nk equal or superior to his. 

13) pratibhadana- He gives the light of intellect to creatures who are deprived of it. 

14) smrtidana. - The same for memory. 

15) sukhadana. - For a time, he gives material comfort ( pratiprasrabhisukha ), thanks to 
which creatures, freed from obstacles, are able to hear the Dhanna, obstacles that are 
produced by the turmoil of the elements (that cause sickness, dhatuvaisamika), by 
demons' attacks ( amanusya ), etc. 


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16) rasmipramoksa - He emits rays of light that pacify ( pratiprasrambh -) the sufferings 
of hell beings, summon the Buddhas and bodhisattvas ... in a word, realize the benefit 
(artha) of creatures. 


8. Superiority in actions ( karmavisesa ) as well, because the adhicitta comprises 
( samgrhnati ) and produces ( abhinirharati ) the ten achievements ( diiskaracaryd ) 
as well. These ten achievements are: 

i) The achievement of vows (pratijndduskaracaryd), because he undertakes 
( upagacchati ) the vows of great enlightenment ( mahabodhipranidhana ). 

ii) The achievement of not withdrawing ( avivartana-duskaracaryd ), because 
he does not withdraw before the sufferings of transmigration 

( samskdraduhkha ). 

iii) The achievement of not turning his back ( apardnmukhi - 
bhavaduskaracaryd), because he does not turn his back on the bad conduct 
( m ithyapratipatti) of all beings. 

iv) The achievement of devoting himself (lit., facing up to, 

(i abhimuklubhdvadmkaracaryd ), because he devotes himself to doing 
whatever benefit is possible ( sarvdrthakriyd ) to evil beings (ghdtakasattva ). 

v) The achievement of being unstained ( anutpalepaduskara-caryd ) because, 
while living in the world, he is unstained ( upalipta ) by human circumstances 
( lokadharma ). 

vi) The achievement consisting of convinced adherence 

(i adhimuktiduskaracarya ), because even without understanding ( avabudh -) it, 
he adheres ( adhimucyate ) to the vast and profound ( vaipulyagdmbhZrya ) 
doctrine of the Greater Vehicle. 

vii) The achievement consisting of penetrating (prativedha-duskciracaryd ), 
because it penetrates (pratividhyati ) the non-existence of self of the individual 
and of things (pudgala-dharmanairdtmya ). 


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viii) The achievement consisting of understanding ( avabodhaduskaracaryd ), 

because he understands ( avabudhyate ) the profound enigmatical words 

( gambhlra samdhdbhdsyd) of the Tathagatas. 

ix) The achievement of not quitting and not being defiled 

(i aparitydganihsamklesaduhkaracaryd ?), because he does not abandon 
( parityajati ) samsara, but is not defiled ( samklista ) by it. 

x) The achievement of effort (prayogaduskaracaryd ), because the Buddhas 
who are established in the removal of all the obstacles ( sarvdvaranamukti ) 
exert themselves (prayunkte ) until the end of samOara (a samsdrakoteh ) to 
spontaneously ( anabhogatah ) render service to all beings 

( sarvasattvdrthakriyd ). [ 1 47a 1 0] 


8. Comm. Bh 362b21-25, bh 210b7-21 lal, U 427cl6-428a7, u 319b8-320a7. 

“i) Not to take vows for one's own happiness but to commit oneself to rendering service 
( arthakriya ) to all beings is very difficult.... 

ii) Not to withdraw before the sufferings of lengthy samsara, wind ( vayu ), cold (sfla), 
etc., is very difficult.... 

iii) Some beings behave badly towards their parents ... To render them service without 
considering their mistakes ( dosa ) is very difficult ... 

iv) To lend oneself to the service of others even if one fears them greatly is very difficult 


v) While still living in the world, not to be stained by the eight human situations 
( lokadharma ), gain ( labha ), etc. (cf. chap. II, § 33; VIII, § 14) is very difficult ... 

vi) To grant one's faith (sraddhd) and one's convinced adherence ( adhimukti ) to a subtle 
(suksma) and very powerful doctrine when one does not understand it is very difficult .... 

vii) The words 'prativedha', 'abhisamaya' and 'samyagavabodhi' are synonymous 
(e kart ha). To penetrate the non-existence of self of the individual and of things 
( pudgaladharmanairdtmya ) that are imaginary (parikalpita ) is very difficult ... 


308 



viii) Rejecting the obvious meaning ( srutartha nirakarana) of the enigmatic 
( samdhabhasya ) words of the Buddha in order to grasp the hidden ( asrutarthanvaya ) 
meaning is very difficult .... 

ix) Dwelling in samsara without entering into error is very difficult. 

x) Having cut through and loosened the obstacle of the emotions and the obstacle to 
knowledge ( klesajneyavarana ), devoting oneself always to the service of all beings, 
going to the final end without stopping and delighting in this effort is very difficult.” (U) 


9. Concerning the avabodhaduskaracarya (the 8th achievement in § 8), what is 
the nature ( kldrs ) of these enignatic words ( samdhabhasya ) of the Buddhas that 
the bodhisattva comes to understand ( avabudh -)? - A sutra says the following: 

i) How does the bodhisattva practice generosity ( dunam upaiti)? When, 
without giving anything, he practices generosity widely in the innumerable 
universes ( apramanalokadhatu ) of the ten directions ( dasadis ). 

ii) How does he love generosity ( dunam rocate )? When he does not love any 
gift. 

iii) How does he believe in generosity (, dunam adhimucyate )? When he 
practices generosity without having faith (sraddha) in the Tathagatas. 

iv) How does he activate generosity ( ddnam pravartayati )? When he does not 
activate generosity, i.e., when he gives naturally ( svabhavatah ). 

v) How does he delight in generosity (ddne ' bhiramate )? When he does not 
give anything ( na kada chit) ever. 

vi) How is his generosity widespread ( visala )? When his mind for generosity 
is not solidified ( asdrasamjhd ). 

vii) How is his generosity pure ( suddha )? When he produces (utpddayati) 
avarice ( mdtsarya ). 

viii) How does his generosity come to an end ( nisthdgata )? When he does not 
stop at the end ( nisthd ). 


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ix) How is he master ( adhipati ) of generosity? When he has no sovereignty 
( vasita ) over generosity. 

x) How is his generosity indestructible ( aksaya )? When he is not fixed in the 
indestructible. 

What is said here about generosity should be applied likewise (yathdyogam ) to 
the other virtues from morality (sTla) to wisdom (prajha ). [147a24] 


9. Comm. Bh 362cl5-363al 1, bh 21 la 1-21 lb4, U 428a23-428b21, u 320a7-321a2. 

“i) When, without giving anything, he practices generosity widely. The bodhisattvas 
include all beings in their own self-nature ( svabhava ) because they have penetrated 
( pratividh -) the identity of themselves and others ( svaparasamata ). When others practice 
generosity, it is the bodhisattvas who are giving; that is why it is said that they practice 
generosity when they give nothing. Moreover, they have given all the wealth that they 
possessed to the whole world; that is why it is said that they give nothing. Finally, as the 
gift given ( deya ), the donor ( dayaka ) and the receiver of the gift (pratigrahaka) do not 
exist, their generosity is of threefold purity ( trimandalaparisuddha ) (cf. Notes chap. IV, § 
5); that is why it is said that they give nothing. 

ii) When he does not love any gift. This phrase is the exact opposite of the question, i.e., 
that the bodhisattva loves a gift by not loving it at all. All thoughts such as "I am giving 
to the supplicant so that he will give to me later on" or, "I am giving if he has already 
given to me" are repugnant to the bodhisattva. He practices generosity by loving and 
seeking only the blissful abode ( sukhavihdra ), nirvana. 

iii) When he practices generosity without having faith in the Tathagatas. The bodhisattva 
practices generosity with this personal knowledge and this intimate conviction that 
allows him to directly perceive ( saksatkr -) the true nature of things ( dharmata ). He is not 
content with believing others. 

iv) When he does not activate generosity. The bodhisattva practices generosity 
spontaneously ( svarasena ). He does not have to make an effort in order to compel others 
and encourage them to give. 

v) When he never gives anything, i.e., when he has always given everything. 


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vi) When his mind for generosity is without solidity. The word asara has as its evident 
meaning (hien mou), ’solidity', and as its hidden meaning ( abhisamdhi ), 'distraction' 
( viksepa ). [For sura and asara, cf. chap. II, § 31]. Taken in its hidden meaning, the 
phrase means that the bodhisattva practices generosity with a mind free of distraction 
(< aviksiptasamjha ), i.e., in samadhi or mind concentration ( cittasamadhana ). 

vii) When he produces avarice. The word utpa- has as its obvious meaning 'to produce’ 
(samutpdda) and as its hidden meaning 'to eradicate' ( utpat - = unmulana). Taken in its 
hidden meaning, the phrase means that the bodhisattva practices generosity by 
suppressing (samudghdta) avarice. 

viii) When he does not quit at the end. Not like the sravakas who have tranquility as the 
one vehicle ( samathaikayanika , cf Samdhinir. VII, § 15, p. 74), the bodhisattva does not 
stop at the end, at nirvana-without-residue (nirinkalpadhisesa nirvana ) . [This point is 
developed in chap. IX, § 1], 

ix) When he has no sovereignty over generosity, i.e., when avarice (mats ary a) and the 
other vices opposing generosity ( danavipaksa ) do not dominate him. 

x) When he is not fixed in the indestructible. Having arrived at perfection ( sampad ), at 
indestructible sovereignty ( aksayadhipya ), at definitive buddhahood (atyantikabuddhata), 
the bodhisattva is not fixed there. How is that? Creating fabricated ( nirmana ) bodies in 
the interests of others (parartha ), he continues to practice generosity. 

What has been said about generosity should be applied likewise to the other virtues from 
morality to wisdom. That applies to the other five virtues. Thus a sutra says: How does 
the bodhisattva have morality (silaf! When he observes no discipline. This means that the 
bodhisattva sees the identity of himself and others. Also when the others observe pure 
discipline, the bodhisattva is himself endowed with morality.” (U) 


10 . [Here is another example of enigmatic language where the technical expressions 
must be taken in their etymological sense. In order to find the term explained 
etymologically, just join up the letters printed in roman letters, i.e. those not 
italicized]. 

i) How is the bodhisattva the killer of living beings (prdnatipdtin )? When he 
takes beings out of transmigration (yadi pran/no/r samarato 'tipat ayati). 


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ii) How is he the thief who takes what has not been given ( adattaddyin )? 
When, without anyone having given him anything, he appropriates to himself 
all beings (yady adatt am apy atmana sarvattvdn adadati) 

iii) How does he misbehave in love ( kdmamithydcdrin )? When he acts by 
saying that all love is bad (yadi kama mithya iti car ati). 

iv) How is he a teller of lies ( mrsdvadin )? When he calls a lie a lie (yadi mrsam 
mrsam iti vad ati). 

v) How is he a slanderer (paisunyavadin )? When he always abides in the 
supreme dwelling of emptiness (yadi pa rame sunyavihare nityain viharati). 

vi) How does he have harmful speech (parusyavadin )? When he is on the 
other bank of knowledge (yadi jneyaparamitah). 

vii) How does he have thoughtless speech (sambhinna-praldpin)! When he 
preaches the Dharma by analysing dharmas correctly (yadi sarvadharman 
sambhidyo pralapat/). 

viii) How is he full of envy ( sa-abhidhyd )? When he attains supreme dhyana 
many times (yady abbiksnam anuttaram dhya nain pratilabhate). 

ix) How is he full of wickedness ( sa-vyapada )? When he suppresses all the 
defects of his mind (yadi sarvacittaklesdn vyapadayot/). 

x) How is he full of wrong views ( sa-mithyadrsti )? When he shows clearly the 
omnipresent falsehood (yadi sarvatragam mithyatvam yathabhiitam 

dars ayati). [147b5] 


10. Comm. Bh 363a22-363b4, bh 21 lb4-7, U 428c2-20, u 321a2-321b2. 

“Cf. the sutra where it is said: ‘O monks, I am a murderer, etc.’ Here the author explains 
the hidden meaning (abhipraya) of these texts. 

i) When he takes beings out of transmigration. To take out' is synonymous with 'to kill', 
and so the answer is in accord with the question. 


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ii) When, without anyone giving him something, he appropriates beings. Without 
someone inviting him ( udyuj -), he personally takes on ( adadati ) the interests of the other 
person (parartha ). 

iii) When he acts knowing that all love is bad. He knows full well ( yathabhutam 
prajanati ) that love of sensate objects ( visayakama ) and love of imaginary things 
( parikalpakama ?) are depraved. A stanza says: The Buddha has said that desire ( raga ), 
hatred ( dvesa ) and ignorance ( moha ) come from the imagination (parikalpasamutpanna). 
The pure {subha) and the impure ( asubha ) also come from error ( viparyasa ) which is 
their condition (pratyaya ). Pure and impure, both of which have this error as condition 
for their arising, do not exist in themselves ( svabhavatah ). Thus desire {kama) in regard 
to them is futile {asambhava). 

iv) When he calls a lie that which is a lie. It is because he calls a lie a lie that he is called 
mrsavadin. A verse says: The Bhagavat has indeed defined all deceitful dharmas. Among 
these, the samskaras are the most deceitful. 

v) When he always dwells in the supreme abode of emptiness. This answer to question v) 
rests on a popular etymology ( nirukti ). Paisunya has 'slanderous words' (li kien yu = 
paisunyavada according to Mahavyut. 8422) as its obvious meaning (hien mou). Its 
hidden meaning is 'eternal supreme emptiness' (nityaparamasunya); indeed, pai (Ch. pei, 
classification 154) stands for parama, su (Ch. siu, 62 and 2) stands for sunya and ni (Ch. 
ni, 44 and 2) stands for nitya. If this hidden meaning is adopted, the answer is in 
accordance (samprayukta), whereas if one keeps to the obvious meaning, it is not in 
accordance. 

vi) When he is on the other bank of the knowledge. Parusya is also taken in its 
etymological sense. As its obvious meaning, parusya is 'harmful speech’ ( parusyavadaf, 
as hidden meaning, 'to be on the other shore' (po ngan, 85 and 5; 46 and 5, = para ace. to 
Mahavyut. 2663). Adopting this hidden meaning, the author is saying: when he is on the 
other shore of knowledge. The other shore of knowledge (jheyapara) is omniscience 
(. sarvajhdna ). That is where the Buddha dwells in peace. 

vii) When he preaches the Dharma by analyzing dharmas correctly. This explanation of 
sambhinnapraldpa is easy to understand. 


313 



viii) When he obtains supreme dhyana many times. As above, an explanation of the 
etymological type. The dhyana that is in the Buddha’s body ( buddhakaya ) is supreme 
(< anuttara ). 

ix) When he suppresses all the defects of his mind. ’Destroy, cut' are synonyms of 
suppress. 

x) When he sees the omnipresent falseness very well, i.e., when he sees that everything 
has deceit, imagination, falseness as nature.” (U) 


11, The ‘profound attributes of the Buddha’ (gambhira buddhadharma) are 
spoken of. What are they? 

i) The eternal dharmas ( nityadharma ) are attributes of the Buddha because 
the dharmakaya of the Buddha is eternal ( nitya ). 

ii) The dharmas of abandonment ( prahdnadharma ) are attributes of the 
Buddha because the Buddha has cut all the obstacles ( dvarana ). 

iii) The dharmas of arisng ( utpddadharma ) are attributes of the Buddha 
because the apparitional body ( nirmdnakdya ) of the Buddha takes birth. 

iv) The dharmas of acquisition (upalabdhidharma) are attributes of the 

Buddha because the 84,000 behaviors of beings ( sattvacarya ) and their 
antidotes (pratipaksa) are acquired (or perceived, upalabdha) by the 

Buddha. 

v) The dharmas connected with lust ( saragadharma ) are attributes of the 
Buddha because the Buddha recognizes (abhyupagacchati) his fundamental 
equality in respect to lustful beings ( sardgasattva ). 

vi - viii) For the same reason, the dharmas connected with hatred 
( sadvesadharma ) are attributes of the Buddha, the dharmas connected with 
ignorance ( sum oh adh arm a ) are attributes of the Buddha and the dharmas of 
ordinary people ( prthagjanadharma ) are attributes of the Buddha. 


314 



ix) The dharmas free of stains ( aliptadharma ) are attributes of the Buddha 
because the true nature ( tathata ) fully realized ( nispanna ) by the Buddha is 
not stained by any obstacle ( avarana ). 

x) The dharmas free of stains ( anupaliptadharma ) are attributes of the 
Buddha because, while dwelling in the world, he is not soiled ( upalipta ) by 
any human situation ( lokadharma ). 

That is why the dharmas of the Buddha are profound. [147b 1 7] 


11. Comm. Bh 363b 18-26, bh 21 Ib8-212a4, U 429a 12-42% 1, u 321b2-322a4. 

“What is the meaning of profound attributes of the Buddha of which the sutra speaks? It 
is a matter here of another sutra saying that the eternal dharmas are the attributes of 
Buddha, and so on up to the dharmas free of dirtiness are the attributes of the Buddha. 
There is a hidden meaning which the author is going to explain. 

i) Because the dharmakaya of the Buddha is eternal. The dharmakaya has the 
transfonnation of the support ( asrayapara vrtti) . (Cf. chap. X, § 3, no. 1) as its nature 
(laksana). It is the true nature ( tathata ) freed of all obstacles ( sarvavaranavimukta ), 
eternal ( nitya ) because immutable ( avikara ). Or indeed, it is supreme immaculate 
unhindered knowledge ( vimalam apratihatam canuttarajhanam). It is not of the order of 
retribution ( vipaka ) like the formless realm (arupyadhatu) because it is pure ( anasrava ). 
It also pertains to the eternal dharmakaya because it is undifferentiated ( nirvisista ) and is 
not conditioned ( samskrta ) by actions ( karman ) and afflictions ( klesa ). 

iv) Because the 84,000 behaviors of beings and their antidotes are acquired by the 
Buddha. The 84,000 sections of the Dhanna ( dharmaskandha , cf. Saddharmapundarlka, 
p. 254, transl. Kem, p. 241; Burnouf, Introd., p. 34, seq.; Kosa I, p. 46-47; Uttaratantra, p. 
184) are the remedies (pratipaksa ) for the 84,000 behaviors of beings (cf. chap. II, § 31) 
dominated, some by desire ( rdgacarita ), some by hatred ( dvesacarita ), some by 
ignorance ( mohacarita ), and some by pride. (Cf. Kosa I, p. 47; VI, p. 297). This makes 
up four groups each consisting of 21,000 units. 


315 



ix) The dharmas free of stainst are the attributes of the Buddha, because the pure tathata 
is not stained by any obstacle (dvarana). The rest is easily understood; there is no need to 
explain it. 

What are the results (pha/a ) of these enigmatic words ( samdhabhasya ) of the Buddha? 
They easily allow the speaker ( sastr ) to explain (v yavasthap-); by condensing the 
meaning ( artha ), he addresses himself easily to others. Thus they allow the listener 
(. sravaka ) to understand easily, to complete ( paripur -) his accumulations ( sambhara ) 
easily by grasping the teaching ( desana ), by penetrating ( pratividh -) the nature of things 
(dharmata) by completing his accumulations. The listener acquires intelligent faith 
(avetyaprasada) with respect to the Buddha whose magnanimity ( mahatmya ) he 
understands. Similarly with respect to the Dharma and the Samgha, both of which are 
superior. In this way, he acquires the truly fortunate abodes ( drstadharmasukhavihdra ) 
by virtue of his awareness of the Three Jewels, Buddha, Dharma and Samgha. In the 
company of wise ones, his information ( upadesa ) is sharpened and he enters into the 
category of the wise ones. Such are the ten advantages of the enigmatic words. 

There are also enigmatic words in the Vehicle of the sravakas, such as the stanza: 'Having 
killed his father and his mother,’ etc. They also present these ten advantages.” (U) - 

[This probably concerns stanza 294 of the Dhammapada, which has already been 
mentioned in chap. Ill, § 10, no. 4: mdtaram pitaram hantva, rajano dve ca khattiye, 
rattham sdnucaram hantva, anigho yati brahmano. This stanza literally means: 'Having 
killed his mother and father and two kings of the ksatriya class, having destroyed the 
kingdom with its subjects, the brahmin is innocent,' But according to the commentary, it 
should be understood thus: ’ Having killed the thirst ( tanha ) and the pride of self 
( asmimana ), and the false views of eternity and annihilation ( sassatucchedaditthi ), 
having destroyed the twelve sense-fields ( dvadasayatana ) with sensual desire 
(, nandiraga ), the khmasava is without suffering ( niddukkha ).’ See also the explanations of 
the Dhammapadatthakatha, III, p. 454: 

tattha sanucaran ti ayasadhakena ayuttakena sahitam, ettha hi "tanha janeti purisan" ti 
vacanato tisu bhavesu sattanam jananato tanha mata nama; "aham asukassa nama 
rahho va raj amahamattassa va putto" ti pitaram nissaya asmimanassa uppajjanato pita 
nama; loko viva rajanam yasma sabbaditthigatani dve sassatucchedaditthiyo bhajantT, 


316 



tasma sassatucchedaditthiyo dve khattiyarajano nama; dvadasayatanani vitthatatthena 
ratthasadisatta rattham nama, ayasadhako ayuttakapuriso vivo tain nissito nandirago 
anucaro nama, anigho tu niddukkho, brahmano ti khmasavo, etesam tanhadmam 
arahattamaggahasina hatatta khmasavo niddukkho hutvayati ti ayam ettha attho.] 

The stanza mataram pitaram hantva (Dhammapada, no. 294) and the stanza asare 
saramatino (Dhammapada, no. 11, considerably altered in the Samgraha, chap. II, § 31, 
and the Sutralamkara, p. 82) are often given as examples of enigmatic language; cf. 
Abhidhanna-samuccaya, T 1605, k. 7, p. 694a21. 


12. Finally, the development of the virtues (pdramitdbhdvana ), the ripening of 
beings ( sattvaparipacana ), the purification of the buddhafields 
(buddhaksetraparisodana) and the production of the attributes of the Buddha 
( buddhadharmdbhinirhdra ) should be considered as so many special actions 
( karmaprabheda ) belonging to the bodhisattvas' samadhis. [147bl8] 


12. Comm. Bh 363cl-7, bh 212a4-8, U 429b4-9, u 322a4-7. 

“The concentrations obtained by the bodhisattvas have, moreover, a fourfold activity. By 
being themselves based on these concentrations, they are able to cultivate all the virtues 
and ripen all categories of beings because, utilizing the means ( upaya ) they have at their 
disposal, magical powers (< rddhi ), etc., they establish beings in the holy Dharma 
( saddharma ). They can also purify the buddhafields by transforming them into gold 
( suvarna ) and other precious substances according to their wishes. They are able to 
acquire ( samudagama ) all the Buddha attributes, such as the powers ( bala ), the 
fearlessnesses ( vaisharadya ), etc. Outside of these concentrations in question, this 
fourfold activity consisting of the cultivation of the virtues, etc., cannot be exercised. 
Thus the sravakas, etc., do not have them.” (U) 


NOTES TO CHAPTER VII 

1. Adhicitta, the superior mind, the great samadhi, characterizes the third bhumi in 
particular cf. Bodh. bhumi, adhicittavihara, p. 335-338; Samdhinir, IX, § 2; Siddhi, p. 


317 



730. This is the second of the three siksas: adhicittam siksa : Samdhinir., IX, § 9; 
Uttaratantra, p. 121; Siddhi, p. 313, 632. 


2 . Object of adhicitta: the law of the Mahayana contained in the Bodhisattvapitaka. The 
latter is defined (Bodh, bhumi, p. 96(6)): tatra dvadashangad vacogatad yad vaipulyam 
tadbodhisatt\>apitakam. avasistam sravakaapitakam veditavyam. See also Bodh. bhumi, 
p. 160 (26), 173 (214), 274 (21). 330 (16), 336 (11); bodhisattvapitakadesana, Bodh. 
bhumi, p. 298 (4); -matrka, p. 157 (4), 180 (16), 332 (23); -vaipulya, p. 197 (10). See also 
Samdhinir., IX, § 9, 10, 18; Uttaratantra, p. 227; J. Przyluski, La legende de Tempereur 
Asoka, 1923, p. 100; Le Concile de Rajagrha, 1926, p. 114, 120, 124, 357-359, 361. 


3 . The four samadhis. These samadhis are of the domain of the fourth dhyana: they are 
exclusively pure ( anasrava ): They cannot be attained before the bhumis. These samadhis 
are infinite in number (cf. Saddharmapundarlka, XXIII, p. 424 (7)). - There is a list of 
1 18 s. in Mahavut., no. 506-623; Satasahasrika P.P., p. 825, 1412, 1531; 
Karunapundanka, p. 90. - Most frequently, as here, only the first four are cited: 
mahayanaloka, sarvapunyasamuccaya, samadhirajabhadrapala and suramgama: Siddhi, p. 
632 (to be corrected according to the terms below, restored according to the 

Tibetan Upanibandhana). Another tetrad in Dharmasamgraha, CXXXVI: gaganaganja, 
vimalaprabha, simhavikrldita, suramgama. - The second s. of Samgraha, 
sarvapunyasamuccaya, is cited in Saddhannapundanka, p. 424 (5). The 
suramagamasamadhi is explained in Buddhabhumisutrasastra, T 1530, k. 5, p. 316a8; it 
has given its name to two sutras: T 642, p. 629; T 945, p. 105. It exists as Sanskrit 
fragments published by R. Hoernle, Manuscript Remains, 1916, p. 125, sq; T 945, p. 105, 
partially trans. By S. Beal, A catena of Buddhist scriptures, 1871, p. 284-369. 


4. On knowledge in regard to the combined object, see notes to chap. Ill, § 12 

On the weakness ( dausthulya ) of the store-consciousness, refer to chap. I, § 61 and the 
references connected with it. 

The example of the nail driven out by another nail occurs in Samdhinir., VIII, v. 36, no. 
3. 


5. For birth at will (yathakamopapatti ) of the bodhisattva, cf. chap. VI, § 5. Otherwise, 
these births are fabricated: see chap. X, § 36, no. 1. 


7. Parinamikl rddhi in the Mahayana: Bodh. bhumi, p. 58-63; Siddhi, p. 792-793. We 
know that rddhi is concentration ( samadhi ) according to Kosa, VI, p. 285, VII, p. 98, 

1 12; Patisambhidha, p. 205-206. The Hmayana counts ten types of iddhv. Dlgha, I, p. 78, 
212; II, p. 87, 213; III, p. 112, 281; Samyutta, II, p. 121; V, p. 264, 303; Anguttara, p. 
180, 255, III, p. 17, 28, 82, 425; V, p. 199; Patisambhida, I, p. 1 1 1, II, p. 207; 
Visuddhimagga, p. 378 seq.; Sumangalavilasim, I, p. 222; Atthasalim, p. 91; limits of 
their power: Katthavatthu, p. 606 seq. 


318 



8. The ten duskaracaryas of the bodhisattva. - Cf. the d. of Sakyamuni, Lalitavistara, 
XVII, p. 243-260; heroism in the practice of the paramitas and the samgrahavastus 
mentioned in Bodh. bhumi: dana. p. 183 (19);, sila, p. 132 (3); ksanti, p. 195 (21); virya, 
p. 202 (2); dhvana, p. 208 (10); prajna, p. 213 (4); priyavadita, p. 218 (3); arthacarya, p. 
221 (27). 


9-11. These paragraphs are an application of chap. II, § 31 which should be consulted in 
the Notes. Avabodhaduskaracarya is the feat of understanding the enigmatic words 
(sarndhdbhdsya) of the Tathagatas. The Lankavatara recommends untangling the 
enigmatic meaning of all dharmas ( sarvadharmasamdhyarthaparimocana , p. 160 (9) by 
avoiding being held up by the literal meaning ( yathdrutabhinivesa , p. 161; it enumerates 
many samadhis. The same advice occurs in the Bhadramayakara, p. 95-102. We kn ow 
indeed that, besides the sutras of explicit meaning ( mtartha ), there are sutras the meaning 
of which should be detemined by reflecting ( neyartha ); see Kosa, IX, p. 246-248; 
Lankavatara, p. 77; Madh. avatara, p. 195; Siddhi, p. 558. A good resume of the doctrine 

in Bodh. bhumi, p. 108 : iha bodhisattvah arthapratisaranas ca bhavati 

cintayan na vyanj anapratisaranah ... artham pratisaran bodhisatt\>o na vyanjanam 
budhhandm Bhagavatam sarvasambhydyavacandny anupravisati. 

Lamotte says that he has not succeeded in identifying the sutras of allegorical meaning 
proposed here as example: the first (§ 9) contains paradoxes on generosity; the second (§ 
10) sets forth enigmas on the ten kannapathas (cf. Mahavyut., 1686-1698; the third (§ 1 1) 
deals with the profound buddhadharmas. 


12. Other activities of the samadhis: 

i. paramitabhavana, cf. chap. IV, § 8 

ii. sattvaparipacana, cf. the lengthy study in Bodh, bhumi: paripakapatala, p. 78-87; 
Sutralamkara, IX, 49-55; Madhyantavibhanga, p. 77 (4), 95 (1), 164(8), 209 (8). 

iii. ksetraparisodana, cf. Sutralamkara, VII, 7; Madhyantavibhanga, p. 98 (8), 105 (16), 
256(17). 

iv. buddhadharmabhinirhara, cf. chap. X, § 9. 


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CHAPTER VIII 


THE OBSERVANCE OF EXCELLENT WISDOM 

( adhiprajnam siksa) 

1. The superiority of excellent mind ( adhicittavisesa ) has been explained in 
Chapter VII . How should the superiority of excellent wisdom ( adhiprajhavisesa ) 
be conceived? Nonconceptual knowledge ( nirvikalpakajnana ) should be 
considered to be the superiority of excellent wisdom. We will examine: 

1) The self-nature of nonconceptual knowledge ( nirvikalpakajnanasvabhava ), 

2) its basis (dsraya), 

3) its cause (g€i ), 

4) its object ( alambana ), 

5) its aspect ( akara ), 

6) refutation of objections ( codyaparihara ) raised against it. 

7) Its role of maintenace ( adhistdna ), 

8) its associates ( sahaya ), 

9) its retribution ( vipaka ), 

10) its necessary consequence ( nisyanda ), 

11) its deliverance ( nihsarana ), 

12) its end ( nisth again an a ) , 

13) the advantages ( anusamsa ) of preparatory (prayogika ), nonconceptual 
(nirvikalpaka) and subsequent (prsthlabdha ) knowledge, 

14) the types {prabheda ) of nonconceptual knowledge, 

15) examples ( drstdnta ) illustrating nonconceptual ( nirvikalpaka ) and 
subsequent (prsthalabdha ) knowledge, 


320 



16 ) the effortless accomplishment of its role (anabh ogakrtyan us than a ) , 

17 ) its profundity ( gamhhlrya ). [147b26] 


1. Comm. Bh 363c 15-22, bh 212a8-212b4, U 429b 17-26, u 322a7-322b4. 

“The author will now explain excellent wisdom ( abhiprajha ). He affirms that 
nonconceptual knowledge ( nirvikalpakajnana ), excellent wisdom, is of three kinds: 
preparatory nonconceptual knowledge (prayogikanirvikalpakajndna) or speculative 
wisdom ( paritrakaprajnd ), fundamental nonconceptual knowledge 

(mulanirvikalapakajndna) or wisdom of realization ( sdksdtkdraprajna ), and subsequent 
nonconceptual knowledge ( prsthalabdhanirvikalpakajhdna ) or applied wisdom 
( kriyaprajnd ?). Here the wisdom of investigation ( paryesandprajnd ) is the first excellent 
wisdom, introspective wisdom ( pratydtmavedyaprajnd ) is the second excellent wisdom 
and sustaining (ddhdraprajnd) wisdom is the third excellent wisdom. Here 
nonconceptual knowledge is demonstrated. But this knowledge comprises a cause (hetu) 
and a result (phala); speculative wisdom is the cause of this knowledge, subsequent 
knowledge is the result of this knowledge. By demonstrating it, both of the others are 
demonstrated at the same time.” (Bh) 


2. Nonconceptual knowledge avoids five characteristics. The avoidance 
( vyapakarsa ) of these five characteristics {paiidkdra ) constitutes the self-nature 
(svabhdva) of noncopnceptual knowledege. 

i) It is not an absence of thinking ( amanasikdra ). 

ii) It excludes ( vyapakarsati ) and surpasses ( atikrdmati ) the stage equipped 
with investigation and analysis ( savitarka-savicdrabhumi ). 

iii) It is not a pacification consisting of cessation of identification and 
sensation ( samjndveditanirodhapasanti ). 

iv) It is not a substance ( rupasvabhdva ). 

v) It is not a description of reality ( bhutdrthacitnkdra ). 


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Nonconceptual knowledge escapes these five characteristics. The following 
stanza concerns this explanation of nonconceptual knowledge: 

In the bodhisattva, the self-nature of nonconceptual knowledge avoids five 
characteristics. It is not a description of reality. [147c3] 


2. Comm. Bh 363c28-364a22, bh 212b4-213a4, U 429c2-26, u 322b4-323a6. 

“Dealing with the self-nature of this knowledge, the author says that it avoids five 
characteristics. The author defines the essential nature of this knowledge by way of 
negation ( nirakaranamukha ) because it cannot be defined ( nirabhilapya ) in a positive 
way ( pratipattimukha ). It is necessary to rule out concepts (vikalpa) in order to 
understand ipratipad -) the self-nature of nonconceptual knowledge (lit. without concept); 
otherwise this knowledge would be furnished with concepts. What is intuition (wou fen 
pie = nirvikalpa )? It is defined above by saying: It is not without thinking, etc. 

i) If absence of thinking ( amaniskara ) were nonconceptual knowledge, sleep 
(apasvdpana) and drunkenness ( mada ) where one does not think would be nonconceptual 
knowledge. But that is inadmissible because one would then effortlessly ( paryatna ) 
arrive at absence of error ( aviparyasa ). 

ii) If the level surpassing investigation and analysis ( vitarkavicdrdtikrdntabhumi , cf. 
Kosa, VIII, p. 183) were nonconceptual knowledge, all ordinary people ( prthagjana ), the 
sravakas, etc., in levels above the second dhyana would possess nonconceptual 
knowledge, when in fact, they do not have this nonconceptual knowledge. 

iii) If cessation of identification and sensation ( samjhdveditanirodha ) were 
nonconceptual knowledge, the essential characteristic of this knowledge, i.e., its ’mental 
factor’ nature which makes it a knowledge, would be difficult to establish in the 
unconscious state ( asamjhin ), etc. In fact, without a mind ( citta ) that supports them, there 
are no mental factors ( caitta ). Now, in regard to the cessation of the mental 
consciousness ( manovijhdnanirodha ), this state of unconsciousness, etc., is called a state 
without mind ( acittaka ), as has been said above (cf. chap. I, § 7). 


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iv) If matter were nonconceptual knowledge, there would be no nonconceptual 
knowledge because it would be like a substance derived ( bhautika , upadayarupa) from 
the four great elements ( mahabhuta ). 

v) If the description of reality {bhutarthaci trikara) were nonconceptual knowledge, this 

knowledge would not be nonconceptual or without concept ( nirvikalpaka ) because, in the 

description of reality, recourse made to concepts by saying: "This is or "This is not 
»» 

In the stanza, the first three phrases (pada ) avoid five characteristics in order to explain 
nonconceptual knowledge. The fourth phrase defines its self-nature. It is not description 
of reality, the fact of not describing reality is its self-nature. Self-nature ( svabhava ) and 
own-essence ( svakaya ) are synonyms; in the same way, the bracelet ( mudrika ) is said to 
have gold ( suvarna ) as self-nature.” (U) 


3. In the bodhisattva, the support ( dsraya ) of nonconceptual knowledge is neither 
mind ( citta ) nor non-mind ( acitta ) because it does not think and is not the result 
of thought ( cittdnvaya ). [147c5] 


3. Comm. Bh 364a22-364b3, bh 213a4-214bl, U 429c26-430a8, u 323a6-323b3. 

“The self-nature ( svabhava ) of this knowledge functions by depending on something. 
Hence another stanza (§ 3) ... This nonconceptual knowledge, someone may say, depends 
on a mind {citta) or on a non-mind {acitta). If one says that it depends on a mind, then it 
could think {manana), and in its quality of mind functioning in dependence on a mind, it 
would not be nonconceptual {nirvikalpa). On the other hand, if it depends on a non-mind, 
it is not a knowledge {jnana ). In order to avoid these two kinds of mistakes, the author 
gives the stanza: The support {dsraya) of this knowledge is not a mind {citta) because 
this knowledge does not think [read pou sseu yi (149 and 13) instead of pou sseuyi (123 
and 7)]. It is not a non-mind {acitta) because it is induced by a thought: the support of its 
arising is a derivative of mind {cittanvaya)r (Bh) 

“A stanza (§ 3) deals with the support of this knowledge ... Knowledge being a mental 
factor {caitta), it must depend on a mind {citta). But if it depends on a mind, it cannot be 


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nonconceptual ( nirvikalpa ) because whoever says ’mind’ ( citta ) says ’the action of 
thinking’ ( manana ). If it depends on a non-mind, it would be like a material thing ( rupa ) 
and not be a knowledge ( jnana ). In order to cut through this twofold difficulty, the author 
gives the half-stanza: Because it does not think and is not the result of a thought. The 
support of nonconceptual knowledge is not a thought because this knowledge does not 
think [same correction as above]; neither is it a non-thought because this knowledge is 
the result of a mind ( cittdnvaya ), has a mind for cause. The power of repeated practice 
(, abhyasa ) produces this state ’derived from mind’. This shows that the mind that serves as 
support for this knowledge transcends ( atikramati ) all action of thinking ( manana ) and 
all concept ( vikalpa ).” (U) 


4. In the bodhisattva, the cause (g€i) of nonconceptual knowledge is the hearing- 
propensity coming from speech (sdbh ildpasruta vdsan d) and correct thinking 
( yonisomanasikdra ). [ 147c7] 


4. Comm. Bh 364b3-l 1, bh 213bl-3, U 430a9-17, u 323b3-5. 

“There follows a stanza on the cause ( hetupratyaya ) of this knowledge (§ 4) ... Cause 
( g€i ) is synonymous with efficient cause ( karakahetupratyaya ). The hearing-propensity 
coming from speech ( sabhilapasrutavasana ): sabhilapa, because it comes from the words 
of others (parato ghosah ) concerning the Greater Vehicle; sruta, because it listens to 
(sravana) these words and nothing else; vasana, i.e., special potentiality ( saktivisesa ) 
produced by this hearing. [The expression sabhilapasrutavasana, therefore, means the 
particular potentiality produced by hearing others' words about the Greater Vehicle]. 
Correct thinking (yonisomanasikdra) is the mental discourse ( manojalpa ) arising from 
this hearing-propensity which is its cause. This attention, being precise (yukta ) and pure 
( suddha ), is called correct (yoniso ).” (U) 


5. For the bodhisattva, the object ( dlambana ) of nonconceptual knowledge is the 
inexpressible nature of things ( anabhildpyadharmatd ), the true nonsubstantial 
nature (n airdtmyadh arm at a). [147c9] 


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5. Comm. Bh 364bl 1-19, bh 213b3-6, U 430al7-26, u 323b5-7. 


“What is the object of this knowledge? The following stanza (§ 5) explains ... 
Inexpressible nature of things : being imaginary in nature {parikalpitasvabhava), all 
dharmas are inexpressible ( anabhilapya ). What is this inexpressibility? It is the true nture 
( tathatd ) consisting {prabhavita ) of self-nonexistence ( nairatmya ). The imaginary 
( parikalpita ), the individual (pudgala) and the dharmas are without self-nature 
( nihsvabhava ): this is what is called self-nonexistence. And the essence (satta) consisting 
of this self-nonexistence is called the true nature ( tathatd ) ...” (Bh) 

- “This knowledge prior to having an object ( visaya ), the following stanza deals with the 
object ( alambana ) of knowledge ... The inexpressible nature of things is the absence of 
self-nature ( nihsvabhava ) of expressible dharmas. It is distinct from the imaginary nature 
( parikalpitasvabhava ) of which one can speak. The true non-substantial nature : this 
makes the concept precise and clear; it is the true nature ( tathatd ) consisting 
( prabhavita ) of self-nonexistence ( nairatmya ) of every individual {pudgala ) and every 
dharma. This true nature, which avoids the two extreme errors of imputation and negation 
(samaropapavadantadvaya), is the object {visaya) perceived by nonconceptual 
knowledge.” (U) 


6. For the bodhisattva, the aspect ( akara ) of nonconceptual knowledge is the 
absence of marks ( animitta ) inherent in its object of awareness {jheydlambana ). 
[147cl 1] 

6. Comm. Bh 364M9-28, bh 213b6-214al, U 430a26-430b5, u 323b7-324al. 

“The following stanza (§portr 6) explains the aspect {akara) of nonconceptual knowledge 
inherent in its object {alambana). For the bodhisattva, the aspect {akara) of 
nonconceptual knowledge is the absence of marks that manifest in its object {alambana). 
That is to say, this knowledge is the same as {sama) the true nature {tathatd) and this 
identity marks it with the characteristic of absence of marks {animittalaksana) which is 
no different from tathata and constitutes the very aspect {akara) of nonconceptual 


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knowledge. Thus, when the eye ( caksus ) grasps a color ( rupa ), it takes on a blue mark 
( nilddinimitta ), and this blue mark is no different from the color grasped by the eye (see 
Kosa, IX, p. 280; Siddhi, p. 445). It is the same here: the nonconceptual knowledge does 
not have an aspect distinct from tathata.” (Bh) - “The Dhanna, furnished with object 
( alambana ), necessarily has an aspect ( akara ). Next follows a stanza on the aspect of 
knowledge ... That which behaves like its object ( alambanasadrsyena ) is called the 
aspect {akara). Nonconceptual knowledge behaves like tathata, its object. Its object is the 
absence of marks inherent in its object of awaremenss: i.e., this knowledge has the aspect 
inherent in tathata which is its object. This means that nonconceptual knowledge 
concerns the tathata, its object ( visaya ), and has as aspect {akara) absence of attention 
{amanasikara) of all concepts, or animitta.” (U) 


7. a) Having the connection of phonemes {samyoga) as self-nature {svabhava), 
the meaning is conceptual ( vikalpita ) and nothing else. When the phonemes 
{aksara) are joined one with another (paramparasamyoga ), there is a meaning 
of connection ( samyogartha ). 

b) Without a designation {abhiddna), knowledge about the thing designated 
{abhideyaj does not operate {pravartate ). Since there is a difference ( virodha ) 
between the two, there is no designation. Thus, everything is inexpressible 
{sarvam anabhilapyam). [147c 15] 


7. Comm. Bh 364b28-364cl9, bh 214al-7, U 430b6-25, u 324al-7. 

“In order to reply to the objections {codyaparihara), the author gives two stanzas.” (Bh) 
- “Next, the author gives two stanzas and refutes the objections concerning the object 
{alambana) and the aspect {akara) of the knowledge discussed above.” (U) 

a) “If all dharmas are inexpressible {anabhilapya), what is conceived ( vikalpita )? In 
order to explain this, the author says: Meaning, having the connection of phonemes as 
self-nature, is conceptual and nothing else. That is to say, meaning {artha), which has the 
joining of phonemes {samyoga) as self-nature {svabhava) is conceived {vikalpita) and 
nothing other than that; this is why the author says: and none other. How to show that? 


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To establish his thesis, the author adds: When the phonemes are mutually joined, there is 
a meaning of connection. When the separate phonemes ( aksara ) are pronounced in series 
( prabandha , sanitaria), this gives a meaning (artha) that has a connection meaning 
( samyogartha ). Thus, the two phonemes cha ksus, when they are not separated 
(< avichchhinna ), express the meaning ’eye’. This is the meaning of connection which is 
conceptual ( vikalpita ).” (Bh) 

“If the conceived object ( vikalpitartha ) does not exist in reality, what is it that is 
conceived ( vikalpita )? The author answers: The meaning having the union of the 
phonemes as self-nature is conceived, and nothing else, etc. Thus when the phonemes 
( aksara ) are mutually joined ( paramparasamyoga ), the expression forms a continuum 
(asamuccheda), and the imagining mind (parikalpacitta ), concerning this conventional 
expression ( samketa ), makes up an imaginary object {parikalpartha ) that is conceptual 
( vikalpita ); but beyond that, there is no real object ( sadartha ) that is conceived. This is 
why the author says: and nothing else. If there were no serial expression fonned by the 
phonemes ( aksaraprabandhabhilapa ), the concept ( vikalpa ) would not exist.” (U) 

b) Why are we sure that ah dharmas are inexpressible ( anabhilapya )? The author answers 
by saying: Without a designation, knowledge on the thing designated does not operate. If 
one does not know the designation (abhidana), the notion (buddhi) of the thing 
designated ( abhiddheya ) is not produced. This is why all dharmas are inexpressible. But, 
one might say, the notion of the thing designated ( abhidheyabuddhi ) is produced in 
dependence ( apeksya ) on the designation ( abhidhana ). In order to refute that, the author 
adds: Since there is a difference between the two, there is no designation. Since the 
designation ( abhidhana ) and the thing designated ( abhidheya ) are mutually different and 
have a different nature ( laksana ) (cf. chap. II, § 24), the designation and the thing 
designated are inexpressible ( anabhilapya ). For this reason, it is said that ah dharmas are 
inexprssible.” (Bh) 

“Why are dharmas inexpressible? To clarify this thesis, the author says: Without a 
designation, the knowledge of the thing designated does not operate. If truly there were 
an object {artha) of which one could speak, it would be that a knowledge similar to 
language would arise on this object independently of the name designating it 
(abhidhananam). But if we do not know the expression designating it 
{abhidhanabhilapa), such a knowledge concerning the thing designated ( abhidheyartha ) 


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does not arise. This is why dharmas are inexpressible. But, one could say, even though 
the outer object ( bahyartha ) really exists, the knowledge of the thing designated 
( a b h idh eyajh ana) is produced in dependence on the designation ( abhidanam apeksya). 
To refute this, the author says: Since there is a difference between the two, there is no 
designation. This means: by virtue of the difference in characteristics, there really is no 
designation. Since the designation (abhiddna) and the thing designated ( abhidheya ) are 
of different natures ( bhinnalaksana ), their self-nature ( svalaksana ) differs. How could 
there be a real designation based on the reality of an object? Everything is inexpressible: 
the logical consequence is that every designation and everything is inexpressible.” (U) 


8, Nonconceptual knowledge is the support ( adhisthdna ) of the practices ( carya ) 
of the bodhisattva acquired subsequent to the insight {tatprsthalabdha) because 
it tends to develop them ( varhana ). [147c 17] 


8. Comm. Bh 364cl9-25, bh 214a7-214bl, U 430b25-430c4, u 324a7-324bl. 

"Of what is nonconceptual knowledge the support ( adhisthdna )? By the knowledge 
acquired subsequent to ( prsthalabdhajnana ) the insight ( nirvikalpa ), the bodhisattva 
practices {carya) are obtained; these practices rest on nonconceptual knowledge. Because 
it tends to develop them : because it makes these bodhisattva practices increase ( vrddhi ), 
nonconceptual knowledge is the support {adhisthdna) of these practices." (Bh) - "Of what 
is nonconceptual knowledge the support? The practices acquired subsequently, these are 
the various bodhisattva practices acquired in the course of the knowledge subsequent to 
insight {nirvikalpaprsthalabdhajhana). These practices have this nonconceptual 
knowledge as support {asraya). Because it tends to develop them : because it cultivates 
these bodhisattva practices: this expresses its role (prayojana) of support {adhisthana). 
Becing free of error {avipanta), it is able to support these practices." (U) 


9. For the bodhisattva, the auxiliaries {salt ay a) to nonconceptual knowledge are 
the two paths {mdrgadvayd) that have as their nature {svabhdva) the first five 
virtues (pdramita ). [147c 19] 


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9. Comm. Bh 364c25-365a5, bh 2 14b 1-5, U 430c4-13, u 324bl-4. 


“The two paths ( marga ) are the path of accumulation ( sambharamarga ) and the path of 
support ( asrayamarga ). The path of accumulation consists of the virtues ( paramita ) of 
generosity ( dana ), morality (sila), patience ( ksanti ) and zeal ( virya ); the path of support 
is the virtue of meditation ( dhyana ). Because of the merits ( kusala ) derived from these 
virtues and depending on the virtue of dhyana, the nonconceptual knowledge is born and 
increases. This knowledge is called the virtue of wisdom (prajhapbram it a ) . ’ ’ (Bh) 

“What are the auxiliaries ( sahaya ) of nonconceptual wisdom, because if it were alone, it 
would be powerless ... The two paths are the path of accumulation and the path of 
support. They have the first five virtues (paramita ) as self-nature ( svabhava ). Here, the 
first four virtues are the path of accumulation, and the fifth virtue, the virtue of dhyana, is 
the path of support. When one abides in concentrated mind (samahitacitta), the four 
above-mentioned virtues are skillful collaborators and thus one produces and develops 
nonconceptual knowledge. This knowledge is called the virtue of wisdom.” (U) 


10. For the bodhisattva, the retribution ( vipdka ) of nonconceptual knowlege 
takes place in the two Buddha- assemblies ( buddhamandala ), in view of 
preparation (prayoga) and acquisition (adhigama). [147c21] 


10. Comm. Bh 365a5-14, bh 214b5-8, U 430cl4-24, u 324b4-7. 

“As along as one has not attained buddhahood ( buddhata ), where does nonconceptual 
knowledge produce (abhinirvrt-) its result of retribution (vipakaphala)! ... In the two 
Buddha-assenblies (buddhamandala), namely, in the assembly of the enjoyment body 
(sambhogakayamandala) and in the assembly of the apparitional body 
(nirmanakayamandala). If nonconceptual knowledge is at the preparatory stage 
(prayoga), it is in the assembly of the apparitional body that one takes birth and one 
enjoys the fruit of retribution; but if one has already acquired (adhigama) nonconceptual 
knowledge, it is in the body of enjoyment that one takes birth and one enjoys the fruit of 


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retribution. In order to mark this idea, the author adds: in consideration of preparation 
and acquisition.'’’’ (Bh) 

“In the two assemblies, namely, in the two assemblies of the two bodies of the Buddha, 
the apparitional body and the enjoyment body. In view of the preparation and 
acquisition : this shows that nonconceptual knowledge can produce a fruit of retribution 
( vipakaphala ), but it is not the cause of retribution ( vipakahetu ) because it counteracts it 
(prqtipaksa). Here the dominant result (adhipatiphala) is metaphorically ( upacara ) called 
fruit of retribution ( vipakaphala ) because it predisposes (tse-hiun); and as other actions, 
impure actions ( sasravakarman ), produce a retribution, it is given this name. When one 
practices nonconceptual knowledge ( prayogika-nirvikalpakajnana ), one is born and 
abides in the assembly of the apparitional body of the Buddha; but when one has acquired 
(adhigama) fundamental nonconceptual knowledge, one is born in the assembly of the 
enjoyment body of Buddha.” (U) 


11. For the bodhisattva, the outcome ( nisyanda ) of nonconceptual knowledge is 
its progression ( visesagamana ) in the course of successive existences 
(uttarottarajanma). [147c23] 


11. Comm. Bh 365al4-21, bh 214b8-215a2, U 439c24-29, u 324b7-325al. 

"What is the outcome ( nisyanda ) of nonconceptual knowledge? ... For the bodhisattva, 
the outcome of nonconceptual knowledge is its progression in the course of successive 
existences : in the course of successive existences in the great assemblies ( mandala ) of the 
two bodies of the Buddha which have been spoken of above. The progression of 
nonconceptual knowledge : the continuous progression of the nonconceptual knowledge 
practiced during these existences constitutes its fruit of outcome ( nisyandaphala ).” (Bh) 


12. For the bodhisattva, the deliverance ( nihsarana ) of nonconceptual knowledge 
is to be sought in the ten levels ( bhumi): it is the nonconceptual knowledge as it is 
acquired (prapta ) and perfected ( nispanna ). [147c25] 


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12. Comm. Bh 365a21-365b2, bh 215a2-6, U 430c29-431a5, u 325al-3. 

“What is the deliverance ( nihsarana ) of nonconceptual knowledge? ... For the 
bodhisattva, the outcome, etc. That which goes to the end ( nisthagama ) is called 
deliverance ( nihsarana ); it is the movement towards the great nirvana. Nonconceptual 
knowledge as it is acquired and perfected : first this knowledge is gained and this is is 
what is called acquired ; then, after countless hundreds of thousands of great periods 
( mahakalpa ), this knowledge is perfected. This outcome is to be sought in the ten levels : 
starting from the first bhumi up to the tenth bhumi in order ( yathakramam ). In the first 
bhumi, this knowledge is acquired only; following that, it is perfected over a long time. 
This is why bodhisattvas spend incalculable periods ( kalpasamkhyeya ) to attain nirvana 
(cf. chap. V, § 6). After this time, they finally come to the end ( nistha ).” (Bh) 

“In the first bhumi, the Joyous ( pramudita ), when the path of seeing is entered 
(< darsanamarga ), all the realms are seen and the insight attains a first deliverance 
( nihsarana ), acquisition; then, in the path of meditation ( bhavanamarga ), the bhumis are 
attained and insight is perfected.” (U) 


13. For the bodhisattva, the outcome ( nistha ) of nonconceptual knowledge is the 
attainment of the three bodies in the pure state ( suddhatrikdya ) and the 
attaining of the excellent masteries ( agravasitd ). [147c27] 


13. Comm. Bh 365b2-l 1, bh 2 1 5a6-2 1 5b 1 , U 43 la6-14, u 325a3-5. 

“The attainment of the three bodies in the pure state, i.e., the attainment of the three pure 
bodies of the tathagata. It is a question of pure body because, on the first bhumi, the three 
bodies are obtained, but it is not until the tenth bhumi that they are pure ( suvisuddha ). 
The attainment of the excellent masteries', this nonconceptual knowledge has as its 
outcome ( nistha ) not only the attainment of the three bodies in the pure state, but also the 
attainment of the ten kinds of mastery, self-nature ( svalaksana ), of which we will learn 
more later (chap. X, § 3, no. 2).” (Bh) 


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14. a) Preparatory nonconceptual knowledge, which is not stained by any kind of 
heavy wrongdoing (papa) because of faith alone ( sraddhamatra ) and 
adherence (adhimukti), is free of blemishes (anupalipta) like space ( akasa ). 

b) Fundamental nonconceptual knowledge, which is liberated (vimukta) from 
any obstacle (dvarana) insofar as it is acquired and perfected 

( praptinispattyupeta ), is free of blemishes (anupalipta) like space (akasa). 

c) Subsequent nonconceptual knowledge is free of blemishes (anupalipta) like 
space. While moving about (vicaran) in the world, the bodhisattva is never 
stained by human circumstances ( lokadharma ). [148a4] 


14. Comm. Bh 365bl l-365cl4, bh 215bl-216a3, U 431al4-431b4, u 325a5-325bl. 

“What are the benefits (anusamsa) of nonconceptual knowledge? First, there are three 
types of nonconceptual knowledge, namely, preparatory nonconceptual knowledge 
( prayogikanirvikalpakajhana ), fundamental nonconceptual knowledge 

(mulanirvikalpakajhana) and subsequent nonconceptual knowledge 
( prsthalabdhanirvikalpakajhana ). 

a) First, the preparatory nonconceptual knowledge (prdyogika-nirvikalapakajndna). 
Initially, the bodhisattva listens to others talk about absence of concept (nirvikalpanaya). 
Next, unable himself to see this absence of concept, he accords it his adherence 
(adhimukti). Finally, with this adherence as support, he skillfully examines (nitirana) 
absence of concept. This is what is called preparatory nonconceptual knowledge. 
Because it gives rise to fundamental nonconceptual knowledge, it too is given the name 
’nonconceptual'. This preparatory nonconceptual knowledge has the advantage of 
immaculateness (nirupalepanusamsa). Is there an example (drstanta) for this? The sastra 
gives verse 14 a). In order to show that which does not stain it, the author says: by any 
kind of heavy wrongdoing. In order to show the cause by means of which it is unstained, 
he says: because of faith alone and adherence, because by delighting in faith in the 
absence of concept, he accords it his adherence. That is why this knowledge can 
counteract (pratipaksa ) any kind of bad destiny (durgati), and this explains that 
wrongdoings (papa ) do not soil it. 


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b) Secondly, the fundamental nonconceptual knowledge ( mulanirvikalpakajhana ) has the 
advantage of immaculateness. What is the example for this? The sastra gives stanza 14 
b). From what is it liberated? It is liberated from any kind of obstacle ( avarana ). How is 
it liberated? Insofar as it is perfected ( nispattyupeta ): in fact, in the bhumis, it is only 
acquired (praptyupeta ) and it must be perfected ( nispattyupeta ) in order to be cause for 
the suppression of the obstacles. This shows that nonconceptual knowledge counteracts 
( pratipaksa ) obstacles.” (Bh) 

[This explanation does not tally perfectly with the commentary of v. 12, but it is also 
proposed by Asvabhava: ‘7/ is liberated from all obstacles : it is liberated from the 
obstacle of the passions and the obstacle to knowledge ( klesajneya varana) . Insofar as it 
is acquired and perfected : in the first bhumi, it is acquired {praptyupeta ); it is necessary 
to reach the Buddha bhumi ( buddhabhumi ) in order for it to be perfected 
{nispattyupeta).’’'’ (U)] 

“c) Finally, the subsequent nonconceptual knowledge ( prsthalabdha-nirvikalapakajnana ) 
has the benefit of immaculateness. What is the example? The sastra gives stanza 14c. By 
the power of this subsequent knowledge, the bodhisattva, considering the interest of 
beings (sath’artha), thinks about coming down here and he takes birth here; but, having 
taken birth, he is not stained by human circumstances {lokadharma). These human 
circumstances are eight in number: 1. gain (labha), 2. loss (alabha), 3. praise (prasamsa ), 
4. blame (ninda), 5. honor ( yasas ), 6. dishonor (ayasas), 7. pain (duhkha), 8. happiness 
{sukha). Because it comes from fundamental nonconceptual knowledge, this subsequent 
knowledge also takes the name 'nonconceptual'.” (Bh) 


15 a) The three knowledges (jndrta) are like a mute person ( miika ) trying to 
understand an object (arthd), a mute person who has understood the object, 
a non-mute person who has understood the object. 

b) The three knowledges are like an idiot (mudha) trying to understand an 
object, an idiot who has understood the object, an intelligent person 
(amudha) who has understood the object, c) The three knowledges are like 
the first five consciousnesses trying to understand an object, the first five 


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consciousnesses having understood the object, the manas which has 
understood the object. 

d) The three knowledges, the preparatory knowledge {prayogika ), etc., are 
like a person who does not understand a treatise ( aviditasastra ) and tries to 
understand it; then by grasping the letter ( dharma ), tries to understand it; 
and finally, by grasping the meaning ( artha ), tries to understand it. [148a 12] 


15. Comm. Bh 365cl4-366al2, bh 216a4-216b3, U 431b4-431c5, u 325bl-8. 

“What is the difference ( visesa ) among the three nonconceptual knowledges, preparatory 
( prayogika ), fundamental ( mania ) and subsequent ( prsthalabdha )? ... To show the 
different aspects ( akaravisesa ) of these three, the author proposes the following examples 
( drstanta ): 

a) Like a mute person trying to grasp an object. Just as a mute person, while trying to 

understand an object ( visaya ) cannot understand it and cannot speak about it, so the 
preparatory nonconceptual knowledge ( prdyogikanirvikalpakajnana ), while trying to 
realize ( sakatkr -) the tathatha, can neither realize it nor speak about it: this is similar. - 
Like a mute person who has understood the object. Just as a mute person who has 
understood the object cannot speak about it, so the fundamental nonconceptual 
knowledge ( mula-nirvikalpakajhana ), which has realized ( saksatkr -) the tathata, avoids 
all vain proliferation (prapahca ): this is similar. - Like a non-mute person who has 
understood the object. Just as a non-mute person who has understood the object sets 
about to speak about it, so the subsequent nonconceptual knowledge 

( prsthalabdhanirvikalpakajhdna ), which has understood the tathata and has realized its 
object {visaya), sets out to teach it: this is similar. 

b) The stanza about the idiot is explained in the same way. [Bh: The idiot (mudha) is a 
person of incoherent language ( avicchinna ).] 

c) Like the first five consciousnesses trying to understand an object. The first five 
consciousnesses, visual consciousness, etc., try to understand an object; but despite the 
attempt, they lack any concept {vikalpa). (Cf. chap. I, § 7). It is the same for the 
preparatory nonconceptual knowledge. - Like the first five consciousnesses that have 


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grasped the object. The first five consciousnesses that have grasped the object are 
without concept. It is the same for the fundamental nonconceptual knowledge. - Like the 
manas which has grasped the object. The mental consciousness ( manovijhana ) which has 
grasped the object is also able to imagine it ( viklp -). It is the same for the subsequent 
nonconceptual knowledge.” (U) 

“d) The stanza on the treatise. Like a man who does not understand a treatise but who 
seeks to understand it: such is the preparatory nonconceptual knowledge. - When he has 
gone over it again, he grasps the letter (, dharma ) only: such is the fundamental 
nonconceptual knowledge. Here by ’letter' ( dharma ) is meant the phonemes ( aksara ). - 
Like a man who has understood the treatise and has grasped the letters ( dharma ) and the 
meaning ( artha ): such is the subsequent nonconceptual knowledge ...” (Bh) 


16 a) The fundamental nonconceptual knowledge is like a man with his eyes 
closed ( nimihjitacaksus ); the subsequent knowledge ( tatprsthalabdha ) is like 
the same man with his eyes open ( unmihjitacaksus ). 

b) The fundamental nonconceptual knowledge is like space ( akdsa ); the 
subsequent knowledge is like the forms ( riipa ) that manifest in this space. 

[148al6] 

16. Comm. Bh 366al2-27, bh 216b3-8, U 431c5-16, 325b8-326a3. 

“The author is going to give various examples ( drstantavisesa ) for the fundamental and 
the subsequent knowledge ... 

a) The first stanza shows the difference ( visesa ) between the two knowledges: their self- 
natures ( sva/aksana ) can be known. Space (akdsa) is all-inclusive ( vyapaka ), unstained 
(anupalipta), not conceptualizing and nonconceptual. It is the same for the fundamental 
nonconceptual knowledge: since it includes the emptiness having a single taste in all the 
dharmas (sarvadharmaikarasasunyata), it is all-inclusive', since it is not stained by any 
dharma, it is unstained', since it itself is without concept ( vikalpa ), it is non- 
conceptualizing', since it is not conceived of by others, it is nonconceptual . 


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b) The fundamental nonconceptual knowledge is like space. The forms manifested there, 
i.e., the forms that appear in space, are conceptualized. It is the same for the subsequent 
nonconceptual knowledge: it is both conceptualized and conceptualizing.” (Bh) 

“These two stanzas show the difference between the fundamental and the subsequent 
knowledge. The examples of the eyes closed and the eyes open, of space and forms, show 
that these two knowledges are, respectively, without concepts ( nirvikalpa ) and furnished 
with concepts ( savikalpa ), identical (sama) and non-identical ( asama ). As for the 
preparatory knowledge (prdyogikajndna ) which is not represented here, it is not spoken 
of. Moreover, the preparatory knowledge (prdyogikajndna ) is the cause (hetu) of the 
fundamental knowledge (mulajhana); the subsequent knowledge ( prishthalabdhajhdna ) 
is its result ( phala ). And this leads us to the role fulfdled ( krtyanusthana ) by 
nonconceptual knowledge.” (U) 


17. Just as precious gems (mani) and celestial music ( tiirya ) accomplish their own 
activity (svakarman) without thought, so it is always without thought that the 
Buddhas accomplish their kinds of activity ( ndndkarman ). [148a 18] 


17. Comm. Bh 366a28-366b9, bh 216b8-217a4, U 431c 16-28, u 326a3-6. 

This stanza is very close to that of Sutralamkara, IX, 18-19: 

aghattitebhyas turyebhyo yatha syac sabdhasambhavah / 

tatha jine vinabhogam desanayah samudbhavah // 

yatha maner vina yatnam svaprabhavanidarsanam / 

buddhesv api vinabhogam tatha krtyanidarsanam // 

“Let us accept that this nonconceptual knowledge realizes the state of buddhahood 
(buddhata); but if it is free of effort ( abhoga ) and free of thought ( manasikaravikalpa ), 
how could it accomplish its activity of working for the benefit and happiness of beings 
(. sattvahitasukhakriyaj. ? ... Even though it is without concept, it does fulfill its role 
(krtyanusthana). In the stanza, the examples (drslanta) of the precious gem (mani) and 
celestial musical instrument (twya) show this. A cintamani [a precious gem that satisfies 


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all the wishes of its possesser], although without concepts ( vikalpa ), is able to fulfill the 
role desired by the beings who possess it. A celestial musical instrument (turya), even 
without being struck ( aghattita ), can produce all kinds of sounds (sabda) according to the 
aspirations (asaya) of those close by. In the same way, the nonconceptual knowledge of 
the Buddhas and bodhisattvas, although without concepts, can accomplish all kinds of 
roles.” (Bh) 

“Nonconceptual knowledge realizes the state of Buddha ( buddhata); but it is without 
concepts ( vikalpa ); how can it procure the interest of beings ( sattvartha )1 ... In the stanza, 
the author brings in the examples of the precious gem and the celestial musical 
instrument to prove that, although without concepts, the nonconceptual knowledge is able 
to accomplish all kinds of roles effortlessly ( andbhoga ). Thus the cintamani and the 
celestial musical instrument do not say: ’I am going to emit light, I am going to produce a 
sound', because they are both without thought ( acetana ). But, by the power of the 
meritorious actions ( punyakarman ) and aspirations (asaya) of beings who have been born 
where they occur, and independently of being struck (ghatthana-nirapeksan), they emit 
all kinds of light (prabha ) and produce all kinds of sounds (sabda). It is the same for the 
nonconceptual knowledge of the Buddhas and bodhisattvas: although without concepts, it 
fulfills its role which is to render all kinds of services (nanarthakriya) in conformity with 
the merits (punya ) and aspirations (asaya) of beings to be converted (vineyasattva) by it.” 
(U) 


18 a) Not concerning either here or elsewhere, it is neither non-knowledge 
(ajnana) nor knowledge ( jhana ) [acc. to H: without being a knowledge, it is 
knowledge.] Not being different ( visista ) from its object (jneya ), this 
knowledge is non-concpt (nirvikalpata). 

b) All dharmas are without concept ( nirvikalpa ) from the beginning 
( prakrtah ) because that which is conceived (vikalpya) does not exist. The 
nonconceptual knowledge is absent. [This last stanza is translated according 
to the Chinese versions of P Dh H; B and the Tibetan version are different.] 

[148a22] 


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18. Comm. Bh 366b9-366cl9, bh 217a4-218a5, U 431c28-432b3, u 326a6-327al. 

“a) Now the author will show the profundity ( gambhirya ) of nonconceptual knowledge. 
This knowledge pertains to ( alambate ) the dependent nature (paratantrasvabhava ), the 
center of concepts ( vikalpa ), or it pertains to another object ( visayantara ). What are the 
errors ( doha ) in these hypotheses? If it pertains to concepts, its nature of noonconceptual 
knowledge (literally, of knowledge free of concept) is not explained; if it pertains to 
another object, since this other object does not exist in any way, what would it then have 
as object ( alambana )? - The Sastra says ... Bearing upon neither here nor elsewhere. This 
knowledge does not bear here: on concepts, because it is without concept ( nirvikalpa ); it 
does not bear elsewhere: on another object, because then it would have as object (vis ay a) 
the Tathagata, the dharmata of dependent ( paratantra ) and imagined ( vikalpita ) dharmas. 
But one can state neither identity nor differernce between these dharmas and their 
dharmata. This means that the fundamental nonconceptual knowledge 
(mulanirvikalpakajhana) pertains to neither concepts ( vikalpa ) nor anything else. 

Furthermore, the fundamental nonconceptual knowledge either is or is not a knowledge. 
What are the faults in these hypotheses? If it is a knowledge, then, as knowledge, is it 
without concepts ( nirvikalpa )? If it is not a knowledge, why is it called nonconceptual 
knowledge ? - The author replies to this question by saying: Without being a knowledge, it 
is a knowledge [according to the Tibetan version: it is neither non-knowledge nor 
knowledge ]. This shows that the fundamental nonconceptual knowledge 
(mulanirvikalakajnnana) is not really a knowledge (jhana) because it does not arise like 
preparatory conceptual knowledge (prayogikavikalpakajhana ). Neither is it a non- 
knowledge (ajhana) because it derives its birth from this preparatory conceptual 
knowledge. 

There is yet another meaning to the phrase: Neither here nor elsewhere, without being a 
knowledge, it is a knowledge. Because here, i.e., in itself, concepts do not exist, it is 
called non-knowledge; but because it functions on the dharmata of concepts and not 
elsewhere, it is a knowledge. In this explanation, the first and last members of the phrase 
are connected to each other. [The first member fei yu ts'e (neither here) explains the first 
member fei tshe (non-knowledge), and the second member fei yu (nor elsewhere) 
explains the second member che tshe (knowledge)]. 


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Not being different from its object, this knowledge is intuition. It is not like the 
preparatory nonconceptual knowledge (pravogikan ir vika l pakajhan a ) which, although 
functioning with objects and subjects of consciousness ( grahyagrahaka ), is called 
nonconceptual ( nirvikalpaka ). On the contrary, it is because it is not distinguished from 
its object ( grahya ) and is completely identified with it ( samasama ), that the fundamental 
nonconceptual knowledge is called nonconceptual: this knowledge does not set up the 
duality of object and subject (, grahyagrahaka ). 

b) In another sutra, the Bhagavat has said that all dharmas are without concept 
( nirvikalpah sarvadharmah). To explain this absence of concept, the author follows with 
stanza 18 b ... 

It should be known that all dharmas are originally free from concept, i.e., that all 
dharmas, in their original nature (prakrtisvabhava ), are without concept. Why? Because 
the thing conceived does not exist. This shows that, the thing conceived being 
nonexistent, all dhannas are originally without concept. 

But if all dharmas are originally without concept because the thing conceived does not 
exist, why do not beings ( satNa ) attain deliverance ( vimoksa ) from the very beginning 
( prakrtah) 1 . ? - In order to anwer this question, the author says: Nonconceptual knowledge 
is lacking, i.e., these beings do not have nonconceptual knowledge, and even though the 
dharmas in their original nature are without concepts, these beings are not liberated from 
the very beginning. But when the knowledge of the true nature ( tathatajhana ) bearing on 
the absence of concept of the dharmas arises in them, when they realize ( saksatkrt -) the 
absence of concepts of dharmas, then they will attain deliverance. But if this knowledge 
does not arise, they will not attain delverance. Knowledge of the true nature 
(tathatajhana) is this same nonconceptual knowledge.” (Bh) 


19. i) First, the preparatory nonconceptual knowledge 

( prdyogikanirvikalapakajhdna ) is of three types according to whether it arises 
from (1) cause ( hetu ), (2) projection (aksepa), or (3) practice (abhydsa). 

ii) Fundamental nonconceptual knowledge (mulanirvikalpak-ajhdnd) is of 
three types, according to whether it is intuition (nirvikalpa) of (1) satiation 
( samtusti ), (2) non-error (aviparydsa), or (3) non-proliferation (nisprapahca). 


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iii) Subsequent intuitive knowledge (prsth alabdhan irvikalpaka-jhan a) is of 
five kinds, according to whether it is analysis ( victim ) of (1) penetration 
( prativedha ), (2) memory ( anusmarana ), (3) preaching ( vyavasthdna ), (4) 
combined ( samsarga ), or (5) success ( samrddhi ). [148a28] 

19. Comm. Bh 367al-367b9, bh 218a5-219bl, U 432b5-432cl3, u 327al-327b6. 

i) “First, the preparatory nonconceptual knowledge is of three kinds according to whether 
it arises from (1) the power of the lineage ( gotrabala ), (2) the projecting power of 
previous births (puiwajanmaksepabala ), or (3) the power of present practice 
( pratyutpannabhyasabaia ): (1) from the power of the lineage, when the lineage ( gotra ) is 
the cause of its arising; (2) from the projecting power of previous births, when practice 
(abhyasa) carried out in the course of previous births is the cause of its arising; (3) from 
the power of present practice, when the power of individual activity (purusakarabala ) in 
the course of the present existence is the cause of its arising.” (Bh) - There is a definition 
in U and u of gotra : “ Gotra is an eternal excellence of the six faculties ( anadhikalikah 
sadayatanavisesa), a natural capacity ( dharmatasamarthya ) of acquiring buddhahood 
( buddhata ).” (U): “ rigs ni thog ma med pahi dus kyi skye niched drug bye brag can sans 
rgyas kyi snod du gyur paho” (u) - Cf. Bodh bhumi, p. 3, chap. X, § 3, no. 3. 

ii) “(1) Nonconcept of satiation ( sarntustinirvikaipa ): one knows that it has reached the 
end of hearing and reflecting ( srutacintanisthagata ). When, out of satiation ( samtusti ), 
no further concepts ( yikalpa ) are formed, there is nonconceptual knowledge of satiation. 
Thus, the bodhisattvas who dwell in the realm of ordinary beings ( prthagjanabhumi ) and 
who have reached the end of hearing ( sruta ), reflecting ( cinta ) and understanding 
(avabodha) experience satiation say to themselves: "The hearing and reflecting of fools 
(baia) extend only so far." It is in this sense that the nonconceptual knowledge of satiety 
is spoken of. There is yet another meaning, because we know that the world ( loka ) also 
has an nonconceptual knowledge of satiety. Thus, beings ( sattva ) who have reached the 
peak of existence ( bhavagra ) and who see nirvana, experience satiety for the rest and say 
to themselves: "There is no further sphere ( ayatana ) to be sought beyond this nirvana." 
This is what is called satiation. 

(2) Nonconcept of non-error ( a viparydsa n irvilcalpa ) . It is that of the sravakas, etc. We 
know that by penetrating (prativedha ) the true nature (tathata), they obtain the 


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knowledge free of the four errors ( aviparyasajnana ) that consists of taking the transitory 
as eternal, etc. (Cf. Prastavana, § 3, p. 8). The suppression of concepts ( vikalpa ) 
comprising this fourfold error about the eternal, etc., is called the nonconceptual 
knowledge of non-error. 

(3) Nonconcept of non-proliferation (nisprapancanirvikalpa) . This belongs to the 
bodhisattvas. Indeed, the bodhisattvas who have attained enlightenment ( bodhi ) of all 
dharmas, avoid any vain proliferation. The true nature ( tathata ) attested by their 
knowledge transcends the ways of discourse ( abhildpapatha ) and surpasses the objects of 
worldly knowledge ( laukikajhanavisaya ). As it cannot be expressed in words, no worldly 
knowledge ( laukikajnana ) can understand it.” (Bh) 

iii) Subsequent knowledge is of five types: ( 1 ) analysis of penetration, (2) analysis of 
memory, (3) analysis of preaching, ( 4 ) analysis of synthesis, and (5) analysis of success. 

(1) Analysis of penetration (prativedhavicara) . At the time of penetration (prativedha ), 
one makes the following analysis: ‘I am penetrating (I understand)’. Here penetration has 
the sense of understanding ( avabodha ). 

(2) Analysis of memory (anusmaranavicara ) . Emerging from ( vyutthana ) this penetration, 
one remembers and says to oneself: ‘I have penetrated absence of concepts (nirvikalpaf . 

(3) Analysis of preaching (vyavasthanavicara) . This is to preach to others what one has 
penetrated. 

(4) Analysis of combination (samsargavicara). The knowledge of the combined object 
( samsrstdlambanajhdna ) sees that all dharmas have one and the same nature 
(< ekalaksana ) and leads towards the transfonnation of support ( asrayaparavrtti ). When 
this support has been transfonned, this knowledge is reproduced. 

(5) Analysis of success (samrddhivicara) . Everything suucceeds ( samrddhyate ) according 
to aspirations ( yathasayam ). By means of this analysis, earth, etc., is transformed 
( parinam -) into gold (cf. chap. I, § 60; chap. II, § 14). In order to obtain this success, this 
analysis is made; that is why the analysis of success is spoken of. Some say that it is 
because of this analysis that one obtains success.” (Bh) 


20. Here are further stanzas proving nonconceptual knowledge: 


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i) Hungry ghosts (preta ), animals ( tiryak ), humans ( manusya ) and gods ((leva) 
have different notions of the same object according to their respective 
capabilities. Therefore it is concluded that objects (artha) do not exist. 

ii) Thus, in the past ( atlta ), etc., in dream (svapna) and in the reflection in a 
mirror (pratibimba ), there is no object of consciousness (alambana) and yet 
perception ( upalabdhi ) takes place [acc. to H: the characteristics of an object 
(visayalaksana) are present]. 

Hi) If the object were truly an object, there would be no nonconceptual 
knowledge ( nirvikalpakajhdna ); if that were the case, the acquisition of 
buddhahood (buddhatadhigamd) would be impossible. 

iv) For bodhisattvas possessing the masteries (vasita) and also for ecstatics 
(dhyayin), earth, etc., is transformed into any substance they wish by the 
power of convinced adhesion (adhimuktibala). 

v) For the bodhisattvas versed in analysis (pravicaya), for sages (dhlmat) in 
possession of tranquility ( santa ), all dharmas appear as object (artha) to them 
when they reflect on it (manasi kurvanti). 

vi) When nonconceptual knowledge is functioning (carati), not a single object 
appears. Thus we know that there is no object and, the object being absent, 
there is no concept (vijhapti). [148b 12] 


20. Comm. Bh 367b23-367c25,bh 219bl-220bl, U 432cl3-433b6, u 327b7-328b7. 

This entire text of this paragraph is taken from chap. II, § 14b. 

“How can it be proved that the imaginary object ( parikalpitartha ) is truly non-existent? 
To establish its non-existence, the author cites some stanzas: 

i) Hungry ghosts, animals, humans and gods, etc. There where humans see water 
(udaka), hungry ghosts see hills of dry earth (sthala). There where humans see dung 
(midha), animals [Bh adds: pigs (varaha), etc.] see pure food (sucyahara). There where 
humans see an impure substance (asucidravya), animals see a pure food. There where 
humans see pure food, gods see a rotten impure substance. But since it is impossible that 


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opposite ( viruddha ) things can be in the same place, we know that the imaginary object 
does not exist. 

Objection : If there is no real object ( sadartha ), how is a consciousness without object 
(nirdlambanavijndna) produced ( samudacar -)? 

Answer. \\) For you, the Sautrantikas, there is no past ( atita ) or future ( anagata ) object; 
then how can there be a consciousness in regard to them? Furthermore, in dream 
(, svapna ), the visions of the dream are non-existent; how then does one know them? The 
bedroom of the dreamer cannot really contain the mountains {paiwata ), rivers ( nadi ) and 
elephants ( hastin ) that are perceived by the consciousness of the dreamer ... Finally, the 
reflection ( pratibimba ) seen in a mirror ( adarsa ) or seen in concentration ( samadhi ) does 
not exist in itself ( dravyasat ); how then does one know it? 

Since all of that is a manifestation of the mind ( cittabhasa ), one perceives only the image 
of the mind ( cittapratibimba ). Nevertheless the characteristics of an object are present 
there: in brief, even though the objects (vis ay a) past {atita), future {anagata), etc., do not 
exist in themselves {dravyasat), the characteristics of an object {visayalaksana) do occur 
in the mind that perceives them. 

iiij If the perceived object ( visayartha ) were truly an object, there would be no 
nonconceptual knowledge {nirvikalpajnana) because there would be concepts {vikalpa). 
Intuitive knowledge being absent, the acquisition of Buddhahood would be impossible: if 
the intuitive knowledge were truly lacking, it would be impossible to attain Buddhahood 
and this would be a very serious error. Therefore we know that the imaginary object 
( parikalpitartha ) has no reality. 

ivj Furthermore, this object has no reality. Why? For the bodhisattvas in possession of 
the masteries: for the bodhisattvas who have attained the great masteries; by the power of 
convinced adhesion, i.e., by the power of aspiration (asayabala), earth is transformed 
into whatever substance they wish: they change {parinam -) earth into gold {suvarna), etc. 
And also for the ecstatics: for persons other than the bodhisattvas, e.g., for the sravakas in 
possession of dhyana. 

v) For bodhisattvas versed in analysis: full of wisdom ( prajha); for the sages: endowed 
with well-tried knowledge, the bodhisattvas are called sages; in possession of tranquility: 
endowed with samadhi {samadhiprapta). When they reflect on the dharmas: when they 


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reflect on the dharmas, on sutras, geya, etc. (cf. Mahavyut., 1267-1278), these appear to 
them as object when they reflect in such and such as way on these dhannas, sutra, etc., 
in their various aspects ( nanakara ), non-substantiality, etc., ( nairatmyadi ), these objects 
appear to them in such and such a way. It should be known then that it is their mind in 
right thinking ( yonisomanasikaracitta ) which appears to them like subjects and objects of 
consciousness (grdhyagrdhaka) and that no external object ( bahyartha ) exists. 

vi) When nonconceptual knowledge is operating, no object whatsoever appears. This is 
in relation to the preceding discussion concerning the non-reality of the object. When 
nonconceptual knowledge becomes active ( samudacarati ) in the bodhisattvas, no other 
object manifests; it should be known then that all perceived objects ( visayartha ) are non- 
existent. Thus there is no object and consequently no concept, by way of conclusion 
( nigamana ), there is no perceived object ( visayartha ) and hence no notion cognizes 
( vijhapti ). We have already discussed this argument previously (in chap. II, § 14) in the 
detailed explanation on the characteristics of the knowable { jheyalaksana ).” (U) 


21, There is no difference ( nirvisista ) between the virtue of wisdom 
(prajh dp dr am itd) and nonconceptual knowledge ( nirvikalpakajhdna ), Thus the 
Bhagavat has said: “The bodhisattva who abides ( tisthati ) in the virtue of 
wisdom by means of non-abiding ( asthdnayogena ) ensures the completion of the 
development (hhdvandparipuri) of the other virtues ( paramita ).” 

How, by the method of nonabiding {asthdnayogena), does he ensure this 
fulfillment (paripuri )? By avoiding five kinds of abiding 
( pahcavidhasthanaparitydga ). Because: 

i) He avoids abiding in the belief in the self of the heretics 
{tlrthikdtniagrdhasthdna-paritydga). 

ii) He avoids abiding in the concepts of the bodhisattvas who have not seen 
reality {adrstatattvabodhisattvavikalpasthdna-paritydga). 

iii) He avoids abiding in the two extremes of samsara and nirvana 
{samsdranirvdndntadvayasthdnaparitydga). 


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iv) He avoids the abiding that consists of being content with just cutting the 
obstacle of the afflictions ( klesdvaranaprahdna-mdtrasamtustdnaparitydga ). 

v) He avoids abiding in the nirvana-without-residue element with disregard 
for the interest of beings (sattvdrth an irapeksan irupadh isesan irvdnadhdtu- 
sthanaparitydga ). [148b20] 


21. Comm. 368a5-26, bh 220bl-221a5, U 433bl4-433cl6, u 328b8-329b4. 

“ There is no difference between the virtue of wisdom and nonconceptual knowledge, i.e., 
they are identical ( sama ) because nonconceptual knowledge is the virtue of wisdom. In 
the sutra it is said: The bodhisattva who abides in the virtue of wisdom by means of 
nonabiding ensures the fulfillment of the development of the other virtues. Why is that? 
By avoiding five kinds of abiding : by avoiding the abiding in belief in the self of the 
heretics, etc. Here, the place where one can live is called abiding ( sthana ). 

i) He avoids abiding in the belief in the self of the heretics. Heretics ( tirtika ) dwell in the 
belief in self ( atmagraha ); they say: Myself I know; this is my wisdom {prajnd). The 
bodhisattva avoids such a dwelling, he does not conceive of a wisdom ( prajnd ) where 
one would believe in ’me’ and ’mine’ ( atmatmiyagraha ). Since the bodhisattva avoids 
such a dwelling {stand), the method of nonabiding ( asthdnayoga ) is spoken of. 

ii) He avoids abiding in the concepts of the bodhisattvas who have not seen reality. The 
bodhisattvas who have not seen reality arouse concepts concerning the virtue of wisdom 
and nonconceptual knowledge: this, they say, is the virtue of wisdom. Since the 
bodhisattva avoids such a dwelling, the method of nonabiding is spoken of. A stanza 
says: If you see some thing, you are bound by it; if you do not see it, you are liberated. 

iii) He avoids abiding in the two extremes of samsara and nirvana. Worldly {loka) people 
dwell in the extreme of samsara because they have the belief in a self {atmagraha)', 
Buddhists {aryaputnya) dwell in the extreme of nirvana because they have cut through 
the afflictions {kleshapra liana). It is not the same for the bodhisattva; that is why it is 
said that by avoiding the two extremes {antadvaya), he observes the method of 
nonabiding. 


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iv) He avoids the abiding which consists of being content with cutting just the obstacle of 
the afflictions. The sravakas believe that the power of meditation ( bhavanabala ) should 
be aimed only at cutting the obstacle of the afflictions ( klesavaranaprahana ) and that 
then they have done all there is to be done (sarvakrtakrtya). But the bodhisattva avoids 
such an abiding because it sets up an obstacle ( avrnoti ) to the benefit and well-being of 
beings ( sattvahitasukha ). A stanza says: Dwelling in the unfortunate destinies (durgati) 
does not set up as great an obstacle to attaining supreme bodhi as does dwelling in the 
levels of the sravakas and the pratyekabuddhas. Since the bodhisattva avoids such a 
dwelling, the method of nonabiding is spoken of. 

v) He avoids abiding in the nirvana-without-residue element with disregard for the 
interest of beings. The sravakas, etc., who do not care about the interest of beings 
(sattvdrtha ) dwell in the nirvana-without-residue element ( nirupadhisesanirvanadhatu ): 
complete extinction, like wood consumed by fire ( agniparidagdhakasthavad 
atyantikanirvrttih). The bodhisattva avoids such a dwelling: being endowed (samp anna) 
with both wisdom (prajna) and great compassion ( mahakaruna ), he abides in the 
nonabiding nirvana ( apratisthitanirvana , cf. chap. IX, § 1). Since he avoids this dwelling 
of the sravakas, the method of nonabiding is spoken of.” (U) 


22. What is the difference ( visesa ) between the two lnowledges, that of the 
sravakas (srdvakajhana) and that of the bodhisattvas ( bodhisattvajhdna )? The 
knowledge of the bodhisattvas is distinguished by five aspects ( dkdra ): 

i) It is distinguised by the absence of concepts (nirvikalpavisesaj because it 
does not conceptualize ( vikalpayati ) the dharmas, viz., aggregates ( skandha ), 
etc. 

ii) It is distinguished by its non-mediocrity (aparlttavisesaj because, by fully 
understanding (prativedha ) reality (tattva; H: tathata), by penetrating all the 
aspects of the knowable (jheydkdra ) and by referring (adhikrtyaj to all beings 
(sattva), it is not mediocre. 

iii) It is distinguished by its non-abidingness ( apratisthitatava-visesa ), because 
it is fixed in nonabiding nirvana ( apratisthita-nirvdna ). 


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iv) It is distinguished by its infinitude ( atyantikavisesa ), because it does not 
become extinguished in the nirvana-without-residue element 

( nirupadhisesanirvanadhatu ). 

v) It is distinguished by its supremacy ( niruttaravisesa ) because above it, 
there is no other vehicle ( yana ) superior to it. 

Here is a stanza: 

With compassion ( karuna ) as nature and its five superiorities (visesa), the 
knowledge of the bodhisattva is at the top of the worldly and supraworldly 
perfections ( laukika lokottara samp ad). (Stanza translated acc. to H). [148c 1] 


22. Comm. Bh 368b8-27, bh missing, U 433c27-434a23, u 329b4-330a8. 

“Here the author is going to show that the knowledge of the bodhisattva is distinguished 
from that of the sravaka by five aspects: 

i) Nirvikalpa visesa . The knowledge of the sravaka is absence of concepts ( nirvikalpa ) 
relative to the four errors ( viparyasa ); the knowledge of the bodhisattva is absence of 
concepts of all the dharmas up to enlightenment (bodhi). 

ii) Apanttavisesa. It is of three types: 

a. Non-mediocrity in the comprehension of the true nature 
( tathataprativedhaparittavisesa ). The sravakas, etc., enter into the seeing of reality 
(, tattvadarsana ), penetrating only the nonexistence of self of the individual 
( pudgalanairdtmya ). On the other hand, the bodhisattvas, having entered into the seeing 
of reality, are able to penetrate the nonexistence of self of the individual and of dharmas 
( pudgaladharmanairatmya ). 

b. Non-mediocrity of the object to be cognized (jney avisay apanttavisesa) . In the 
sravakas, etc., it is enough that the knowledge of the truths, viz., the truth of suffering, 
etc., (duhkhadisatyajnana) should arise in order to say that they have attained their goal 
(correct sieou si by sieou yi acc. to the Tib. don byas pa = krtartha). On the other hand, 
for the bodhisattva, the knowledge of non-error on all objects to be known 


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(sarvajn eya vis ay a viparyasajnana ) must arise in order that it may be said that they have 
attained their goal (read sieou yi ) and that they have done what had to be done. 

c. Non-mediocrity with respect to beings ( sattvan adhikrtyaparittavisesa). The sravakas, 
etc., who seek only their own personal interest ( svdrtha ), zealously cultivate the 
knowledge of suppression of the afflictions and of non-production ( ksayan it tpddajnan a , 
cf. Kosa, I, p. 82; IV, p. 180). On the other hand, the bodhisattva, by considering 
( adhikrtya ) all beings, seeks perfect enlightenment ( mahdbodhi ). It is by these three types 
of non-mediocrity that the knowledge of the bodhisattva is distinguished from that of the 
sravaka. 

iii) Apratisthitvavisesa. The sravakas, etc., dwell solely in nirvana. On the other hand, the 
bodhisattvas, by the dominant power ( adhipatibala ) of compassion ( karuna ) and wisdom 
(prajna) with which they are endowed, dwell in the nonabiding-nirvana 
(< apratisthitanirvdna ). 

iv) Atyantikavisesa. This shows the great difference between the nirvana of the sravakas 
and that of the bodhisattvas. In the sravakas who abide in the nirvana-without-residue 
element (nirupadhisesanirvana), body (kdya) and knowledge are extinguished ( ksina ) 
like the flame of a lamp (dipajvdla) when it is put out. On the other hand, when the 
bodhisattvas become buddha, the body of the Dhanna ( dharmakaya ) which they have 
realized ( saksdtkrta ) goes on until the end of samsara ( asamsdrakoteh ) without being 
destroyed. Moreover, in the formless realm ( arupyadhatu ), the mental series ( sanitaria ) 
does not cease. It is also by this difference that the knowledge of the bodhisattva is 
distinguished. 

v) Niruttaravisesa. Above the vehicle of the sravaka ( srdvakaydna ) there is the vehicle of 
the pratyekabuddha ( pratyekabuddhayana ) and above that is the Greater Vehicle 
( mahayana ). The vehicle of the bodhisattva is the vehicle of the Buddhas ( buddhayana ) 
and there is none higher ( niruttara ). 

These are the five points on which the knowledge of the bodhisattva is distinguished 
from that of the sravaka. 

Finally, the stanza reviews these ideas. Five superiorities', this is a matter of the five 
types of differences already spoken of. Worldly and supraworldly perfections', the 
dhyanas and the formless ( arupya ) concentrations are called worldly perfections', the 


348 



nirvana acquired by the sravaka, etc., is called supraworldly perfection. Since this 
knowledge transcends them, it is put at the head of the list.” (U) 


23. If the bodhisattvas are thus endowed with the qualities (guna ) and 
perfections ( sampad) of excellent morality ( adhislla ), excellent mind ( adhicitta ), 
and excellent wisdom ( adhiprajhd ), if they have attained sovereignty over all 
riches ( sarvadhana-vibhutva ), why is it that there are beings ( sattva ) deprived of 
resources ( ksmadhana )? - This is because the bodhisattvas give nothing to some 
beings because they see that these beings feel loathing {pratibaddhakarman ) for 
the riches; because they see some beings to whom riches ( bhoga ) have been 
granted who are setting up obstacles (pratibandha ) to the arising ( utpdda ) of 
wholesome dharmas ( kusaladharma ); because they see some beings whose riches 
are exhausted who are turning towards dislike ( samvegabhimukha ); because they 
see some beings to whom riches have been granted who are accumulating 
unwholesome dharmas ( akusaladharma ); because they see some beings to whom 
riches have been granted who are causing suffering {pTdana, ghdtana) to 
innumerable other beings. That is why there are some beings deprived of riches. 

Here is a stanza: 

Seeing the disgust ( karman = pratibaddhakarman), obstacle {pratibandha ), 
turning away ( abhimukhatva ), accumulation (cay a) and wickedness {pTdana ), 
we understand why some beings do not obtain any of the riches of the 
bodhisattvas. [148c 11] 


23. Comm. Bh 368cl0-369al3, bh missing, U 434b6-434c4, u 330a8-331a5. 

“Here the author is going to show why the bodhisattvas, although they have sovereignty 
over riches (dhanavibhutva), do not give anything to certain beings. 

Because they see some beings feel disgust for the riches. When the bodhisattvas see some 
beings experience disgust for the riches, they do not give them any. They do not want to 
give in vain, uselessly ( nisphalam ), for these beings would not accept even if they gave. 


349 



Thus a stanza says: The mother can suckle her child herself for months tirelessly; but if 
the child closes its mouth, what good is the nourishment? 

Because they see some beings to whom riches have been granted set up obstacles to the 
arising of wholesome dharmas. The bodhisattvas see certain beings who experience no 
disgust for the riches but who, once in possession of abundant riches, become careless 
( pramada ) and produce no wholesome dharmas. Then the bodhisattvas have this thought: 
It would be better ( varam ) for these beings actually ( drstadharma ) to be poor ( daridra ) 
for a short time rather than to be poor for a long time in future existences (janmantara ). 
That is why the bodhisattvas do not give them the riches which they have at their 
disposal. 

Because they see some beings whose riches have been exhausted turn towards disgust. 
The bodhisattvas see some beings whose riches are exhausted turn ( abhimukha ) towards 
disgust (samvega) for samsara and seek deliverance ( nihsarana ). But if they have fortune 
( vibhava ), they take to drunkenness (mada). That is why the bodhisattvas do not give 
them the riches they have at their disposal, thinking: It would be better {varam) for them 
to be poor {daridra) and turn their mind ceaselessly to disgust for samsara rather than to 
be rich and give themselves up to pleasure {sukha), to carelessness (pramada ), without 
experiencing disgust for samsara and without producing wholesome dharmas. 

Because they see some beings to whom riches have been granted accumulate 
unwholesome dharmas. The bodhisattvas see that some beings to whom opulent wealth 
has been given, give themselves up to carelessness {pramada ) and accumulate ( ci -) all 
sorts of unwholesome dharmas. That is why they do not give the riches which they have 
at their disposal. Thus a stanza says: It would be better (varam) to be poor (daridra) in 
riches and avoid the bad destinies (durgati) and bad actions ( duscarita ) than to be rich 
(vibhavant), disturbing the senses (indriya) and exposing oneself to becoming a 
receptacle (bhajana) for future suffering. 

Because they see some beings to whom wealth has been given make trouble for countless 
other beings. The bodhisattvas see some beings, once in possession of fortune (vibhava), 
who trouble countless beings ( apramanasattva ). That is why they do not give them the 
riches they have at their disposal. They think: It would be better (varam) that a person 


350 



undergoes the suffering of poverty ( daridryaduhkha ) rather than trouble many other 
beings. 

The stanza summarizes these ideas by saying: Seeing the repugnance, obstacle, 
orientation, etc. The text is easy to understand; there is no need to explain it.” (U) 


NOTES TO CHAPTER VIII 


Preliminary Note: - Lamotte finds this is to be the most detailed study on the 
nirvikalpakajnana. See L. de La Vallee Poussin, Siddhi, p. 633-635 and Rahder, 
Hobogirin, art. Chi, p. 296-297 . - Other works contain only scattered infonnation: Abhis. 
al. al, p. 97 (6) seq.; Samdhinir., p. 52, 88, 96, 1 16, 135, 136, 141, 142; Lankavatara, p. 
12, 19, 25,56, 78, 119, 168,231,268,269, 174, 175,277, 284, 288, 352; Madh, vrtti, p. 
352 (5); Bodhicaryavatara, IX, st. 33-35; Bodh. bhumi, p. 38 (25), 44 (8),; Sutralamkara, 
XVI 41; XIX, 52; Madhyantavibhanga, p. 4 (5), 5 (12-13), 97 (2), 101 (12), 104(6), 115 
(17), 133 (19), 180 (20), 204 (8), 217 (16), 220 (21), 222 (7), 225 (7), 229 (16), 235 (8), 
244 (1 68), 249 (22), 271 (6); Uttaratantra, p. 225; Trimsika, p. 40 (24), 43 (18), 44 (4); 
Siddhi, p. 9, 17, 394, 407, 445, 585-588, 607-610, 634-625, 634, 663, 688-689, 751. 


2. Nature of the n.j. - Defined in Sutralamkara, appendix, p. 191 (22): tad 
anenarupyanidarsanam apratistham anabhasam avijhaptikam aniketam iti nirvikalpasya 
jnanasya yathasutram laksanam abhidyotitam bhavati. Same formula in 
Kasyapaparivarta, v. 56, 57, p. 887. 

3. Object of the n.j. - Abhis. al al., p. 97 (6), sq.: Sutralamkara, XIX, 52: 
tathatalambanam jhanam. Madhyantavibhanga, p. 180 (20): n.j.: tattvavabodha; p. 115 
(17); the object of n. j. (gocara) is bhdvabhdva-vimukta dvayabhavasvarupa . 
Sutralamkara, XIX, 52: n. v. = tathata-lambanam jhanam. Madhyantavibhanga, p. 180 
(20): n. j. = tattvabodha; p. 115 (17): the object of the n. j. is bhavabhavavimukta 
dvayabhavasvarupa . Samgraha, here: the object of n.j. is anabhilapyadharmata, the 
nairatmyadharmata. - On anabhilapya-svabhavata, cf. E. Obenniller, Doctrine of the P. 
P., p. 94; Samdhinir., chap. I; Vimsika, p. 6 (18), 10 (26); Madhyantavibhanga, p. 221 
(17), 222 (1). - On pudgaladhannanairatmya, see E. Obenniller, ibid., p. 16, 21; Bodh. 
bhumi, p. 280 (18); Sutralamkara, XVIII, 92-103 ( pudgalanairatmya ); 
Madyantavibhanga, p. 133 (17), 200 (24); Uttaratantra, p. 138; Vimsika, p. 6; Trimsika, 
p. 271-273, 451, 668, 590. - All these expressions are synonymous, cf. 
Madhyantavibhanga, p. 49 (17) seq.: tathata bhutakotis canimittam paramarthata 
dharmadhatus ca pa ry ay ah sunyatdyah samastas ... etac ca paryayapahcalam yatha 
pradhanam gathayam uktam anye ‘pi paryaya ihanuktah. pravacanad upadhdrydh. 
tadyatha advayata avikalpadhatuh dharmata anabhilapyata anirodhah asamskrtam 
nirvanadi. 


351 



7. The reply to the objections raised here depends on two principles: 

Without designation, without concept of the thing designated, cf. Lankavatara, p. 187 (2): 
abhidhanavinirmuktam abhidheyam na laksyate. 

No real relationship between deignation and the thing designated, cf. Samgraha, chap. Ii, 
§ 24, p. 118: the name is paratantra, the thing is parikalpitcr, Lankavatara, p. 227 (11): 
the name and the thing are imaginary ( nama nimittam ca parikapitah svabhavo 
veditavyah ); confrontation of theses in Siddhi, p. 538. 

See also Notes to chap. Ill, § 16. 


10. Buddhaparsanmandala: below, chap. X, v. 1; Sutralamkara, VII, 6; XX, 28: 
(buddhaparsanmandalesu cotpattih sarvkalam ity etani aparani lingani bodhisattasya ); 
Madhyantavibhanga, p. 96 (20) ( sambhogika-parsanmandala ), 191 (12). 


14. On the eight lokadharmas which have been already mentioned in chap. II, v. 33; VII, 
v. 8, no. 6, see also Dlgha, III, p. 260; Anguttara, IV, p. 156 seq.; V, p. 53; Cullaniddesa, 
p. 55; Patisambhida, I, p. 22, 122; Vibhanga, p. 387; Nettippakarana, p. 162, Lalita, p. 8 
(22), 435 (1); Kosa, IV, p. 25; Mahavyut., 2342-2348; Dharmasamgraha, LXI; Bodh. 
bhumi, p. 193 (9); Buddhabhumistrasastra, T 1530, k. V, p. 3 1 5b 1 8 sq. (good 
definitions). 


17. Examples of cintamani and turiya: below, chap. X. 

Sutralamkara, IX, 18- 19; Madhyantavibhanga, p. 4 (3); Uttaratantra, p. 251. 


20. See above chap. II, § 14b; Abhdhannasamuccayavyakhya, T 1606, k. V, p. 7 1 5b 19. 


21. Similar ideas in Vajrachchhedika: bhasisye 'ham ye yathya 
bodhisattvayanasamprasthitena sthatavyam yatha pratpattavyam yatha cittam 
pragrahftavyam, etc. 


22. A more reasonable explanation of evil in the world is given in Samdhinir., IX, § 265: 
the evil in the world is due to the wrongdoings of beings and the bodhisattvas are unable 
to oppose the law of the retribution of actions. 


352 



CHAPTER IX 


CUTTING OFF, FRUITION OF THE THREE TRAININGS 

( phalaprahana ) 


1. (Translated acc. to H). The superiority of excellent wisdom ( adhiprajnavisesa ) 
has been explained in chapter VIII; how should one conceive of ( hath am 
drastavyah) the superiority of the cessation (prahanavisesa ) that is the fruition of 
the three siksas? 

Cessation (prahdna ) is the nonabiding-nirvana ( apratisth it an irvdna) of the 
bodhisattva; it has as nature ( laksana ) this twofold tranformation of support 
( dsrayapravrtti ) which consists of rejecting the defilements ( samklesaparitydga ) 
and not abandoning transmigration ( samsdraparitydga ). 

i) First, transmigration ( samsdra ) is the defiled portion ( samklesabhdga ) of 
the dependent nature (paratantra-svabhdva ). 

ii) Nirvana is the pure portion ( vyavaddnabhdga ) of the dependent nature. 

iii> The two aspects of the support ( asraya ) is the dependent nature 
( paratantrasvabhdva ) as it is included in both parts at the same time 
( tadubhayabhdgapatita ). 

iv9 The transformation (pardvrtti ) of the support consists of the expulsion 
(tchouan die = Idog = vivartana) of the defiled portion ( sainklesabhdga ) of the 
dependent nature when its antidote (pratipaksa ) arises and it is reduced 
(i tchouan to = gyur pa = parindma) to its pure portion ( vyavaddnabhdga ). 

[148c 1 8] 


1. Comm. Bh 369a22-28, bh missing, U 434cl6-435al0, u 33 1 16-33 lb6. 

“Nonconceptual knowledge ( n ir vika l pakajhdn a ) , which counteracts (pratipaksa ) all that 
is opposed to it ( vipaksa ), necessarily results in cutting off (prahdna); this is why, 


353 



immediately after it ( tadanantaram ), the writer speaks of the superiority of severance 
( prahanavisesa ). 

Nonabiding-nirvana : because the bodhisattva does not rest, like mundane people ( loka ), 
sravakas and pratyekabuddhas, in samsara or nirvana. It consists of rejecting the 
defilements and not abandoning samsara : it destroys the power ( anubhava ) of the 
defilements as one would crush a cursed serpent ( sapasarpa for, without abandoning 
samsara, it is free of defilements. It has as its nature the twofold transformation of the 
support ...: the bodhisattva abides in this transformation of the basis ( asrayaparavrtti ) as 
in a fonnless realm ( arupyadhatu ); in his own personal interest ( svakartha ), he is 
endowed with great wisdom (prajha) and so does not yield ( avakasam kr -) to the 
afflictions ( klesa ); on the other hand, in the interest of others ( parartha ), he is endowed 
with great compassion ( mahakaruna ) and thus does not cease to live in samsara. 

What are samsara, nirvana, the basis ( asraya ) and its transfonnation (paravrtti )? All of 
these must be defined. 

i) Samsara is the defiled part of the dependent nature : this is the imaginary part 
( parikalpitabhaga ) composed of a mind and mental factors ( cittacaitta ) disturbed by 
afflictions ( klesaskhalita ) and the uninterruptedness of the misery of birth and death 
(jatimaranadinavadamuccheda). [In chapter II, § 29, we have seen that the imaginary 
nature forms the defiled part of the dependent nature.] 

ii) Nirvana is the purity part of the dependent nature : It is the absolute part 
(parinispannabhaga) involving the transfonnation or complete suppression 
(dtyan tikapard vrtti) of the imaginary (parikalpita ). [In chapter II, § 29, we have seen that 
the absolute nature forms the purity part of the dependent nature.] 

Hi) The support with two aspects is the dependent nature insofar as it is included in both 
portions at the same time. The support with its two aspects is the dependent nature in all 
its complexity. 

iv) The transformation (paravrtti) concerns the dependent nature (paratantrasvabhava)\ 
the dependent nature of the mind and of the mental factors ( cittacaitta ) is the basis 
(asraya) of the transformation that destroys the defilements (samklesa); it is also the 
basis of all the buddha attributes (buddhadharma). Some actually say: The bhumis and 
the virtues (paramita) are the support (asraya) of the buddha attributes; the 


354 



transformation of the basis ( asrayaparavrtti ) is the fruit (phala ), etc. [The Chinese text, 
badly punctuated, should be corrected according to the Tibetan: sa dan pha rol phyin pa 
ni / satis rgyas chos kyi gnas yin no / gnus gyur pa ni hbras bu ste]. - What is the 
transfonnation of the basis? It concerns the dependent nature. When its antidote arises, 
i.e., when the nonconceptual knowledge arises, the dependent nature expels its defiled 
part it destroys its disturbed part ( skhalitabhaga ), which is formed by all the objects and 
subjects of consciousness ( grahyagrahaka ), and is reduced to its purity part, rejecting 
this imaginary nature which is formed by objects and subjects of consciousness 
(, grahyagrahaka ), it is reduced to its very pure part ( suvisuddhabhaga ), completely free 
of subjects and objects of consciousness ( grahyagrahakavivarjita ), cognizable by 
introspection (pratyatmavedya ) and avoiding all empty prolifreration 

(prapahcocchedaka) .” (U) 


2. In brief (samdsatah), this transformation of the basis {asrayaparavrtti) is of six 
types: 

i) DurbalTkaranopabrmhanapardvrtti: the transformation that consists of 
weakening and strengthening. Indeed, by the stability ( sthiti ) of the hearing- 
propensity ( srutavdsana ) due to the power of convinced adherence 
{adhimuktibala), and by the presence of shame ( lajja ), the afflictions ( klesa ) 
are but slightly or not at all active {samuddcaranti) 

ii) Prativedhaparavrtti : the tranformation of penetration. It is the 
transformation of the bodhisattvas who have entered onto the bhumis 

( bhiimipravista ). Actually, the appearance and disappearance of the real and 
the unreal ( tattvdtattva-khydndkhydna , cf. Sutralamkara, XIX, 54) takes 
place up to and including the sixth bhumi. 

iii) Bhdvandpardvrtti: the transformation of development. It is the 
transformation of the bodhisattvas fettered by obstacles ( sdvarana ). Actually, 
there is the disappearance of all concepts {sarvanimittakhydnd) and 
appearance of the real ( tattvakhydna ) up to and including the tenth bhumi. 


355 



iv) Phalaparipiiripardvrtti: transformation of the fulfillment of the result. It is 
the transformation of the bodhisattvas freed from the obstacles ( anavarana ), 
because there is the disappearance of all concepts ( sarvanimittakhydna ), 
appearance of the very pure reality ( ativisuddhatattva-khydna ) and 
attainment of mastery over everything ( sarvanimittavibhutvaldbdha ). 

v) HTnapardvrtti: the lesser transformation. This is the transformationof the 
sravakas, etc. Actually, they penetrate {pratividhyanti ) only the non-existence 
of self of the individual {pudgalanairatniya ); they turn their back completely 
(ekdntena prsthibhavanti) on transmigration ( samsara ) and completely 
abandon ( ekdntena parityajanti) this transmigration. 

vi) Visdlapardvritti : extensive transformation. This is the transformation of 
the bodhisattvas. Actually, they penetrate {pratividhyanti ) further the non- 
existence of self of dharmas {dharmanairatmyd) and, considering samsara as 
peace (santa), they cut through the defilements ( samklesa ) but do not 
abandon samsara. 

What disadvantagess {admava) do the bodhisattvas get from the lesser 
transformation ( h In apardvrtti) ? By scorning {anapeksyd) the interest of others 
(sattvartha), they go against {atikramanti) their quality of bodhisattva and share 
in the deliverance ( vimoksa ) of the practitioners of the Lesser Vehicle 
(lunaydnika): these are the drawbacks of this transformation. 

What benefits {anusamsd) do the bodhisattvas derive from the extensive 
transformation ( visdlapardvrtti )? Having transformed their own basis, they 
obtain sovereignty over all the dharmas of samsara ( samsdradharmavibhutva ). 
Appearing (pradarsana ) in all the destinies ( sarvagati ) in the bodies of all kinds 
of beings ( sarvasattvakaya ), they exercise their skill in various disciplinary means 
{vinayopayakausalya) in order to discipline and establish beings who are to be 
converted into happiness {abhyudaya) and the three vehicles (yanatraya): these 
are the benefits of this transformation. [149a7] 


2. Comm. Bh 369bl9-369cl6; bh missing; U 435a28-435b21; u 331b6-332bl. 


356 



i) DurbalTkaranopabrmhanaparavrtti. “It breaks ( samudghatatayati ) the strength ( bala ) 
of the affliction-propensities ( klesavasana ) contained in the store-consciousness 
(alayavijhana) and increases ( vardhayati ) the power (prabhava) which counteracts 
(tatpratipaksa) them. This first transformation of the basis is obtained in this way. By the 
stability of the hearing-propensity due to the power of confirmed adherence : when one 
abides in the level where adherence ( adhimukticaryabhumi ) is practiced, the power of the 
hearing-propensity ( srutavasana ) is stabilized ( sthapayati ); this is how this 
transfonnation of support is obtained. And by the presence of shame : in this state 
(avastha of adhimukticaryabhumi), when the afflictions (kies a) are active 
(samudacaranti), one is completely ashamed, and then the afflictions are only slightly or 
not at all active.” (Bh) 

“By the power of adherence ( adhimukti ) and the hearing-propensity ( srutavasana ), one 
breaks ( samudghatayati ) the propensities of the afflictions ( klesavasana ) contained in the 
retribution consciousness ( vipakavijhana ) and one increases ( vardhayati ) the power 
( prabhava ) of the pure dharmas ( vaiyavadanikadharma ). By the stability of the hearing- 
propensity (srutavasana) due to adherence (adhimukti) and by the presence of shame 
(lajja), the afflictions are caused to act only slightly or not at all.” (U) 

ii) Prativedhaparavrtti. “This is the transfonnation of the support obtained by entering 
into the bhumis. The appearance and disappearance of the real and the unreal 
(tattvdtattvakhydndkhyana), etc.: this transformation extends up to the sixth bhumi. 
Sometimes it is the cause for the appearance of the real (tattvakhyana)', sometimes, when 
emerging from (vyutthana) concentration, it is the cause for the appearance of the unreal 
(i attavakhyana ).” (Bh) - “When one has entered into the great bodhisattva bhumis, there 
is appearance and disappearance of the real and the unreal', according to whether the 
nonconceptual knowledge (nirvikalpakajhana) functions mediately (sottaram) or 
immediately (anantaram), there is sometimes the appearance of the real (tattvakhyana) 
when one enters into concentration, and sometimes the appearance of the unreal 
(atattvakhyana) when one emerges from (vyutthana) concentration. Thus the real and the 
unreal, in these two moments, appear and disappear respectively. This appearance and 
disappearance lasts until the sixth bhumi.” (U) 

iii) Bhavanaparavritti . “ It is that of the bodhisattvas fettered by obstacles, i.e., fettered by 
the obstacle of knowledge (jheyavarana ). There is the disappearance of every concept, 


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etc.: this transformation of the basis lasts up until the tenth bhumi. All concepts (nimitta) 
disappear; nonconcept (animiita), the true nature ( tathata ) alone, appears.” (Bh) 

iv) Phalaparipuripardvrtti. “ It is that of the bodhisattvas freed from the obstacles. They 
are free of the obstacles (anavarana) because they have no further obstacle. There is 
appearance of the very pure reality (ativisuddhatattvakhvana) for the same reason. The 
bodhisattvas obtain sovereignty over everything (sarvanimittavibhutva): with this 
transfonnation as support (as ray a), they gain mastery over things ( nimittavibhutva ) and 
according to their aspirations ( yathasayam ), they procure the benefit and happiness of 
beings (. sattvahitasukha ).” (Bh) 

v) HTnaparavrtti. “ This is that of the sravakas, etc .: by etc., one should understand the 
pratyekabuddhas. They penetrate ( pratividhyanti ) only one non-existence of self 
(nairatmya), that of the pudgala. This transformation, not being able to procure the 
interests of others (parartha), is lower (hTna)T (Bh) 

vi) Visalaparavrtti. “ This is that of the bodhisattvas, etc. Since they penetrate 
( pratividhyanti ) both non-existences of self (nairatmya), that of the pudgala and that of 
dharmas at the same time, they become established in a place where they can cut through 
the defilements (samklesa) without abandoning samsara. This transformation which 
procures both the personal interest of the bodhisattva and that of others (svaparartha) is 
extensive (visala)T (Bh) - “They cut through the defilements (samklesa) but do not 
abandon samsara. Penetrating ( pratividh -) the two non-existences of a self (nairatmya), 
they cut the defilements; but seeing peace (santa) in samsara, they do not abandon it.” 
(U) 

“ What disadvantages do they incur in the lower transformation, etc.? This passage is 
easy to understand. 

What benefits do they derive from the extensive transformation, etc.? Since the 
bodhisattvas have obtained mastery in all the destinies (gati) with the body appropriate 
(sabhagakaya) to these destinies and their inhabitants, [cf. Vimalaklrtinirdesa, in 
Siksasamuccaya, p. 324 seq.; Hobogirin, art. Bosatsu, p. 139b]. By means of their skill in 
various disciplinary means (vinayopayakausalya), they confirm those beings [who are 
capable of entering the path ( yeou kan = bhavya, cf. Kosa, IV, p. 201] into the 
discipline. They establish them (niksipanti) in happiness (abhyudaya) and in the three 


358 



vehicles ( yanatraya ). By happiness, the fortunate worldly existences 
(laukikasukhajanma) [or, ace. to Bh, the riches of the world ( laukikavibava )] should be 
understood. This is what constitutes the benefits of the Dharma.”(U) 


3. Here are some stanzas (cf. Sutralamkara, XIX, 53-54): 

a. tattvam samcchddya bdldndm atattvam khyati sarvatah / 

tattvam tu bodhisattvdndm sarvatah khydty apdsya tat// 

Amongst foolish people, the unreal, concealing the real, pushing aside the 
real, appears on all sides. 

b. akhydnakhydnatd jheyd asadarthasadarthayoh/ 

asrayasya paravrttir mokso 'sau kamacaratah // 

The disappearance and appearance of the false and the real is the 
transformation of the basis, deliverance, for one acts as one wishes. 

c. When the knowledge that knows the sameness ( samatdjhdna ) of samsara 
and nirvana has been produced, then samsara becomes nirvana. 

d. As a result, one does not give up ( tyajati ) or hold onto samsara; one does 
not attain (prapnoti ) or miss nirvana. [149a 16] 


3. Comm. Bh 369c26-370al9, bh missing, U 435c2-18, u 332b 1 -8. 

“In order ro explain the transformation of the basis ( asrayaparavrtti ), the author gives 
several stanzas: 

a. Among foolish people: among fools ( bala ), ignorance (avidya) is not cut off ( prahina ) 
and, since the real ( tattva ) does not appear (na khyati), it is said that it is hidden 
( achanna ). By the power of ignorance, everything that is not real (atattva) appears 
{khyati) in its entirety. Among bodhisattvas, it is not the same: ignorance being cut off, 
they understand ( pratividhyanti ) that the unreal is nonexistent; that is why it is said: 
avoiding the unreal. For bodhisattvas, the real appears everywhere ( sarvatah khyati). 


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[Cf. Sutralamkarabhasya: etena yatha balanam svarasenatattvam eva khyati nimittam na 
tattvam tathata. evam bodhisattvanam svarasena tattvam eva khyati natattvam ity 
upadarsitam]. 

b. Asa result, the appearance and disappearance of the real and the false, etc.: when the 
absolute ( parinispanna ), the real ( sadartha ), appears and when the imaginary 
( parikalpita ), the false ( asadartha ), disappears, this is the transformation of the basis 
( asrayaparavrtti ). That is to say, the disappearance of the false ( asarthdkhyana ) and the 
appearance of the real ( sadarthakhyana ) are called transformation of the support 
{asrayaparavrtti). This is deliverance ( moksa ): the transfonnation of the support is called 
deliverance. For one acts as one wishes (kamacaratah)'. this transformation of the basis is 
deliverance, independence ( svatantrya ); one acts as one wishes in the world {/oka), since 
by deliverance is meant a sovereignty in action in accordance with desires 
( yathakamakriyavibhutva ) and not the fact of giving up the life of the body {kayajivita) as 
if one were going to be beheaded {sirascheda). 

[Cf. Sutralamkara: asadarthasya nimittasydkhydnata sadarthasya tathatayah khvanata 
asrayaparavrttir vediavya. taya hi tadakhydnam ca. saiva ca mokso veditavyah. kim 
karanam. kamacaratah. tadha hi svatantro bhavati svacittasavarti prakrtyaiva 
n im i ttasamudacarat \ . 

c. When the knowledge that knows the identity of samsara and nirvana is produced, etc.: 
The imaginary nature (parikalpitasvabhava ) is called samsara. It is without self-nature 
{nihsvabhava). This absence of self-nature {nihsvabhavata) is emptiness {sunyata). 
Emptiness is nirvana, the absolute nature (parinispannasvabhdva ). 

d. For this reason, one does not give up and one does not hold onto samara, etc. Since 
samsara is nirvana, one does not abandon it; but since the notion of samsara 
{samsdrasamjha) no longer applies (pravti -) to samsara, one does not keep samsara. 
Since nirvana is not attained outside of samsara, one does not acquire nirvana; but since 
nirvana is experienced {sdksatkrta) within samsara, one does not lack nirvana.” (U) 


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NOTES TO CHAPTER IX 


1. Apratistitanirvana. - Difficult grammatical explanation: nirvanam yatra na 
pratisthTyate (Note of J. Speyer in Museon, 1914, 9. 33; Syntax, § 360); apratisthito 
nirvane (Mahavyut., 406). - Astasahasrika P.P., p. 23: api tu sthasyati sarvajnatdydm 
asthanayogena, comm. Abhis. al. al., p. 105 (9): tatra sthanam vastupalambhah. 
pratisthanam cetasah. tatpratisedhad asthanam', Astasahastika, p. 37: apratisthitamanso 
hi thatagato ‘rham damyaksambuddhah. sa naiva samskrte fhatau sthito napy asamskrte 
dh atau sthito na ca tato vyutthitah, comm. Abhis. al. al, p. 151 (25): samskrta iti 
kamadike. asamskrta iti tathataike. Tatra na sthas tattvato vastuvanupalambhat. na ca 
tato vyutthota iti naiva tatrasthitio nirvisayasya nano 'prayogat. sainv rtya tv sthanam 
asthanam vd prajhaptam Bhagavateti matih; Vajracchedika, p. 27: apartisthitahitta; 
Bodhicaryavatarapanjika, p. 421 (16): apratisthitanirvanatvena paramamsantim gate ... 
bodhisattve; Dharmasamgiti in Siksasam., p. 322b seq.: buddha bhagavanto ... 
sarvasattvasamacitta niotyasamadhigocarh sain s arabirvdna vi mulct a yd vat sattvdndun 
mdtdpitrkalpah samanamaitracittah; Sutralamkara, III, 3; IX, 14 
(samsdranirvandpratisthitatvat samskrtasamskrtatvenadvayd vrttih ); IX, 45; IX, 70; 
XVII, 32; XVII, 42 ( tatrapi ca nihsnehdndm sravakapratyekabuddhaanam 
sarvadukhopasame nirvane pratisthiam manah. Bodhisayyvandm tu karundvistatvdn 
nirvane ‘pi mano na pratisthitam ); XVIII, 70; XIX, 62; Madhyantavibhanga, p. 4 (1), 

108 (14-15), 160 (17) (dharmanairdtmyavisayendpratisthitanirvdnaprdpakendvikalpena 
jnanena svayam niryanam mahayanam ucyate), 187 (14) (kim tad apratisthitarn 
nirvanam. b odh is a tt vd vas t hay dm tavat kamopapattivasitamnisrayena kdrunikatvdt 
samsasropattih, prajhabalena tatrdsamklesah ); Siddhi, p. 628, 771, 677 , 683, 777, 810; 
Uttaratantra, p. 162, 173, 174. - Consult J. Masuda, Der individualistische Idealismus, 
1926, p. 49, sq.; T. Stcherbatsky, Conception of Buddhist Nirvana, 1927, p. 185, 204; N. 
Dutt, Aspects of Mahay ana Buddhism, 1930, p. 200; H. von Glasenapp, Unsterblichhkeit 
und Erldsung in den indischen Religionen, 1938, p. 62. 

Asrayaparavrtti: see Notes to chap. I, v. 57. Also Lankavatara, p. 202 (2): cittam 
drsyavinirmuktam svabhavadvayavarjitam asrayasya paravrttim anutpadam vadamy 
aham; Sutralamkara, XIX, 54 (= moksa = tathatayah khvanata ); XIV, 29 (in the first 
bhumi); XIV, 45 (final or nisthagata ); Bodh. bhumi, p. 404 (27) ( niruttara and sottaras ); 
Siddhi, p. 219 (fruit of klesaprahana ); p. 600 ( paravrtti of rupaskandha and of 
skandhacatuska)', p. 667 (its twofold fruit). 

Nirvana: cf. the definition of Lankavatara, p. 200 (4): animittam iti vikalpasyapravrttir 
anutpado nirvanam iti vadami. ttra nirvanam iti yathabhutaryasthanadarsanam 
vikalpacittacaittakalapasya pardvrttipurvakam 

tathdgatasvapratydtmdryajhanddhigamam nirvanam iti vadami. - See Siddhi, p. 668- 
680. 


2. Repeated and developed in Siddhi, p. 661-667 . 


3. The first two stanzas are taken from Sutralamkara, XIX, 53-54. The third deals with 
the identity of samsara and nirvana, cf. Madh. vrtti, XXV, 19-20, p. 535: na samsarasya 
nirvdndt kimcid asti vise sanam, na nirvanasya samskarat kimcid asti visesanam. - 
nirvanasya ca yd kotlh sams arasya ca, na tayor antaram kimcit susuksmam api vidyate 


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(T. Stcherbaatsky, Conception of Buddhist Nirvana, p. 205; L. de La Vallee Poussin, 
Reflexions sur le Madhyamaka, MCB, II, 1933, p. 29); Lankavatara, p. 42 (7): 
samsdranirvdnasamatd, p. 76; Madhyantavibhangga, p. 160 (11): samsaranirvanayor 
anabhildpyadharmatdprativedhdd avikalpam jnanam: Samgraha, chap. II, § 30. 


362 



CHAPTER X 


KNOWLEDGE OF THE RESULT 

( phalajnana ) 


1. The superiority of the cessation that is the result of the three siksas 
{tatphalaprahanavisesa) has been explained in Chapter IX; how should one 
conceive ( katham drastavyah) the superiority of the knowledge concerning this 
result (tatph alajh an a vises a) ? - The three bodies of the Buddha (buddhakdya) - 
the essential body ( svabhavikakaya ), the body of enjoyment ( sambhogakaya ) and 
the apparitional body ( nirmanakaya ) - consitute the superiority of the knowledge 
of this result. 

i) First, the essential body {svabhavikakaya) is the dharmakaya (body of the 
doctrine) of the Tathagata, because it is the basis of sovereignty over all the 
dharmas {sarvadharmavibhutva). 

ii) The body of enjoyment {sambhogakaya) is based on the dharmakaya and 
is characterized {prabhavita ) by all the types of assemblies {parsanmandala ) 
of the Buddha because it experiences ( anubhavati ) the very pure 
buddhafields {parisuddhaksetra ) and the enjoyment of the doctrine of the 
Greater Vehicle {mahaydnadharmasambhoga). 

iii) The apparitional body {nirmanakaya) also is based on the dharmakaya 
and manifests {pradarsayati ) the following activities: [cf. the twelve acts of the 
Buddha in Lalitavistara analyzed by Bu-ston, II, p. 7-72; Dasabhumika, p. 
14]: 

1-2: dwelling in the Tusita palace and then departing 

{tusitabhavandvasam didim krtva cyavanam); 

3. entry into the womb (garbhdvakrdnti); 

4. birth {janma ); 


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5. youthful games ( kumaraknda ); 

6. abiding in the harem (antahpuravasa ) ; 

7. leaving home ( abhiniskramana ) and keeping company with the 
heretics ( tlrth ikasam Tp again an a ) ; 

8. ascetic practice ( dmkaracarya ); 

9. victory over Mara ( maradharsana ); 

10. attainment of enlightenment ( abhisambodhi ); 

11. turning the wheel of the Dharma ( dharmacakra-pravartana ); 

12. parinirvana ( mahaparinirvana ). [149a26] 


1. Comm. Bh 370bl-9, bh missing, U 435c28-436al9, u 332b8-333a8. 

“When one has cut off what needs to be cut off (prahatavya ), immaculate unhindered 
knowledge ( vimalam apratihatam ca jnanam ) is obtained. This is why, immediately after 
( anantaram ) the superiority of cutting off ( prahanavisesa ), the author explains the 
superiority of the knowledge concerning the result (phalajhana-visesa ). 

i) The svabhavikakaya does mot contain anything created ( krtima ), this is why it is called 
essential ( svabhavika ); it is the basis ( asraya ), this is why is is called body ( kaya ). Being 
a body (kaya), the nature of things (dharmata) is called dharmakaya; or rather, because it 
is the basis ( asraya ) of the dharmas, it is called dharmakaya. [In Sanskrit: dharmataiva 
kaya iti dharmakayah. athava dharmanam asrayo bhavatfti dharmakayah ]. Because it is 
the basis of sovereignty over ail dharmas : it is also the basis of attaining mastery over all 
dharmas and this is why it is the basis of mastery over all dharmas. 

ii) The sambhogakaya depends on the dharmakaya : because there is a dharmakaya, there 
is a sambhogakaya. It is characterized by all types of Buddha assemblies'. These are a 

collection ( caya ) of groups of the great bodhisattvas in these buddha bhumis these 

are the bhumis situated in the four directions, such as SukhavatT. Because they experience 
the very pure buddhafields and the enjoyment of the doctrine of the Greater Vehicle : in 
the very pure buddhafields, they experience the many joys of the doctrine of the Greater 
Vehicle (sutras, etc.), because they understand their meaning (artha). Or else, in the very 


364 



pure buddhafields, they enjoy all sorts of jewels ( ratna ): gold ( suvarna ), silver ( rajata ), 
etc. The Buddhas and bodhisattvas mutually ( parampara ) enjoy their bodies of 
wonderful colors, etc.; they enjoy texts ( dharma ), sutras, etc. and many theses ( artha ) (cf. 
Chap III, § 1); they establish (y yavasthap-) the specific characteristics ( svalaksana ) and 
the general characteristics (sdmdnyalaksana). How is it the basis (as ray a) and of what is 
it the basis? Of immaculate unhindered knowledge ( vimalam aparatihatam ca jhanam). 
By the dominant power (adhipatibala) of this wonderful knowledge, one is established in 
inconceivable liberations ( acintyavimoksa ). A knowledge arises in the great bodhisattvas 
who have entered into the great bhumis which manifests the very pure buddhafields 
( parisuddhabuddhaksetra ) and the enjoyment of the doctrine of the Great Vehicle 
(mahayanadharmasambhoga). 

iii) The nirmanakaya depends on the dharmakdya : see what was said above. By the 
power of the knowledge of the result (phalajhana-visesa ), he abandons the abode of the 
Tusitas, etc., and finally enters into nirvana. But that is all pure fiction. This is how 
peculiar ideas having the aspect of a person (manusyasabhagavijhapti), a person who is 
accomplishing the stereotyped career of the Buddha Sakyamuni, arise in the mental series 
(sanitaria) of beings.” (U) 


2 . Here is a summary in one verse ( uddanasloka ): 

Characteristics ( laksana , § 3), achievement (alabha, § 4), sovereignties 
(vibhutva, § 5 ), basis (asraya, § 6), constitution (parigraha , § 7 ), difference 
(bhinnatva, § 8 ), qualities (guna , § 9 - 27 ), profundity (gdmbliirya , § 28 ), 
recollection (anusmrti, § 29 ), actions (karman, § 31): these are the sections in 
regard to buddhahood. [149a29] 

3. What is the characteristic (laksana) of the dharmakaya of the Buddhas? - In 
brief, (samdsatah) it has the following five characteristics: 

i) The transformation of the basis (dsrayapardvrttilaksana). Having destroyed 
(viskambh-) all the obstacles (avarana) and the dependent nature in its defiled 
portion (samklesabhagapatita paratantrasvabhava ), it is free (vimuc-) of all 


365 



obstacles; it secures ( upasthap -) mastery of all the dharmas ( sarvadharma - 
vibhutva), and it is transformed into the purity portion of the dependent 
nature ( vyavadanabhagapatita paratantrasvabhdva). 

ii) Its nature is that of being constituted of white dharmas 

(, sukladharmasvabhdvalaksana ) because it has attained the ten masteries 
{vasita) by means of the fulfillment of the six virtues (satpdramitd-paripuri): 

(a) Mastery of life ( dyurvasitd ), mastery of mind ( cittavasitd ) and mastery 
of provisions ( pariskaravasita ) have been acquired by means of fulfillment 
of the virtue of generosity ( ddnapdramitdparipuri ). 

(b) Mastery of action ( karmavasita ) and mastery of birth ( upapatti vasita) 
have been acquired by the fulfillment of the virtue of morality 
{sTlapdram itdparipuri) . 

(c) Mastery of aspiration ( adhimuktivasita ) has been acquired by 
fulfillment of the virtue of patience ( ksdntipdramitdparipdri ). 

(d) Mastery of vow ( pranidhanavasita ) has been acquired by fulfillment of 
the virtue of zeal ( vTryapdramitdparipuri ). 

(e) Mastery of miraculous powers ( rddhivasita ) pertaining to ( samgrhlta ) 
the five superknowledges ( abhijiid ) has been acquired by fulfillment of 
the virtue of dhyana (dhydn apdram itdparipuri) . 

(f) Mastery of knowledge ( jiidnavasita ) and mastery of Dharma 

( dharmavasita ) have been acquired by fulfillment of the virtue of wisdom 
( prajndpdramitdparipuri ). 

iii) It is nondual ( advayalaksana ). 

(a) It has the nature of nonduality of existence and nonexistence 

(, bhdvdbhdvddvayalaksana ): in other words, it is neither existent nor 
nonexistent as, on the one hand, all dharmas are nonexistent 
(nihsvabhdva) and, on the other hand, emptiness ( sunyatd ) exists really. 

(b) It has the nature of nonduality of being conditioned and 
unconditioned (sainskrtdsamskrtddvayalaksana): in other words, it is 


366 



neither conditioned nor unconditioned as, on the one hand, it is not 
fabricated ( abhisamskrta ) by action ( karman ) or by afflictions ( klesa ) and, 
on the other hand, it has the sovereign power ( vibhutva ) of appearing 
( pradarsana ) in the aspect ( abhdsa ) of the conditioned ( samskrta ). 

(c) It has the nature of nonduality of plurality and singleness 
(nanatvaikatvadvayalaksana): in other words, it is neither many nor one 
because, on the one hand, the basis of all the Buddhas (sarvabuddhasraya) 
does not consist of divisions ( abhinna ) and, on the other hand, numberless 
mental series (up mm an a-sam tana) reach enlightenment 
{abb isambudhyan te ) . 

Here are several stanzas: 

(*) [Transl. according to H]. Since belief in a self ( dtmagrdha ) does not apply to 
the basie, there are no different supports ( dsraya ) in the base; but as various 
entries into the possession of this support have taken place in the past 
( purvadhigama-prabedha ) and are referred to ( anusara ), it is asserted 
(v yavahryate) that there are different supports. 

(**) (Cf. Sutralamkara, IX, 77): 

gotrabhedad vaiyarthyat sdkalydd apy an adit ah / 

abheddn naikabudhatvam bahutvam camalasraye // 

“In view of the division of lineages, in view of needlessness, of totality, of non- 
beginning and of absence of divisions in the stainless support, there is neither 
uniqueness nor multiplicity of Buddha.” 

iv) It is eternal in nature ( nityalaksana ), for it has purification of the true 
nature ( tathatdvisuddhi ) as nature; it is the result ( abedha ) of an earlier vow 
( purvapranidhana ), and its activity ( kriya ) is never exhausted (paripurnd). 

v) It is inconceivable in nature ( acintyalaksana ), for this purification of the 
true nature ( tathatdvisuddhi ) is known by introspection (pratyatmavedyd ), has 
no equal in the world (Joke ' nupama ) and is not an object accessible to 
speculation (tarkikagocara). [140b24] 


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3. Comm. Bh 370bl7-371c5, bh mising, U 436bl-437b21, u 333b 1 -335b 1 . 

“i) Asrayaparavrttilaksana. Having destroyed all the obstacles and the defiled portion of 
the dependent nature : having rejected by means of revolution (transfonnation) (tchouan 
li), the defiled part of the dependent nature along with its pseudo-objects and -subjects of 
consciousness ( grahyagrahakanimitta ) and having prevented them from rearising, it has 
acquired liberation from all the obstacles ( sarvavaranavimoksa ) by means of 
transfonnation (tchouan tfi). - It assures sovereignty over all the dharmas and is 
transformed into the puure part dependent naturet. It has acquired the stainless true 
nature (a maid tathata) by means of transformation, the absolute nature 
( parinispannasvabhdva ) consisting of ( prabhavita ) the absence of objects and subjects of 
consciousness ( grahyagrahakasvabhava ). It is also transformed by attaining sovereignty 
( vibhutva ) over all the dharmas. . . 

ii) Sukladharmasvabhavalaksana. The transformation of the basis ( asrayaparavrtti ) 
acquired by the sravaka consists (prabhavita ) only of the cutting off of the defilements 
( klesaprahana ) and its nature is not constituted by white dharmas (sukladharma). On the 
other hand, the transformation of the basis acquired by the bodhisattva, thanks to the 
complete development ( bhavanaparipuri ) of the six virtues ( paramita ), has as its nature 
the ten masteries ( vasita ) that are the very nature of the white dharmas. At that moment, 
there is not a single instant ( ksana ) that is indeterminate from the moral point of view 
(avyakrta) or, a fortiori, defiled (kista). [See the distinction between lima and visala 
paravrttih, chapter IX, § 2). - The author then goes on to explain the ten masteries (cf. 
Mahavyut., 771-780; Dharmasamgraha, LXXIV): 

(a) Mastery of life (ayurvasita) consists of abandoning life at will. - Mastery of 
mind ( cittavasita ) consists of not being defiled ( sarnklista ) while in the midst of samsara. 
Mastery of mind is also called the mastery which, knowing how to procure the provisions 
( pariskara ) for others according to their aspirations ( yathasayam ), is also able to turn 
their minds away from these provisions. - Mastery of provisions (pariskaravaOita ) 
consists of accumulating supplies at will: drink (pana ), food (ahara), etc. Provisions 
( pariskara ) and accumulations ( sambhara ) are synonymous. - [They are acquired by the 
fulfillment of the virtue of generosity, because fulfilment of generosity of the Dharma 


368 



( dharmadana ), generosity of safety ( abhayadana ) and material generosity ( amisadana ) 
have these three masteries respectively (yathayogarn ) as result. 

(b) Mastery of activity ( karmavasita ) consists of acquiring great mastery over 
actions [ace. to Bh: bodily actions ( kayakarman ) and vocal actions ( vakkarman )]. It 
accomplishes only good actions ( kusala ) and not bad ( akusala ) or indeterminate actions 
(avyakrta). Moreover, it encourages ( samadapayati ) beings to establish good actions. - 
Mastery of birth ( upapattivasita ) consists of being able to take birth at will in any destiny 
one wishes. - It is acquired by fulillment of the virtue of morality, these two masteries are 
the result of the virtue of morality (sTla), because the ethical person (silavat) carries out 
only good actions and sees his vows ( pranidhana ) realized. 

(c) Mastery of aspiration (adhimukti vasita ): it is enough that, on earth, he forms 
an aspiration ( adhimukti ) to change earth into gold, etc. (cf. chap. I, § 60; chap. II, v. 14). 
Earth, etc., gold, etc., are changed according to his aspirations. - It is acquired by the 
fulfillment of the virtue of patience: this mastery is the result of patience ( ksanti ); it is 
because of having previously cultivated patience joyously and abiding by the wishes of 
beings that one is now able to change earth, etc., gold, etc. according to one’s aspirations. 

(d) Mastery of vows (pranidhanavasita) consists of realizing everything according 
to the vows. - It is acquired by the fulfillment of the virtue of zeal ( virya ); it is because of 
previously having cutivated zeal and never showing any laziness ( kausidya ) in the service 
of others ( sattvartha ) that one now acquires mastery of vows. 

(e) Mastery of miraculous powers (rddhivasita) pertaining to the five 
superknowledges: it consists of accomplishing all kinds of astonishing miracles at will. - 
It is acquired by the fulfillment of the virtue of dhyana: it is by previously having joyfully 
cultivated concentration and adjusting oneself to the interest of beings ( sattvaprayojana ) 
by entering into all kinds of dhyanas and concentrations ( samapatti ) that one now attains 
this mastery of miraculous powers derived from concentration. 

(f) Mastery of knowledge (jhanavasita) consists of realizing knowledge 
(jhanasaksatkara) in accordance with all types of speech ( vyavahdra ). - Mastery of the 
Dharma ( dharmavasita ) consists of preaching the twelve-membered doctrine: sutra, 
geya, etc. at will (cf Mahavyutpatti, 1267-1278). - They are acquired by the fulfillment of 
the virtue of wisdom: these masteries are the result of wisdom (prajtia ); it is by 


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previously having joyfully cultivated wisdom and having preached the good Dharma 
(saddharma) according to its twelve classes that one now attains supreme wisdom. The 
miraculous sounds ( sughosa ) are called the good Dharma {saddharma). 

iii) (a) Bhavabhavadvayalaksana. It does not have a nature of existence 
( bhavalaksana ) because all dharmas are imaginary ( parikalpita ) and nonexistent; neither 
does it have a nature of nonexistence ( abhavalaksana ), because the self-nature composed 
of emptiness (, sunya ) exists. (Cf. the second quality of the Buddha, chap. II, § 33). 

(b) Samskrtasamskrtadvayalaksana. Because it is not conditioned (, samskrta ) by 
action ( karman ) and afflictions {klesa), it does not have the nature of the conditioned 
(samskrtalaksana). Because it has acquired the mastery of appearing (vibhutva) as 
conditioned dharmas and because, repeatedly at many times {abhiksnam), it appears as 
conditioned, it does not have the nature of the unconditioned {asamskrtalaksana). 

(c) Ndndt va ika t v ad vaya 1 a ks an a . Since the dharmakaya of the Buddhas is 
essentially one, it does not have the nature of plurality ( nanatvalaksana ). Since 
innumerable persons ( apramanasraya ) attain it (adhigam-) each in turn, it does not have 
the nature of uniqueness {ekah’alaksana). This absence of plurality and of singleness is 
called the nature of nonduality {advayalaksana). [See below, § 8, 33]. 

Two stanzas follow which summarize these ideas so that they may be easily understood: 

(i) Since the belief in a self does not apply to the basis, etc. Wherever there is the belief in 
a self (i atmagraha ) that takes the inner ( adhyatmika ) as self (atman) and the outer ( bahya ) 
as other, such divisions as self and other, this and that, are also imagined ( vikalpa ). But 
since belief in a self does not apply to the dharmakaya of the Buddhas, it is free of such 
divisions. 

Objection. If that is so, why are there several Buddhas? 

Reply. Because it refers to various entrances into the possession of this basis [= of this 
dharmakaya] that have occurred in the past, it is asserted that there are various bases [= 
different Buddhas]. Since various entrances into the possession of this basis by the 
bodhisattvas are referred to, it is asserted ( vyavahr -) that there are different Buddhas. In 
conformity with mundane language {laukikavyavahara), one says: "This one is 
Sakyamuni, that one is Vipasvin", etc. 


370 



(ii) In view of the division of lineages (gotrabhedat): since the original cause has 
divisions, there is but one single Buddha. There are two types of lineages ( gotra ): 1) 
innate lineage (prakrtistham gotram ) , i.e., a superiority having no beginning and 
characterizing the six faculties (anddikdlikah sadayatanavisesah ), a natural gift that is 
transmitted (paramparagato dharmatdpratilabdhah ); 2) acquired lineage ( samudamtam 
gotram ), i.e., that which is realized by an earlier effort (purvabhyasa ): consorting with a 
spiritual friend ( ka/yanamitra ), etc. (Cf. Bodh. bhumi, p. 3). Since the innate lineage is 
indivisible (wou yeou fen pie), it may be said that there is but one Buddha. But the 
acquired lineage includes many kinds and, in view of the multiplicity of these lineages, it 
cannot be said that there is but one single Buddha and that the other Buddhas do not 
exist. 

Because of needlessness (vaiyarthyat), there is but one single Buddha. Several Buddhas 
depending on the first lineage (gotra) accumulate ( sambhr -), each separately, the 
accumulations of enlightenment ( bodhisambhara ). If there were only one Buddha 
reaching enlightenment while the others do not, the accumulations ( sambhara ) 
accumulated by these others would be vain (sunya) and sterile (nisphala). But that is 
impossible ( ayukta ). 

In view of totality (sakalyat), there is but one single Buddha. Embracing all beings to be 
converted separately, the Tathagatas assure their welfare and happiness (hitasukha), i.e., 
they establish them in the three vehicles as appropriate. But if there were but one 
Buddha, they could not assure these beings or introduce them into the buddha-vehicles 
(buddhayana), for there is not a second Buddha. [In other words, if by rights there is only 
one Buddha, what is the good of introducing beings into the vehicles destined to make 
Buddhas out of them?] Thus, the buddha activity (buddhakriya) carried out by these 
Tathagatas would never succeed. That is why it is necessary to admit that there are 
several Buddhas. 

In view of non-beginning (anaditah), there is not just one single Buddha. The 
appearances of the Tathagatas on the earth (pradurbhava ) have had no beginning 
(anadika), just like samsara. Since it is impossible to become Buddha spontaneously 
(svatah) without having accumulated the accumulations (sambhara), since it is 
impossible to accumulate these accumulations without having been in the service 
(upasana) of a Buddha, it is completely impossible that there be just one Buddha. 


371 



On the other hand, it cannot be asserted that there may be several Buddhas, given the 
absence of divisions in the stainless basis ( abhedad amalasrayd). Here the pure 
fundamental element ( anasravadharmadhatu ) is called the stainless basis because the 
excellence of knowedge (jhanavisesa) has definitively cut through the adventitious stains 
( agantnkamala ). One cannot assert the presence of different Buddhas in this pure 
fundamental element. That is why the author says: There is neither singleness nor 
plurality of Buddha ( naikabuddhatvam bahutvam ). - See below, § 33. 

iv) Nityalaksana. The dharmakaya is immutable (avikdro) and its series ( sanitaria ) is 
uninterrupted ( asamucchinna ); this is why it is stated that it has eternity as nature. This 
characteristic is attributed to it for three reasons ( hetupratyaya ): 

It has the purification of the true nature as nature : this shows that the true nature 
(tathata) is eternal ( nitya ) and immutable (avikdro). But the Buddha has acquired the 
dharmakaya as self-nature. If this dharmakaya changed, it would not be the true nature. 
That is why it is eternal. 

It is the result of an earlier vow. Previously, the Tathagatas have uttered the following 
vow: May I save (uttr-) numberless beings (apramanasattva) and thus lead them to 
nirvana. But various categories of beings do not reach nirvana and thus the result 
projected (aksipta) by this vow is never interrupted ( asamucchinna ). That is why it is 
eternal (cf. chap. II, § 33: the Buddha aparantakotinistha). This projection of the vow 
would be impossible without the eternity of the series. 

Its activity is never exhausted. The activity derived from this previous great vow is never 
exhausted because the categories of beings are infinite in number. As long as beings 
continue to exist, the activity carried out by the Buddhas is never interrupted. That is why 
the dharmakaya is proclaimed to be eternal. 

v) Acintyalaksana. It has inconceivability as nature. The faculty of conceiving (cintana) 
is an imagining cognition (savikalpakajhana), coming from reasoning ( yukti ), meditation 
(nidhydna) and mental engagement ( manasikara ); it is the result ( samgrhita ) of 
speculation (tarka) and may be illustrated by comparisons (drstanta). The Buddhas are 
not grasped (gocara) by it; that is why they are inconceivable. Since they transcend 
(samatikram-) all stages of speculation ( tarkabhumi ), one can adhere to them only by 
means of faith ( sraddhadhimukti ); one cannot conceive of them (cintana).' 1 ' (U) 


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4. How is this dharmakaya attained ( adhigata ) for the first time ( prathamam ) by 
contact ( sparsa )? 

i) By means of nonconceptual knowledge ( nirvikalpakajhdna ) and subsequent 
knowledge ( tatprsthalabdhajhdna ) of the syncretic dharmas of the Greater 
Vehicle (m ah ay an a-samsrstadh arm dlambaka), by means of the fivefold 
cultivation (pahcavidhabhdvand). 

ii) By means of fivefold development {pancavidhabhdvana). 

iii) By means of the gathering of the accumulations (samb haras ant cay a) in all 
the bhumis. 

iv) By means of the diamond-like samadhi {vajropamasamddhi) which serves 
to break ( bhid -) the subtle obstacles ( suksntdvarana ) that are so difficult to 
break {durbheda). Immediately after (< an an tar ant ) this samadhi, one is freed 
of all the obstacles (dvarana). 

By these means the transformation of the support ( dsraya-pardvrtti ) is obtained. 

[149b28] 


4. Comm. Bh 371cl0-14, bh missing, U 437b26-437cl0, u 335b 1 -7. 

“Adherence by means of faith (sraddhadhimukti) itself is the first acquisition of the 
dharmakaya, likewise the practice of the Dharma ( dharmacarya ). In order to exclude 
them, the author speaks of the actual acquisition [ace. to u: acquisition by contact 
(, sparsadhigama )] of the dharmakaya. He speaks only about acquiring the dharmakaya 
and not about its production ( upapatti ) because the dharmakaya is eternal ( nitya ) in 
nature. Bearing on the syncretic dharmas of the Greater Vehicle : the meaning is easy to 
understand (cf. chap. Ill, § 12). The fivefold development the five aspects are non-arising 
{anutpada), unceasing ( anirodha ), calm from the beginning ( adisanti ), being nirvanized 
in essence ( prakrtiparinirvrti ) and absence of nature (nihsvabhava) (cf. chap. II, § 30). 
This fivefold development, syncretic cultivation (samsrstabhdvana), etc. (cf. chap. V, § 
4), realizes ( nispadayati ) five results (phala ): 


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(1) the melting at each moment of the base of all the imperfections ( pratiksanam 
sarvadausthulyasrayam dravayati ); 

(2) the suppression of numerous notions and thus pleasure in the garden of the Dharma 
(nandtvasamjndvigatim ca dharmaramaratim pratilabhate ); 

(3) the complete understanding of the Dharma's brilliance in its immense and unlimited 
aspect ( aparicchinndkdram ca sarvato 'pramanam dharmavabhasam samjanite ); 

(4) the appearance of the marks, the auxiliaries of purity, non-imagined ( avikalpitani 
casya visuddhibhagvyani nimittani samudacaranti ); 

(5) the taking possession of the ever most perfect cause for the perfecting and 
achievement of the dharmakaya ( dharmakaya-paripuriparinispattaye ca uttarad 
uttaratam hetusamparigraham karoti ) (cf. chap. V, § 4; Sutralamkara, XX-XXI, 31). 

The diamond-like samadhi that serves to break subtle obstacles that are so difficult to 
break: this gives the reason why this concentration is like a diamond. Just as the diamond 
( vajra ), hard ( drdha ) by nature, is able to break things {bind-) that are difficult to break 
(i durbheda ), in the same way this concentration surpasses the lower categories and is able 
to demarcate the supreme pure path of knowledge (anuttara visuddhajndnamarga ) ; this is 
why it is like a diamond. [Ace. to u: this concentration, which breaks the non-defiled 
ignorance so difficult to break by the other knowledges, is the anantaryamarga (cf. Kosa, 
V, p. vii) of knowledge; this is why it is like a diamond.] Since immediately after this 
concentration one is rid of all the obstacles, one acquires the transformation of the basis: 
by means of nonconceptual knowledge ( nirvikalpakajhana ) and subsequent knowledge 
( prsthalabdhajnana ), one acquires the transformation of the basis and one attains the 
dharmakaya of the Buddhas.” (U) 


5. By how many masteries (vibhutva) does the dharmakaya acquire sovereignty? 
In brief (samasatah), it acquires it in five ways (pancavidha): 

i) By the transformation of the form aggregate ( rupaskandha-paravrtti ), it 
acquires sovereignty over the buddha fields ( ksetra ), the body ( kdya ), the 
marks ( laksana ), the minor marks ( anuvyahjana ), infinite phonemes 
( anantarasvara ), the invisible cranial marks ( adristam urdh alaksan a) . 


374 



ii) By the transformation of the sensation aggregate ( vedand - 
skandhapardvrtti), it acquires sovereignty over the blissful abodes 

( sukhavihdra ), irreproachable ( niravadya ), immense ( apramdna ) and vast 
(visdla). 

iii) By the transformation of the perception aggregate 

( samjndskandhapardvrtti ), it acquires the sovereign power of explaining every 
collection of words ( ndmdkdya ), collection of phrases (padakdya ) and 
collection of phonemes (vyanjanakdya). 

iv) By the transformation of the formations aggregate 

( samskdraskandhapardvrtti ), it acquires sovereignty over creation ( nirmdna ), 
transformation (parindma ), the reunion of assemblies {parsatsamgraha ) and 
accumulation of white dharmas ( sukladharmasamgraha ). 

v) By the transformation of the consciousness aggregate 
(vijndnaskandhapardvritti), it acquires sovereignty over the mirror-like 
knowledge ( ddarsajndna ), the knowledge of sameness ( samatajndna ), the 
knowledge of contemplation (pratyaveksanajndna ) and the knowledge of the 
accomplishment of what had to be done ( krtydnusthdna-jndna ). [149c7] 


5. Comm. Bh 371c23-372a22, bh missing, U 437cl8-438a26, u 335b7-336b4. 

“By transformation of the five aggregates ( pancaskandhaparavrtti ), five sovereignties are 
acquired. The sravakas, etc., fearful of suffering ( duhkhabhaya ), cut through ( samucchid - 
) the aggregates ( skandha ) like a foolish leper (bala kusthin ) who destroys (jahati ) the 
life of his own body ( kayajTvita ) himself. But the bodhisattvas who are endowed with 
means ( parigrhTtopdya ) destroy the blameful aggregates ( savadyarupadiskandha ), form, 
etc., by transfonnation, and acquire the blameless aggregates ( niravadyarupadiskandha ) 
by transformation, like a wise leper (patu kustiri) who looks for a good remedy ( osadi ), 
transfonns his sick body ( amayavikaya ) and gets a healthy body ( niramayakaya ). 

i) By means of transformation of the form aggregate, 


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(a) it acquires the sovereign power of manifesting the buddha-fields 
( buddhaksetrasamdarsana ) for, in accordance with the wishes ( yathakamam ) of beings, it 
manifests buddha-fields in gold ( suvarna ), silver ( rajata ), etc.; 

(b) it acquires the sovereign power of manifesting its own body (svakava) for, in 
accordnce with the aspirations, it manifests in all kinds of great assemblies 
( parsanmandala ) in conformity with the individual capacities ( bhavyatavisesa ) of the 
beings who are to be disciplined ( vineyasattva ); 

(c) it acquires the sovereign power of manifesting the major marks ( Iaksana ) and 
minor marks ( anuvyanjana ) for, according to wishes {yathakamam ), it manifests all the 
major marks and minor marks (cf. below, § 16); 

{d) it acquires the twofold sovereign power of manifesting infinite sounds 
(anatarasvara) and invisible marks of the head ( adrstamurdhalaksana ), for the sounds of 
the Buddha have an infinite range (cf. Hobogirin, art. Button, p. 215), and its cranial 
marks are invisible (cf. Hobogirin, art. Buccho, p. 148). 

ii) By means of the transformation of the sensation aggregate, it acquires sovereignty 
over the blissful abodes, irreproachable, immense and vast. These abodes are 
irreproachable because they are free of afflictions (. klesa ); they are immense because 
there are many of them; they are vast because they surpass ( atikram -) all the pleasures of 
the three worlds (traidhatukasukha). 

iii) By means of the transformation of the discrimination aggregate, it acquires the 
sovereign power of expressing all the collections of words, phrases and phonemes. (Cf. 
Kosa, II, p. 238). Ideas have, as self-nature ( svabhava ), the grasping of characteristics 
( nimittagrahana , cf. chap. II, § 16). With such an accumulation ( sambhara ) as cause, by 
means of the transformation it acquires this special power (prabhavavisesa) thanks to 
which it possesses mastery over the collections of words, etc., according to wishes 
( yathakamam ). [Bh: The grasping of characteristics is called perception. It is by means of 
the collections of words, etc., that the characteristics are grasped. By changing the defiled 
discrimination aggregate ( klistasamjha-skandha ), the pure discrimination aggregate 
{yisuddhasamjhdskandha ) is attained]. 

iv) By means of the fonnations aggregate, it acquires sovereignty over creation, 
transfonnation, reunion of assemblies and accumulation of white dharmas. Volition 


376 



(< cetana ) occupies the prime place in the formations aggregate ( samskaraskandha ). By 
means of this volition, sovereignty over creation, etc., can exist. 

(a) Sovereignty over creation ( nirmanavibhutva ) consists of creating ( nirma -) 
according to wishes (yathakamam). 

(b) Sovereignty over transformation ( parinamavibhutva ) consists of transforming 
things according to wishes, earth into gold, etc. (cf. chap. I, § 60; chap. II, § 14). 

(c) Sovereignty over reunion of assemblies ( parsatsamgraha-vibhutva ) consists of 
reuniting great assemblies of gods ( deva ), etc., according to aspirations ( yathasayam ). 

(d) Sovereignty over accumulation of white dharmas 
(sukladarmasamgrahavibhutva) brings it about that the pure dharmas ( anasravadharma ) 
may be present (sammukha) according to aspirations ( yathasayam ). 

v) By means of the transformation of the eightfold consciousness aggregate, store- 
consciousness ( dlayavijhana ), etc., it acquires the four marvelous knowledges: the 
mirror-cognition, etc. According to the order ( yathakramam ) and the possibilities 
(yathayogam), the transformation of the store-consciousness affirms the mirror-like 
knowledge ( adarsajhana ): even though the objects that are known ( vijhatavisaya ) may 
not be present ( abhimukha ), it cannot forget them ( mus -); it is not limited in time and 
space. It is always free of error ( amudha ) in respect to all objects (sarvavisaya). 
Functioning without concepts ( nirvikalpa ), it is able to enjoy ( sambhuj -) images ( bimba ) 
perceived by the wisdom of the Buddha. 

The transfonnation of the afflicted manas ( klistamanas , cf. chap. I, § 6) affirms the 
cognition of equality (samatdjndna). This cognition, having as its object the sameness of 
all beings, is acquired at the first moment of full understanding of the truths 
(i abhisamaya ), i.e., at the start of the path of seeing or darsanamarga, cf. chap. Ill, § 1 1); 
then it is transfonned and purified in the course of the path of meditation 
(bhdvandmdrgdvastha). From that, it is established in non-abiding nirvana 
( apra tisth item ir vdna ) . Ever endowed with great loving-kindness ( mahamaitri ) and great 
compassion ( mahakaruna ), it manifests images of the Buddha ( buddhabimba ) in accord 
with aspirations (yathasayam ). 


377 



The transformation of the mental consciousness ( manovijnana ) assures the knowledge of 
contemplation {pratyaveksandjnana ). Endowed with all the samadhi- and 
dharanhnukhas, it is like a treasury of jewels ( ratnakosa ); it manifests all the sovereign 
activities in the great assemblies; it is able to cut through doubt ( samsayachedana ) and 
cause the rain of Dharma ( dharmavarsa ) to fall. The transformation of the live 
consciousnesses assures the cognition of the accomplishment of duty 
( krtydnusthanajnana ); in all the universes ( lokadhatu ) situated in the ten directions 
(dasadis) , it manifests creations ( nirmana ) beginning with the going forth from the divine 
palace of the Tusitas ( tusitabhavana ) up to attaining nirvana (cf. above, chap. X, § 1); it 
accomplishes its activity dedicated to the service of all beings ( sarvasattvarthakriya ).” 
(U) 


6. Of how many things is the dharmakaya the basis ( asraya )? - In brief, it is the 
support of three things: 

i) It is the support of the various abodes of Buddha ( ndndbuddhavihdra ). 
Here are some stanzas: 

(a) Since the Buddhas have attained ( samprapya ) their own element 

( svadhdtu ), they have gained the fivefold satisfaction ( tusti ). Those who 
have not attained this element are deprived of satisfaction. That is why 
those who desire this satisfaction must acquire this element. 

(b) The power and accomplishment of duty ( krtydnusthdna ), the flavor of 
the texts ( dharmarasa ), the perfection of theses ( arthasampad) and the 
perfection of the qualities (gunasampad) are immense ( aprameya ). Seeing 
these ever non-perishable benefits ( nityaksaya ), the Buddhas gain 
supreme (vara) irreproachable (niravadya) satisfaction. 

ii) It is the support of the various bodies of enjoyment ( nandsambhogakaya ), 
for it assures the maturing (paripdcana ) of the bodhisattvas. 

iii) It is the support of the various apparitional bodies (ndndnirmdnakdya), 
for it assures the maturation mainly {pray end) of the sravakas. [149c 15] 


378 



6. Comm. Bh 372b2-372c7, bh missing, U 438b6-438cl5, u 336b4-337b5. 

“Of how many things is the dharmakaya the basis ? The author asks of how many 
dharmas is the dharmakaya the basis. In brief, it is the basis of three things : in general, it 
is the basis of innumerable qualities ( apramanaguna ), but now, in particular, it is said 
that it is the basis of three things: 

i) It is the support of the various buddha abodes : the dharmakaya, attained by the 
Tathagata, serves as basis for all kinds of abodes ( sukhavihdra ), divyavihara, aryavihara 
and brahmavihara. Among the divyaviharas, the Tathagatas dwell especially ( bahulam 
viharanti ) in the fourth dhyana; among the aryaviharas, they dwell especially in the door 
of deliverance called emptiness ( sunyatavimoksamukha); among the bramaviharas they 
dwell especially in compassion ( karuna ). These different abodes of the Tathagatas 
surpass those of the sravakas, etc., and in order to show that the nirvana attained by the 
Tathagata surpasses the nirvana attained by the sravakas, etc., the author says: The 
Buddhas have gained the fivefold satisfaction, etc., because they have acquired their own 
element, their own fundamental element ( svadharmadhdtu ). They have properly realized 
it by cultivating the counteragent (pratipaksabhavana) to the afflictions and wrong 
views: that is why they have acquired it correctly (samprapya). Those who have not 
acquired this element lack satisfaction-, the Tathagatas who have acquired their own 
fundamental element abide in joy ( sukham viharanti) in the five satisfactions 
( pahcatusti ); but the sravakas, etc., who go to nirvana as to a beheading (sirascheda), are 
deprived of this higher satisfaction. That is why those who desire this satisfaction must 
acquire this element the bodhisattas who eagerly seek the five satisfactions must secure 
( samudagama ) this real fundamental element. What is this fivefold satisfacion that they 
seek? The author then explains [in verse (b)]: 

The power and accomplishing of duty, the flavor of the texts, etc. The satisfactions differ 
because their causes ( hetu ) differ. 

(a) Power ( anubhava ) means capability ( sakti ). Surpassing the numberless grains of sand 
of the Ganges (apramdnagahgdvdlukdti-krdnta), the powers of the Buddhas and the 
Tathagatas equally depend on the dharmakaya; they are syncretic (mixed together?) 
(samsrsta), equal (sama) and without differences ( abhinna ). The Buddhas have 
satisfaction seeing the immensity of this power. 


379 



(b) And the accomplishment of duty (krtyanusthanam ca). Here the word and indicates an 
enumeration ( casabdah samuccayarthah). Duty ( krtya ) means action ( kriya ), the activity 
consisting of procuring the benefit of all beings ( sarvasattvarthakriya ) by establishing 
them suitably ( samyakprasthapana ) and according to their capabilities ( yathakalpam ) in 
the three vehicles (yanatraya ). Accomplishment (anusthana) means realization 
(sadhana). This accomplishment of what has to be done goes on without any obstacle 
(apratigham) for an immense length of time. Seeing that their power and the 
accomplishing of what has to be done are immense ( aprameya ), the Buddhas have great 
satisfaction. 

(c) The flavor of the texts ( dharmarasa ), i.e., the supreme flavor of the Dharma 

( anuttaradharmarasa ), such as the sutras, etc. This concerns the flavor of the arguments 
( yuktirasa ) that are tasted in realizing the absolute truth ( paramarthasatya ). 

(d) The perfecting of theses (arthasampad)'. the theses explained ( abhidheyartha ) in the 
texts, sutras, etc., are all perfect, for they appear according to aspirations (yathasayam 
avabhasante). 

(e) The perfecting of qualities ( gunasampad ):, that is, the perfection of qualities such as 
the superknowledges ( abhijha ), etc. They gain great satisfaction in seeing the immensity 
of the flavor of the texts, the immensity of the perfecting of the theses and of the 
qualities. 

Furthermore, some say that the word artha [translated here as thesis] means nirvana and 
that the gunas are the faculties that arise at will. Their perfection also produces a great 
satisfaction. 

Seeing these ever-unperishing advantages, the Buddhas gain supreme and 
irreproachable satisfaction-, the Tathagatas see the unique flavor of the true nature 
(tathataikarasa), the great satisfaction resulting from their immense power, etc., in 
themselves. Even if they enter into nirvana, all of this will never perish. This is why their 
satisfaction is supreme (vara) and irreproachable ( niravadya ); supreme because the 
obstacle of the defilements and the obstacle to knowledge ( klesajheyavarana ) along with 
their traces (savasana) have been completely cut off ( prahina ). 

ii) It is the basis of the various enjoyment bodies: the bodies of enjoyment (nirmanakaya, 
sic: sambhogakaya) exist with the dharmakaya as ruling condition ( adhipatipratyaya ). 


380 



That is why the dharmakaya is called basis, but not in the way that the sun ( surya ) is the 
basis of the rays ( rasmi ). [In u, the negative is missing: de ni hi ma dan hod zer gyi tshul 
Ita bu yin no = suryarasmiyogena], 

iii) Likewise, it is the basis of the apparitional bodies ( nirmanakaya ): it is the same thing. 
It ensures the maturation of the sravakas mainly. The author says mainly (prayena) in 
order to include the bodhisattvas of the level where convinced adherence is practiced 
(adhimukticaryabhumi). Being of weak aspiration ( hinddhimuktika ), the sravakas do not 
mature if they do not see (read li kien in place of souei kien) the Buddha’s apparitional 
body; it is the same for beginning bodhisattvas ( adhikarmikabodhisattva ). But the 
bodhisattvas who have already entered onto the great bhumis have no need of seeing the 
Buddha's apparitional body in order to be ripened, because they themselves penetrate 
( pratividhyanti ) the vast and profound Dharma ( gambhiravipuladharma ). (U) 


7. By how many Buddha attributes ( buddhadharma ) is the dharmakaya 
constituted (lit. grasped: samgrhlta )? - In brief, it conists of six kinds of 
attributes: 

i) The attribute of purity ( visuddhi ), for it is by transforming the store- 
consciousness ( dlayavijhdna ) that the dharmakaya is obtained. 

ii) The attribute of retribution ( vipdka ), for it is by transforming the material 
organs (rupindriya) that the knowledge of retribution ( vipdkajndna ) is 
obtained. 

iii) The attribute of abode ( vihara ), for it is by transforming the abodes such 
as the life of pleasure, etc. ( kdmacaryddivihdra ) that the abode of immense 
knowledge (a pram an ajhan a vihara) is obtained. 

iv) The attribute of sovereignty ( vibhutva ), for it is by transforming the 
various profitable actions ( nandparigraha-karman ) that the sovereignty 
consisting of abhijna unimpeded in all the universes ( sarvalokadhatasv 
apratihatam abhijndjnanam) is obtained. 

v) The attribute of conduct ( vyavahara ), for the sovereignty consisting of a 
knowledge that charms the minds of all beings 


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{sarvasattvacittasam tosanan irdesajn ana) is obtained by transforming conduct, 
i.e., that which is seen heard, felt, understood 
(i drstasrutamatavijhatavyavahara , cf. chap. II, § 16). 

vi) By the attribute of expelling ( samudghdta ), for the knowledge that drives 
away the torments and faults of all beings 

(, sarvasattvopadravadosasamudghatajnana ) is obtained by transforming all the 
torments ( iipadrdva ) and faults ( dosa ). 

The dharmakaya consists ( samgrhlta ) of these six Buddha attributes. [149c25] 


7. Comm. Bh 372cl8-373al0, bh missing, U 438c25-439al9. u 337b5-338a6. 

“It is a matter here of the self-nature of the dharmakaya. The author explains the 
constitution the self-nature of the dharmakaya. 

i) Visuddhi. The Buddha attribute of ’purity' constitutes (, samgrnati ) the self-nature of the 
dharmakaya, because the dharmakaya is pure by nature. What purifies it, what transforms 
it so that it is pure? Replying to this question, the author says: By transforming the store- 
consciousness. The store-consciousness appropriates ( upadadati ) all the defiled seeds 
(samklesikabija). When its counteragent arises (pratipaksa ), it suppresses all the defiled 
seeds by transformation and it acquires confonnity with all the perfections ( paripuri ) and 
irreproachable ( niravadya ) qualities ( guna ) by transfonnation. In the same way, in the 
world, medicine ( agada ) is able to change a sick person ( amayavin ) into a healthy person 
(niramaya), and that is why transfonnation (revolution) is spoken of here. 

ii) Vipaka. The Buddha attribute of 'retribution' consitutes the self-nature of the 
dharmakaya. By transforming the material organs, i.e., the organs endowed with matter, 
such as the eye, etc., the knowledge of retribution is acquired. Since that which was 
abandoned by transformation was 'of retribution’, that which is acquired by 
transfonnation is, likewise, metaphorically ( prajhapti ) 'of retribution’. By the example of 
the material organs 'of retribution’ formerly obtained, the real knowledge actually 
obtained is also metaphorically called 'of retribution’ ( vipdkajhdna). 

iii) Vihara. The Buddha attribute of 'abode' consitutes the self-nature of the dharmakaya. 
In the phrase: by changing the abodes such as the life of pleasure, etc., the word etc. 


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serves to include the practice of convinced adherence ( adhimukticarya ), etc. By 
transfonning them, the knowledge that pacifies and suppresses the torments ( upadrava ) 
of all beings is acquired. [Ace. to u: by transforming them, the knowledge of the abodes 
( viharajnana ) is acquired. For the abode of immense knowledge is acquired by means of 
which one resides in the various abodes ( nanavihara ) such as divyavihara, etc.]. 

iv) Vibhutva. The Buddha attribute of 'sovereignty' constitutes the self-nature of the 
dharmakaya. Profitable actions ( parigrahakarman ) are commerce ( vanijya ), agriculture 
(krsikar manta), royal affairs ( rajakarman ), etc. By transfonning them, the sovereignty of 
unhindered superknowledges ( apratihatabhijha ) is acquired. 

v) Vyavahara. The Buddha attribute of 'conduct' constitutes the self-nature of the 
dharmakaya. By transfonning worldly conduct ( laukikadrstddi vya vahdra), sovereignty 
over what is seen, heard, felt, understood ( drstasrutamatavijhatavibhutva ) is acquired. By 
means of that, the wonderful knowledge which channs the minds of all beings is 
acquired. 

vi) Samudghata. The Buddha attribute of 'expulsion' consitutes the self-nature of the 
dharmakaya. The torments, etc.: e.g., sadness ( daurmanasya ), suffering ( duhkha ) 
inflicted by a king's court ( rajakula ), etc., in the world. They can be pacified ( santa ) by 
friends ( suhrd) or by wealth ( dhana ). In the same way, here the wonderful knowledge 
that pacifies all torments and all the faults of all beings is acquired by transformoing 
these torments. By transfonnation, these six worldly attributes ( lokadharma ) are 
abandoned and, by transformation, these six Buddha attributes are acquired 
( buddhadharma ).” (U) 


8. Should we say that the Buddha Bhagavats are different ( bhinna ), or should we 
say that they are identical ( abhinna )? 

Since their bases ( asraya ), their intentions ( abhiprdya ) and their actions ( karman ) 
are identical, it may be said that the dharmakayas are identical. But since 
numberless individuals ( apramdnakmaya ) reach enlightenment 
(< abhisambudhyante ), it may be said that the dharmakayas are different. What is 
said about the darmakayas is equally true for the bodies of enjoyment 
(, sambhogakdya ). Since their intentions ( abhiprdya ) and their actions ( karman ) 


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are identical, the sambhogakayas are identical. But since their bases (as ray a) are 
different, the sambhogakayas are different for they exist in numberless supports. 

It is the same for the apparitional bodies (nirmanakayd) as for the bodies of 
enjoyment. [150a2] 


8. Comm. 373al7-22, bh missing, U 439a25-439b6, u 338a6-338b3. 

“Since their bases, their intentions and their actions are identical, the darmakayas of the 
Buddhas are identical. Since the true nature ( tathata ) of the Buddhas is identical, their 
bases ( asraya ) are identical. Since all have the same intention of working for the benefit 
and happiness of all beings (sarvasattvahitasukha), their intentions ( abhipraya ) are 
identical. Since all accomplish various activities likewise for the welfare of others 
( parahita ) mainly, such as attaining enlightenment ( abhisambodhi ), entry into 
parinirvana, etc., their actions ( karman ) are identical (cf. chap. II, no. 4). But since 
numberless individuals reach enlightenment, it must be said that the dharmakayas are 
different: Since, in numberless different individuals, the bodhisattvas become Buddhas, 
the dharmakayas are not different as has been explained at length above (chap. X, § 3, no. 
3). 

What is said about the dharmakayas is also true for the bodies of enjoyment. The author 
asserts that in the sambhogakaya, the intentions ( abhipraya ) and the actions ( karman ) are 
identical, but he denies that the bases (asraya) are the same, for there are innumerable 
kinds of bases. Indeed, in each different universe (lokadhatu), the assembly 
( parsanmandala ), the expression (adhivacana), the size of the body (kayapramana), the 
major marks ( laksana ) and the minor marks (anuvyahjana), the enjoyment of the flavor 
of the Dhanna ( dharmarasasambhoga ), etc., are special to each. And it is the same for 
the apparitional bodies (nirmanakayd) of the Buddhas.” (U) 


9. With how many qualities (guna ) is the dharmakaya associated ( samprayukta )? 
- It is associated with the very pure (parisuddha ) qualities, which are: 

(1) the four immeasurables ( apramdna ), 

(2) the eight liberations (vimoksa). 


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(3) the eight sovereign views of the object ( abhibhvayatana ), 

(4) the ten totalities of the object ( krtsnayatana ), 

(5) the power of preventing the arising of defilement in another ( arand ), 

(6) the knowledge resulting from resolve ( pranidhijnana ). 

(7) the four liberated knowledges (pratisamvid ), 

(8) the six superknowledges ( abhijnd ), 

(9) the thirty-two marks of the Great Man ( mahapurusalaksana ), 

(10) the eighty-four minor marks ( anuvyanjana ), 

(11) the four omniform (?) purities (sarvakaraparisuddi), 

(12) the ten powers (bald), 

(13) the four fearlessnesses (vaisdradyd), 

(14) the three things not requiring secrecy ( araksya ), 

(15) the three equanimities ( smrtyupasthdna ), 

(16) the complete destruction of the propensities ( vdsandsamudghdta ), 

(17) unfailing memory (asammosata), 

(18) great compassion ( mahdkarund ), 

(19) the eighteen unique attributes of the Buddha ( dvenika buddhadharma), 

(20) universal knowledge ( sarvdkdrajnatd ), 

(21) fulfillment of the six virtues ( paramitaparipuri ). [150a7] 

9. Comm. Bh silent , bh missoing, U 439bl2-440bl, u 338b3-340b6. 

“Here the author explains the pure excellences (visesa) and qualities (guna) of the 
Buddha Bhagavats which are also found amongst the sravakas, etc. They are very pure 
( parisuddha ), and this shows that these qualities arise amongst those who have cut off the 
obstacle of the defilements and the obstacle to knowledege ( klesajneydvarana ). The 
epithet 'very pure' should be applied to each of the qualities enumerated in § 9. 


385 



(1) The four apramanas: loving kindness (maitri), compassion {koruna), joy 
( mudita ) and equanimity ( upeksa ) which have as their object an infinite number 
of beings (apramanas attva) (cf. below, § 10). 

(2) The vimoksas: the eight vimoksas: rupi rupani pasyati, etc. (cf. § 1 1). 

(3) The abhibhvayatanas: the eight abhibhvayatanas (cf. § 1 1). 

(4) The krtsnayatanas: the ten krtsnayatanas (cf. § 1 1). 

(5-6) The arana and the pranidhijnana are identical (!) (cf. § 12 and 13). 

(7) The four pratisamvids: dharmapratisamvid, arthapratisamvid, 

niruktipratisamvid, pratibhanapratisamvid (cf. § 14 and above, chap. V, § 2, no. 

9). 

(8) The six abhijnas, from rddhyabhijna up to asravaksayajnana. (cf. § 15). 

(9) The thirty-two mahapurusalaksanas, such as cakrankitahastapadah, etc. (cf. § 
16 and the Notes). 

(10) The eighty anuvyanjanas, such as tunganasah, etc. (cf. § 16 and the Notes). 

(11) The four sarvakaraparisuddhis: asrayaparisuddhi, alambanaparisuddhi, 
cittaparisuddhi. jnanaparisuddhi. (cf. § 17). 

(12) The ten balas: 

i. the power consisting of the knowledge of the possible and the impossible 
( stdndsthdnajndnabala ); 

ii. the power consisting of the knowledge of the retribution of actions 
(karmavipdkajndnabala); 

Hi. the power of the knowledge of the dhyanas, the concentrations and the 
meditative stabilizations (dhydnavimoksa-samddhisamdpattijndnabala); 

iv. the power of the knowledge of the extent of the moral faculties of beings 
(indriyapardparajndnabala); 

v. the power of the awareness of the various aspirations of beings 
(ndnddhimuktijndnabala); 


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vi. the power of the knowledge of the various dispositions acquired by beings 
( nanadhatujnanabala ); 

vii. the power of the knowledge of the paths leading to the various destinies 
(. sarvatragdmimpratipajjndnabala ); 

viii. the power of the knowledge of fonner abodes ( purvanivdsajndnabala ); 

ix. the power of the knowledge of the death and rebirth of beings 
(< cyutyupapadajnanabala ); 

x. the power of the knowledge of the destruction of the defilements 
( asravaksayajhanabala ). 

(13) The four vaisaradyas: 

i. The Buddha Bhagavat himself truly asserted (cf. Anguttara, II, p. 8-9; 
Kosavyakhya, p. 645 30 seq.): "I am truly enlightened and if anyone objects that I 
have not clarified such and such dharmas, I find no validity in this criticism." This 
is the first fearlessness ( samyaksambbuddhasya bata me sata dharma 
anabhisambuddhaity atra me kascic .... codayet, tatraham nimittam api na 
samanupasyami. idam prathamam vaisaradyam). 

ii. He truly said: "I have truly destroyed the impurities, and if someone 
objects that such and such impurities have not been destroyed by me, I find no 
validity in this criticism." This is the second fearlessness ( ksmasravasya bata me 
sata ime asrava aprahma ity atra me kascih .... codayet, tatraham nimittam api 
ma mananupasyami. idam dvitvyam vaisraradyam). 

Hi. He truly said: "I have preached to the sravakas the path of escape from 
suffering, and if anyone objects that this path, the practice of which does not lead 
to the final suppression of suffering, I find no validity in this criticism." This is 
the third fearlessness (yo va punar may a sravakanam marga akhyato .... 
nairyanikah ...., tatkarasya samyakduhkhaqksayaya .... sa na niryasyatity atra 
main kascic .... codayet, tatraham nimittam api na samanipasyami. idam trtvyam 
vaisaradyam). 

iv. He truly said: "To the sravakas I have revealed the dharmas that 
present an obstacle to the path and if anyone objects that these dharmas, which 


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should be abandoned, do not constitute an obstacle, I find no validity in this 
criticism." This is the fourth fearlessness (ye vd punar maya sravakdndm 
antarayika dharma akhydtah. tan pratisevamanasya nalam anatardyayety atra 
mam kascic .... codayet, tatraham apt na samanupasyami. idain caturtham 
vaisaradyam). 

Not finding any validity in these criticisms ( nimittam asamanupasyan) on these four 
points, the Buddha gained great confidence (ksemaprapta) and dispelled all fear by 
himself (abhayaprapta). (cf. § 19) 

(14) The three araksyas (for the orthography, see Notes). - [Ace. to 
Sanghisuttanata, DTgha, III, p. 217; Samgrtisutra, R. Hoernle, Manuscript Remains of 
Buddhist Literature found in E. Turkestan, Oxford, 1916, p. 21 and 23], the Tathagata has 
very pure physical conduct; he does not have any physical conduct that he must hide for 
fear that somebody should come to learn about it. This is the first araksya. 

( parisuddhakayasamudacarah tathagatah, nasti tathagatasya kayaduscaritam yat 
tathagah praticchadayet kascin me pare na vijaniyuh. idam prathamam asaksamyam). 
What has been said about physical conduct ( kayakarman ) is also valid for the vocal 
action ( vakkarman ) and the mental action ( manaskarman ; thus there are three araksyas 
(cf. § 20). 

(15) The three smrtyupasthanas (ace. to Majjhima, III, p. 221; Kosavyakkhya, p. 
646 34 seq). When the Tathagata preaches the Dharma ..., some listeners listen 
respectfully, lend an ear, establish the mind of perfect knowledge and seize upon the path 
of truth. Nevertheless, the Tathagata feels neither contentment nor satisfaction nor 
jubilation towards them (ilia tathagato dharmam desayati ... tasya te sravakah 
susrusante, srotam avadadhati, ajndcittam upasthapayanti, pratipadyante 
dharmasydnudharmam prati ... ten a tathagatasya na nandi bhavati, na saumanasyam na 
cetasa utplavitatvam). Other listeners do not listen respectfully, etc.; nevertheless, the 
Tathagata feels no hostility or impatience or discontentment towards them (tasya te 
sravakah na susrusanta iti vistarah. tena tathagatasya naghato bhavati naksantir 
napratyayo na cetaso 'nabhiraddhih). Still others both listen repectfully and do not listen 
respectfully, etc.: the Tathagata feels neither contentment nor hostility towards them; in 
regard to all of them, he is settled in equanimity (tasya te sravakah susrusante naiva 


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susrusanta iti vistarah. tena tathagatasya na nadi bhavati naghato bhavati. upeksakas 
tatra tathagato viharati smrtah samprajanan) (cf. § 20.) 

(16) Vasanasamudghata. - This is to have completely destroyed the signs of 
afflictions ( klesadrisacesta ) that remain even when there are no more afflictions, e.g., the 
habit of jumping about like a monkey, etc. (cf. § 21, the example of Maudalyayana). 

(17) Asammosata. - This is correct memory (smrti) and knowledge ( jnana ); not 
wasting time in which one could be of service to beings (sattvarthakriydkalanatikrama) 
(cf. § 22). 

(18) Mahakaruna. - This is to aspire for the welfare of all beings 
(sakalaj anahitasayata) (cf. § 23). 

(19) The eighteen avenika buddhadharmas. - Avenika, unique, has the meaning of 
exclusiveness ( asadharana ). 

i. The Tathagata does not misstep (ndsti tathagatasya skhalitam ). On the 
contrary, even though he has destroyed his impurities ( ksinasrava ), the arhat, when he 
goes out to a town to beg his food ( pindapata ), sometimes meets ( samagacchati ) a wild 
elephant {has tin), a wild horse (asva), a wild bull (go) or a wild dog ( kukkura ); 
sometimes he treads on sharp thorns {gall var aka n taka ) underfoot and jumps with both 
feet together onto a venomous snake; sometimes he enters a house ( grha ) and the 
townswomen ( mdtrgrdma ) speak to him in an inappropriate way; sometimes in the forest, 
he loses the right path and takes a wrong path; sometimes he meets up with brigands 
( amitracaura ), madmen ( svapada ) or married women (parakalatra ), etc. All these 
missteps ( skhalita ) of this type which occur to the arhat do not occur for the Buddhas. 

ii. The Tathagata does not shout (ndsti ravitam). On the contrary, the 
arhat who walks in the forest ( aranya ) and loses his way, or who enters an empty house 
(tyaktagrha) raises his voice, calls out and utters loud cries ( ravita ). Or even, as a result 
of deep-rooted ( vasanadosa ) but non-defded ( aklista ) habits, he opens his lips, uncovers 
his teeth and bursts out into laughter ( hasya ). All these squallings ( ravita ) of this kind 
that occur among the arhats do not occur among the Buddhas. 


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Hi. The Tathagata has an infallible memory (ndsti musita smrtih). On the 
other hand, the arhat, even though he is stainless, forgets what he has done or what he has 
said a long time ago.. The Buddhas forget nothing. 

iv. The Tathagata has no notion of multiplicity (ndsti nanatvasamjna). On 
the other hand, the arhat produces exclusively ( ekanena ) the notion of disgust 
( pratikulasamjhd ) with respect to nirvana-with-residue ( sopadhisesanirvana ); with 
respect to nirvana-without-residue ( nirupadhisesanirvana ) he produces exclusively the 
notion of calmness (santasamjna). With regard to both sopadhisesanirvana and 
nirupadhisesanirvana the Tathagata produces the notion of identity ( abhedasamjha ) and 
is established in supreme equanimity ( upeksa ). 

v. The Tathagata does not have an unconcentrated mind ( nasty 
asamahitam cittam). On the the other hand, the arhat concentrates his mind in order to 
enter into absorption and, when he emerges from it, ( vyutthita ) he is not longer 
concentrated. In every state ( avastha ), the Tathagata does not have an unconcentrated 
mind. 

vi. The Tathagata has no ill-considered renunciation ( nasty 

apratisamkhydyopeksa). The arhat practices equanimity without considering the welfare 
of beings (sattvartha) by means of his intelligece ( mati ). The Tathagata has no ill- 
considered equanimity (apratisamkhyayopeksa) of this kind. 

vii - xii. The Tathagata does not experience the six losses, loss of zeal, etc. 
(< chandadihani ). On the contrary, in the purification of the obstacle to knowledge 
( jheyavaranaparisuddi ), the arhat experiences failure ( aprapti ) and losses ( hani ): loss of 
zeal (chanda), energy ( virya ), memory ( smrti ), concentration ( samadhi ), wisdom (prajna) 
and liberation ( vimukti ). These six losses do not occur with the Buddhas. 

xiii-xv.- In the Tathagata, physical, vocal and mental actions are preceded 
by knowledge and are in accord with knowledge (kayavagmanas karma 

jnanapurvamgamam jhdndnuparivarti). On the other hand, the arhat sometimes has good 
(kusala) bodily actions, sometimes morally indeterminate ( avyakrta ) bodily actions, and 
it is the same for vocal and mental actions. Since these three actions are preceded by 
knowledge and are in accord with knowledge in the Tathagata, they are never 
indeterminate. That which is the outcome of knowledge (j nanasamutthita) is called 


390 



preceded by knowledge ( jnanapurvamgama ); that which accompanies knowledge 
( jndnasahacdrin ) is called in accordance with knowledge (jndndnuparivartin). 

xvi - xviii. In respect to the three times, the Tathagata has a nonattached 
and unhindered knowledge and vision (, tryadhvany asangam apratiharam 

jnanadarsanam pravartate). As the arhat is unable to grasp the things of the three times 
by means of a simple production of mind ( cittotpadamatra ), his knowledge (jiiana ) and 
vision {dars ana) are hindered ( asakta ); as he cannot know everything absolutely, his 
knowledge and his vision are prevented ( pratihata ). On the contrary, with respect to the 
things of the three times, the Tathagata knows absolutely every object in one simple 
production of mind. This is why his knowledge and his vision are unattached and 
unprevented. Consequently, these eighteen attributes individually are the attributes 
unique to the Buddha (cf. § 24). 

(20) Sarvakaravarajnana, etc. This is to understand correctly all the aspects 
(i dkara ) of all the aggregates ( skandha ), elements (dhatu) and bases of consciousness 
{ayatana). The word etc. designates the innumerable qualities ( apramanaguna ) 
associated (s amprayukta) with the dharmakaya.” (U) 


10. Here are some stanzas: 

[The four apramanas, the four limitless ones, cf. Sutralamkara, XXI, 43]: 

anukampaka sattvesu samyogavigamasaya / 

aviyogdsaya saukhyahitdsaya namo 'stu te // 

“You have compassion for beings: you aspire to reunite, to separate; you 
aspire not to divide; you aspire for welfare and happiness! Homage to you!” 

[150a9] 


10. Comm. Bh silent, bh missing, U 440b7-15, u 340b6-341a2. 

“In this stanza the author explains the four limitless ones ( apramana ). You have 
compassion for beings (anukampaka sattvesu) is the general theme (samanyapada). - a) 
You aspire to reunite (samyogasaya): explains the apramana of loving kindness ( maitri ) 


391 



because he aspires that beings may be joined with happiness ( sukhasamyoga ). - b) You 
aspire to separate (vigamdsaya): explains the apramana of compassion ( karuna ), because 
he aspires that beings may be separated from suffering ( duhkhaviyoga ). - c) You aspire 
that they may not be divided (aviyogasaya): explains the apramana of joy ( mudita ) 
because he aspires that beings may not be separated from happiness ( sukhaviyoga ). - d) 
You aspire for the welfare and happiness (saukhyahitdsaya): explains the apramana of 
equanimity ( upeksa ) because he aspires that beings may attain welfare (hit a) and 
happiness ( sukha ). Equanimity ( upeksa ) is disgust ( vaimukhya ): he aspires that beings 
may reject the agreeable feeling (sukhavedana), etc., and the traces of the defilements 
(klesanusaya), but he does not abandon beings. Furthermore, equanimity is called the fact 
of staying in the very middle. In view of this quality (guna), homage is paid to the 
dharmakaya of the Buddhas and this is why it is said: Homage to you (namo 'stu te).” (U) 


11 . [The eight vimoksas (liberations), the eight abhibhvayatanas (dominating views 
of the subject) and the ten krtsnayatanas (views of totality of the subject), cf. 
Sutralamkara, XXXI, 44]: 

sarvdvarananirmukta sarvalokddbhibhu mune / 

jhdnena jheyam vydptam te muktacitta namo 'stu te // 

“You are liberated from all obstacles, you dominate the entire world, O 
Muni! Your knowledge peetrates the knowable; you are of freed mind! 
Homage to you!” [150al 1] 


11. Comm. Bh silent, bh missing, U 440b 19-26, u 341a3-5. 

“a) You are liberated from all obstacles (sarvdvarananirmukta)'. this phrase shows that 
the vimoksas of the Buddhas surpass those of the sravakas, etc. - b) You dominate the 
entire world, O Muni (sarvalokabhibhu mune): this phrase shows that the 

abhibhvayatanas of the Buddhas surpass those of the sravakas, etc. - c) Your knowledge 
penetrates the knowable (jhdnena jheyam vydptam te): this phrase shows that the 
krtsnayatanas of the Buddhas surpass those of the sravakas, etc. It is not like in the 
vehicle of the sravakas where there are only eight vimoksas, eight abhibhvayatanas and 


392 



ten krtsnayatanas. The vimoksas precede the abhibhvayatanas and the abhibhvayatanas 
precede the krisnayatanas (cf. Kosa, VIII, p. 215). Thus, in his contemplations 
(, manasikara ) and in his thinking ( cintana ), he is liberated from all obstacles, he 
dominates the entire world and his knowledge penetrates all things ( visaya ); this is why 
he is of liberated mind ( muktacitta ): endowed with these three qualities, his mind is 
liberated from bonds ( bandhana ).” (U) 


12 . [Arana (the power of preventing the arising of defilements in others), cf. 
Sutralamkara, XXI, 45]: 

asesam sarvasattvdn dm sarvaklesavindsaka / 

klesaprahdraka klistasdnukrosa namo 'stu te // 

"You destroy all the afflictions of all beings completely; you crush the 
afflictions; you have compassion for afflicted beings! Homage to you!" 

[ 1 50a 13] 


12. Comm. Bh silent, bh missing, U 440cl-16, u 341a6-341b3. 

“This stanza explains the arana that is a wisdom of the mundane order ( samvrtijnana ) (cf. 
Kosa, VIII, p. 87). This arana is not like the arana obtained by the sravakas. Before 
entering a village (grama) or a forest (atavi), the sravakas reflect ( vibhavana ) and 
examine (pratyaveksana) as to whether someone might experience passion or 'rana' with 
respect to them, and if in the affirmative, they do not enter. The Tathagatas, however, 
consider (sampasyanti) things differently. Even if beings might experience passion 
(klesa) with respect to the body of the Buddha (buddhakaya), if these beings are able to 
enjoy the appearance of a Buddha (buddhanirmana), the Tathagatas go to them and 
discipline them skillfully ( upayena vinayanti ) in order to destroy the afflictions. You 
completely destroy all the afflictions of all beings : it is not like the sravaka who, resting 
in the concentration called arana (aranasamadhiviharin), suppresses in a few beings only 
the generating causes ( utpapattipratyaya ) of afflictions having as object his own person, 
and who subdues only the afflictions of the desire realm that have a real object 
(, kamadhatusavastukaklesa , cf. Kosa VII, p. 87) and not the others. [Cf. the comm., of 


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Sutralamkara, p. 184: time hy aranaviharinah sattvanam kasyacid eva tadalambanasya 
klesasyotpattipratyayamatram pratiharanti ]. On the other hand, the Buddhas destroy all 
the passions of all beings without residue ( asesam ). You crush the afflictions 
(k/esapraharaka): he crushes the afflictions ( klesa ) only, but he does not crush the beings 
(sattva). You have compassion for afflicted beings ( klistasanukrosa ): if there are beings 
stained by the afflictions, the Buddha has compassion for them and does not torment 
them. A stanza says: Just as a good physician ( vaidya ) exorcist cures those possessed by 
a demon by tormenting only the demons and not the possessed, in the same way the Great 
Compassionate One cures the victims of the afflictions by tormenting only the passions 
and not the beings.” (U) 


13 . [Pranidhijnana (the knowledge resulting from from vow), cf. Sutralamkara, XXI, 
46]: 

andbhoga nirdsahga avyaghata samdhita / 

sadaiva sarvaprasndndm visarjaka namo 'stu te // 

“Your knowledge is spontaneous, detached, unfettered, always concentrated 
and resolves all questions! Homage to you!” [ 1 50al 5] 


13. Comm. Bh silent, bh missing, U 440c20-441a2, u 341b3-8. 

“This stanza shows that the pranidhijnana of the Buddhas surpasses that of the sravakas, 
etc., by five aspects ( akara ), because it is spontaneous (andbhoga), detached ( nirdsahga ), 
unfettered (avyaghata), always concentrated (sadasamahita) and cuts through all doubts 
(sarvasamsayachedaka). On the contrary, the pranidhijnana acquired by the sravakas 
presupposes entry into concentration (samapattipravesa) according to a previous vow (cf. 
Kosa, VII, p. 89); it knows only one particular object and does not know others. It is not 
the same for the Buddha: a) His kno wedge is spontaneous (andbhogajhdna), he makes no 
effort: like a precious jewel (mani) or a heavenly musical instrument (turya) (fulfilling 
their roles spontaneously, cf. chap. VIII, § 17), the Buddha, according to his vow 
(anupranidhim), knows everything (visaya). b) His knowledge is detached 
(nirdsahgajndna), for it is without obstruction in respect to knowable things 


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( jheyavisaya ). c) His knowledge is unfettered ( a vydghdtaj hdna ) , for he has cut the 
obstacle of defilements ( klesavarana ) along with its traces ( savasana ). cl) He is always 
concentrated ( sada samahito), for the obstacles to concentration ( samapattyavarana ) 
have been cut. A stanza says (Anguttara, III, p. 436; Theragatha, p. 70, v. 696; Kosa, IV, 
p. 41): The Naga (or the Buddha) is concentrated when he walks, when he stands, when 
he lies down, when he sits ( gaccham samahito nago thito nago samahito / sayam 
samahito nago nisinno pi asahito / sabbattha samvuto nago esa nagassa sapada). e) By 
virtue of the marvellous vow that he has taken, he is able to resolve all questions always.” 
(U) 


14 . [The four pratisamvids (infallible knowledges), cf. Sutralamkara, XXXI, 47]: 

dsraye 'thasrite desye vdkye jhdne ca desike / 

avydhatamate nityam sudesika namo 'stu te // 

“By virtue of the support and the supported which are the sermons, by virtue 
of language and knowledge which are the preacher, your intellect is without 
obstacle; you are always a kind preacher! Homage to you!” [150al7] 


14. Comm. Bh silent, bh missing, U 441a6-18, u 341b8-342a5. 

“This stanza explains the four pratisamvids. The support (asraya) is the texts 
(desanddharma), i.e., the sutras, etc. The supported (asrita) is the meaning expressed 
(abhidheydrtha) by these texts. Both are called the preacher ( desya ), for they are the 
action accomplished ( krtakarman ) by the preacher. Language ( vakya ) and knowledge 
{ jhana ) are both the preacher ( desika ), for they are the agent ( karaka ) who emits the 
voice ( vaksamutthapaka ). Your intellect is without obstacle ( avyahatamati ) means that in 
their regard the Buddha has unfailing knowledge ( avivartyam jnanam). You are always a 
good preacher ( nityam sudesika)'. because he is endowed with the four pratisamvids (cf. 
chap. V, § 2, no. 9), the Buddha can always teach well. 

a) Intellect free of obstacle ( avyahatanati ) with respect to the support ( asraya ) is called 
unfailing knowledge of dharmas ( dharmaprati-samvid ), for it knows the religious texts 
(dharmaparydya) without obstacle ( apratigham ). 


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b) Intellect without obstacle with respect to the supported ( asrita ) is called unfailing 
knowledge of meaning (arthapratisam vid) , because it knows the self-nature ( svalaksana ) 
and the shared nature ( samanyalaksana ) of all dharmas, or because it knows without 
obstacle the intentions dealing with something other ( arthanatarabhi-praya , cf. chap. II, 
v. 33) than what is found in the texts. 

c) Intellect without obstacle in regard to language ( vakya ) is called unfailing knowledge 
of etymology ( niruktipratisamvid ): it can express the varied expressions referring to the 
particular objects in all lands by confonning to the diverse notions arising in each of 
these lands. Or also, it knows without obstacle the etymology of all the dharmas. 

d) Intellect without obstacle in the categorizing knowledge of the dharmas 

(< dharmaprabhedanajnana ) is called infallible knowledge of preaching 

( pratibhanapratisamvid ), because it encounters no obstacles in its explanatory knowledge 
of the dharmas.” (U) 


15 . [The six abhijnas (superknowledges), cf. Sutralamkara, XXI, 48]: 

upetya vacanais tesdm carijha agatau gatau / 

nihsare caiva sattvanam svavavada namo 'stu te // 

“For brings, you are the kind adviser who approaches them and knows their 
language, their behavior, their past, their future and their escape! Homage to 
you!” [150al9] 


15. Comm. Bh silent, bh missing, U 441a22-441b3, u 342a5-342b3. 

“This stanza explains the six abhijnas. For beings ( sattvanam ): this is the general theme 
(. samanyapada ); you are the kind adviser ( svavavada ): this word is applied to each 
member of the stanza and should be repeated in front of each of them. In the expression 
svavavada, su means ’fine’ (caru) and avavada means ’speech’ (vac); the person who says 
fine words in order to give good directions is called kind adviser. 

a) You are the kind adviser who comes close to beings (upetya svavavada ): this is the 
abhijha called magical power (rddhyabhijha). The Buddha comes close to beings by 


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conforming to those who must be disciplined {anu vineyan). Accomplishing great 
miracles ( pratiharya ), he gives good advice to beings. 

b) You are the kind adviser who knows the language of beings {vacanajha svavavada ): 
this is the abhijna called divine ear ( divyasrotr abhijha ). The Buddha hears the sounds 
(, sabda ) with their meanings and all sounds ( svara ) in general, even if they are far off 
(< durasthita ); he preaches the law as appropriate in the language of the beings to be 
converted. 

c) You are the kind adviser who knows the behavior of beings (carijha svavavada ): this is 
the abhijna called knowledge of others' minds {cetahpary ay abhijha). Knowing the high 
or low qualities ( varavara ) of the minds of beings, the Buddha advises them well. 

d) You are the kind adviser who knows the past of beings (agatijha svavavada ): this is the 
abhijna called memory of fonner existences ( purvanivdsdnusmrtyabhijha ). Knowing 
beings' past (atita), the Buddha advises them well. 

e) You are the kind adviser who knows the future of beings {gatijha svavavada ): this is 
the abhijna called knowledge of deaths and births {cyutyupapadajhanabhijha). Knowing 
beings' future (anagata), the Buddha advises them well. 

J) You are the kind adviser who knows beings' deliverance {nihsarajha svavavada ): this is 
the abhijna called knowledge of destruction of the impurities {asravaksayajhanabhijha). 
Knowing those who have destroyed the afflictions ( klesa ), the Buddha advises them 
well.” (U) 


16. [The thirty-two laksanas (marks) and the eighty anuvyahjanas (minor marks), cf. 
Sutralamkara, XXI, 49]: 

satpurusyam prapayante tvdm drstvd sarvadehinah / 

drstamatrat prasddasya vidhdyaka namo 'stu te// 

“All beings, when they have seen you, recognize in you the Human Being par 
excellence; just seeing you they have faith; you are the organizer! Homage to 
you!” [ 1 50a2 1 ] 


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16. Comm. Bh silent, bh missing, U 441b7-12, u 342b3-5. 


“This stanza explains the laksanas and the anuvyanjanas, for the dharmakaya is the base 
( asraya ) for the appearance of the laksanas and anuvyanjanas. In view of these laksanas 
and anuvyanjanas, homage is paid to the dharmakaya. All beings, when they see you, 
recognize in you the Great Human Being par excellence ( satpurusyam prapadyante tv dm 
drstva sarvadehinah ): everyone ( loka ), seeing the Bhagavat endowed with the laksanas 
and the anuvyanjanas, recognizes in him the Great Human Being par excellence 
( mahapurusa ). All beings means those who, now or later, will see an appearance of the 
Buddha. Just seeing you, they have faith ( drstamatrat prasadasya ): hardly have they seen 
that the Bhagavat is endowed with the laksanas and anuvyanjanas than they conceive 
pure faith and recognize in him the kind organizer of the world ( lokavidhayaka)' ’ (U) 


17 . [The four sarvakaraparisuddhis (omniform purities), cf. Sutralamkara, XXI, 50]: 

dddnasthdn as am tydgan inn an ap annum an e/ 

sum ddh ijhdnavasitdm anuprapta namo 'stu te // 

“You have gained the mastery that consists of assuming, keeping and 
abandoning, the mastery that consists of creating and transforming, the 
mastery of concentration and the mastery of knowledge! Homage to you!” 

[149a23] 


17. Comm. Bh silent, bh missing, U 441bl6-25, u 342b5-343al. 

“This stanza explains the four sarvakaraparisuddhis: 

a) The mastery that consists of assuming, keeping, abandoning 
( adanasthanasamtyagavasita ): this is the purity of basis ( asraya - pa ris u ddh i ) or the 
power, based on dhyana ( dhyanasrita ), of assuming ( adana ), keeping ( sthana ) or 
abandoning (sanity ago) existence (atmabhava) at will (yathakamam ) as long as one 
wishes (yavatkamam ). 

b) The mastery that consists of creating and transforming ( nirmanaparinamavasita ): this 
is the purity of the object ( alamabamaparisuddhi ). The act of producing all kinds of 


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substances previously nonexistent ( apurvajata rupa) is called creation ( nirmana ); the act 
of changing already existing substances in order to make gold ( suvarna ), silver (raj at a), 
etc., is called transformation ( parinama ). The Buddha has gained the mastery in all these 
types of trasformation and creation. 

c) The mastery of concentration (samapattivasita): this is purity of mind 
(< cittaparisuddhi ); according to his wish ( yathakamam ), he has at his disposal mastery 
over the gates of concentration ( samadhimukha ); he can enter into concentration at each 
moment ( pratiksanam ), according to aspirations ( yathasayam ). 

d) The mastery of knowledge (jhanavasita): this is the purity of knowledge 
( jhanaparisuddhi ); according to wishes ( yathakamam ), he has the mastery of the 
dharannnukhas at his disposal. Anugata means that he has indeed arrived at 
(samudagata) the four mentioned purities.” (U) 


18 . [The ten balas (powers), cf. Sutralamkara, XXI, 51]: 

upaye sarane suddhau sattvanarn vipravadane / 

mahayane ca niryane marabhahja namo 'stu te // 

“You crush Mara who deceives beings by way of means, refuge, purity and 
escape in the Great Vehicle! Homage to you!” [150a25] 


18. Comm. Bh silent, bh missing, U 441b29-441c25, u 343al-343b4. 

“This stanza explains the ten balas. Mara deceives beings: 

i ) in the way of actions and of going to a good or a bad destiny 
(sugatatidurgatigamanopayakarman); ii ) in the way of refuge ( sarana ); Hi) in the way of 
mundane and supramundane purity ( laukika-lokottarasuddhi ): iv) by way of escape in the 
Great Vehicle ( mahayananityana ). Mara deceives beings on these four points. Here the 
stanza explains the action of the ten balas that subdue Mara: 

a) In the way of means (upaye): the way of going to a good destiny are good actions 
(kusalakarman); the way of going to a bad destiny are bad actions ( akusalakarman ). 
When it is a matter of going to these destinies, Mara attempts to cast confusion on this 


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doctrine. He says: "That is not true, it is the contrary." He says that bad actions are the 
means to going to a good destiny and that good actions are the means of going to a bad 
destiny. Or, in fact, he says that everything is without cause ( ahetuka ), or that everything 
has a creator ( isvara ) for its cause, a god, etc. The strength consisting of the knowledge 
of what is possible and what is impossible ( sthanasthanajnanabala ) crushes ( bhanakti ) 
Mara's claims. Etymologically, sthana means that which can occur (. sopaya ), that which 
can take place ( savakasa ). That which cannot occur ( anupaya ), that which cannot take 
place ( anavakasa ) is called asthana. To subdue Mara's claims, the Buddha says: “It is 
impossible, it cannot happen ( asthanam anavakasah ) that beings are arise without a 
cause or from a bad cause. Why? Because if this is, that also is; if this arises, that arises 
also... Effects (results) have ignorance as their cause” (i mas mini sati idam hoti imass' 
uppada idam upajjati, yadidam avijjapaccaya sankhara, cf. Majjhima, i, p. 262-3; II, p. 
32; III, p. 63; Samyutta, II, p. 65; Udana, I, p. 1, etc.). It is not a creator, a god, etc., who 
produces them in succession. 

b) By way of refuge (saranef. these are actions ( karman ), for it is said: “Beings are the 
result of their own actions, are the inheritors of their actions... have each their own 
actions for refuge” (cf. u: hjog rten bdag git byas pa las gyi bgo skal la spyod pa, 
fragmentary quotation from Majjhima, III, p. 203; Visuddhimagga, p. 301; Jataha, IV, p. 
128; Milinda, p. 65: kamasaka, manava, satta kammadayada kammayoni kammabandhu 
kammapatisarana). When it is a question of actions, Mara attempts to cast confusion on 
this doctrine, etc., as before. The second strength, which consists of the knowledge of 
retribution of actions ( karmavipdkajnanabala ), subdues the claim of Mara, for it is 
irresistible ( apratigha ). In order to subdue Mara's claim, the Buddha says (Majjhima, III, 
p. 203): “It is action that divides beings into lower and higher categories ( kammam satte 
vibhajati yadidam hmappamtatayati). That does not take place without cause, neither by 
the act of a creator nor of a god, etc.,” as before. 

c) By way of purity (suddhau), i.e., by way of mundane purity ( laukikasuddhi ) and 
supramundane purity ( lokottarasuddhi ). Provisionally or definitively, it tames 
( vidhamati ) the afflictions and suppresses ( samudghatayati ) the propensities ( anusaya ) of 
the afflictions by means of the dhyanas, the meditative stabilizations ( samadhi ), the 
absorptions ( samapatti ) and the noble path ( aryamarga ). When it is a matter of purity, 
Mara attempts to cast confusion on this doctrine, etc., as before. The strength consisting 


400 



of the knowledge of the dhyanas, liberations, meditative stabilizations and absorptions 
(i dhydnavimoksasamadhisamdpattijhanabala ) subdues this claim of Mara. 

d) By way of escape in the great Vehicle (mahayane ca niryane): this shows the role 
( prayojana ) played by the other powers (cf. chap. X, § 9, no. 12). When it concerns the 
Great Vehicle, the supreme result (dtyantikanirydna) of which is buddhahood 
( buddhata ), Mara attempts to cast confusion on this doctrine. He says that supreme 
complete enlightenment ( anuttara samyaksambodhih ) is very difficult to attain 
(sudurlabha) and that definitive escape must be sought in the vehicle of the sravakas. The 
other seven strengths subdue this claim of Mara because they are irresistible.” (U) 


19 . [The four vaisaradyas (fearlessnesses), cf. Sutralamkara, XXI, 52]: 

jndnaprahdnirydnavighnakdrakadesika/ 

svapararthe 'nyatlrthydndm niradhrsya namo 'stu te // 

“In your own personal interest and that of others, you proclaim knowledge, 
cutting off, escape, and that which makes obstacles, without ever being 
attacked by others, by the heretics! Homage to you!” [150a27] 


19. Comm. Bh silent, bh missing, U 441c29-442a8, u 343b4-8. 

This stanza explains the four vaisaradyas. 

“ a ) You proclaim knowledge (jha nudes ika): the Buddha says truly: ‘I am perfectly 
enlightened ( samyaksambuddha ).’ He knows that he has understood all dhannas 
completely. 

b) You proclaim cutting off (prahanadesika): the Buddha affirms truly : ‘I am he who has 
truly destroyed his impurities ( samyakksmdsrava ). He has destroyed the impurities of the 
afflictions ( klesa ). These two points refer to the fact that the Buddha proclaims in regard 
to himself ( svartha ). 

c) You proclaim escape (niryanadesika): the Buddha affirms truly: ‘For the sravakas, I 
proclaim the dharmas of escape ( niryanadharma ), the true escape.’ 


401 



d) You proclaim that which creates obstacle (vighnakarakadesika): the Buddha proclaims 
truly: ‘For the sravakas, I proclaim the dharmas which create obstacles 

{vighnakaradharma), true obstacles.’ These two points refer to the fact that the Buddha 
proclaims in the interest of others ( parartha ). Without being attacked by others, by 
heretics ( anyatirthydndm niradhrsya): this shows that vaisaradya is synonymous with 
absence of fear ( nirbhaya ). The Buddha cannot be attacked by others, by the heretics. 
This is why he is fearless.” (U) 


20 . [The three araksyas (things not requiring secrecy) and the three smrtyupasthanas 
(equanimities), cf. Sutralamkara, XXI, 53]: 

vigrhyavakta parsatsu dvayasamklesavarjita / 

nirdraksa asammosa ganakarsa narno 'stu te // 

“You speak independently in the assemblies; you are free of the twofold 
defilement. Having nothing to hide, free of failure of mindfulness, you attract 
the assemblies! Homage to you!” [150a29] 


20. Comm. Bh silent, bh missing, U 442al2-18, u 343b8-344a3. 

“This stanza explains the araksyas and the smrtyupasthanas. 

a) You speak independently in the assmblies (vigrhyavakta parsatu): in the great 
assemblies, the Buddha is able to criticize ( vigrah -) the claims of others (paravada ), for 
in his physical, vocal or mental actions ( kayakarmadi ) or in his posture ( Tryapatha ) there 
is nothing ugly ( virupaka ) that he should hide ( araks -) for fear of reproach ( ninda ); this is 
why the Buddha can criticize the claims of others in the assemblies. This explains the 
three araksyas. 

b) You are free of the twofold defilement ( dvayasamklesavarjita ): in the midst of 
respectful ( susrusamana ), disrepectful, or both respectful and disrespectful sravakas, the 
Buddha skilfully uses his mindfulness and thus avoids affection ( anunaya ) and aversion 
( pratigha ) towards them. This explains the three smrtyupasthanas. Having nothing to 


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hide ( niraraksa ), free of failure of mindfulness ( asammosa ), the Buddha skilfully draws 
( karsati ) the assemblies ( gana ) of sravakas.” (U) 


21. [The vasanasamudghata (complete destruction of the impregnations), cf. 
Sutralamkaara, XXI, 54]: 

care vihare sarvatra nasty asarvajhacestitam / 

sarvada tava sarvajha bhutarthika namo 'stu te // 

“Everywhere, while walking or standing still, you have no action that is not 
that of an omniscient one; you are always the omniscient one in the true 
sense! Homage to you!” [150b2] 


21. Comm. Bh silent, bh missing, U 442a22-442b7, u 344a3-344bl. 

“This stanza explains the vasanasamudghata. Everywhere, while walking or standing still 
(care vihare sarvatra ): whether he goes ( akram -) and comes ( vikram -) to beg 
( pindapataya ) in the villages (grama) or the towns (nagara), or whether he stays 
peacefully ( vihr -) at the foot of a tree (vrksatala) etc., in one of the four bodily postures 
(Tryapatha), the Buddha has no action which is not that of an omniscient one ( nasty 
asarvajhacestitam ). The sravakas, etc., although they may have destroyed their afflictions 
(ksmaklesa), still retain the persistence of the propensities of the afflictions 
(klesavasanabandha). Thus, the sthavira Maudgalyayana, who for five hundred earlier 
existences (jataka) had been a monkey (markata), remained bound (anubaddha) to his 
monkey habits (vasana) and, although he had destroyed his afflictions, he leapt like a 
monkey ( markatapraskanda ) when he heard music. A pratyekabuddha, who for many 
previous existences had been a courtesan (ganika), still kept those habits (vasana) and 
continued to decorate his face. Such ways of behavior are not the actions of the 
omniscient one (sarvajhacestita). They are not found in the Bhagavat, and that is a 
quality unique (asadharanaguna) of the Tathagata. - You are always omniscient in the 
true sense (sarvada sarvajha bhutarthika ): the Buddha is not like the six heretic masters 
(sastr), Purana, Kasyapa, etc., who were not really omniscient (cf. Anguttara, IV, p. 428); 
this is why it is said that the Tathagata is omniscient in the true sense (bhutarthike 


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sarvajhah ). Here, according to a rule for stanzas, the words sarvajna and bhutdrthika, 
which fonn an indissoluble expression, are cited out of order. Or else, these two words 
are to be separated; in this case, sarvajna means that the Buddha is omniscient, and 
bhutdrthika means that the Buddha possesses the real meaning ( bhutartha ), as when one 
says dandika to designate a man who possesses a danda {club)/'’ (U) 


22. [Asammosata (non-failure of mindfulness, cf. Sutralamkara, XXI, 55]: 

sarvasattvarthakrityesu kdlam tvam ndtivartase / 

avandhyakrtya satatam asammosa namo 'stu te // 

“In your work dedicated to the interest of all beings, you do not waste time; 
your work is never sterile; your memory is ever unfailing! Homage to you!” 
[150b4] 


22. Comm. Bh silent, bh missing, U 442b 1 1-18, u 344bl-4. 

“This stanza explains the asammosata. In your work dedicated to the interest of all 
beings, you do not waste time (sarvasattvarthakrtyesu kdlam ndtivartase •): if there is a 
being to be converted ( vineya ) at a given moment, the Buddha Bhagavat accomplishes 
his work ( krtya ) at his place and at the desired time without wasting any time. Thus a 
stanza says: Just as the water of the great ocean has its tides at the right time, so the 
compassion ( anukampa ) of the Buddha manifests without ever failing. Your work is 
never sterile ( avandhyakrtya ): the work of the Buddha is not in vain ( sunya ) or without 
result ( nisphala ). Your memory is unfailing (asammosa): he never forgets the time 
appropriate for acting.” (U) 


23. [Mahakaruna (great compassion), cf. Sutralamkara, XXI, 56]: 
sarvalokamahordtram sahatkrtvah pratyaveksase / 
mahdkarunayd yukta hitdsaya namo 'stu te// 


404 



“Six times during the day and night, you think about the entire world; you 
apply yourself to great compassion; you aspire for the good! Homage to 
you!” { 1 50b6] 


23. Comm. Bh silent, bh missing, U 442b22-442cl, u 433b4-7. 

“This shows that great compassion ( mahakaruna ) has as nature ( svabhava ) the aspiration 
to work for the benefit and happiness of all beings ( hitasukhasaya ). It is called great 
because it is produced ( samudagata ) by the accumulations of merit and wisdom 
( punyajndnasambhara ), because it has the freeing from the threefold suffering 
( duhkhatraya ) as aspect ( akara ), because it has ( alambana ) the beings of the threefold 
world ( traidhatukasattva ) as object, because it bears equally on all beings, because no 
compassion surpasses it {tato ' dhimdtratardbhdvat ). (See Kosa, VII, pp. 77-68). Day and 
night, you view the whole world (sarvalokamahordtram satkrtvah pratyaveksase): this 
explaims the activity ( karman ) fulfilled by great compassion., In every part of the day 
and the night, in the three times ( tryadhvan ), the Buddha Bhagavat looks at the whole 
world and wonders: Which good dharma ( kusaladharma ) is increasing ( yardhate ); which 
good dharma is decreasing ( hfyate ); which root of good ( kusalamula ) is ripening 
(■ vipacyate ); which root is not ripening; who is able to enjoy happiness ( abhyudaya); who 
is able to enjoy predestination ( niyama ); who is a practitioner of the vehicle of the 
Buddhas ( huddhayanabhajana ); who is a practitioner of another vehicle, etc?” (U) - Cf. 
Bodh bhumi, p. 90: karunaviharo vena tathagatas triskrtvo ratrau triskrtvo ratrimdivena 
buddhacaksusa lokam vyavalokayati ko vardhate ko hvyate kasyanutpanani 
kusalmulani... vistarenagraphale 'rhattve pratisthapayamfti. 


24 . [The eighteen avenika buddhadharmas (attributes unique to the Buddha), cf. 
Sutralamkara, XXI, 57)]: 

cdrenddhigamendpi jhdnenapi ca karmana / 

sarvasravakapratyekabuddhottama namo 'stu te // 

“In your deeds, your attainment, your knowledge, and your acts, you surpass 
all the sravakas and pratyekabuddhas! Homage to you!” [150b8] 


405 



24. Comm. Bh silent, bh missing, U 442c5-13, u 344b7-345a3. 

“This stanza explains the eighteen avenika buddhadharmas. 

a) In your deeds (carena), i.e., in all your activity at the moment of action. This concerns 
the following attributes: i) The Tathagata does not take a wrong step (nasti tathagatasya 
skhalitam). ii) He has no grumbling (nasti ravitam ). iii) He has no faulty memory (nasti 
musita smrtih ). iv) He has no unconcentrated mind ( nasty asamahitam cittani). v) He has 
no notion of multiplicity (nasti nanatvasamjha ). vi ) He has no thoughtless renunciation 
(nasty apratisamkhyayopeksa) . 

b) In your attainment (adhigamena), i.e., in the six things that he does not lose ( ahani ) 
when he has acquired them: he has no loss of zeal (chanda), of energy (vlrya), of 
memory (smrti), of concentration ( samadhi ), of wisdom (prajiia ), or of liberation 
(vimukti). 

c) In your knowledge (jhanena): the Tathagata has unattached and unhindered vision and 
knowledge of the three times (tryadhvany asangam apratihatam jnanadarsanam 
pravartate). 

d) In your actions (karmand): the bodily, vocal and mental acts of the Tathagata are 
preceded by wisdom and are in accord with wisdom (sarvakayavagmanas karma 
jhanapurvamgamam jnananuparivarti). - You surpass all the sravakas and 
pratyekabuddhas (sarvasravakapratyeka-buddhottama): this shows that the Buddha far 
surpasses ( bahvantaravisista ) the vehicles of all the sravakas and pratyekabuddhas 
because he is endowed with the eighteen unique attributes (< avenikaguna ).” (U) 


25 . [Sarvakarajnata (universal wisdom), cf. Sutralamkara, XXI, 58]: 

tribhih kayir mahabodhim sarvdkdrdm upagata / 

sarvatra sarvasattvdn dm kdnksdcchida namo 'stu te // 

“By means of the three bodies, you have attained great universal 
enlightenment; everywhere you cut off the doubts of all beings! Homage to 
you!” [150bl0] 


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25. Comm. Bh silent, bh missing, U 442cl7-443a5, u 345a3-7. 

“This stanza explains the sarvakarajnata. The true wisdom bearing on all the aspects 
(sarvakaresu samyagjnanam ) is called sarvakarajnana; the self-nature ( svabhava ) of this 
wisdom is called sarvakarajnata, It is essentially a higher knowledge bearing on all the 
aspects of every knowable object ( sarvajheyavisaybndm sarvakaresu vis is tarn j nan am). 
By means of the three bodies ( tribhih kayaih ): this concerns the essential body 
(svabhavikakaya), etc. By means of these three bodies, the Buddha has attained 
( upagata ) the result of great universal enliughtenment ( mahabodhih sarvakara ) which 
has an immaculate and unhindered wisdom ( vimalam apratihatam ca jhanani) as its self- 
nature. This enlightenment is universal ( sarvakara ), i.e., endowed with all the aspects. 
According to some, the expression 'all the aspects' means the sixteen aspects beginning 
with the transitory ( anitya ) aspect, (cf. Kosa, VI, p. 163; VII, p. 28) and enlightenment 
uses them as antecedent cause. According to others, the expression 'all the aspects' means 
that all others as well, namely, that all the dharmas are without self-nature ( nihsvabhava ), 
unborn ( anutpanna ), undestroyed ( aniruddha ), calm from the very beginning ( adisanta ), 
nirvanic in essence ( prakrtiparinirvrta ) and of imperceptible nature 

(anipalabdhalaksana) [Cf. chap. II, § 30], According to yet others, it is not a matter here 
of various aspects to counteract ( vipaksa ) by means of their antidote (pratipaksa ) [i.e., to 
counteract by way of seeing the truths], but but rather a completely beneficent perfection 
{sarvarthasampad) comparable to a cintamani of universal efficacy [a precious stone 
assuaging all the desires of its possessor, cf. chap. VIII, § 17]. As for myself [Asanga], I 
see in this universal enlightenment ( sanmkara ) a special cutting of all the obstacles 
(sarvavaranaprahanaprakara). Why? Because it cuts off all kinds of obstacles 
(, sarvavaranaprakara ); indeed, it cuts all the obstacles to knowledge ( sarvajheydvarana ) 
and it cuts off all the propensities (sarvavasana). Moreover, this great enlightenment is a 
true knowledge ( samyagjhana ) bearing on all objects (visaya). This is why the Buddha 
cuts through ( chinatti ) all the doubts of others (parakahksa ). Everywhere (sarvatra), i.e., 
in all the worlds (sarvaloka), he cuts off the doubts of others: all the doubts of men 
( manusya ) and gods ( deva ). He cuts off these doubts completely. Thus, this activity of 
cutting off all the doubts of men and gods shows the superiority of this universal 
knowledge (sarvdkdrajhdna ) . (U) 


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26. [Paramitaparipuri (completion of virtues), cf. Sutralamkara, XXI, 59]: 

niravagraha nirdosa niskalusyanavasthita / 

aninksya sarvadharmesu nisprapahca namo 'stute// 

“You are without greed, without error, without turmoil, without fixedness, 
without agitation, and without vain words on all dharmas! Homage to you!” 


26. Comm. Bh silent, bh missing, U silent, u 345a7-345b3. 

Since this stanza has not been explained by U, here is the commentary of the 
Sutralamkara: 

anena sakalasatparamitavipaksanirmuktataya satparamitaparipurir bhagavata 
udbhdvita / tatranavagrahatvam bhoganiragrahatvad veditavyam / nirdosatvam 
nirmalakayddikarmatavat / niskalusyatvam lokadharmaduhkhdbhydm cittakalusikarandt 
/ anavasdiitatatvam alpdvaranamdtrddhigamdnavasthdndt / dnihksyatvam aviksepat / 
nisprapancatvam sarvavikalpaprapahcasamuddcdrdt / 

“Being freed from the vices opposed to the six virtues, the Bhagavat has reached the 
fulfillment of the six virtues. He is without greed because he is not attached to wealth. He 
is without error because his acts, bodily actions, etc., are immaculate. He is without 
turmoil because his mind is not disturbed by human situations (cf. chap. VIII, § 14) or by 
sadness. He is without fixedness because he is not limited to mediocre or inferior results 
only. He is without agitation because he is not distracted. He is without empty words 
because he does not use the empty language of all concepts.” 

The Tibetan commentary u is even more clear: “He is without greed ( niravagraha ): this 
is the virtue of generosity (danapdramita). He is without error (nirdosa): this is the virtue 
of morality ( silaparamita ). He is without disturbance (niskalusya) : this is the virtue of 
patience ( ksantiparamita ). He is without fixedness (anavasthita): thanks to energy 
coming from previous effort (purvaprayoga ), he does not stop. He is without agitation 
(aninksya): this is the virtue of dhyana ( dhydnapdram i td) ; when he is concentrated 
( samahita ), he is neither distracted nor agitated. He is without empty words on all the 


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dharmas (sarvadharmesu nisprapancah) : this is wisdom ( prajna ), nonconceptual 
knowledge ( nirvikalpakajhana ). This wisdom uses no empty words ( prapahca ).” 


27. Such are the qualities ( guna ) with which the dharmakaya of the Buddhas is 
associated ( samprayukta ). Furthermore, it is associated with the following 
qualities: self-nature ( svabhdva ), cause ( hetu ), result (phala ), action ( karman ), 
associated qualities (yoga), function ( vrtti ). The dharmakaya of the Buddhas has 
supreme ( anuttara ) qualities. 

Here are some stanzas (cf. Sutralamkara, XXI, 60-61): 

a. nispannaparamartho 'si sarvabhumivinihsrtah / 

sarvasattvagratam praptah sarvasattvavimocakah // 

“i) You have completely achieved the Absolute; ii) you have emerged from all 
the bhumis; iii) you have attained the first place among all beings; iv) you are 
the liberator of all beings.” 

b. aksayair asamair yukto gunair lokesu drisyase/ 

mandalesu apy adrsyas ca sarvathd devamdnusaih // 

“v) You are endowed with inexhaustible and unequaled qualities; vi) you 
show yourself equally in the universes and in the assemblies, but you are 
completely invisible to gods and men.” [150b 17] 


27. Comm. Bh 373c 10-22, bh missing, U 443a 13-27, u 345b3-346al. 

"The dharmakaya which is associated with the aforesaid qualities is associated with six 
other qualities. Two stanzas explain them in sumary: 

i) You have completely achieved the Absolute (nispannaparamartho ’si): the dharmakaya 
of the Buddha has completely achieved the Absolute: it consists of the true nature 
(tathatdprabhdvitd). This indicates that the dharmakaya is associated with a quality of 
self-nature (. svabhavaguna )... in the way that fire (agni) is associated with the quality of 
heat ( usnatvaguna ). 


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ii) You have left behind all the bhumis (, sarvabhuminihsrtah ): you have emerged from the 
ten bhumis, Pramudita, etc. This is the cause ( hetu ) of why the dharmakaya has 
completely achieved the Absolute. 

iii) You have attained the foremost place among all beings (sarvasttvagratam prapta ): 
this concerns omniscience which ensures supremacy ( visesa ) among all beings. This is 
the fruit (phala) resulting from achievement of the Absolute. 

iv) You are the liberator of all beings ( saiwasath’avimocakah ): this is the activity of the 
dharmakaya which has achieved the Absolute. 

v) You are endowed with inexhaustible and unequalled qualities (aksayair asamair yukto 
gunah): these are the qualities with which he is associated, for he is endowed with 
infinite ( ananta ) and unique ( asadharana ) qualities, powers ( bala ), fearlessnesses 
( vaisaradya ), etc., which are inexhaustible and unequalled. 

vi) You show yourself in all the universes equally (lokesu drsyase mandalesu api): by 
means of his apparitional body ( nirmanakaya ), he manifests in the universes (/oka); by 
means of his enjoyment body (sambhogakaya), he manifests in the great assemblies 
( mandala ): these two bodies are visible. On the other hand, he is completely invisible to 
gods and men (adrsyas ca sarvatha devamanusaih), for the dharmakaya of the Buddhas 
is not seen by men, gods, etc. This passage shows the difference ( visesa ) between the 
three bodies of Bhagavat by noting their function ( vrtti ). The function (vrtti) is a special 
transfonnation (parinamavisesa ) of the self-nature (svabhava). Among the three bodies, 
two are visible (drsya), the third is invisible (i adrsya ).” (U) 


28. The dharmakaya of the Buddhas is profound (gambhlra ), very profound 
(atigambhlra). How should this profundity ( gdmbhlrya ) be conceived? - Here are 
the verses: 

i) The Buddha has non-arising (anutpdda) as arising (utpdda), non-dwelling 
(apratisthd) as dwelling (pratistha ); all his actions are done without effort 

(i andbhoga ); he has the fourth nutriment (caturdhara) as food ( ahdra ). 

ii) The Buddhas are one (abhinnd) but innumerable ( aprameya ); their 
activity (karman) is immeasurable (aprameya), but one ( eka ); they have a 


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changeable ( adhruva ) and unchangeable ( dhruva ) action, for the Buddhas are 
endowed with three bodies ( trikdya ). 

iii) The Enlightened One ( abhisambuddha ) does not exist, but all the Buddhas 
are not non-existent. At every moment (pratiksanam ), there are innumerable 
Buddhas consisting (prabhdvita ) of existence ( bhava ) and non-existence 

( abhdva ). 

iv) The Buddha is not attached ( rakta ) and not unattached ( arakta ). It is by 
means of attachment ( rdga ) that he has attained certainty of release 

( nihsarana ). Knowing attachment (rdga) and unattachment (viraga), he has 
penetrated the nature of attachment ( rdgadharmatd ). 

v) The Buddha has transcended the aggregates ( skandhad-kranta ), but dwells 
in the aggregates ( skandhavihdrin ). The latter are neither identical to the first 
ones nor different from them (naivydnyd ndnanyah ). Although not 
abandoning them, the Buddhas are completely pacified (upasdnta). 

vi) The actions of the Buddhas are homogeneous (flow together) ( samsrsta ); 
they are like the waters of the ocean (samudrajala). The Buddhas do not 
worry themselves about serving beings (sattvartha), saying: “I have done 
that, I am doing that or I will do that.” 

vii) It is the fault of beings (sattvadosa) if the Buddha does not appear, like 
the moon ( candra ) which does not appear in a broken pot 
(bhagnabhajana). He penetrates (v yapnoti) the entire world with his doctrine 
(dharmaprabha) like the sun (surya). 

viii) Sometimes the Buddha manifests enlightenment (abhisambodhi), 
sometimes he is nirvanized: it is like fire ( agni ). He is never non-existent, for 
the body of the Tathagata is eternal. 

ix) With regard to ordinary dharmas ( andryadharma ), with regard to human 
destinies ( manusyagati ) and the bad destinies ( durgati ), with regard to non- 
religious dharmas (abrahma-caryadharma), the Buddha has a higher essence 
(i dtman ) and a higher abode ( vihdra ). 


411 



x) The Buddhas go everywhere ( sarvatra vicaranti ), but do not go anywhere. 
Although they appear everywhere, they are not perceived (gocara ) by the six 
senses ( indriya ). 

xi) Among the Buddhas, the defilements ( klesas ) have been corrected ( hata ) 
but not cut off ( prahata ) like a poison (visa) corrected by a magical spell 
(mantra). It is by means of the afflictions that they attain the destruction of 
the afflictions (klesaksaya) and attain the omniscience (sarvajhana) of a 
Buddha. 

xii) [Cf. Madhyantavibhanga, p. 98]: 

kleso bodhyanga apanno mahopayaprayoginah / 

samsaro 'py upasantydtmd tato 'cintyas tarthagatah // 

“In the Buddhas endowed with great means, the defilements become 
auxiliaries of enlightenment and samsara is identical with nirvana. Thus the 
Tathagata is inconceivable.” 

These depths are twelve in number: (1) depth of arising, establishment, activity 
and subsistence (utpddapratisthdkarmasthitigdmbhTrya); (2) depth of taking 
possession, of number and of activity (vyavasthdna-samkhydkarmagambhTrya); 
(3) depth of enlightenment (abhisambuddhagamblurya); (4) depth of detachment 
(vairdgya-gdmbhTrya); (5) depth of elimination of the aggregates 
(skandhaprahanagamblnrya); (6) depth of the ripening activity used on beings 
(sattvaparipacanagdmbhTrya); (7) depth of appearance ( dviskaran agdmb lurya ) ; 
(8) depth of the manifestation and of nirvana (abhisambodhinirvdna- 
darsanagambhlrya); (ix) depth of abode (vihdragdmbhTrya); (10) depth of 
manifestation of their self-essence (dtmabhdva-samdarsanagdmbhTrya); (11) 
depth in the cutting off of defilements (klesaprahdnagambhTrya); (12) depth of 
inconceivability (acintyagambhlrya). [150c 19] 


28. Comm. Bh 374al2-376al0, bh 221a5-225a3, U 443b6-445a6, u 346al-348b5. 


412 



“The dharmakaya of the Buddhas is profound, i.e., the dharmakaya of the Buddhas has a 
self-nature ( svabhava ) difficult to understand ( duravabodha ) and the intellect of the 
sages of this world (, lokakusala ) is unable to comprehend it. It is very profound, i.e., the 
dharmakaya is particularly difficult to understand and the intellect of the sravakas, etc., 
cannot grasp it. This depth is described in brief in twelve stanzas.” (U) 

“i) This stanza explains the profundity ( gambhirya ) of arising ( utpada ), establishment 
( pratistha ), activity ( karman ) and subsistence ( sthiti ). 

The Buddha has non-arising as arising : although they have no arising, the Buddhas seem 
to have an arising. That is the profundity of arising ( utpadagambhTrya ). 

He has non-establishment as establishment : his establishment consists of not being 
established in either samsara or nirvana; he is established in non-abiding nirvana 
( apratisthitanirvana , cf. chap. IX). That is the profundity of establishment 
( pratisthitagambhirya ). 

All his actions are carried out effortlessly, he accomplishes all his actions ( kriya ) 
effortlessly (prayatna ), like a precious jewel ( mani ) or a celestial musical instrument 
( turiya ). (Cf. chap. VIII, § 17). That is the profundity of activity ( karm a gam bh fry a) . 

He has the fourth nutriment as food. The nutriments are four in number: 

a. the nutriments that sustain an impure person (asuddhdsrayasthitydhdra); thus, 
the person bound by all the bonds {sakalabandhana, cf. Kosa, II, p. 180) sustains his 
body by means of the four foods: food-by-the -mouthfuls, etc. ( kavadikarahara , cf. chap. 
I, § 37). 

b. The nutriments that sustain a person who is both pure and impure 
( suddhdsuddhdsrayasthitydhdra ). Those who are bom and dwell in the realm of fonn 
(rupadhdtu) or in the formless realm (drupyadhdtu) sustain themsleves by contact-food 
( sparsahara ), mentally-operating food ( manahsamcetandhdra ) and consciousness-food 
( vijhdndhdra ). Having no craving ( vitaraga ), they do not have food-by-the-mouthfuls. 
On the other hand, the srotaapannas, in their quality as saiksas, are also both pure and 
impure (suddhasuddhasraya) but are sustained by the four nutriments. 

c. The nutriments that sustain a person who is exclusively pure 
(ekdn tasuddhdsrayasth i tydhdra ) ; thus, the arhats, etc., are sustained by these four foods. 


413 



d. The nutriments that sustain an obviously pure person 
(, samdarsakamdtrdsryayasthitydhdra ); thus the Buddha Bhagavat evidently receives and 
uses the four foods, food-by-the -mouthfuls, etc., but when the Bhagavat eats, he does not, 
in reality, experience eating. Nor does he pretend to eat so that his body subsists. 
Confonning to the world, he seems to utilize eating and borrows eating so that his body 
subsists. By appearing to eat this fourth food, he obtains his subsistence. That is the 
profundity of subsistence ( sthitigambhirya ).” (U) - Bh justifies the paradoxes of this 
stanza by means of four groups of ten reasons. 

“ii) This stanza explains the profundity of taking possession ( vyavasthana ), of number 
( samkhya ) and of activity (/carman). 

The Buddhas are one, but innumerable : this explains the profundity of taking possession 
(■ vyavasthanagambhuya ). Because the dharmakaya of the Buddhas is undivided 
(asambhinna), the Buddhas are one', but as innumerable people ( apramanasraya ) reach 
enlightenment ( abhisam - 

budh-) the Buddhas are innumerable (cf. above, chap. X, § 3, no. 3; § 8.; § 33). 

Their activity is immense, but single: this explains the profundity of number 
(samkhydgdmbhirya). Although the Buddhas may be innumerable, they have the same 
single activity. Hence their profundity. 

They have unstable and stable activity, for the Buddhas are endowed with three bodies. 
The Tathagatas are endowed with three bodies: By way of their enjoyment body 
(. sambhogakaya ), their activity is stable; by way of their apparitional body 
(nirmanakaya), their activity is unstable. This is the profindity of activity 
(karmagambhirya).” (Bh) - U differs: “The activity of the essential body (svabhavakaya) 
is stable; the activity of the other two bodies is unstable.” 

“iii) This stanza explains the profundity of the Enlightened One 
(abhisambuddhagambhuya). The Enlightened One does not exist, for the pudgala and the 
dharmas are non-existent; but, conventionally (samvrti) it is said that all the Buddhas are 
enlighened. How do we know that the Buddhas are enlightened? At every moment, there 
are innumerable Buddhas. This shows that at each instant, innumerable Buddhas reach 
enlightenment. They are constituted of existence and non-existence: this shows that the 


414 



true nature ( tathata ) is existence ( bhava ) and non-existence ( abhava ) and that the 
Buddhas are constituted ( prabhavita ) by this true nature.” (Bh) 

“The Enlightened One does not exist, for there is no imaginary nature 
( parikalpitasv abhava ) in the dependent nature ( paratantra ); but a// the Buddhas are not 
non-existent, for the absolute nature (parinispannasvabhava) really does exist in the 
dependent nature (cf. chap. II, § 32). At each instant, there are innumerable Buddhas : in 
universes ( lokadhatu ) surpassing in number the numberless grains of sand of the Ganges 
( gahgdnadivdluka ); from moment to moment and simultaneously ( samakala ), 
innumerable Buddhas reach enlightenment. They are consituted of existence and non- 
existence : the Tathagatas have attained a place (pada ) consisting {prabhavita ) of the 
emptiness of existence and of non-existence ( bhavabhavasunyata ).” (U) 

“iv) This stanza explains the profundity of detachment (vairagyagambhirya). The Buddha 
is not attached nor is he unattached. Since sensual attachment ( kamaraga ) is absent in 
him, it is said that he is not attached (rakta). Since he has no attachment, he is not 
unattached ( arakta ) either. Why? Because sensual attachment is necessary for one to be 
able to be detached from it. Since this attachment does not exist in him, he is not 
unattached. It is by way of attachment that he has attained release, for it is by eliminating 
the explosion of desire ( ragaparyavasthana ) but by keeping the traces of desire 
( kamanusaya , cf. Kosa, p. 3, 73) that he has attained definitive release 
(aty antikanihsar ana). If he had not kept the traces of desire, he would have entered into 
parinirvana like the sravakas, etc. Knowing attachment and unattachment, he has 
penetrated the nature of detachment. Understanding that this imaginary sensual 
attachment (parikalpitaka-maraga ) has no nature of attachment, he has understood the 
true nature of attachment ( ragadharmata).” (Bh) 

“v) This stanza explains the profundity of elimination of the aggregates 
(skandhaprahanagambhirya). The Buddhas have gone beyond all the imaginary 
aggregates (parikalpitaskandha), the aggregate of form, etc., (rupadiskandha), for they 
understand (yathabhutam parijananti ) completely that that which is imaginary does not 
exist. But they reside in the aggregates : the Buddhas reside in the aggregates of the true 
nature (dharmataskandha). These latter ones are not the same as the previous ones nor 
are they different from them. It cannot be said that the aggregates of the true nature are 
different from the imaginary aggregates, for the imaginary aggregates do not exist and, 


415 



consequently, are no different from what is. It cannot be said that they are identical, for 
the imaginary aggregates are afflicted ( sarnklista ) and, consequently, are distinct from the 
aggregates of true nature which have been purified. There is no identity nor difference 
between dharma and dhannata. Not abandoning them, the Buddhas are completely 
pacified : by not abandoning these aggregates of true nature, the Buddhas have attained 
nirvana par excellence.” (U) 

“vi) This stanza explains the profundity of ripening action ( paripacanagambhirya ). The 
actions of the Buddhas are homogeneous flow together j: the activity of the Tathagatas 
consists of actions dedicated to the welfare and happiness of beings (sattvah itasukha) . 
These actions, which are joined to one another and which together have a single taste 
(< ekarasa ), are mixed with one another. It is asked what these actions resemble, and the 
author replies that they are like the waters of the ocean : thus, the waters that flow into the 
reservoir ( varidhara ) of the ocean ( samudra ) have one and the same flavor, are mixed 
together and all maintain the well-being of the fish ( matsya ), etc. The Buddhas do not 
worry about sennng others, saying: 7 have done that, I am doing that ’ or 7 will do that 
without forcing themselves ( cittabhisamskarana ) or thinking ( manasikr -) about the 
interests of others ( parartha ), the Buddhas spontaneously ( svarasena ) accomplish the 
service of others in the three times. In the same way, the precious jewel ( mani ) and the 
celestial musical instrument of Sakra, etc., fulfill their role without thinking about it.” (U) 
- Same examples in Sutralamkara, IX, 18-19. 

vii) This stanza explains the profundity of appearance ( aviskaranagambhuya ). The 
people of the world ( loka ) do not see the Buddha and yet it is said that the body of the 
Buddha is eternal (nitya). If the body of the Buddha is eternal, why cannot it be seen? It 
is the fault of beings if he does not appear, like the moon which does not appear in a 
broken jar. water does not remain in a broken jar and, since the water does not remain in 
the jar, the moon cannot be reflected there; the same among beings ( satNakaya ): the 
water of tranquility ( samathajala ) being absent, the moon of Buddha ( buddhacandra ) 
does not appear. Here, concentration ( samadhi ) is compared to the water, for it is clear 
(ardra) by nature. He penetrates the whole world by means of his law, like the sun. 
Actually, the Buddha does not show himself in the world, but he penetrates everywhere 
(sarvavydpin) by his buddha activity ( buddhakriya ), by preaching the doctrine, sutra, 


416 



geya, etc. Like the light of the sun ( suryaprabha ) that penetrates the entire world, he 
fulfills his buddha activity and ripens ( vipacayati ) beings.” (Bh) 

This seventh stanza is very close to Sutralamkara, IX, 16: 

yathodabhdjane bhinne candrabimbam na drisyate / 

tatha dustesu buddhabimbam na drisyate // 

“viii) This stanza explains the profundity in the manifestation of enlightenment and 
nirvana ( abhisambodhinirvanasamdarsanagambhirya ). Sometimes the Buddha manifests 
enlightenment, sometimes he is nirvanized: it is like fire. Fire in this world blazes 
( prajvalati ) at some moments and is extinguished ( nirvapyate ) at other moments. It is the 
same for the Buddha: to those whose roots of good are not ripe ( aparipakvakusalamula ), 
he manifests enlightenment ( abhisambodhi ) in order to ripen these beings and lead them 
quickly to deliverance ( vimukti ); to those whose roots of good are ripe 
(paripakvakusalamula) and who are already delivered ( vimukta ), the Buddha manifests 
parinirvana, for he has nothing further to do. He is never non-existent, etc.: the meaning 
is easy to understand.” (U) 

This eighth stanza is very close to Sutralamkara IX, 17: 

yathagnir jvalate 'nyatra punar anyatra sayati / 

buddhesu api tatha jheyam samdarsanam adarsanam // 

“ix) This stanza explains the profundity of abode ( viharagabhirya ). In regard to ordinary 
dharmas, the Buddha has a superior essence and abode : in respect to bad dharmas 
(i akusaladharma ), the Buddha has a superior essence and a superior abode [cf. bh: de dag 
la yah bdag hid mchog dan b€ugs pa mchogyin te\. His abode is superior, for it is by 
abiding in the concentrations on emptiness ( sunyata ), wishlessness ( apranihita ) and 
signlessness ( animitta ) that he is supported ( alambate ) on these bad dharmas and abides 
there. - In respect to human destinies and bad destinies, he has superior essence and 
abode: His abode is superior because it is by abiding in the dhyanas and the 
concentrations ( samapatti ) that he knows these destinies and abides there. - With respect 
to the dharmas of non-religion, he has a superior essence and superior abode: His abode 
is superior because it is by abiding in the brahmaviharas called the infinite practices 


417 



{apramana, cf. above, chap. X, § 10) that he knows these dharmas of non-religion and 
abides there.” (U) 

“x) This stanza explains the profundity of the very essence ( atmabhavagambhirya ). The 
very essence, because the eternal dhannadhatu of the Tathagatas and the qualities ( guna ) 
derived therefrom are designated generally by the expression 'very essence’. The Buddhas 
go everywhere: their subsequent nonconceptual knowledge ( prsthalabdhajhdna , cf. chap. 
VII) goes everywhere. Where do they go? To diverse objects ( visaya ), good ( kusala ), bad 
(< akusala ), indeterminate ( avyakrta ), impure ( sasrava ), pure ( anasrava ), conditioned 
(, sarnskrta ), unconditioned ( asarnskita ). etc. But they do not go everywhere: their 
fundamental nonconceptual knowledge ( nirvikalpakajhana ) which is without concept 
( vikalpa ) does not go out to the diverse objects. Although they appear everywhere: 
although their apparitional bodies ( nirrndnakaya ) take birth in all places, the Buddhas are 
not perceived by the six senses, because from the absolute point of view 
( pararnarthatah ), the eternal dharmakaya does not present the possibility of arising 
(, upapattyayatana ) and is not grasped by the damned ( naraka ) or by similar beings 
(. sabhagasattva ).” (U). 

“xi) This stanza explains the profundity of cutting off the afflictions 
(, klesaprahanagambhirya ). In the Buddhas, the afflictions are corrected but not cut off: in 
the state of bodhisattva, they have corrected the afflictions without cutting them off. In 
the way that a poison is corrected by a spell: corrected by a magician's spell {mantra), a 
poison {visa) keeps its nature but is unable to hann. [Cf. Kasyapaparivarta, § 48, p. 78]. It 
is the same for the afflictions: the power of mindfulness {srnrti) and knowledge {jhana ) 
corrects their eruption, but the traces {anusaya) of the afflictions subsist. Why do the 
traces of the afflictions persist? Because while suppressing them, the Buddhas fear 
entering into parinirvana immediately like the sravakas. Thus it is thanks to the afflictions 
that they reach the destruction of the afflictions {kleshaksaya) and attain omniscience 
{sarvajhana). A stanza says: When the afflictions are rectified by the power of 
mindfulness {srnrti) and knowledge {jhana ), bodhi is attained; similarly, when a poison 
{visa) is submitted to the action of a magical spell {mantra), its faults {dosa) become 
qualities {guna).” (U) 

“ By retaining the defilements in the state of traces {anusaya), the Buddhas reach the 
definitive destruction of the defilements {atyantikaklesaksaya) and attain the omniscience 


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of a Buddha, instead of entering into parinirvana at once like the sravakas, because 
omniscience is attained when the afflictions are destroyed.” (Bh) 

“xii) This stanza explains the profundity of inconceivability (acin tyagam bh Try a ) . The 
defilements become auxiliaries of enlightenment ( bodhipaksya ), and the suffering of 
samsara is the same as nirvana. Results such as these coming from causes such as these 
are inconceivable in the world.” (U) 


29. When the bodhisattvas recollect the dharmakaya of the Buddhas, by how 
many recollections ( anusmrti ) do they recollect it? In brief ( samasatah ), the 
bodhisattvas practice ( bhavayanti ) seven methods ( sap tad ltd ) of recollecting the 
Buddhas (buddhan usmrti ) : 

i) They recollect them by saying: "The Buddhas enjoy sovereignty over all 
dharmas ( sarvadharmavibhutva )”, for in all the universes ( lokadhdtu ) they 
have acquired unhindered ( apratigha ) superknowledges ( abhijha ). Here is a 
stanza: 

The Buddas do not have sovereignty over the entire world of beings 
( sattvadhatu ) who are prevented by obstacles ( savarana ), deprived of the 
cause ( hetuvisamyukta ) and bound by the twofold fate 
( niyamadvayasamprayukta ). 

ii) They recollect them by saying: " The body of the Tathagatas 

( tathagatakaya ) is eternal (, nitya )", for the Tathagatas [ace. to H: tathata] are 
[is] always without stain ( malavimukta ). 

iii) They recollect them by saying: “The Tathagatas are absolutely ( atyantam ) 
blameless (niravadya )" , for they are free of any obstacle of affliction and any 
obstacle to knowledge ( sarvaklesajheydvarana ). 

iv) They recollect them by saying: "The Tathagatas have no effort to make 
(andbhoga )" , for, being free of effort, any activity of the Buddha 
(sarvah u ddh akriyd) knows no interruption ( asamucchinna ). 


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v) They recollect them by saying: " The Tathagatas have great enjoyment 
(mahabhoga)" , for the pure Buddha fields (pans uddh ab u ddh aksetra) are a 
great enjoyment. 

vi) They recollect them by saying: "The Tathagatas are free of stains 
(anupalipta)" , for they are not stained by any human situation ( lokadharma ) 
while appearing in the world. 

vii) They recollect them by saying: "The Tathagatas have great usefulness 
(mahartha)" , for by manifesting ( samdarsana ) enlightenment ( abhisambodhi ) 
and nirvana, they ripen beings who are not yet ripe ( aparipakvasattvdn 
paripdcayanti) and deliver beings who are already ripe (paripakvasattvdn 
vimocayanti). Here are some stanzas: 

a. The Buddhas possess: (1) the perfection resulting from perfect 
volition (svacittddh In asampad) , (2) the perfection of eternity ( nitya ), (3) the 
perfection of purity ( suddha ), (4) the perection of absence of effort 

( andbhoga ), (5) the perfection consisting of communicating the great 
enjoyments of the Dharma (m ah ddh arm as am bh ogan upraddna). 

b. (6) The perfection of independent movement ( andsritapracdra ), (7) 
the perfection consisting of wanting the welfare of beings 

( bahiijandrthakdmatd ). Wise people ( dliira ) should practice the recollections 
(i anusmrti ) with regard to all these Buddhas. [ 1 5 1 al 0] 


29. Comm. Bh 376b2-376c7, bh 225a3-226a5, U 445a27-445c5, u 348b5-349b7. 

“This passage explains how the bodhisattvas recollect the qualities ( guna ) of the 
dharmakaya of the Buddhas. 

i) The Buddhas enjoy sovereignty over all dharmas : as a result of repeated practice 
(abhyasa), the Tathagatas have attained sovereignty over all dharmas 
(sarvadharmavibhutva, cf. chap. X, § 1); at their will ( kantamatrena ), the fulfillment of 
all the qualities ( sarvagunaparipuri ) is manifested ( sammukhfbhavati ) in them. 

Objection : If the Tathagatas in all the immense ( apramana ) and infinite ( ananta ) 
universes ( lokadhatu ) enjoy the unhindered superknowledges ( apratihatdbhijhd ), why do 


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not all beings reach parinirvana? - Because these beings are prevented by the obstacles 
(sdvarana) and deprived of the cause of nirvana. Having shown that the Buddha enjoys 
sovereignty over all the dharmas ( sarvadharmavibhutva ) in a general way, then, the 
author is going to explain in a more specific way why the Buddha does not have 
sovereignty over beings ( sattvavibhutva); this is why he says the stanza: 

Over the entire world of beings hindered by the obstacles and deprived of the cause. 
Beings are prevented by the obstacles: obstacles consisting of afflictions ( klesa ), action 
( karman ) and retribution ( vipaka ); for example, the violent emotions ( tfvrak/esa , cf. 
Kosa, IV, p. 202), the sins requiring immediate retribution ( anantaryakarman , cf. Kosa, 
IV, p. 201), stupidity (jadata), deceit ( kaitava ), and so on. They are deprived of the 
cause, because they do not have the cause for nirvana, because they do not have the 
family ( gotra , cf. chap. X, § 3, no. 3). They are bound by the twofold fate 
( niyamadvayasamprayukta ), namely, the fate of karmic action ( gurukarmakaraniyama ) 
and the the necessity of suffering the retribution ( vipakanubhavaniyama ). The fate of 
karmic action: a repeated action ( abhyasa ) brings about a result of similar cause 
(. sabhagahetu ), necessarily associated with a result that accords with the cause 
(i nisyandaphala ). [Cf. u: yah dan yah du goms pahi phyir skal ba mham pahi rgyu las mi 
za rgyu mthun pahi hbras bu hbyuh bahi phyir te. For the explanation, see Kosa, II, p. 
294]. Thus Ajatasatru, who had killed his father, king Bimbisara (cf. Sumangalavilasim, 
I, p. 135-137), was in turn killed by his son Udaya or Udayibhaddha, (cf. Mahavamsa, 
IV, 1). The necessity of suffering retribution, for action necessarily always requires 
retribution; it is necessary to suffer the result of retribution ( vipakaphala ). Thus the 
Sakyas necessarily had to be killed by Virudhaka (Pali, Visudabha, cf. 
Dhammapadatthakatha, I, p. 346-349; Katthaharijataka, no. 7, I, p. 133; 
Bhaddasalajataka, no. 465, IV, p. 146 seq., 151 seq.). The Buddha has no sovereignty 
allowing him to introduce the beings in question into nirvana; this is why, after having 
shown in general that the Tathagata enjoys sovereignty over all dharmas, the author is 
forced to say, more specifically, that he does not have sovereignty over beings. 

ii) The Tathagata ’s body is eternal because he has the very pure tathata 
( ativisuddhatathatd ) as self-nature because it is unalterable ( ananyathavrtti ) and 
immovable ( avikara ). 


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iii) The Tathagatas are absolutely without reproach, because they have cut all the 
erroneous ( savadya ) obstacles, the obstacle of defilements and the obstacle to knowledge 
( kies aj hey a varana) . 

iv) The Tathagatas do not have to make any effort : they are like a celestial musical 
instrument (tiny a, cf. chap. VII, § 17). The meaning is easy to understand. 

v) The Tathagatas have great enjoyment, for they enjoy the blooming of the qualities 
( gunavyuha ) of the pure buddhafields ( buddhaksetra ) which are the great enjoyment of 
the Dhanna ( mahadharmabhoga ). [Ace. to Bh: The pure buddhaksetras of the Tathagatas 
are called great enjoyment], 

vi) The Tathagatas are free of stains : they are like the blue lotus ( mlotpala ) which is 
unstained by the water. (Cf. Kasyapaparivarta, v. 38, p. 67). The meaning is easy to 
understand. 

vii) The Tathagatas are of great use. By manifesting enlightenment and nirvana, they 
render the greatest service to beings: according to needs ( yathakalpam ), they ripen them 
or deliver them. 

These are the seven recollections of the Buddhas. 

Two stanzas summarize these ideas. The word ‘perfection’ ( sampad) applies to each 
member of the stanza: 

(1) The perfection resulting from right volition {s va c ittddh in a sum pad) summarizes the 
first recollection: sovereignty over all dharmas (sarvadharma vibhutvalaksana ) . 

(2) The perfection of eternity ( nityasampad) summarizes the second recollection: the 
eternity of the body ( kayanityalaksana ). 

(3) The perfection of purity ( suddhasampad) summarizes the third recollection: 
irreproachability ( niravadyalaksana ). 

(4) The perfection of absence of effort (anabhogasampad) summarizes the fourth 
recollection: absence of effort ( anabhogalaksana ). 

(5) the perfecion of communicating the great enjoyments of the Dharma 
( mahadharmasambhoganupradanasampad ) summarizes the fifth recollection: the great 
enjoyment of the Dharma ( mahadharmasambhogalaksana ). 


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(6) The perfection of independent movement ( anasritapracarasampad) summarizes the 
sixth recollection: the fact of not being stained by any human circumstances 
(lokadharma). 

(7) The perfection consisting of wanting the welfare of many beings 
(bahujanarthakamatasampad) summarizes the seventh recollection: being of great use by 
procuring the welfare and happiness (hitasukha) of beings widely. 

In regard to all these Buddhas, i.e., towards the perfections ( sampad) and the qualities 
( guna ) of the Tathagatas, the wise ones, i.e., the bodhisattvas, should practice the 
recollections: should practice the seven recollections ( anusmrti ). This recollection 
consists of remembering ( smarana ) the Buddha and recalling (ahhildpa) him without loss 
of memory ( mushitasmrtita ).” (U) 


30. How should the pure buddhafield {parisuddhabuddhaksetra ) of the Buddhas 
be understood? - As it is said in the introduction (prastdvand) to the Sutra in 
One Hundred Thousand Lines of the bodhisattva-pitaka ( bodhisattvapitaka - 
satasahasrikasutra; cf. Samdhinirmocanasutra, ed. p. 31-32). The Buddha 
dwells ( viharati ) in a great palace ( mahdvimdna ): 

i) This palace is adorned with seven brilliant jewels (pradTpasaptaratnaracita) 
and emits great light filling immense universes 
(aprameyalokadhdtuparipurakamahdrasmyutthdpaka). 

ii) Its immense rooms are well arranged ( suvibhaktd-pramdnavyavasthdna ). 

iii) Its surface is unlimited ( aparicchinnamandala ) [H adds: and its dimensions 
immeasurable ( duravagahapramana ) . 

iv) Its domain surpasses the threefold world ( traidhdtuka - 
samatikrdntagocard). 

v) It is the result of supramundane and supreme roots of good 
(lokottarataduttarakusalamulotpanna). 

vi) It has the very efficacious and very pure knowledge 
( visuddavijhaptilaksana ) as nature. 


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vii) It is the residence of the Tathagata ( tathagatavihara ). 

viii) It is the refuge of the great bodhisattvas (mahabodhisattvapratisarana). 

ix) It is the immense promenade ( apramdnavicarana ) of the devas, nagas, 
yaksas, asuras, garudas, kimnaras, mahoragas, manusyas and 
amanusyas. 

x) It is supported by the great joy and great bliss of the taste of the Dharma 
( m ah ddh arm arasapntisukh adhistita ) . 

xi) It is used in the service of all beings ( sarvasattvdrtha-kriyopasthita ). 

xii) It excludes all the suffering of the afflictions ( apagatasarvaklesopadrava ). 

xiii) It drives out all the maras (sarvamaraparityakta). 

xiv) It surpasses all other manifestations ( sarvavyuhdtirikta ), for it is adorned 
with the miraculous activity of the Tathagata ( tathagatadhisthanaracita ). 

xv) It has great mindfulness, great intellect and great practice 
( mahasmrtimatipratipattiniryana ) for paths. 

xvi) It has great tranquility and great insight ( mahasamathavipasyanayana ) 
as vehicles. 

xvii) It has the great gates of deliverance: emptiness, signlessness, and 
wishlessness (sunyata-n im ittdpran ih itam ahdvim oksamukh apravesa) as entry- 
ways. 

xviii) It has one of the priceless king-lotuses adorned with innumerable 
collections of qualities ( apramanaguna - 
samcaydlamkrtamahdratnapadmardjanisrita ) as base. 

In the same way, the following perfections are attributed to the pure 
buddhaheld: (1) perfection of color ( varnasampad ), (2) perfection of shape 
( samsthdnasampad ), (3) perfection of size (pram an asampad) , (4) perfection of 
territory (desasampad), (5) perfection of cause (hetusampad), (6) perfection of 
result (phalasampad ), (7) perfection of ruler (adhipatisampad), (8) perfection 
of assistance (paksasatnpad ), (9) perfection of retinue (parivarasampad ), (10) 


424 



perfection of maintenance (adh ishth an asampad ) , (11) perfection of action 
( karmasampad ), (12) perfection of auxiliary ( upakdrasampad ), (13) perfection 
of absence of fear ( n irhh ay asampad) , (14) perfection of seat ( dspadasampad ), 
(15) perfection of path ( margasampad ), (16) perfection of vehicle 
(yanasampad), (17) perfection of entry ( mukhasampad ), (18) perfection of 
base (i adit ur asampad ). 

The enjoyment ( bhoga ) of this pure buddhafield is absolutely pure 
( ekdntasuddha ), absolutely blissful ( ekdntasukha ), absolutely irreproachable 
( ekantaniravadya ) and absolutely efficacious ( ekdntavibhu ). [15 lb2] 


30. Comm. Bh 376c28-377b6, bh 226a5-227bl, U 445c25-446b27, u 349b7-351b7. 

[For the equivalence Bodhisattvapitikasatasahasrika = Samdhinormocana, see Notes]. 
“This passage concerns the pure buddhafields of the Buddha: 

i) This palace is adorned with seven brilliant jewels. The buddhaksetra of the Buddha is 
brilliant with light and has seven jewels ( ratna ) as ornaments. Or else, it is the seven 
jewels that are brilliant. These seven jewels are: 1) gold ( suvarna ), 2) silver ( rupya ), 3) 
lapis-lazuli (vaidurya), 4) cat's-eye ( musaragalva ), 5) emerald ( asmagarbha ) including 
indramla (sapphire), mahamla, etc., 6) red pearl ( lohitamuktika ) which is an extract of a 
red insect ( lohitapranika ), 7) chrysoberyl ( karketana ). (See Notes) 

It emits a great light filling immense universes. The seven brilliant jewels 
( pradTptasaptaratna ) emit a great light ( maharasmi ) which fdls infinite universes 
(anantalokadhdtu). Or else, the pure buddhaksetra itself emits a great light which fills 
infinite universes, for it penetrates (y vapnoti) infinite universes by its nature 
( svabhavatah ), 

These two phrases which concern the pure buddhaksetra explain its perfection of color 
( varnasampad ). 

ii) Its immense rooms are well arranged. The immense rooms ( apramanavyavasthana ) of 

the pure buddhaksetra are well arranged ( suvibhakta ): they are distributed 

(y yavasthapita) and adorned ( mandita ) according to a plan decided upon in advance. This 
phrase explains the perfection of shape ( samsthanasampad) of the buddhaksetra. 


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iii) Its surface is limitless and its dimensions immeasurable. The dimensions ( pramana ) 
and the surface ( mandala ) of the pure buddhaksetra are limitless ( aparicchinna ) and 
immeasurable ( duravagaha ). Or else, its surface is immeasurable because its dimensions 
are limitless. This phrase explains the perfection of dimension (pramanasarnpad) of the 
buddhaksetra. 

iv) Its domain surpasses the threefold world. Its territory ( desa ) surpasses the domain 
( gocara ) of the threefold world ( traidhatuka ) because it is not the object ( gocara ) of the 
craving belonging to the threefold world (traidhatukatrsna) and because it is not a result 
of retribution of action ( karmavipakaphala ). This phrase explains the perfection of 
territory ( desasampad ) belonging to the buddhaksetra. 

v) It is the outcome of supramundane and supreme roots of good. The pure buddhaksetra 
arises having the supramundane roots of good ( lokottarakusalamula ) and the supreme 
roots of good previously acquired ( prsthalabdhottarakusalamula ) as cause ( hetu ). It does 
not have a creator ( Isavara , etc.) as cause. This phrase explains the perfection of cause 
(, hetusampad) of the buddhaksetra. - [Bh: What is its cause? It is supramundane 
nonconceptual knowledge ( lokottaranirvikalpakajhana ) and subsequent knowledge 
( prsthalabdhajhdna ); this subsequent knowledge is called supreme (u tiara) because it is 
acquired subsequent to the preceding one.] 

vi) For nature it has the very efficacious and very pure mind. The pure buddhaksetra has 
the very efficacious ( ativibhu ) and very pure ( ativisuddha ) mind ( vijnapti ) as nature 
(, laksana ) for it is nothing but mind (vijhaptimd.tr a) and there is no external object 
(bahya) such as jewels (ratna), etc., outside of this mind. But it is this pure mind that is 
transfonned ( parinam -) in this way into jewels, etc. This phrase explains the perfection 
of result (phalasampad) of the buddhaksetra. 

vii) It is the residence of the Tathagata. It has the Buddha and none other as ruler 
(adhipati). This phrase explains the perfection of ruler (adhipatisampad) of the 
buddhaksetra. 

viii) It is the refuge of the great bodhisattvas. Only the bodhisattvas already entered into 
the great bhumis ( mahabhumipravista ) live there and assist the Tathagata. There are no 
sravakas, etc., there. This phrase explains the perfection of assistance (paksasarnpad) of 
the buddhaksetra. 


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ix) It is the immense promenade of the devas, nagas, yaksas, etc. The devas, etc. who live 
there serve him as retinue ( parivara ). These are magical creations ( nirmana ) without 
reality. Mahoraga means the great boa constrictors. This phrase explains the perfection of 
retinue ( parivarasampad ) of the buddhaksetra. 

x) It is maintained by the great joy and great bliss of the taste of the Dharma. In this pure 
buddhaksetra, joy ( priti ) and bliss ( sukha ), the taste of the Dhanna of the great vehicle 
( mahayanadharmarasa ) serve as food (cihara). This phrase explains the perfection of 
maintenance ( adhisthdnasampad) of the buddhaksetra, for food ( ahara ) maintains 
(adhitisthdti) the life of the body. 

xi) It is used to procure the interest of all beings. After eating this food, it procures the 
interest of all beings (sarvasattvdrtlia). This phrase explains the perfection of activity 
(karmasampad) of the buddhaksetra. 

xii) It excludes the torments of the afflictions. In this pure buddhafield there are no 
tonnents ( upadrava ) caused by the afflictions (kies a). This phrase explains the 
benefaction ( upakarasampad) of the buddhaksetra. 

xiii) It drives away the maras. It expels the four enemies ( caturamitra ), namely, 
klesamara (the afflictions), skandhamara (the aggregates), mrtyumara (death) and 
devaputramara (the Evil One) (cf. Sikshasamuccaya, p. 198; Mahavastu, III, p. 273, 281; 
Madh. vrtti, p. 49; etc.). This phrase explains the perfection of absence of fear 
(nirbhayasampad) of the buddhaksetra. 

xiv) It surpasses all the other manifestations and is adorned with the miraculous activity 
of the Tathagata. It surpasses the manifestations (vyuha) of all the bodhisattvas for it is 
the seat (aspada) of the manifestation of a Tathagata. This phrase explains the perfection 
of seat ( aspadasampad) of the buddhaksetra, for it is far superior (bahvantaravisista) to 
all other seats. 

xv) For roads it has great mindfulness, great intellect and great practice. Great 

mindfulness ( mahasmrti ) is the wisdom that comes from hearing (read wen so tch’eng 
houei = srutamayiprajha). Great intellect ( mahamati ) is the wisdom that comes from 
reflecting (read: sseu so tch’eng houei = cintamayiprajha). Great practice 

(mahapratipatti) is the wisdom that comes from meditation ( bhavanamayiprajha ). This 


427 



phrase explains the perfection of path ( margasampad) of the buddhaksetra. Here road 
(nirvana) is synonymous ( paryaya ) with path (marga). 

xvi) As vehicles, it has the great tranquility and great insight. Mounted ( arudha ) on 
tranquility (hamatha) and insight ( vipasyana ), it travels on the three paths of wisdom 
( prajhamarga ) and goes toward the pleasure-garden of destinies (gatyarama). This 
tranquility and insight, which surpass the tranquility and insight of the sravakas and 
pratyekabuddhas, is called great. This phrase explains the perfection of vehicle 
( yanasampad) of the buddhaksetra. 

xvii) For entry-ways, it has the great gates of deliverance: emptiness, signlessness and 
wishlessness. It has three gates of deliverance ( vimoksamukha , cf. Kosa, VIII, p. 184) as 
entries. Entry (pravesa) is synonymous with door (dvara). These doors are called great 
for the same reason as above. This phrase explains the perfection of entry 
(mukhasampad) of the buddhaksetra. 

xviii) As base it has a priceless king-lotus adorned with innumerable collections of 
qualities. Just as worldly people (loka) are ornamentd with jewels (ratna), collections of 
jewels ornament this pure buddhafield. It has as support a priceless king-lotus (hong lien 
hoa translates satapattra, padma and utpala in Mahavyut, 6143-6145) (maharatna) 
adorned with innumerable collections of qualities. Just as the circle of earth rests on the 
ciircle of wind (vayumandala, cf. Kosa, III, p. 138), so this pure buddhafield is supported 
by a priceless king-lotus adorned with innumerable collections of qualities. This lotus 
(padma), being far superior (bahvantaravisista) to other flowers, is called the priceless 
king-lotus (maharatnapadmaraja). - Or else, it is the Tathagata who is called great king 
(maharaja) because he is the great Dhanna king (mahadharmaraja) and this lotus is the 
seat (adhara) of the Buddha and takes its name from its master. It is the basis of the 
buddhaksetra: the pure buddhaksetra which rests on this king-lotus lasts for a long time 
without interruption. This phrase explains the perfection of the basis (adharasampad) of 
the buddhaksetra. 

The enjoyment of this pure buddhaksetra is absolutely pure : this ksetra is without dirt 
(asuci) because it is free of dung (midha). It is absolutely blissful, for in it there is no sad 
feeling (duhkhavedand) or intermediate feeling (madhyavedana). It is absolutely 
irreproachable, for in it there is no bad element (akusala) or ethically indeterminate 


428 



feeling ( avyakrta ). It is absolutely efficacious, for, without depending on any external 
condition ( bahyapratyayanapeksam ), the buddhaksetra results from a simple production 
of mind ( cittotpadamatra ).” (U) 


31. Moreover, this fundamental element ( dharmadhatu ) of the Buddhas carries 
out five activities ( karman ) at all times: 

i) It protects (paritarayati) beings from torments ( upadrava ), for by its view 
alone ( drstamatra ), it protects against the torments of blindness ( audit at d ), 
deafness ( badhirata ), madness ( unmdda ), etc. 

ii) It protects against bad destinies ( durgati ), for it makes one abandon bad 
states ( akusaldt sthanad vyutthdpayati) and introduces one into good states 

( kusale sthdne pratisthapayati). 

iii) It protects from bad methods ( anupdya ), for by preventing heretics 

( tlrthika ) from seeking deliverance ( vimoksa ) by bad means (anupdya), it 
introduces them ( nivesayati ) into the holy Dharma (aryadesand) of the 
Tathagata. 

iv) It protects from satkaya, for it provides a path transcending the threefold 
world ( traidhdtukasamatikrdntamdrga ). 

v) It protects from the lower vehicles, for it introduces (nivesayati) 
bodhisattvas who are attached to other vehicles and sravakas, etc., who are 
of uncertain family (aniyatagotra) into the practice of the Greater Vehicle 
(mahdydnapratipatti). 

All Buddhas have the same (santa) activity concerning these five activities of 
protection. Here is a stanza: 

Since the causes (hetu), supports (as ray a), functions (kriya), intentions (dsaya) 
and modes of operation (samskdra) differ, in the world differences in activity 
are assumed. Since these diversifying forces are not present in them, the 
masters of the world (lokandyaka) do not have different activities. [ 1 5 1 b 14] 


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Comm. Bh 377b21-377cl 1, bh 227bl-228a3, U 446c 1 1 -447a 17, 351b7-352b6. 

“This fundamental element ( dharmadhatu ) of the Buddhas is the dharmakaya. It carries 
out five activities (lair man) always: 

i) It protects beings from torments. Torments ( upadrava ) are the sufferings, illnesses 
(vyadhi), etc., produced by causes ( pratityasamutpanna ). Just by seeing it, it protects 
from the torments of blindness, deafness, madness, etc. Thus a sutra says: By the sight of 
the Buddha, the blind recover their sight, the deaf their hearing and madmen thier 
reasoning, etc. [Cf. Suvarnaprabhasa, ed. Hokei Idzumi, p. 8: jatyandhas ca sattva rupani 
pasyanti sma, badhirds ca sattvah sattvebhyah sabdani srnvanti, unmattas ca sattvah 
smrtim pratilabhante 'viksiptacittas ca smrtimanto babhuvuh ]. 

Objection. You said, in chap. X, § 27, that the dharmadhatu is not perceived by the six 
senses (indriya). Why do you say now that blind people, etc., recover their sight and see 
the dharmakaya? - Seeing the dharmakaya is to perfect ( paripuri ) the dharmakaya by 
means of the projecting power ( avedhabala ) of a previous vow ( purvapranidhana ). Then 
the dharmakaya carries out the activity of an apparitional body ( nirmdnakdya ) and thus 
causes blind people, etc., to recover their sight and, by the power of their previous 
accumulatuions ( purvasambhara ), to attain ( adhigam -) the dharmakaya. The dharmakaya 
carries out its activity spontaneously ( svarasena ) like a mechanical wheel that, at the end, 
returns to its beginning. Here it is said that one sees the dharmakaya but, in reality, one 
sees only an appearance (nirmana). 

ii) It protects from the bad destinies. In making one abandon the bad destinies, it 
introduces one into the good states and this is what is called protection ( paritrana ) for, if 
the cause no longer exists, the result does not exist either. 

iii) It protects from bad methods. The meaning is clear. 

iv) It protects from satkaya. Kaya means ’body' or ’accumulation’ and sat means 'false, 
erroneous'. This accumulation body, being false, is called satkaya. Satkayadrsti arises in 
relation to it (cf. Kosa, V, p. 16). It concerns the impure dharmas of the threefold world 
(traidhatukasasravadharma). In regard to them, the Buddha preaches the doctrine of 
escape ( nairyanikadharma ), and this is what is called protection. 


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v) It protects from the lower vehicles. It causes the bodhisattvas and the sravakas of 
indeterminate family ( aniyatagotra ) to reach great enlightenment ( mahabodhi ) and it 
establishes them in the complete practice ( samyakcarita ) of the Greater Vehicle. 

From the point of view of these five activities, the Buddhas are all the same ( sama ). In 
order to explain this idea, the author adds a stanza. 

In the world ( loka ), when the causes (hetu) differ, differences of activity 
( karmaprabheda ) are assumed: thus, the divine cause is a peculiar cause; the human 
cause, the demonic cause, etc. are peculiar causes. This is why the activities are different. 
Among the Buddhas, this is not the case. The cause being identical ( abhinna ), their 
activities are not different. 

In the world, when the supports ( asraya ) are different, differences in activity are 
assumed. By supports is meant the individuals. Because they differ, the activities differ. 
Thus, Devadatta and Yajnadatta, who are different individuals, have different activities. 
This is not the case for the Buddhas. Since the dharmakaya of all the Buddhas is 
identical, their activities have no difference. By functions here is meant the diverse 
occupations ( prayojana ) practiced. Because the functions differ, the activities are 
different. Thus the fanner ( krsibala ) has a perculiar function, the merchant ( vanij ) has a 
peculiar function, and so on. Since their function, i.e., the service to beings, is identical 
among all of them, their activities are not different. 

In the world, when intentions ( asaya ) differ, differences in activity are assumed. 
Intention means the pursued aim ( abhipraya ). Thus in the world, the intention directed 
towards the good ( hitasaya ) and the intention directed towards happiness ( sukhasaya ) 
have different objects ( visaya ) and the activities corresponding to them are different. This 
is not the case with the Buddhas. Since their intentions of working for the benefit and 
happiness of all beings ( sarvasattvahitasukhakriyasaya ) are identical, their activities are 
not different. 

In the world, when the modes of operation ( samskara ) differ, different activities are 
assumed. Mode of operation means effort ( vyayama ). Thus a mediocre effort produces a 
mediocre activity, a great effort produces a great activity. Because the efforts differ, the 
activities are different. This is not the case for the Buddhas. Since all their activity ( kriya ) 
is carried out without effort ( anabhoga ), their activities are not different. 


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Since these diversifying forces do not exist among them, the masters of the world do not 
have different activities : since these five diversifying forces, cause ( hetu ), etc., do not 
exist among them, there are no differences in the fivefold activities among the masters of 
the world ( lokanayaka or Buddha).” (U) 


32. If this dharmakaya of the Buddhas, associated with such qualities (guna ) and 
such perfections ( sampad ), does not occur ( asddhdrana ) among the sravakas and 
the pratyekabuddhas, with what intention ( kimsamdhaya ) did the Buddha 
proclaim a single vehicle ( ekayana )? - Here are some stanzas: 

a. [Cf. Sutralarnkara, XI, 54]: 

akarsanartham ekesam anyasamdharanaya ca / 

desitaniyatanam hi sambuddhair ekayanata // 

“In order to attract some and to maintain others, the single vehicle has been 
preached by the Buddhas to people of indeterminate family.” 

b. [Cf Sutralarnkara, XI, 53]: 

dharmanairatmyamuktinam tulyatvat gotrabhedatah / 

dvyasayaptes ca nirmanat paryantad ekayanata // 

“By virtue of the identity of dharmas, the non-existence of self and 
deliverance, by virtue of the difference in families, acquisition of two 
convictions, transformations and preeminence, there is but one single 
vehicle.” [151b20] 

32. Comm. Bh 377cl9-378a22, bh 228a3-229a6, U 447a25-447b27, u 352b6-353b5. 

“Two stanzas explain the intention of the Buddha in proclaiming a single vehicle: 

a. To attract some (akarsanartham ekesam)'. he attracts the sravakas of indeterminate 
family ( aniyatagotra ) and arranges it so that they enter into the Greater Vehicle. Why? 
Because he wants the sravakas of indeterminate family to reach parinirvana by means of 
the Greater Vehicle. To support others (anyasamdharanaya)'. he maintains the 


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bodhisattvas of indeterminate family and arranges it so that they remain in the Greater 
Vehicle. Why? Because he wants the bodhisattvas of indeterminate family not to leave 
the Greater Vehicle and not to use the vehicle of the sravakas to reach parinirvana. The 
Buddha proclaims a single vehicle for these reasons.” (Bh) 

“b. By virtue of iden tity of the Dharma (dharmatulyatvdt) . By Dhanna is meant the true 
nature ( tathata ). The vehicles - the vehicle of the sravakas, etc., - although they are 
different, lead alike to tathata, and as this tathata towards which they go is the same 
(i nirvisista ), the Buddha proclaims the single vehicle. 

By virtue of the identity of the non-existence of self (nairdtmyatulyatvdt) . In these 
vehicles, the non-existence of self of the individual ( pudgalanairdtmya ) is the same. If 
there really were different pudgalas, there could be different vehicles, e.g., that of the 
sravakas and that of the bodhisattvas. But as there really are no different pudgalas, the 
Buddha proclaims the single vehicle. 

By virtue of the identity of deliverance (muktitulyatvdt) . Insofar as they deliver from the 
obstacle of the afflictions ( klesavaranavimukti ), the three vehicles are identical. As the 
Buddha said: “There is no difference between deliverance and deliverance.” It is in this 
sense ( samdha ) that the Buddha proclaims the single vehicle. 

By virtue of the difference of families (gotrabhedatah). Sravakas of indeterminate family 
(< aniyatagotra ) are of different kinds. In the crowds of sravakas moving towards 
enlightenment ( bodhiparinata ) there are both the family of the sravakas ( shravakagotra ) 
and the family of the Buddhas ( buddhagotra ). For this reason, the Buddha proclaims the 
single vehicle. 

By virtue of the acquisition of two convictions (dvydsaybpteh): because a twofold 
conviction ( ahaya ) has been acquired: 1) The Buddhas acquire the conviction of being 
the same as all beings (sarvasattvesu atmasyam prapnuvanti ); they say: "They are me, 
and I am them. Since this one (myself) has become Buddha ( abhisambuddha ), those will 
become Buddha also." That is the first conviction. 2) In the assembly of 
Saddharmapundarlka, the Bhagavat made a prediction (vyakarana) to the sravakas, such 
as Sariputra, predicting that they would become Buddha; cf. Saddhannapundarika, p. 65: 
bhavisyasi tvam Sariputranagate 'dhvani... samyaksambuddhah. In this way, these 
sravakas acquired the following conviction: "We and the Buddha are the same ( sama ) 


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without any difference ( advitvya )." Moreover, in this assembly there are some 
bodhisattvas who have the same names as these sravakas who receive the same 
prediction. Thus, one and the same word of the Buddha bears a twofold advantage: the 
sravakas acquire the conviction of being the same as the Buddha and the bodhisattvas 
receive the revelation of it. This is why the Buddha proclaims the single vehicle (see 
Notes). 

By virtue of metamorphoses (nirmanat). In fact, the Buddha said: "O monks, I remember 
that at one time, at many hundreds of times, I attained parinirvana by means of the 
vehicle of the sravakas" ( anekasatakrtvo 'ham sravakayanena parinirvrtah, cf. 
Sutralamkara, p. 68). Having already become Buddha, how could he again attain 
parinirvana by the sravaka vehicle? There is a hidden meaning ( samdhi ) in this phrase. It 
is in order to convert beings of the sravaka category who are to be converted 
( vineyasattva ) that the Buddha created ( nirma -) bodies and manifested a parinirvana in 
accord with the sravaka vehicle. Thus, since the sravaka vehicle and the pratyekabuddha 
vehicle are mixed with the Greater Vehicle, there is only one single vehicle. 

By virtue of preeminence (prayantat). Based on the argument of preeminence, the 
Buddha proclaims the single vehicle. Other vehicles are not absent, but there is no other 
vehicle superior to it. Alone, this single vehicle is far superior ( bahuvantaravisista ). That 
is why the Buddha proclaims the single vehicle.” (U) 


33. If the Buddhas have one and the same dharmakaya, how do we know that 
there are many Buddhas? - Here is a stanza: 

Since there are not two Buddhas in one and the same world ( dhdtu ), we 
know that there is one single Buddha. But since innumerable ( aprameya ) 
beings complete their accumulations {sambhdrd) at the same time and since 
births ( kramopapatti ) of Buddhas in succession is impossible, the plurality of 
Buddhas is affirmed. [151 b24] 


33. Comm. Bh 378a27-378bl3, bh 229a6-229b8, U 447c3-10, u 353b5-7. 


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“Now the author will explain why it must be assumed that the Buddhas are one ( eka ) and 
many ( sambahula ) at the same time, while having all the same dharmakaya. 

They are one because their dharmakaya is the same (cf. chap X, § 3, no. 3). The Buddhas 
have the same dharmakaya for self-nature ( svabhava ); and as this dharmakaya is unique, 
there is but one Buddha. Moreover, there is but one Buddha because there are never two 
Buddhas appearing simultaneously in one and the same universe (cf. below, chap. X, § 
36, no. 8). Therefore there is but one Buddha. 

In the stanza, it is shown that the Buddhas are one and many at the same time. In the 
same world, there are not two Buddhas : this phrase shows that there is one single 
Buddha. In the same universe ( lokadhatu ), two Buddhas do not appear simultaneously. 
This is why it is said that there is but one single Buddha. 

The other phrases in the stanza show that the Buddhas are many. Innumerable beings 
complete their accumulations at the same time : innumerable bodhisattvas complete their 
accumulations ( sambhara ) at the same time. If these bodhisattvas, who have completed 
their accumulations of merit and wisdom ( punyajhanasambhara ) at the same time, did 
not become Buddha at the same time, these accumulations would be vain and sterile 
(, nisphala ). But as numerous bodhisattvas finish the accumulations at the same time, it 
must be acknowledged that there are many Buddhas at the same time (cf. chap. X, § 3, 
no. 3). The arising of the Buddhas in succession is impossible : it is not possible {there is 
a line missing here at the bottom of the xerox page} we know that there is but a single 
Buddha. But since innumerable ( aprameya ) beings end their accumulations ( sambhara ) 
at the same time, and since the arising in succession ( kramopapatti ) of the Buddhas is 
impossible, the plurality of the Buddhas is asserted.” (Bh) 


34. How do we know that in the dharmakaya the Buddhas are neither absolutely 
parinirvanized (< atyantaparinirvrta ) nor absolutely non-parinirvanized 
{atyan tdparin irvrta) ? - Here is a stanza: 

Because they are free of all obstacles ( sarvavaranavinirmukta ), because their 
activity ( kriyd ) has not ended (puma), the Buddhas are absolutely nirvanized 
{atyan tan irvrta) and absolutely non-nirvanized ( atyantdnirvrta ) at one and the 
same time. [15 lb28] 


435 



34. Comm. 378b 18-26, bh 229b8-230a5, U 447c 15-20, u 353b7-354a2. 


“There are adepts of the Greater Vehicle who say that the Buddhas are absolutely non- 
parinirvanized; they are referring to the nirvana-without-residue element 
(i nirupadhisesanirvanadhatu ). Other adepts claim that the Buddhas are absolutely 
parinirvanized: they are referring to the nirvana-with-residue element ( sopadhisesa - 
nirvanadhatu ). These two opinions are inadmissible ( ayukta ). Those who reason 
correctly should say that the Buddhas are neither absolutely nirvanized nor absolutely 
non-nirvanized. Having succeeded in freeing themseves from all the obstacles, the 
Buddhas are absolutely nirvanized. Bur since the activity which they practice has not 
come to a final end (cf. chap. X, § 3, no. 4), the Buddhas are not absolutely nirvanized.” 
(U) 


35. Why is not the body of enjoyment ( sambhogakaya ) the essential body 
(s vabh dvikdya) ? - For six reasons: 

i) Because it appears ( avabhasate ) as a material body ( riipakaya ). 

ii) Because it appears differently in numberless Buddha assemblies 
( apramanabuddhaparsanmandala ). 

iii) Because by manifesting according to the aspirations (adhimukti) of 
beings, it appears with an indeterminate nature ( aniyatasvabhava ). 

iv) Because by manifesting in different ways, it appears with a changing 
nature ( calasvabhdva ). 

v) Because it appears mixed ( samsrsta ) with all kinds of assemblies {parsat ) of 
bodhisattvas, of sravakas, of devas, etc. 

vi) Because the two transformations of support ( dsraya-pardvrtti ), that of the 
store-consciousness (dlayavijndna) and that of the active consciousnesses 

( pravrttivijndna ), not being in accord ( visama ), therefore the enjoyment body 
is not the essential body. [15 lc5] 


436 



35. Comm. Bh 378c5-22, bh 230a5-230b7, U 447cl7-448al3, u 354a2-8. 


“i) Because it appears as a material body. The enjoyment body has a material 
appearance, whereas the essential body does not have a material appearance. This is why 
the enjoyment body is not the essential body. 

ii) In innumerable assemblies, the enjoyment body takes on different material 
appearances, whereas the essential body does not have such differentiations. This is why 
the enjoyment body is not the essential body. 

iii) The enjoyment body appears in accordance with the aspirations ( adhimukti ) of beings 
and is not determinate ( niyata ) by nature. One category of spectators sees the Buddha of 
enjoyment, another category sees a young man ( kumara ), a third sees a child ( daraka ), 
etc. The essential body does not have the indetenninate aspects. This is why the 
enjoyment body is not the essential body. 

iv) The enjoyment body is changeable ( cal a ) by nature and of diverse appearances. The 
same spectator first sees the enjoyment body in one aspect ( akrti ), then he sees it in 
another aspect. The essential body is unchanging in nature. This is why the enjoyment 
body is not the essential body. 

v) The enjoyment body is always mixed {sadasamsrsta) with all kinds of assemblies of 
bodhisattvas, of sravakas, devas, etc., whereas the essential body is not mixed with 
assemblies of this kind. This is why the enjoyment body is not the essential body. 

vi) We see that the transfonnations of the basis ( asrayaparavrtti ) are discordant. Indeed, 
it is by transforming the store-consciousness ( alayavijnana ) that the essential body is 
acquired, and it is by transforming the active consciousnesses (pravrttivij liana ) that the 
enjoyment body is acquired. This is why the enjoyment body is not the essential body. 

In view of these six discordances, the enjoyment body is not the essential body. (U) 


36. [Translated according to H]. Why is the apparitional body {nirmanakaya) not 
the essential body ( svabhdvika-kdya )? - For eight reasons: 


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i) It is impossible ( ayukta ) that the Bodhisattva, who, a long time ago {drat), 
acquired imperishable concentrations {acyutasamddhi), should take birth 
among the Tusitas and among humans. 

ii) It is impossible that the Bodhisattva, who, for a long time, has had the 
memory of his former abodes ( purvanivdsanusmrti ), should not know writing 
(lipi), oral arithmetic (ganana). calculation {samkhya), carving (mudra), the 
arts ( silpa ), the sciences ( sdstra ), as well as the enjoyment ( sambhoga ) of 
desirable objects {kamaguna) perfectly. 

iii) It is impossible that the Bodhisattva, who for a long time has known the 
doctrine, badly {durbhasita) proclaimed or well ( subhdsita ) proclaimed, 
should go to find the heretics {tlrthika). 

iv) It is impossible that the Bodhisattva, who for a long time has known the 
right way of the three vehicles iydnatraya), should take up the wrong practice 
of asceticism {duskaracaryd). 

v) It is impossible that the Bodhisattva, neglecting hundreds of thousands 
(koti) of Jambudvipas, should be content with one single place to reach 
enlightenment {abhisambudh-) and turn the wheel of Dharma {dharma- 
cakra). 

vi) If, without manifesting enlightenment {abhisambodhi), the Bodhisattva 
used only apparitional bodies (nirmdnkdya) to accomplish the deeds of a 
Buddha {buddhakriya) everywhere else but in Tusita, it must be that he 
would have attained enlightenment only among the Tusita gods. 

vii) Why not accept that the Buddhas are born simultaneously in all the 
Jambudvipas? There is no scriptural text (dgama) or argument (yukti ) that 
prevents that assumption. 

viii) Even if there are many simultaneous appearances ( nirmdna ) of 
Buddhas, that does not contradict the sutra (Anguttara, I, p. 27) which 
affirms that there are not two Buddhas appearing at the same time in one 
and the same world, because, in speaking of one and the same world 
{lokadhdtu), the sutra means {samgrhndti) one and the same universe-of-four- 


438 



continents ( caturdvipaka ). In the same way, two cakravartin kings do not 
appear simultaneously in one and the same world. 

Here is a stanza: 

Subtle apparitional bodies ( suksmanirmanakaya ) of numerous ( sambahula ) 
Buddhas enter into wombs ( kuksi ) simultaneously and function to illustrate 
( samdarsana ) omnigeneric enlightenment ( sarvakarabhisambodha ). 

It is in the service of all beings ( sarvasattvartha ) that the Buddha made his 
vows ( pranidhana ), devoted his efforts {yoga) and attained great 
enlightenment ( mahabodhi ). His complete parinirvana ( atyantikaparinirvana ) 
is therefore impossible ( ayukta ), for then his vows and his efforts would be 
sterile ( nisphala ). [15 lc24] 


36. Comm. Bh 379al4-389bl8, bh 230b7-231b7, U 448b4-448cl0, u 354a8-3555a8. 

“The author establishes the impossibility of the apparitional body ( nirmanakaya ) being 
identical with the essential body ( svabhavikakaya ) by means of eight reasons ( hetu ),. 

i) It is impossible that the Bodhisattva, who has acquired undying concentrations 
(acyutasamadhi) for a long time and who never regresses ( avaivartika ), should take birth 
in the desire realm ( kamadhatu ), among the Tusita gods and, even more so {prak ), among 
humans, for it is impossible that, having cultivated for ages ( kalpa ) the undying 
concentrations, he should obtain a result (i.e., an existence) in the desire realm. Thus it is 
proved ( siddha ) that the apparitional body differs from the essential body. 

ii-iv) It is impossible that the Bodhisattva who, for a long time, has the memory of his 
previous abodes ... up to ... indulges in ascetic practice. This passage is easy to 
understand and does not need further explanation. 

v) It is impossible that the Bodhisattva, neglecting hundreds of kotis of Jambudvipas, 
should utilize only one place in order to reach enlightenment and turn the wheel of the 
Dharma, because all these places are all the same. For this reason, the apparitional body 
is not the essential body. 


439 



vi) Someone may object: The Buddha avoids (li) manifesting enlightenment 
( abhisambodhi ) in the other Jambudvipas: only in our Jambudvipa does he really attain 
enlightenment; it is by means of the apparitional bodies ( nirmanakaya ) that he 
accomplishes the deeds of a Buddha ( buddhakriya ) everywhere else. - Why not assume 
that he truly attains enlightenment among the Tusita gods and that his apparitional bodies 
(i nirmanakaya ) descend into all the universes-of-four-continents ( caturdvipaka , each 
containing a Jambudvipa, ace. to Kosa, III, p. 145) in order to accomplish the deeds of a 
Buddha? 

vii) If you think that attaining enlightenment in one single Jambudvipa and manifesting 
an apparitional body elsewhere is not impossible, why was the Buddha unable to attain 
enlightenment only when he dwelt among the Tusita gods and to manifest his 
apparitional body in all the Jambudvipas of the universes-of-four-continents 
(i caturdvipaka )? If reaching enlightenment in all the caturdvlpakas indiscriminately can 
be denied, there is no scriptural text ( agama ) or argument ( yukti ) allowing the affirmation 
that there are Jambudvipas where the Buddha does not appear. 

viii) Objection. Is that is not contradictory to the sutra ( siitravirodha )? The sutra actually 
says (Anguttara, I, p. 27): It is impossible in the present or in the future that two 
Tathagatas appear in one and the same world without the one preceding and the other 
following ( atthdnam etam bhikkhave anavakaso yarn ekissa lokadhdtnyd dve tathagata 
arahanto samma sambuddha apubbarn acarimam uppajjeyum, cf. the Sanskrit in Kosa, 
III, p. 198; commentary in Kosavyakhya, p. 338). If you agree that many Buddhas appear 
simultaneously in all the Jambudvipas, you are in contradiction to the sutra. 

Answer. To refute this objection ( codyaparihara ), we say that the simultaneous existence 
of many apparitional ( nirmana ) Buddhas does not contradict the sutra according to which 
two Buddhas do not appear simultaneously in one and the same world. For this sutra, 
speaking of one and the same world ( ekissa lokadhatuya), means the same unique 
universe-of-four continents ( caturdvipa ), and not a universe-of-a-thousand-continents 
(sahasradvrpaka, or chiliocosm, containing a thousand caturdvlpas, cf. Kosa, III, p. 170). 
Indeed, this same sutra adds (Anguttara, I, p. 28) that, likewise, two cakravartin kings are 
not bom simultaneously. If you deny that many Buddhas appear simultaneously in 
different caturdvlpas, you must also deny that many cakravartins appear simultaneously 
in different caturdvlpas. But you accept that the impossibility for two cakravartins to 


440 



appear simultaneously concerns only one single caturdvTpaka and does not concern the 
sahasradvlpaka. Therefore you must also accept that the impossibility of two Buddhas 
being born simultaneously concerns only one single caturdvTpaka and does not concern 
the sahasradvTpakas. [See Notes]. Furthermore, the stanza mentions many Buddhas and 
illustrates omnigeneric enlightenment: subtle apparitional Buddha bodies, etc. Just as the 
apparitional body ( nirmdnakaya ) of the Buddha descends into the womb of his mother 
( garbhdvakranti ) and accomplishes the other deeds of the Buddha, in the same way many 
fictitious ( nirmita ) sravakas, such as Sariputra, etc., with their distinctive characteristics, 
descend into the wombs of their mothers simultaneously at the same time. It is in order to 
illustrate the superiority of this omnigeneric enlightenment ( sarvakarabhisambodha ) that 
the Buddha created these fictions (nirmdna). 

In order to show that the complete annihilation ( atyantikaparinirvana ) of the Tathagata is 
impossible, the author says: It is in the service of all beings that the Buddha made his 
vows, dedicated his efforts and attained great enlightenment. These vows (pranidhana ) 
and these efforts (prayoga) have in view only the service of all beings ( sarvasattvartha ). 
As long as this work is not completed, it is impossible that the Buddha is parinirvanized 
in complete annihilation ( atyantikaparinirvana ), for his vows and his efforts would both 
be sterile ( nisphala ). Therefore the parinirvanized Buddha is the apparitional body 
( nirmdnakmaya ) and not the essential body ( svabhavikakaya ).” (U) 


36 - 2 . [Translated ace. to P, T 1593, p. 1 32a25- 1 32b 1 6] . 

Why is the apparitional body ( nirmdnakaya ) not the essential body 
(s vdbhhdvikakdya) ? - For eight reasons: 

i) It is impossible that the Bodhisattva who, a long time ago ( drat ), has 
acquired imperishable concentrations ( acyuta-samddhi ), should take birth 
among the Tusita gods and among humans. 

ii) It is impossible that the Bodhisattva who, for a long time, has the memory 
of his former abodes ( purvanivasdnusmrti ), should no longer know writing 
(lipi), oral arithmetic ( gan and ), calculus ( samkhyd ), carving ( mudrd ), the arts 
(silpa), the sciences ( sdstra ), the practice of desirable objects ( kamaguna ) and 
the enjoyment of desirable objects. 


441 



iii) It is impossible that the Bodhisattva who, a long time ago, has learned to 
distinguish the wrong doctrine (asaddh arm a-desand) from the good doctrine 
(saddh arm adesand) , should go in search of heretics ( tlrthika ) and make them 
his teachers. 

iv) It is impossible that the Bodhisattva who, long ago, has penetrated 
( prativedha ) the value of the the noble path of the three vehicles 

( ydnatraydryamdrganaya ), should still search for his path and give himself up 
to wrong asceticism ( duskaracarya ). 

v) It is impossible that the Bodhisattva, paying no attention one hundred 
kotis of Jambudvlpas, should reach supreme enlightenment ( anuttard 
bodhih ) and turn the wheel of Dharma ( dharmacakra ) in one single place. 

vi) If, abstaining from manifesting upaya and supreme enlightenment 
( anuttard bodhih), the Bodhisattva used only one apparitional body 

( nirmanakaya ) to accomplish the deeds of a Buddha ( buddhakriyd ) elsewhere 
than in our Jambudvlpa, then he would have attained enlightenment among 
the Tusita gods. 

vii) If that were not so, if it was not in Tusita that he attained enlightenment, 
why would the Buddha not appear likewise in all the Jambudvlpas? That the 
Buddha does not appear elsewhere than in our Jambudvipa is a teaching 
showing neither scripture (again a) nor reasoning (yukti ). 

viii) Someone may object: In your hypothesis, two Tathagatas appear 
simultaneously in the same world (lokadhdtu). This is not contradictory, if 
one accepts that there are many apparitional bodies (nirmanakaya), that they 
make up a plurality. 

When we speak of the same world, this concerns one and the same universe- 
of-four-continents (caturdvTpa). This is why two cakravartin kings cannot be 
born, either one or the other, simultaneously in the same world. It is the 
same for the Buddhas. 

Here is a stanza: 


442 



Subtle apparitional Buddha bodies penetrate many wombs in the same way. 
In order to manifest omnigeneric enlightenment ( sarvakarabhisambodha ), 
they manifest in the world. 


36 - 2. Comm. Taisho 1595, p. 267c9-268cl2. 

There are eight reasons proving the difference between the apparitional body and the 
essential body: 

i) From the first bhumi up to the tenth bhumi, during thirty-three incalculable periods 
(i asamkhyeya , chap. V, § 6), the Bodhisattva has acquired five hundred imperishable 
concentrations ( acyutasamadhi ). Long ago, he has abandoned the threefold world 
( traidhatuka ) of desire. It is impossible that he should be reborn in a divine destiny and, a 
fortiori, among humans in the royal family of the Sakyas. In order to convert beings, he 
seems to take on a human body, but there is no reason that this body exists truly in the 
world. Therefore it is not a body of retribution ( vipakakaya ) nor an essential body 
(, nirmanakaya ): it is an apparitional body ( nirmanakaya ). 

ii) From the first bhumi up to the tenth bhumi, the Bodhisattva. For a long time, has kept 
the memory of his former dwellings ( purvanivasa ) and does not lose the memory of 
innumerable arts ( apramanakala ) that he has previously cultivated: the different writings 
(lipi) current in the sixty-four lands (cf. Lalitavistara, chap. X, p. 125-126); the sixteen 
mental calculations ( ganana ): addition, subtraction, etc.; beyond the sixteen mental 
calculations, the science of the exact numbers ( samkhya ) of objects making up a heap, 
and the science of the exact dimenion ( pramana ) of heaps; the art of marking objects 
with a seal ( mudra ) in order to distinguish them; the power of increasing or decreasing; 
the art of guarding or directing (?); the sixty-four arts ( kala ); the eighteen vidyasthanas 
(cf. Mahavyut., 4954-4971); the sixty-four royal arts (kala), tactics ands stratagems; 
acquiring that which has not yet been acquired, increasing what has been acquired and 
distributing what has been increased to honest people. The practice of desirable objects 
refers to the six objects. Thus, the use of singers and dancers, collectors, tailors, 
apothecaries, etc., is called enjoyment of desirable objects. [On the enumeration of lipi- 
ganand-samkhyd-mudrd, etc., cf. Majjhima, I, p. 85; Milinda, p. 78; Mahavyut., 4974; 
Divya, p. 3, 26, etc.; Mahavastu, II, p. 423; Lalitav., p. 156; Kosa, IV, p. 254] For 


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innumerable periods ( kalpa ), the Bodhisattva remembers all the arts that he had 
cultivated in his previous abodes; his memory is unfailing. It is impossible that he should 
not know or not remember all these arts that he once practiced. In order to convert 
beings, he declares that people of inferior category can change and become people of 
higher category; he shows himself as not having these arts and as having to develop 
them. That is why his body is an apparitional body ( nirmanakaya ) and not an essential 
body ( svabhavikakaya ) or a body of enjoyment (sain bhogakava ) . 

iii) For thirty-three incalculable great periods (kalpasamkhyeya), the Bodhisattva 
cultivated the good practices zealously; his merits ( punya ) and his knowledge (jiiana ) are 
complete (paripurna). It is impossible that, in his subsequent existences, he should not 
know how to tell the difference between bad and good preaching. If he were lacking this 
knowledge, what dhanna would he know once he became Buddha? It is in order to 
convert the heretics that he manifests such hesitations in choice of doctrine. This is why 
his body is an apparitional body and not one or other of the two other types. 

iv) For thirty-three incalculable periods, the Bodhisattva sojourned in the ten liberations 
(vimoksa) and the ten good practices ( catya ). From the first bhumi, he has penetrated 
( pratividh -) the value of the noble path of the three vehicles (yanatrayaryamarganaya ). 
Having cut through belief in nihilism and eternalism ( ucchedasasvatagraha ), he does not 
give himself up to bad painful and pleasureable practices: that is the value of the noble 
path of the first two vehicles. Rejecting belief in the existence of the conditioned 
(samskaragraha), he cultivates the good practice of knowledge free of concept 
(nirvikalpakajnana): that is the value of the noble path of the bodhisattvas. The 
asceticism ( duskaracarya ) of the heretics ( tirthika ) can destroy the dharmas already 
obtained ( prapta ), it cannot acquire dharmas not yet obtained ( aprapta ). In the two 
worlds (?), it can only destroy and not increase anything; that is why it is futile. It is 
impossible that the Bodhisattva should practice it. It is in order to convert beings that he 
stated the cultivation of asceticism; it is not for retribution that he appears to practice it. 
That is why his body is an apparitional body and not either of the other two bodies. 

v) When the Bodhisattva is cultivating the path throughout 10,000 kotis of JambudvTpas, 
he ripens beings of 10.000 kotis of JambudvTpas. When he attains enlightenment, it must 
be that he assumes bodies everywhere. But he receives only one single body, a body of 
retribution ( vipakakaya ) and cannot have many of them. If that were so, why would he 


444 



not assume a retribution body separately in a higher place, in all places accomplishing his 
work of conversion by means of apparitional bodies ( nirmanakmaya )? It is impossible 
that he would give up 10,000 kotis of JambudvTpas and accomplish enlightenment 
( sambodhi ) and the turning of the wheel of Dharma ( dharmacakrapra vartana) only 
partially in one single Jambudvlpa. It is in order to convert beings and bring them the 
knowlege that a Buddha has appeared in the world that he manifests all these activities, 
such as bodhi under the banyan tree, preaching in India, etc. This is why this body of the 
’historical’ Buddha is an apparitional body ( nirmanakaya ) and not one or other of the two 
other bodies. 

vi) If you maintain that he attains supreme enlightenment ( anuttara bodhih ) in only one 
single Jambudvlpa and that elsewhere he abstains from such upayas as entering the womb 
( garbhavakranti ), etc., and only manifests apparitional bodies ( nirmanakaya ) in order to 
accomplish the deeds of a Buddha ( buddhakriyd ), why do you not maintain that a 
Bodhisattva, as you represent him here, attains supreme enlightenment in Tusita and not 
under the banyan tree, in one single Jambudvlpa, and that everywhere else, he is content 
with manifesting apparitional bodies in order to accomplish the deeds of a Buddha? This 
body, that of Sakyamuni of our Jambudvlpa, would then not be an apparaitional body 
according to you. 

Cf. Taisho 1596, p. 320b5: If you say that he attains enlightenment in only one single 
place [in our Jambudvlpa], and that everywhere else he is content to manifest apparitional 
bodies with their entourage ( parivara ), why would it not have been among the Tusitas 
that he would have attained enlightnment, being content with manifesting apparitional 
bodies in all the universes-of-four-continents? 

[P. Demieville: Evidently here the author is addressing himself to the school that does 
accept the doctrine of the nirmana body but does not accept that the ’historical’ 
Sakyamuni was one. And the author seeks to win them over by saying: ‘Then it should be 
easy for you to accept that he was already Buddha in Tusita’, i.e., outside the dvTpas and 
that in India there was but one nirmana.] 

vii) If it was not in the Tusita heaven that he attained enlightenment, then he must attain 
it everywhere ... There is neither scripture ( agama ) nor reasoning that can demonstrate 
the doctrine that he attained it in one single place, i.e., in one single Jambudvlpa. 


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Therefore this body, i.e., the Sakyamuni of our Jambudvipa, is an apparitional body and 
not one or the other of the two other bodies. 

[P. Demieville: It is a fact that the Buddhas are many, as we will establish in the eighth 
reason. Thus, if you do not accept that these multiple Buddhas are all nirmanas of a 
transcendent Buddha who has 'really' attained bodhi, then there is only one possibility: it 
is that the attaining of bodhi is itself only ninnana and is produced everywhere by 
ninnana: which is what we maintain from our side. - We are going to show that it is 
inadmissible that the Buddha is realized in one single Jambudvipa, which is in no way 
established even by tradition; then one of two things: either the Buddha of our single 
Jambudvipa was already Buddha in heaven - then he is just one kind of ninnana of his 
antecedent in Tusita - and it is from him all the other Buddhas emanate by ninnana; or 
else this Buddha of our Jambudvipa, like all the others, is quite simply emanated by his 
other two bodies.] 

Dh, Taisho 1596, p. 320a 16: Why not accept that the Buddhas appear likewise [ace. to 
Huian-tsang: simultaneously] in all the Jambudvlpas? Neither scripture nor reasoning can 
demonstrate that this is not so. - Comm., p. 320b8: If you say that he did not attain 
enlightenment in all the universes-of-four-continents (< caturdvipa ), that is impossible, for 
there is neither scripture nor reasoning that are opposed to it. 

viii) “In one single sahaloka, two Tathagatas appear simultaneously.” This scriptural text 
is not contradictory to our doctrine. Why? Because it is acknowledged that the 
apparitional bodies ( nirmanakaya ) consist of a plurality. That these apparitional bodies 
are many, that there are apparitional bodies everywhere, there is nothing impossible 
there. That is why this body is an apparitional body and not one or other of the two other 
bodies. - Thus we are able to prove that you are in contradiction with the sutra if you say 
that the Buddha is not seen in a single one of hundreds of kotis of universes. There are 
some who say that two Buddhas cannot be born simultaneously in one single great 
trichiliocosm ( mahatrisahasralokadhatu ) and that it is the same for the cakravartin kings. 
But you must interpret this sutra in the light of the case of the cakravartin kings. Two 
cakravartin kings cannot be bom simultaneously in one and the same universe, but there 
is nothing preventing them being born in different universes. It is the same for the 
Tathagatas. 


446 



Explanation of the stanza: The Buddha descends from the Tusita heaven in Jambudvipa 
in order to be conceived there. At this moment, he creates all his disciples by nirmana, 
Sariputra, etc., who are conceived. Thanks to this creation, supreme enlightenment 
(< anuttara bodhih ) with its signs ( Sahara ) can be manifested: if there were only the two 
lower vehicles, it would be impossible to show that the Buddha is superior. If there were 
only the superficial and narrow knowledge of these two vehicles, it would be impossible 
to show that the wisdom of the Buddha is endowed with all the signs ( sakara ). The 
Active bodies of Sariputra, etc., appear in the world in order to show that. 


37, Since the enjoyment body ( sanibhogakmaya ) and the apparitional body 
( nirmdnakdya ) are both transitory (unity a), how can the sutra say the the body of 
the Tathagata (tathdgatakdyd) is eternal ( nitya )? - Because the resultant body 
(nisyandakaya = sambhogakaya) and the apparitional body both depend on the 
eternal dharmakaya. Since the enjoyment (sambhoga) is never interrupted 
(samucchinna) and appearances ( nirmana ) are always re-occuring, we know that 
the body of the Tathagata is eternal. Compare the phrase: it always experiences 
happiness ( sadd sukham anubhavati ), and the phrase: it always nourishes (sadd 
pindam prayacchati). [15 lc29] 


37. Comm. Bh 379b24-379c4. bh 231b7-232a5, U 448cl5-28, u 355a8-355b7. 

“A sutra says: The body of the Tathagata (tathagatakaya) is eternal (nitya). But the 
enjoyment body (sambhogakaya) and the apparitional body (nirmdnakdya) of the Buddha 
are transitory (anitya). Then how can the body of the Tathagata be eternal? - Although 
these two bodies in question are transitory, they depend (nisrita) on the dharmakaya and, 
as the dharmakaya is eternal, they also are proclaimed to be eternal. An ’eternal body' is 
eternal by its nature (svabhavanitya) or eternal by means of its basis (asray anitya). This 
shows that the resultant body (nisyandakaya = sambhogakaya) and the apparitional body 
are eternal by equivalence (paryayena ) and not eternal by nature (svabhavatah). 

In regard to the enjoyment body, the enjoyment is never interrupted; compare the phrase: 
it always experiences happiness. In a similar way, people (loka) say about X: he always 
experiences happiness (sadd sukham upabhunakti). Although the happiness experienced 


447 



by X is neither eternal ( nitya ) nor uninterrupted ( asamucchinna ), it is said, nevertheless, 
that he always experiences happiness. It is the same for the enjoyment body of the 
Buddha: although it is not eternal, it is sometimes proclaimed to be eternal because, in 
the various assemblies of bodhisattvas, he experiences ( upabhunakti ) the great bliss of 
the Dharma ( mahadharmasukha ) uninterruptedly. The apparitional body of the Buddhas 
appears many times ( abhiksnam ) without ever being interrupted: it is from this special 
point of view ( tenabhiprayena ) that it is proclaimed to be eternal. Compare the phrase: 
he always gives food. Here, people say about X: he always gives food (sadd pindam 
prayacchati) even though X does not give food uninterruptedly. However, as he gives 
many times ( abhiksnam ) and his generous intention persists, it is said that he always 
gives food. It is the same for the apparitional body of the Buddha. If it is proclaimed to be 
eternal, it is not that it is without birth ( utpada ) or destruction ( nirodha ) but because it 
appears many times for the benefit of beings to tbe converted ( anivuneyasattvan ) without 
ever stopping. It is in this sense ( abhipraya ) that it is proclaimed eternal.” (U) 


38. [Translated according to H]. The apparitional body ( nirmanakaya ) of the 
Buddha does not last eternally ( atyantam ) for six reasons ( hetu ): 

i) because its activity ( kriya ) ends (paripurna ) when he has liberated ( vimuc -) 
the beings destined to be ripened (paripdcyasattva ). 

ii) to prevent ( nirdkr -) the rejecting of nirvana under the pretext of seeking 
( paryes -) the eternal body ( nityakdya ) of the Tathagata. 

iii) to prevent one fromn despising ( avajhd ) the Buddhas and so that one 
becomes attached to understanding ( avabudh -) the exposition of the profound 
Dharma (gambhiradharmadesand ). 

iv) in order to arouse interest ( autsukya ) with regard to the Buddha. He is 
afraid that actually those who see him continually might feel disdain 

( vimdnana ) for him. 

v) in order to stimulate the individual's energy {pratydtma-vlryd) among 
beings. In this way they know that the teacher of the Dharma ( sastr ) of the 
Dharma is difficult ( durlabha ) to find. 


448 



vi) in order that beings ripen (paripac -) quickly ( sigram ) by not giving up the 
yoke ( dhura ) of their personal energy ( svdvlrya ). 

Here are two stanzas: 

a. Because his activity ( kriya ) is complete (paripurna ), in order to prevent 
rejection of nirvana, in order to prevent disdain (avajhd) for the Buddhas, in 
order to stimulate interest ( autsukya ) in regard to the Buddha, 

b. in order to stimulate the personal energy ( pratyatmavlrya ) of beings and in 
order to ripen them {paripac -) quickly (sigram), the apparitional body of the 
Buddha is not present definitively ( atyantikam ). [152al 1] 


38. Comm. Bh 379cl7-18, bh silent, U 449al2-29, u 355b7-356a6. 

“i) Because his activity is complete when he has delivered beings destined to be ripened. 
[This reason is not commented on; see § 38-2] 

ii) In order to prevent the rejection of nirvana under the pretext of seeking the eternal 
body of the Tathagata. This explains why the Tathagata enters into nirvana. It is because 
the body of the Tathagata is transitory ( anitya ) that one desires nirvana. If one were 
looking for ( paryes -) the eternal body of the Tathagata, one would turn one’s back 
( prsthibhu -) on nirvana. But the Bhagavat seems to be annihilated ( nirudh -) and 
manifests a transitory body in order that one may desire an absolute ( atyantika ) and in 
order that eternal ( nitya ) nirvana be sought. 

iii) In order to prevent disdain for the Buddhas and in order that one becomes attached 
to understanding the exposition of the profound Dharma. If the apparitional body of the 
Buddha were eternal, beings would not use the means ( upaya ) to understand ( avabudh -) 
his exposition of the profound Dhanna ( gambhiradharmadesana ); they would say: "We 
don’t understand it now, but surely we will understand it later." If the Buddha continually 
questioned his listeners ( sravakas j, thay would answer scornfully ( avajhd ) and, being 
attached to their own views ( drsti ), they would say: "We challenge the question for such 
and such a reason." But if they knew that that the Buddha was going to leave the world, 
to what would they direct their scorn? They would agree to say: "We do not know this 
truth and, when the Buddha will be nirvanized, who else could explain it to us without 


449 



error ( viparyasa )?" This is why they exert themselves to understand the Dharma that the 
Buddha proclaims to them before he enters into nirvana. 

iv) In order to arouse interest with regard to the Buddha. This reason is not explained; 
see § 38-2. 

v) In order to stimulate personal energy in beings. In this way they know that the 
Dharma is hard to find. When they know that the Bhagavat is going to enter into nirvana, 
they personally ( pratyatmam ) exert their energy ( virya ). The Buddha is the master who 
teaches the Dharma in the world; when he is no longer there, the world is without 
support. Knowing that, they exert their energy. 

vi) In order that beings ripen quickly by not rejecting the yoke of personal exertion. In 
order that they exert their energy and avoid rejecting ( niksip -) the good yoke 
( kusaladhura ) by saying: "Our roots of good ( kusalamula ) will ripen inevitably as long as 
the Bhagavat has not been annihilated ( niruddha )." 

For these six reasons, the apparitional body of the Buddha does not last eternally. In 
order to summarize the ideas explained above, the author says the stanzas: Because his 
activity, etc.” (U) 


38 - 2 . [Translated according to P, T 1593, p. 132b 17-29]. 

There are six reasons why the Buddha Bhagavats do not dwell eternally as 
nirmanakaya: 

i) Because their activity ( kriyd ) is complete (paripurna) when they have 
delivered ( vimuc -) beings who are already ripened (paripakvasattva ). 

ii) When they have obtained deliverance ( vimukti ), beings seek (paryesante) 
parinirvana. But the Buddha wants them to reject the idea of parinirvana 
and to seek to attain the eternal body of the Buddha ( nityabuddhakaya ). 

iii) In order to remove any erroneous thought ( avajhdcitta ) they may have 
with regard to the Buddhas and in order to lead them to penetrate 

( pratividh -) the profound (gambhira ) tathatadharma and the 
subasitadharma. 


450 



iv) In order that these beings experience feelings of interest ( autsukyacitta ) 
towards the body of the Buddha and not be satisfied ( samtusti ) by seeing him 
continually . 

v) In order that these beings exert their energy ( vlrya ) personally 

( pratyatmam ) by knowing that the teacher of the Dharma ( sdstr ) is going to 
disappear. 

vi) In order that these beings quickly reach the ripened state 

( paripakavastha ) by preventing them from abandoning the energy the yoke of 
which they bear. 

Here are some stanzas: [cf. above, § 38], 


38 - 2. Comm. Taisho 1595, p. 268cl3-269al7. 

“There are six reasons why the Buddha must abandon his nirmanakaya: 

i) When the activity of the nirmanakaya of the Tathagata has come to an end, this 
nirmanakaya does not exist any longer. Ripening beings and making them obtain 
deliverance ( vimukti ) is the activity of the nirmanakaya. When all beings are ripened and 
delivererd, this activity is finished. 

ii) When beings are liberated from the obstacle of the afflictions ( klesavarana ) they seek 
nirupadhisesanirvana. In order to change this mentality and demonstrate that the 
nirmanakaya is without reality ( asadbhuta ), the Buddha abandons his nirmanakaya. He 
teaches the distinct existence of an eternal dharmakaya which itself is truly existent 
( paramarthasat ). In order that beings stop pursuing the idea of the nirupadhisesanirvana 
of the lesser vehicle and in order that they seek the eternal dharmakaya, the nirmanakaya 
does not last eternally. 

iii) When beings take note of the fact that the Buddha, like themselves, is subject to birth 
(jati), old age (jam ), sickness ( yyadhi ) and death ( marana ), they conceive scorn ( avajna ) 
for the Tathagata. But the Buddha wants these beings to recognize the true body 
( paramarthakaya ) of the Tathagata and his false body (samvrtikaya). The true body is the 
body of the Tathagata and the body of the good preaching ( subhasitakaya ). The good 
body of preaching is the result that accords with the body of the Tathagata and is called 


451 



the subhasitakaya. These two bodies are called dharmakaya. This Dharma is very 
profound ( atigambhira ) and hard to penetrate ( pratividh -); it is not graspable by people 
of lower category. But those who have penetrated it conceive profound respect for the 
Tathagata. The false body ( samvrtikaya ) is the nirmanakaya. In order to show that this 
body is imaginary ( parikalpita ) and without true reality ( asadbhuta ), the nirmanakaya 
does not last eternally. 

iv) If the Buddha remained always in one single nirmanakaya, the beings who would see 
him for the first time would feel interest ( autsukya ), but then, after a while, they would 
experience satiety. But if the nirmanakaya undergoes all kinds of wondrous 
transfonnations ( adbhutaparinama ) in its color and shape ( rupasamsthana ), the beings 
who see him continually feel ever a new interest and ignore their satiety. This is why the 
nirmanakaya does not last eternally. 

v) If the Buddha always remained as nirmanakaya, beings would not bother themselves 
with him. Also the Tathagata abandons his mirmanakaya in order that, knowing that the 
Buddha will not be in the world for a long time, beings will make an effort and train 
rhemselves without depending on someone else ... This is why the nirmanakaya does not 
last eternally. 

vi) We have just shown how beings who have not developed effort are led to develop it. 
Now it will be shown how those who already have developed effort do not abandon it. By 
developing the wisdom of concentration ( samadhiprajfia ), perfection is soon reached 
(sampad). This is why the nirmanakaya does not last eternally.” (P) 


39. [According to H]: 

Objection : The dharmakaya of the Buddhas is without beginning 
( anddhikalika ), is homogeneous ( nirvisista ) and infinite ( aprameya ); therefore 
it is not necessary to acquire ( adhigam -) it to make efforts ( prayatna ). 

Answer : Here is a stanza: 

If the state of Buddha ( buddhaldbha ) which is homogeneous ( nirvisista ) and 
infinite ( aprameya ) caused beings to neglect the efforts necessary to obtain it, 


452 



this state of Buddha ( buddhalabha ) would be always acquired without cause. 
But to remove such a cause is not permissible. [152a 15] 

The Mahayanasamgraha, the work of master Asanga, is now completed. 


39. Comm. Bh 379c23-380al2, bh 232a5-232b5, U 449b5-16, u 356a6-356b7. 

“An objection is raised here: The dharmakaya of the Buddhas is without beginning 
(anadhikalika), is homogeneous ( nirvisista ) and infinite ( aprameya ); it is the cause of 
obtaining ( adhigamahetu ) buddhahood. Why should an effort be made to seek this 
buddhahood (fo kouo = buddhatd )? - There is yet another objection: The dharmakaya is 
without beginning, is homogeneous and infinite; one single Buddha suffices to assure the 
service of all beings ( sarvasattvarthaktiya ); thus it is unnecessary to exert oneself to 
become Buddha. 

In order to refute these objections ( codyaparihara ), the author says: If the state of 
Buddha, etc.: if the state of Buddha ( buddhadhigama ), without beginning, homogeneous 
and infinite, caused beings to neglect the efforts necessary to obtain buddhahood 
(buddhatd), this state of Buddha would always be acquired without cause. But since the 
state of Buddha does not cause beings to neglect the efforts necessary to obtain 
buddhahood, the objection does not hold. If one could attain buddhahood without effort, 
all beings would have attained it right from the beginning. This is why it is not permitted 
to suppress the cause, i.e., the necessity of effort. - Moreover, the dharmadhatu of the 
Buddhas, without beginning, homogeneous and infinite, was originally the cause for 
everyone to acquire buddhahood and it led the bodhisattvas, whose minds were full of 
compassionate resolve ( karunapranidhanapariksiptacitta ) to seek buddhahood zealously. 
These bodhisattvas sought buddhahood and used their efforts to ensure the service of all 
beings (. sarvasattvarthakriya ).” (U) 


453 



NOTES 


The bibliography on the three bodies of the Buddha is immense; a mass of infonnation 
(sources and works) may be found in Hobogirin, under Busshin, p. 174-185; Siddhi, 
Appendix III, p. 762-813. 

There are many similarities between the present chapter and the 
Abhisamayalamkaraloka, chap. XXIX. 

On the buddhology of the Vijnaptimatra school (Saramati, Asanga, Vasubandhu, 
Bandhuprabha) see especially: Uttaratantra, p. 240-288; Sutralamkara, IX, 60-66; 
Samgraha, chap. X; Prajnaparamita-sutrasastra, T 1510, k. Ill, p. 792; 
Saddharmapundankopadesa, T 1520, p. 18c3 (three bodhis); Dasabhumikasutrasastra, T 
1522, k. II, p. 130c seq.; Buddhabhumisutrasastra,T 1530, k. VI